Capital transnational et transformations des élites
Colloque de l'Université de Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne
4–5 juin 2014

`

Sous la direction de
Bertrand Réau, MCF, CESSP, Université de Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne
Mikael Palme, SEC, Uppsala University

Publication en ligne, édition préliminare, 6 juin 2015

Centre européen de sociologie et de science politique (CESSP),
l'Université Paris-Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS/EHESS/
www.cessp.cnrs.fr

Sociology of Education and Culture (SEC),
Uppsala University
www.skeptron.uu.se/broady/sec/

Capital transnational et transformations des élites
Colloque de l'Université de Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne, 4–5 juin 2014

Éd. Bertrand Réau & Mikael Palme

Centre européen de sociologie et de science politique de la Sorbonne (CESSP),
l'Université Paris-Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS/EHESS/
Sociology of Education and Culture (SEC), Uppsala University

1re édition, Paris/Uppsala, 6 juin 2015

ISBN 978-91-86701-05-5

Table de matières

Introduction – Introduction in English – Programme du colloque – Liste des participants..... 5

The Valorisation of 'the International' in the Elite Segment of Swedish Upper Secondary Education – MIKAEL PALME, SEC, Uppsala University 13

La *diversité culturelle* : de la défense d'une cause à la construction d'un *capital symbolique transnational* – MAURICIO BUSTAMANTE & CONSTANZA SYMMES, Universidad Internacional del Ecuador et l'EHESS-CESSP 33

Performing Politics, Producing Privilege: Student Formation at an Internationally Oriented Swedish Upper Secondary School – MARIA TÖRNQVIST, SEC, Uppsala University 51

The interplay between national and transnational capital in the education of the Irish elites – ALINE COURTOIS, Université de Paris 1 77

Des investissements internationaux incertains. Les étudiants mexicains en gestion ou en science politique dans les grandes écoles françaises – ANNE CATHERINE WAGNER & DOMINGO GARCIA GARZA 91

Preparing for Transnational Power? The Existence and Efficiency of "Transnational Capital" in French Preparatory Schools – MURIEL DARMON, CNRS-EHESS-Paris I 117

Le cosmopolitisme tourné vers l'intérieur : une stratégie de distinction d'élites brésiliennes – ELISA KLÜGER, Universidade de São Paolo 127

The Field of the Business Elite in the Netherlands, 1976 and 2009 – ROB TIMANS, Erasmus Centre for Economic Sociology (ECES), Erasmus University 141

International dimensions of political position-takings among Swedish upper secondary students. Education, social class and place. – YLVA BERGSTRÖM, SEC, Uppsala University 193

L'internationalisation de la formation des élites, le cas des grandes écoles d'ingénieurs françaises – ADRIEN DELESPIERRE, Université de Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne 221

Transnational capital and transformation of the elites. La revue *Algérie Littérature/ Action*: fragilité d'un capital transnational entre l'Algérie et la France pendant la « décennie noire ». – TRISTIAN LEPERLIER, EHESS - CESSP 233

Introduction – Introduction in English – Programme du colloque – Liste des participants

Réseau de recherche en sciences sociales - Journées d'études

Capital transnational et transformations des élites

4 et 5 juin 2014
Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne-CESSP et SEC, Uppsala University

Les textes présents dans ce dossier constituent une partie des contributions du colloque sur le capital transnational et la transformation des élites qui s'est déroulé à l'université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, les 4 et 5 juin 2014. Il s'agit de texte en construction et non pas d'articles finalises. Pour certains, les auteurs ont mentionné qu'ils ne souhaitent pas que leurs textes soient cités en l'état actuel. Le programme complet du colloque se trouve à la fin du texte introductif.

En de multiples sens, les processus contemporains de mondialisation affaiblissent voire dissolvent les frontières nationales. Ainsi les actifs des marchés financiers globaux peuvent être transférés en moins d'un dixième de seconde d'une banque à une autre, d'un pays à un autre, certaines grandes entreprises organisent leur production à l'échelle mondiale et proposant des carrières professionnelles qui transcendent les frontières nationales, les marchés de consommation deviennent de plus en plus globaux, affectant à la fois les cultures, les langues et les modes de vies par-delà les frontières. Dans le domaine de l'éducation, les instances supranationales telles que la Banque Mondiale, l'Union Européenne ou l'OCDE, recourant à de nouveaux modèles gestionnaires et organisationnels, sont devenus de puissants acteurs dans la restructuration des systèmes éducatifs nationaux. Le processus de Bologne est exemplaire à cet égard. Avec pour ambitions de faire de l'Europe un espace commun d'enseignement supérieur et de faciliter les migrations internationales d'étudiants, d'enseignants et d'universitaires, il constitue une vaste entreprise de rationalisation des institutions nationales d'enseignement supérieur.

Avec l'émergence de ces espaces sociaux transnationaux, des formes transnationales de biens symboliques se développent, ce qui conduit à définir une nouvelle espèce de capital, transnational. Les diplômes scolaires orientés vers l'international, comme le Baccalauréat International ou les Masters in Business Administration, les compétences linguistiques, la

connaissance du paysage institutionnel et organisationnel qui encadre les relations entre pays, ou encore une certaine familiarité avec des formes culturelles mondialement partagées en sont des éléments constitutifs. C'est sur l'analyse de ce capital et de ses effets que porteront les journées d'études.

Comment se transforment les conditions d'accès aux positions d'élites dans ce processus de transnationalisation? Les biens symboliques qui transcendent les frontières nationales ne sont pas une nouveauté historique. Bien au contraire, chez les élites traditionnelles, dans l'aristocratie ou la grande bourgeoisie, les ressources internationales ont traditionnellement occupé une grande place parmi les ressources privilégiées sur lesquels leurs positions ont pu reposer. Les Etats-Nations conservent en outre un rôle crucial dans la consolidation de positions depuis lesquelles des ressources transnationales sont acquises ; les individus, groupes sociaux et institutions qui détiennent le plus de capitaux symboliques nationalement reconnus sont aussi en position dominante dans la compétition pour le capital transnational. Les conversions de capital peuvent se produire dans les deux directions : tandis que les ressources construites à l'échelle nationale sont souvent une condition préalable à l'accumulation de capitaux reconnus sur les marchés transnationaux, les ressources accumulées sur les marchés transnationaux peuvent être mis à profit dans la compétition pour des positions sociales nationales. L'analyse de ces jeux doit prendre en compte les types de légitimités spécifiques à chaque champ social, en d'autres termes, le type particulier de capital symbolique en jeu. Ainsi, les capitaux symboliques transnationaux peuvent avoir des composantes communes, telles que la maîtrise de la langue anglaise ou une connaissance générale de l'état du monde, mais ils prennent aussi d'autres formes, adaptées aux croyances sur lesquelles des champs sociaux particuliers s'appuient. Ces capitaux transnationaux ne sont pas de même type et n'ont pas la même valeur, par exemple, dans le champ littéraire, le champ des sciences sociales, le champ de la finance internationale, ou encore dans le champ émergent des organisations politiques et administratives transnationales.

L'objectif de ces journées d'études est d'interroger la production, l'accumulation et la circulation du capital transnational selon les groupes sociaux, institutions et champs (économiques, éducatifs ou culturels). Une attention particulière sera portée à la relation entre d'un côté, les structures et les pratiques qui s'appuient sur des formes transnationales de capital et de l'autre, aux systèmes et pratiques nationalement situées qui produisent des ressources similaires mais liées à l'Etat Nation. Les processus de globalisation et d'internationalisation seront analysés à la fois comme des enjeux et comme des conséquences de stratégies doublement situées, dans des espaces sociaux nationaux et transnationaux. Comment de tels enjeux et stratégies se déploient-ils dans des contextes historiques spécifiques?

Ancrées dans les sciences humaines et sociales, principalement la sociologie et l'histoire, ces journées mettront l'accent sur quelques domaines de prédilection des recherches en cours des participants : éducation secondaire et enseignement supérieur, stratégies transnationales des groupes sociaux, et en particulier des élites, mobilité et accumulation de ressources symboliques transnationales.

Comité d'organisation

Bertrand Réau, MCF, CESSP, Université de Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne
Anne-Catherine Wagner, PU, CESSP, Université de Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne
Mikael Palme, SEC, Uppsala University
Mikael Börjesson, SEC, Uppsala University

Avec l'assistance de
Caroline Bertron, doctorante, Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne
Adrien Delespierre, doctorant, Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne

Transnational capital and Transformation of the elite
4th and 5th June 2014

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
12, place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris,
Salle 216

Time distribution during the sessions
Discussant: 20-25 minutes
Presenter's individual response : 10 minutes
Collective discussion: 45 minutes

Mercredi 4 juin

9H : ACCUEIL DES PARTICIPANTS (CAFE)

***

10H-12H **REPRESENTATIONS DE L'INTERNATIONAL/REPRESENTING INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENA**
Discussant : Muriel DARMON, CESSP – CNRS

Mikael PALME, Uppsala University
La lutte sur l'international. Enjeux et stratégies institutionnelles dans le champ de l'enseignement secondaire dans la région de Stockholm/The Struggle for the International and Institutional Strategies in the field of Upper secondary Education in Stockholm

Mauricio BUSTAMANTE, CESSP – EHESS
La diversité culturelle *: de la défense d'une cause à la construction d'un capital symbolique transnational*

Maria TORNQVIST, Uppsala University – Departement of Education
Global ethos and the production of privilege: student formation at an internationally oriented Swedish Upper Secondary

***

12H-14H DEJEUNER (CLUB DES ENSEIGNANTS, SORBONNE)

***

14H00-16H00 **ECOLES D'ELITE ET SOCIALISATION INTERNATIONALE/ ELITE SCHOOLS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION**
Discussant : **Gisèle SAPIRO,** CESSP-EHESS

Aline COURTOIS, University College Dublin
The interplay between national and transnational capital in the education of Irish elites.

Ciaran O'NEILL, Trinity College
European elites and the "international school" in the 19th century.

Caroline BERTRON, CESSP – Université Paris 1
Construction d'un objet de recherche. Capital transnational, capitaux transnationaux : Les pensionnats suisses aux frontières entre migration et éducation des classes dominantes.

Claire MAXWELL, Institute of Education – University of London
Creating cosmopolitan subjects – the role of families and elite schools in England.

***

16H-16H30 PAUSE CAFE

***

16H30-18H30 **CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL**
Discussant : Sébastien ROUX, CESSP - CNRS

Anne Catherine WAGNER, CESSP – Université Paris 1 et Domingo GARCIA, Université Lille 3
Des investissements internationaux incertains. Les étudiants mexicains en gestion ou en science politique dans les grandes écoles françaises.

Mikael BÖRJESSON et Donald BROADY, Uppsala University
L'espace des étudiants internationaux/ The global space of international students.

Muriel DARMON, CESSP – CNRS
Preparing for transnational power? Existence and efficiency of "international capital" in French elite schools (classes préparatoires économiques).

Lucile DUMONT, CESSP – EHESS
Accumulation and circulation of transnational capital in French literary studies in the 1960s: a case study of the "Nouvelle Critique". Internationalization dynamics caught between the academic and the literary fields.

***

20H DINER (RESTAURANT LE PROCOPE, 13 rue de l'Ancienne Comédie, 75006 Paris)

***

Jeudi 5 juin

9H30 : ACCUEIL (CAFE)

10H-12H30 **ELITE AU POUVOIR /THE POWER ELITE**
Discussant : **François DENORD,** CESSP – CNRS

Yves DEZALAY, CESSP
Reproduction internationale des élites et des savoirs d'Etat: complémentarité et contradictions d'une scolarisation des héritiers.

Didier GEORGAKAKIS, CESSP – Université Paris 1
How EU civil servants loose their sacred part and became casual international managers? Notes on the dedifferentiation of an international capital.

Elisa KLUGER Université Sao Paulo
Le cosmopolitisme tourné vers l'intérieur : une stratégie de distinction d'élites brésiliennes.

Felix BÜHLMANN et Thierry ROSSIER, Université de Lausanne
The Reconfiguration of Swiss Academic Elites: Between National and Cosmopolitan Capital/ Internationalisation des élites académiques suisses au XXè siècle: convergences et contrastes.

Rob TIMANS, Erasmus University Rotterdam
The field of the Dutch Corporate Elite 1976 - 2009

***

12H30-14H DEJEUNER (SORBONNE, SALLE F608)

***

14H-16H **INSTITUTIONS ET LUTTES INTERNATIONALES/INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLES**
Discussant : Jean Louis BRIQUET, CESSP – Université Paris 1

Ylva BERGSTRÖM, Uppsala University
The Space of political position-takings and practices with special foci on clusters of international orientations – education, social class and place.

Adrien DELESPIERRE, CESSP – Université Paris 1
L'internationalisation des écoles d'ingénieurs.

Ugo LOZACH, Université de Strasbourg – SAGE
S'ouvrir au monde. Fonction technique et fonction sociale de « l'année de mobilité » dans les IEP de province

***

16H-16H30 PAUSE

***

16h30-18h30 **CIRCULATIONS INTERNATIONALES**
Discussants : Mikael PALME, Donald BROADY, Mikael BORJESSON, Uppsala University

Don WEENINK, University of Amsterdam – dept. of Sociology and anthropology (avec Tito BACHMAYER)
Transnational practices, cosmopolitanism and symbolic boundaries. A study of transnational and domestic middle class fractions in Amsterdam and London.

Tristan LEPERLIER, CESSP – EHESS
Algerian Writers during the Civil War: Political Migrations and Conversions of Capital Between Algiers and Paris.

Bertrand REAU, CESSP – Université Paris 1
La circulation internationale des savoirs: l'exemple des tourism studies

***

CONTACTS ORGANISATION

Caroline Bertron <carolinehs.bertron@gmail.com> (+33698574900)
Adrien Delespierre <delespierre.adrien@gmail.com> (+33612856331)
Mikael Palme <mikael.palme@edu.uu.se>
Bertrand Réau <bertrand.reau@gmail.com> (+33641680596)
Anne-Catherine Wagner <acwagner@univ-paris1.fr>

LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS

Madeline Bedecarré <mbedecar@gmail.com>
Ylva Bergström <ylva.bergstrom@edu.uu.se>
Caroline Bertron <carolinehs.bertron@gmail.com>
Mikael Börjesson <mikael.borjesson@edu.uu.se>
Jean-Louis Briquet <jean-louis.briquet@univ-paris1.fr>
Donald Broady <donald.broady@soc.uu.se>
Felix Bühlmann <felix.buhlmann@unil.ch>
Mauricio Bustamante <Mabus005@gmail.com>
Aline Courtois <courtoisaline@gmail.com>
Tobias Dalberg <tobias.dalberg@edu.uu.se>
Muriel Darmon <muriel.darmon@ehess.fr>
Adrien Delespierre <delespierre.adrien@gmail.com>
François Denord <denord@msh-paris.fr>
Yves Dezalay <dezalay@msh-paris.fr>
Leonora Dugonjic <leonora_dugonjic@yahoo.fr>
Lucile Dumont <lucile.dum@gmail.com>
Hakan Forsberg <hakan.forsberg@edu.uu.se>
Domingo Garcia <domgarci@gmail.com>
Didier Georgakakis <didier.georgakakis@univ-paris1.fr>
Elisa Kluger <elisa.kluger@gmail.com>
Frédéric Lebaron <frederic.lebaron@u-picardie.fr>
Tristan Leperlier <tristan.leperlier@gmail.com>
Ugo Lozach <ugo.lozach@misha.fr>
Claire Maxwell <c.maxwell@ioe.ac.uk>
Ciaran O'Neill <ciaran.oneill@tcd.ie>
Mikael Palme <mikael.palme@edu.uu.se>
Bertrand Réau <bertrand.reau@gmail.com>
Thierry Rossier <thierry.rossier@unil.ch>
Sébastien Roux <sebastien.roux@cse.cnrs.fr>
Petter Sandgren <petter.sandgren@eui.eu>
Gisèle Sapiro <sapiro@msh-paris.fr>
Rob Timans <rob.timans@gmail.com>
Maria Tornqvist <maria.tornqvist@edu.uu.se>
Anne-Catherine Wagner <anne.catherine.wagner@gmail.com>
Don Weenink <don.weenink@wur.nl>

The Valorisation of 'the International' in the Elite Segment of Swedish Upper Secondary Education

MIKAEL PALME, SEC, Uppsala University[1]

INTRODUCTION: THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL STUDY PROFILES

While "internationalisation" has been a political concern in Swedish compulsory and upper secondary education since at least the 1980s, it long remained a phenomenon restricted to a few internationally oriented schools, such as schools created for foreign communities living in larger cities (like German and French schools) and select boarding schools with international recruitment that attended to the needs of the Swedish bourgeoisie. Even if the establishment of the first International Baccalaureate (IB) Diploma Programme (DP) in the 1970s[2] signalled a slowly growing interest in international forms of secondary education[3][4], it was in the wake of the radical education reforms of the 1990s that schools and study programmes with an international profile gradually became more visible to the general public. To simplify, the introduction of free school choice operated through a voucher system, in combination with a national curriculum, which enabled schools to launch "profiled" local versions of national study programmes and created the basis for a marketization of upper secondary education in which international study orientations could flourish.[5]

The expansion of the IB programme in Sweden indicates the growing interest for international study orientations among families and social groups. While in 1992 IB schools were still a rare phenomenon, restricted to only three schools in the vicinity of the Sweden's

[1] Maria Törnqvist, Ylva Bergström, Håkan Forsberg, Tobias Dalberg, Josef Dahlberg and Max Persson have all contributed to collecting the data on which the article draws.

[2] See *Skolans internationalisering* [The Internationalization of Education], Government bill to the Swedish Parliament, Prop. 1992/93:158

[3] Despite the IB programme being an exemplary form of transnational education at the secondary level, research publications about the programme with sociological ambitions are scarce. One picture of the development of the IB programme is given in Ian Hill, 'The history of international education: an International Baccalaureate perspective', in Mary Hayden et al (eds.), *International Education in Practice: Dimensions for National and International Schools*. London: Kogan Page, 2002, pp. 18–35, while Paul Tarc provides an analysis of the transformations of the discourse on the "international" in IB schools in "What is the 'International' in the International Baccalaureate?: Three structuring tensions of the early years (1962-1973)", *Journal of Research in International Education*, 8(3), 2009, pp. 235–261.

[4] The scientific literature on the IB programme made a huge leap forward with Leonora Dugonjić's doctoral thesis, *Les IB Schools, une international élitiste. Èmergence d'un espace d'esneignement secondaire au XX^{e} siècle*. École des hautes études en science sociales, Paris, and Université de Genève, 2014.


[5] At present, students (or their families) at primary and secondary levels possess a school voucher representing the public funds made available for their schooling. This voucher can be used for entry into any school recognised by the Swedish National Agency for Education, including so-called independent schools, i.e. schools not owned by Swedish municipalities ("public schools"), normally private commercial education companies or organisations, some of which own many schools. This is the basis for the creation of a school market where public and independent schools compete for students who, through the voucher system, represent their main and often only source of revenue.

largest cities[6], by 2008 the number had increased to 30 schools dispersed throughout a larger geographical area. To a significant degree, the expansion expresses a growing interest in the IB programme by families of purely Swedish origin. In older IB schools established before 1993, the share of foreign born students with non-Swedish parents, equalling 40 percent. The proportion in the years 2006-2008, including newer IB schools created after 1993, was only half, at 20 percent. If one situates these new IB schools within the social structure of Swedish upper secondary education (Graph 1)[7], it also becomes visible that the expansion is parallel to a social diffusion, i.e. educational strategies involving the IB programme are no longer restricted to social groups with particularly high volumes of capital.[8]

[6] Two of which are located in the Stockholm region and one in Gothenburg, Sweden's second largest city

[7] The graph illustrates the two first axes in a simple correspondence analysis of all students in Swedish upper secondary education in 2006-2008, where the rows correspond to study programmes per school and the columns to the number of students per sex in all 32 social groups. The first axis – from left to right – mainly expresses a gender differentiation, with male dominated study programmes on the left and female dominated on the right. The second axis represents a social hierarchical dimension with study programmes characterized by particularly strong recruitment from fractions of the upper middle class at the top (company executives in the private sector, lawyers, senior officials in the public sector, medical doctors, university teachers, etc.) and study programmes characterized by string recruitment from the working class and lower middle class at the bottom (unskilled and skilled workers in service, production and reproduction). Hence the triangle forms of the space. Male and female students are particularly separated by vocational study programmes oriented towards male and female professions respectively in the lower regions of the space with a low social recruitment, whereas gender differences tend to be reduced in the study programmes at the top which prepare for higher education and where the social recruitment is at the highest level. The data analyses illustrated in graphs 1, 2a-2b and 3 were made by Tobias Dalberg

[8] Hugh Lauder argues that the rapid expansion of IB schools should be seen as the expression of an increasing educational competition and the ensuing search for a seemingly competitive educational investment, see Lauder, H. (2007), "International schools, education and globalization: Towards a research agenda", in M. Hayden, J. Thompson & J. Levy (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of research in international education* (pp. 441–449). London: SAGE. Catherine Doherty's research on IB-schools in Australia seems to confirm this point; C. Doherty, "Optimising meritocratic advantage with the International Baccalaureate Diploma in Australian schools", *Critical Studies in Education*, Vol. 53, No. 2, June 2012, pp. 183–196




Graph 1
Positions of IB study programmes in the space of Swedish upper secondary education in 2008. Simple CA with all individual study programmes per school as individuals and the number of students per sex in 32 social groups as modalities.

A similar process of social dispersion seems to characterize the space of study programmes with international orientations within the ordinary upper secondary school system that started to evolve in the second half of the 1990s in the wake of the education reforms. While in 1995-97, almost all of the existing 42 individual study programmes with an international profile[9] recruited students, generally female, originating from the upper middle class (Graph 2a), the 67 individual programmes of the same kind identified in 2006-08 were more socially dispersed (Graph 2b).


[9] The data originate from Statistics Sweden's individual-based registers of enrolled upper secondary students in which each particular study programme appears as both a code and a name. In this case, only study programmes with a name comprising words such as "European", "international", "global" or the like have been considered. While this gives a somewhat skewed picture of internationally oriented study programmes, since well-established, prestigious upper secondary schools in particular often do not advertise their efforts to give their study programmes international content, it is nevertheless functional as an indicator of change.

Graphs 2A and 2B. Dispersion of internationally oriented study programmes in the space of Swedish upper secondary education in 1995-97 and 2006-08. Simple CA equivalent to the CA in Graph 1 above.

Graph 2A: 1995-97



Graph 2B: 2006-2008



Arguably, the expansion of internationally oriented forms of secondary education reflects a search for educational assets that are recognized either on a transnational education and job market or at segments of a national one where international knowledge, skills and contacts are required. In this respect, the effects of globalization are visible in the ongoing transformations of national education systems such as the Swedish system, which are driven equally by the demands for international education by social groups, education institutions, through their competitive strategies, and government initiatives that encourage international content and skills. While internationally recognized knowledge and skills provided by both family and formal education have historically been a concern for primarily elite groups, they now tend to increasingly be a concern for groups within national education systems who are primarily oriented towards national education.[10]

With reference to Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital, these kinds of assets have alternatively been named international cultural capital, global capital, transnational capital or cosmopolitan capital.[11] Evidence from the ongoing research that is the basis for this paper

[10] While, as Anne-Catherine Wagner shows, international assets have historically functioned as a marker of social distinction in between social classes, one of the aspects of current globalization is the creation of new international elites who constitute a challenge to national ones. A-C Wagner, *Les nouvelles élites de la mondialisation. Une immigration dorée en France.* Paris : PUF, 1998 ; and *Les classes sociales dans la mondialisation. Paris* : La Découverte, 2007. Mary Hayden argues that one can justifiably talk about two different processes of internationalization of schools, one being that of national schools opting for international profiles and another being that of the growing number of international schools. Mary Hayden, "Transnational spaces of education: the growth of the international school sector", *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 211-224.

[11] In the research literature, an abundance of Bourdieu-inspired concepts can be found that seem to have in common that they designate forms of recognition conferred at an international, transnational or global arena as opposed to recognition constrained to a national one, for example "international capital", "international cultural capital", "global symbolic capital", "transnational capital" or "cosmopolitan capital". A discussion of some alternative concepts is found in Hiroki Igarashi & Hiro Saito, "Cosmopolitanism as Cultural Capital: Exploring the Intersection of Globalization, Education and Stratification, *Cultural Sociology*, Vol. 8(3), 2014, pp. 222 –239.

suggests two arguments with respect to how the definition of the international as symbolic capital should be understood. First, it suggests that the individual social properties of the elite[12] educational institutions as institutions – at the upper secondary level, the *gymnasium* or *lycée* – matter in the production of the particular kind of symbolic capital they provide students with. In other words, in order to understand differences in regards to the content of the international as it is embodied in students' habitus as knowledge, skills, contacts and attitudes, it is not sufficient to consider only students' particular social origin and the assets this origin provides. Secondly, it argues that transnational symbolic capital, or whatever concept of Bourdieusian inspiration we choose, should not be understood as monolithic and unchangeable but rather as subject to the tensions and struggles of definition, in much the same way as national cultural capital.

THE INTERNATIONAL AS INSTITUTIONAL ASSETS[13]

A detailed examination[14] in 2013 of all home pages of upper secondary schools in the Stockholm region, by virtue of its large population also the largest school market in the country, shows that 91 out of 210 schools used words such as "international", "global" or "European" to describe either their general profile, as such, or at least one of the study programmes they offered. However, the content or activities connected to these labels varied, as well as the volume and intensity. If one considers the sheer quantity of regular "international" activities these 91 schools describe on their web pages and focus on the number of exchange programmes with schools abroad, participation in the European Youth Parliament, study visits or travels to

[12] In this paper, the concept of (Swedish) "elite" educational institution is somewhat broad. It includes all schools and study programmes with a particularly high social *and* scholarly recruitment, dominated by students emerging from upper middle class families, more precisely sons and daughters of university teachers, diploma engineers, architects, physicians, civil servants in leading positions, lawyers, directors and managers in leading positions in private companies, high military officers and company executives. The purely quantitative analyses build on anonymized data at individual level from Statistics Sweden, covering the entire population of upper secondary students in the Stockholm region, approximately 20.000 students per year cohort. These analyses separate between 32 social groups, 8 of which – roughly those mentioned above – are classified as pertaining to the upper middle class, using the highest position held by any of the parents as indicator. In the interviews, a more complex picture of the various assets connected to social origin emerges. While some students at the "elite" upper secondary schools who in statistical terms would be classified as having an upper middle class origin undoubtedly do come from well-established, particularly resourceful families that by virtue of their history and economic, cultural or social capital belong to "the elites", others originate from families with relatively weaker resources but where one parent, most often the father, has attained a high professional position. To the inherited capital should be added the educational capital acquired by the individual student. The fact that students at the elite upper secondary schools have in common a particularly successful previous educational career leaves a certain space for meritocratic mechanisms as regards student recruitment. Even though scholastic performance generally is strongly related to inherited resources, for some students the acquired educational assets – getting very good marks in compulsory school – is a more defining characteristic than the assets guaranteed by the family of origin.

[13] In the following, the expression "the international" will be used as a shortcut for all content and activities related to and also ideas about phenomena that go beyond national borders, such as historical, political, and cultural conditions or institutions that transgress the nation state, as well as school or personal activities designed to target, make contact with or use such content or activities, for example, exchange programmes. Admittedly, the concept is a vague one, but functional in this context.

[14] Data were collected by Håkan Forsberg.

European and non-European countries, the number of foreign languages taught at the school, the offer of the most advanced optional English course at this level[15], and, finally, the number of invited guest lecturers from other countries, a clear opposition occurs between schools with high social and scholarly recruitment, on the one hand, and schools with modest recruitment profiles, on the other. In fact, virtually all prestigious Stockholm upper secondary schools report fairly strong investments in international activities of this kind on their websites.

Even if schools' web pages should be interpreted as only an expression of how the schools wish their public image to look, not the least in order to attract students in the competition with other schools, these differences have been confirmed by school visits which convey that established elite schools by far exceed others as regards international "assets" in terms of exchange programmes, connections to foreign universities, study visits abroad, invited foreign lecturers, offer of advanced language course modules and provision of language teachers with foreign origin among others.

These differences are further reinforced by the international assets that their students bring to the school. Elite upper secondary schools to a significantly higher degree than middle or low ranked schools offer an institutional environment characterized by their students' international experiences and personal international networks, rooted in their family of origin as well as in their own activities as young adults through extensive traveling and foreign contacts. In both these respects – the scope of activities, events, travels, contacts and exchange programmes upheld by the school itself, and the more concealed but still solid web of personal experiences and contacts in the whole body of students – the elite schools "add" international content to what is already provided by the formal curriculum.

While well-established, socially and scholarly distinctive schools distinguish themselves from schools with more modest resources in terms of international assets, a second opposition can be observed within the sub-space of schools that claim an international orientation. On the one hand, in some schools the "international" takes the form of content and activities related to predominately Western countries, such as the US and the UK, in combination with a focus on established political organisations such as the European Youth Parliament, with advanced English language courses and economy-oriented topics for lecturers and other events. On the other hand, some schools direct their efforts towards developing countries, other languages than English and questions related to global justice or sustainable development. Only some of the most established elite schools try to combine these international orientations, if one is to judge based on the activities and content reported on the schools' web pages.

[15] The Swedish upper secondary curriculum for most study programmes consists of course modules, some of which are compulsory and others optional. As for English, schools, especially those with study programmes preparing for the entry into higher education, may choose to offer the most advanced English course module, named English 9.

The international as *topoi* at schools' web pages

These two major oppositions – between schools with strong international assets in the sense described above and those with modest ones, and between schools with an international orientation restricted to Anglo-Saxon countries and those with an orientation embracing developing countries along with topics such as global justice or sustainable development equally – tend to be expressed also in the values and beliefs attributed to the "international" at schools' web pages. In a separate analysis, schools' web pages were scanned for all occurrences of words comprising the elements "värld" ["world"], "internation-" and "global-" or word constructions comprising both the prefix "ut" and the suffix "land" (approximately equivalent to English words "foreign" or "abroad").[16] A comparison between the 15 highest and lowest ranked schools in the Stockholm region reveals an overwhelming difference between elite schools and low-prestigious schools dominated by lower social classes (Table 1).[17]

[16] The following section draws on an exam paper from January 2014 by Josef Dahlberg, supervised by the author of the present text.

[17] Schools were ranked using a number of elite criteria (the share of students with particularly high marks in their final year, share of students originating from families in fractions of the dominating class according to an aggregated social classification, share of students with parents who have particularly high educational levels, share of students with parents who have particularly high incomes), which, in a second step, were unified into a single ranking scale. The epithets "elite school" and "low prestigious school" here apply to the highest and lowest ranked schools respectively.

Table 1. Frequencies of "international words" at high- and low-ranked upper secondary schools' web pages in the Stockholm region in 2013

Type of school/"International words"	"interna-"	"global-"	"-värld-"["world"]	"ut" + "land" ["foreign"]	Total
Highest ranked schools (elite schools), n=15	64	18	41	18	141
Lowest ranked schools (low-prestigious schools), n=15	8	2	8	5	23

Unsurprisingly, the "international", as a figure of thought, or *topos*[18], potentially corresponding to a socially embedded conviction, or collective representation in the Durkheimian sense, is present more often on the web sites of highly ranked upper secondary schools than on low-ranked schools.[19] When the word occurrences are analysed more closely in their linguistic context, qualitative dimensions of these differences emerge. On elite schools' web pages, international words of the kind described above are part of the presentation of the school's general profile and they are put forward as having a self-evident, inherent value connected to various domains of knowledge in relation to students' personal development, future study careers and life chances, as in the following example:

> [The school's international profile] connects politics, geography and sustainable development to international economy.

This stands in contrast to the reference of "the international" on low-prestigious schools' web pages, where such references most often are confined to the particular context of single study programmes. Here, the international is put forward either as referring to something that has limited, instrumental utility, as opposed to generally valid knowledge, or as an exciting experience, as on the web page of a low-ranked school with a vocational study programme oriented towards hotels and tourism:

[18] Briefly, the concept of *topos* (pl. *topoi*), borrowed from the domain of rhetoric, is used here in the sense of "figure of thought", contained within the "message" that the web page represents, and assumed to connect to socially embedded convictions, beliefs or collective representations in the Durkheimian sense. The analysis here builds on the philosopher Mats Rosengren, who, departing from Chaïm Perelman's work on *figures* and *tropos*, tries to establish a link between rhetoric and sociology, especially in relation to Bourdieu's concept of *doxa*. In the analysis suggested here, the particular *topoi*, "figures of thought", are seen as expressing, or at least potentially evoking deep social convictions connected to *doxa* among social groups with different volumes and, in particular, compositions of capital and, correspondingly, different habitus, shaped by the accumulation of these assets. See M. Rosengren. *Doxologie. Essai sur la connaissance.* Hermann, 2000. Cf. M. Palme, *Det kulturella kapitalet, Symboliska tillgångar i det svenska utbildningssystemet 1988-2008* [Cultural Capital. Symbolic Assets in the Swedish Education System 1988-2008], 2008

[19] In an interesting analysis of what they name the "hidden internationalism" at the web pages of elite English schools, Rachel Brooks and Johanna Waters, reveal a tension between the schools' interest in presenting themselves as "cosmopolitan", on the one hand, while maintaining their "Englishness", on the other hand, a tension, it is suggested that, could be explained by the value of both these ideas on the educational market; Rachel Brooks & Johanna Waters, "The Hidden Internationalism of Elite English Schools", *Sociology*, Vol. 49(2), 2015, pp. 212 –228.

> Hotels and tourism is professional domain [where] you meet many new people. There is much that is exciting and fun in Hotel and tourism. You learn to meet people and to communicate and the [profession] is about international contacts.

In the social dimension separating elite schools from low-prestigious schools, "the international" tends to be connected to different *topoi*: on the one hand a universal and self-evident component in preparations for a global future, on the other hand a restricted, instrumental value constrained to specific future professional areas.

In order to find differences in the *topoi* attached to the international at elite schools' web pages, a second analysis was made comprising only the 30 highest ranked schools. The analysis here points to a more subtle but nonetheless visible and systematic difference separating figures of thought that constitute what can be named a *Bildung* related view of education opposed to a rationalistic, utility-oriented view. The former emphasizes a holistic understanding of man as comprising a variety of potential talents that develop into a unique personality through a process of self-development taking place within a constantly renewed but historically embedded civilization. In contrast, the latter underlines the perspective of man as a rational actor investing in education in competition with others in order to secure future benefits. One of the forms in which this opposition manifests itself concerns the view of the educational project as such. In a *Bildung* perspective, education is a natural part of human development, a sacred value that cannot be reduced to the benefits it produces in terms of future study careers or life chances. In a utility-oriented perspective, education becomes above all a means for personal advancement in the competition with others.

On elite schools' web pages, the international is connected to a *Bildung*-oriented perspective through a variety of regularly appearing *topoi*. One *topos* is the emphasis on the idea of diversity as enriching the Self. Cultural, international and ethnic diversity is put forward as beneficial to human and social development as such. This idea is, in turn, connected to key values in the *Bildung* perspective, expressed by words such as "understanding", "insight" and "tolerance" with regard to others, as well as to the belief that cultural differences should be understood and potentially also overcome through an understanding of their historical and social genesis, i.e. through interest in and respect for the various social and historic contexts that produce these differences.

A second set of associated *topoi* relate to the view that the world, the planet, as well as society, is a shared responsibility, a "challenge" common to all. Web pages leaning towards a Bildung perspective often emphasize that moral or political values are at stake, be it environmental sustainability, economic injustices in the world, peace or gender equality. These need collective attention and present themselves as a moral obligation or commitment for the individual. Thus, key words such as "commitment", "responsibility" and "ethical" also tend to be comparatively frequent.

In contrast, web pages of elite schools where the dominate *topoi* can be said to express a rational, utility-oriented view of man in relation to education, above all emphasize the connection between international content, on one hand, and, on the other hand, future study and job careers. An often expressed figure of thought is the idea that the globalized world exposes

the individual to global competition in which high quality education is a vital investment. In this perspective, language studies represent to a lesser degree a key to understanding different cultures as likely presented by schools adhering to a *Bildung*-perspective. Rather, language skills are more likely presented as an instrument for competition in future study and job markets. In the same vein, the holistic idea of education as a process that brings forward inherent talents of a cognitive, aesthetic and moral nature is challenged or at least balanced by the conviction that competition, as a basic condition of life, demands careful use and coaching of available personal resources. The belief in education as competitive investment is often combined with the idea of educational quality being something measurable through quality-guaranteed certificates and rankings, such as the "Investor in People" or the UN-certification of international schools. *Topoi* related to this rationalistic, utility-oriented view are expressed through a comparatively high frequency of words and expressions such as "study career", "job market", "invest", "competition", "quality", "certification" and "coaching", whereas words signalling ethical perspectives on the state of the world tend to be less frequent. While the educational project on these schools' web pages is purely individual, dimensions of the educational process related to collective action are almost entirely connected to well-established political organisations or institutions, such as the UN, and seldom to less official and potentially contested ones, such as Greenpeace.

What is here described as two conflicting, fundamental views on education and the individual in relation to the international are in fact tendencies, but systematic ones in the sense that individual ideas expressed on the web pages form patterns of fairly systematic differences that situate a particular website closer to or further from either one of the basic views described above. The individual *topoi* taken together constitute a "language" accessible through web pages when they address the international or the global. Individual elements may appear in varying configurations, in which particular words, concepts or expressions achieve significance through the structural relations they uphold in relation to other words or concepts. An example is the rather frequent, among elite schools, mention of the value of "international contacts". On web pages articulating ideas that come close to a rationalistic, utility-oriented view, this expression tends to assume the meaning that international contacts are fruitful in the perspective of competitive individual investments, whereas the same phrase, on web pages leaning towards a holistic *Bildung*-oriented view, potentially assume a meaning related to ideas of mutual cultural understanding between schools and individuals situated in different "cultures".

The degree of affinity to either of the two basic views revealed by the analysis of *topoi* on schools' web pages – the holistic, *Bildung*-oriented one as opposed to the rationalistic, utility-oriented one – can be connected to the social character of the student recruitment of the various schools that are part of the analysis. If one takes into account the positions of the 30 highest ranked schools in the social space of upper secondary education in 2008[20], it becomes clear that

[20] Also, this space was constructed using simple correspondence analysis on the sole basis of the recruitment profiles of all individual study programmes, using a social classification distinguishing between 32 social groups, where no difference is made between the sexes. In the analysis, the "individuals" (rows) represent all study programmes per school and the properties (columns) represent the number of individual students pertaining to

schools whose web pages predominately express what has been named a rationalistic, utility-oriented view tend to be located in the space close to the pole characterized by particularly strong recruitment of fractions of the middle class and upper middle class close to the economic sector (executives at high or middle-high levels in the private sector, entrepreneurs), whereas schools leaning towards an expressed *Bildung*-oriented view tend to be situated in proximity of the space close to the pole where recruitment is dominated by fractions for which cultural capital is the strongest asset (university teachers, cultural producers, journalists, senior employees in the public sector, to some extent physicians).

Evidence seems to point in the direction of a homology between, on the one hand, the views on the relation between the international, expressed in the forms of *topoi* on schools' web pages, and, on the other hand, collective representations, in the Durkheimian sense, that can be assumed typical for social groups with different volumes and compositions of capital, and, thus, different habitus which makes them inclined to favour or disfavour particular schools. Regardless of how this homology came to be[21], it can be seen as an expression of a partly conflicting emphasis – confirmed in student interviews – expressed by the concerned fractions of the upper middle class on how they attribute value and meaning both to education and to the international. In this sense it can also be said to testify to an ongoing battle over the definition of legitimate cultural capital as it unfolds at this level of the education system. In a concluding section of this paper, we shall approach this question from a different angle, more precisely through the perspective of upper secondary students in internationally oriented study programmes in Stockholm.

THE INTERNATIONAL IN THE STRUGGLES FOR THE DEFINITION OF LEGITIMATE CULTURAL CAPITAL

The following analysis is based on student interviews conducted at four upper secondary schools in Stockholm with internationally oriented study programmes, three of which can safely be described as elite schools in terms of students' social and scholarly origin, their school performance and their future study careers. Hosting only the IB study programme and charging high school fees for Swedish standards[22], the first, independent, school mainly receives foreign students, most often with families in high positions in Swedish or foreign companies temporarily posted in Sweden. A second school, a well-reputed traditional public *läroverk* (*lycée*), offers the IB programme along with both English-speaking and Swedish-speaking study programmes preparing for higher education. A third school, independent like the first one, is entirely Swedish speaking and has for some years occupied the position as the most

each of the 32 groups. The schools appear as supplementary individuals in the same analysis as opposed to the study programmes per school that, as active individuals, contribute to the construction of the space.

[21] It would for example be interesting to analyse the role of advertising experts in shaping the schools' web pages. It is known that schools and in particularly schools belonging to larger education companies invest considerable resources in their marketing strategies.

[22] Schools that are part of the formal education system generally cannot charge school fees, although this is allowed in rare cases, for example, for boarding schools or schools believed to be important in enabling foreign-based families to stay in the country.

scholarly selective and high-performing upper secondary school in the Stockholm area. Finally, a fourth school was selected for the study with the purpose of offering a contrast to the first three elite schools, a suburban public school situated in an immigrant area receiving mostly Swedish students with immigrant parents. At this school, the interviews were restrained to academically successful students with immigrant backgrounds who were selected to take part in the school's internationally oriented activities (travels, seminars and exchange programmes).[23]

The interviews shed light on the crucial rule of "culture" in the relation that students have with what has been here named "the international", both as an embodied personal asset in the form of language proficiency, knowledge, personal contacts and experiences from their previous trajectories as well as experienced "identity", or more accurately put, as a strategy for creating a socially embedded and recognizable image of themselves.

To start with, students at the suburban immigrant-dominated school, who in all cases possessed vast international networks stemming from their families and family histories, often involving family contacts in many countries across Europe and the world, as well as skills in many languages, rarely and only partially regarded their "culture" of origin as a valid asset that could be valorised in their future study and professional careers. In their own judgment, family-based resources were fragile when confronted with the challenges of making a successful study career, obtaining high school marks, recognised language skills, general knowledge and the contacts demanded in Swedish society and its institutions. Having parents with modest incomes and low levels of formal education, who were often unskilled workers or small entrepreneurs in import and resale businesses, they relied almost entirely on the Swedish education system for social advancement. Higher education appearing as a remote, distant goal, their knowledge of the Swedish higher education system was generally poor compared to students at the elite upper secondary schools. Despite their international networks and experiences, the educational institutions of other countries seemed even more remote than the Swedish ones. In some cases, a significant symbolic resource for shaping attitudes towards and belief in education was the father's previous political experience in the family's country of origin, a commitment that had led to the immigration as refugees into Sweden and that remained in the form of embodied political capital.

To simplify, the main declared ambition, or hope, of most students consisted of obtaining mid-level careers in Swedish society through obtaining professional diplomas in Swedish higher education. In some cases, though, interviewed students claimed that they had a special capacity, by virtue of their personal experiences in cultural diversity, to serve as cultural intermediaries, in Sweden, between the dominating Swedish society and immigrant groups threatened by isolation in segregated suburban settings. For some of the latter interviewees, the recognition of a particular cultural experience of otherness in relation to the dominating

[23] At present (May, 2014), 59 in-depth interviews (12 in the suburban immigrant dominated school; 16 in the IB programme at the international independent school; 24 at the traditional *lycée*, 8 of which in its IB programme; and 7 at the independent Swedish-speaking school) have been conducted using a life story approach by a research team consisting of the author, Ylva Bergström and Josef Dahlberg.

Swedish society took the form of political commitment and affiliation to political movements rising in especially immigrant dominated suburbs.

The surprisingly Swedish or national orientation of these immigrant students' views in regard to the significance of globalization and the international in their personal trajectories should probably be understood in the light of the relatively weak inherited and acquired resources they possess in the Swedish context. It stands in contrast to the attitudes and expectancies of most students at the elite schools. Keeping to students of Swedish background, who constitute a minority in the IB programme but dominate the internationally oriented Swedish study programmes, one can identify three basic "outlooks" in relation to the significance of globalisation and the international in their personal trajectories.

First, a considerable number of interviewees saw their investments in the Swedish education system as primary and crucial. Declaring themselves open to the perspective of studying or working abroad "later on", they regarded Swedish national education diplomas as the safest guarantee for making such trajectories possible. Hesitant in making English their language of school instruction, they assessed that a high level of proficiency in Swedish was a requirement for safe journeys through the higher education system, often referring to the advanced Swedish language skills demanded by the Swedish entry test to higher education where extremely good results can replace less competitive marks from the final year of upper secondary education. As high performing students with a successful previous school career behind them that opened the gate to the selective elite school where they now studied, they had reasons to trust the Swedish education system, more precisely its top ranked institutions, and saw no reason to venture into unknown international forms of education. Their belief in Swedish education was founded on a high degree of familiarity with the hierarchies and secrets of Swedish higher education, e.g. the relative value of various university institutions and study programmes, the hidden dangers or opportunities, a knowledge often secured by their highly educated parents and family networks.

However, part of these students' reluctance to go international and embrace the gospel of a globalized study culture often had to do with their declared belief in societal and cultural values that they connected to their country of origin, although they acknowledged that these may likely exist elsewhere, albeit in different forms. They connected these values to what they believed to be a fairly open and democratic society with an acceptable social security system and relatively high social and gender equality. In addition, they referred to specific values connected to identity, culture, history and nature, values that they admitted were difficult to pinpoint but could potentially be missing if they studied or worked internationally. While the purely cultural practices of many of these students – as regards to literature, theatre, film or visual arts – were not necessarily particularly developed and in many cases could be described as mainstream with high consumption of international commercial culture, they still regarded "Swedish culture" as somewhat distinct from what they envisaged as "international" culture.

A different outlook could be found among students with a particularly strong cultural capital consisting of familiarity with existing legitimate cultural forms in the Swedish society and a certain proximity to fields of cultural production (literature, theatre, visual arts, music, or

the intellectual sectors of the academia). As interviews testify to, such strong cultural capital was often acquired through a combination of strong cultural assets in the family of origin (highly educated parents, often in the humanities, social or natural sciences, or medicine, but not in economics), and personally acquired experiences through students' own aesthetic practices (such as music or writing). While confessing that they made strong efforts to be extremely high performing, these students, comparatively few in number, regarded themselves as critical to mainstream student culture, as they believed it expressed itself in manners of dressing, political opinions, cultural practices, as well as in an uncritical relation to education. Above all, they were in search for a "critical" perspective that met their demands of being "unique" as persons, "original" and "individual" (as opposed to mainstream). In one of the schools, these culturally oriented students participated in a philosophy seminar given outside teaching hours by one of the teachers, which introduced them to French critical theory (Derrida, Foucault and other thinkers). Often their standpoints intersected with advanced forms of feminism (Judith Butler was a common reference) or left-wing perspectives on society's power structures, in Sweden and globally.

For these students, by far the richest in traditional legitimized cultural capital, defined as a combination of general knowledge and advanced insights into the world of culture, globalisation and the international were seen as genuine challenges. On the one hand, they believed that globalisation processes could not and should not be stopped, since they brought the world together. On the other hand, they expressed that globalisation as the advancement of a global commercial culture threatened to extinguish "real culture" as embedded in language and national or regional history. They saw no immediate solution to this dilemma, except through fighting so that "genuine" culture could survive. This genuine culture was not entirely national, but increasingly international and global, albeit different from commercial culture, emerging from various cultural forms of expressions connected to what they believed to be "opposition" or "resistance".

Acquainted well with the Swedish institutions paving the way to cultural professions, both in the sub-system of preparatory institutions (such as courses in journalism, writing, theatre or jazz music at, for example, people's high schools) and in higher education (for example the various academies of art), and having well established networks comprising friends working in cultural or intellectual areas, they could talk at length about the demands for shaping careers in the cultural domains in Sweden. They could also to some extent assess the connections between cultural fields of production in Sweden and internationally. As for themselves, much in the same way as their student colleagues in the entirely different social setting of the suburban immigrant school, they believed that, once having passed through higher education, they could find a role for themselves as cultural intermediaries between the "Swedish" and "the international". However, this required a substantial time investment in order to master both cultural forms connected to Sweden and, simultaneously, become sufficiently familiar with cultural areas as they exist in other countries and in a transnational arena.

Finally, a third outlook or standpoint vis-à-vis the international could be identified among Swedish students inhabiting internationally oriented study programmes at the three elite upper secondary schools. Typically expressed by students in the IB programme, it also manifested itself among students in purely Swedish programmes, particularly at the selective independent elite school, in spite of these students having different previous trajectories. In spite of their Swedish origin, many students in the IB programme had a particular history of either staying outside their country of origin for years or having studied within the IB system in Sweden. In the interviews, they describe this experience as double-sided. On the one hand, they emphasized their appreciation of what they saw as a rare "openness" and "cultural diversity". The fact that they regularly faced newly arriving students from a variety of countries, with varying religious faiths, native languages and backgrounds, made them "open-minded" and "flexible" in ways that believed were extremely rare in purely Swedish schools. Suspicious attitudes or mobbing were non-existent. In this regard, the interviews express almost a cult-like belief in cultural diversity.[24]

However, simultaneously, the interviewed students confessed that this "openness" came at the price of constantly being prepared to lose friends and contacts, since people regularly moved to other countries with their families of origin. This repeated experience of constant mobility created a feeling of social and cultural rootlessness and of total dependence on their personal family network, a dependence that was never entirely stable since the members of the extended family who normally visited during holiday periods, were often firmly embedded in national contexts in ways that separated them from the international movers. Moreover, the programme of cultural openness, scrutinized critically, did not, as many students admitted amount to any deeper insights into various national or regional "cultures" in practice. On the contrary, the personal contacts made within the framework of the IB programme, as well as in local international communities in various parts of the world to which the father's professional career brought the family, tended to establish a shared, international culture with rather superficial common references, often based on commercially produced mainstream culture in the areas of for example music, films and literature.

While some of the interviewed students happily embraced this international culture, seeing it as true expression of "cultural diversity", others were more reluctant, confessing that they had

[24] While the idea of representing a genuine spirit of "internationalism" makes part of the auto-image of the IB organization, it also finds it ways into supposedly scientific articles that celebrate the same idea by discussing the IB programme's weaknesses and strengths in this regard. See John Wells, "International education, values and attitudes: A critical analysis of the International Baccalaureate (IB) Learner Profile", *Journal of Research in International Education*, 10(2), 2011, pp. 174–188. In a similar way, Paul Tarc takes the "internationalism" of the original IB programme for granted, while recognizing a growing tension within the programme itself between this internationalism and the increasingly important role of providing competitive educational exams, a shift of emphasis described as "a loss of control over the meanings and uses of IB in the world"; Paul Tarc. *Global dreams, enduring tensions: International Baccalaureate in a changing world*. New York: Peter Lang, 2009. p. 58. In contrast to these forms of idealization, Leonora Dugonjić's critical analysis of the curriculum of the IB Diploma programme points to its predominately Anglophone and Westernized character which seems to fit well with value of the diploma on a global, competitive educational market. Cf. Leonora Dugonjić, op.cit. marketdefinition of the previously mentioned doctoral thesis, Les IB Schools, une international élitiste. Èmergence d'un espace d'esneignement secondaire au XXe siècle. École des hautes études en science sociales, Paris, and Université de Genève, 2014.

learnt to suppress or filter all references to their own experiences, often connected to their country of origin and native language, that they believed were incomprehensible in this international culture. The first kind of students with few exceptions originated from families with comparatively modest cultural assets, at least in terms of traditional legitimate culture. What the family lacked in cultural capital was, however, balanced by a successful career (the father's) in a larger international business company, i.e. assets connected to the international economic domain, most often connected to diplomas in technical or economic education. These students expressed no particular understanding for or interest in the questions posed to them about the relative importance of "national culture", i.e. knowledge and mastery of national languages, history and institutional settings, as opposed to "international culture", as they understood the latter. In some cases, they entirely dismissed the idea that nation-related assets would have any particular significance, referring to the "language" of economy and management, as one interviewee put it, as an international currency accepted everywhere.[25] In other cases, students regarded nation-related competencies and experiences as skills that could have a limited value in their countries of origin, but that would be potentially important only if the international study and professional trajectories they sought would fail. Some students experienced the relationship between nation-related cultural competence and what they understood as an internationally valid one as problematic in terms of personal identity, revealing that they regarded their national experiences as a sort of hidden "self" that could never be entirely translated to an international arena such as the IB programme or to the English language.

An interesting relation to the balance between "international" and "national" is expressed in the a few interviews with Swedish students in the IB programmes originating from families with particularly strong traditional cultural assets (often connected to the father being a highly ranked diplomat) and with personal ambitions to orientate themselves towards cultural fields of production (for example literature or visual arts). Caught between cultural inclinations and ambitions made "natural" within the cultivated family of origin and void both in terms of personal contacts (for example friends with similar interests) and knowledge of culture as an institutionalized arena, including the complex and hierarchical system of educational institutions giving access to this arena, their cultural ambitions remained uncensored, disoriented or "naïve" compared to their student colleagues at purely Swedish study programmes having similar cultural ambitions. Without the necessary social and institutional anchoring provided by a wider social environment than the family, their cultural insights and taste remained undistinctive.

Perhaps the relations that the Swedish students in internationally oriented study programmes establish to the international never become as visible as their relations to language. Whereas students confessing to the salvation provided by the choice of international study

[25] Cf. Marion Fourcade, "The construction of a global profession. The transnationalization of economics", *American journal of sociology*, Vol.112, 1, pp. 145-194. See also Sarah Halla & Lindsey Appleyard "Trans-local academic credentials and the (re)production of financial elites", *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011, pp. 247-264.

careers tended to see their mother tongue as dispensable, a simple means of communication with a very limited market value, students with strong investments in traditional, nationally defined cultural capital, and especially those attracted by the fields of cultural production, regarded the Swedish language as a crucial vehicle for their orientation in both Swedish and international society and culture, "a building", as one of them put it, in which their identities had been formed and which they needed to take seriously, if not for other reasons simply because they otherwise may run the risk of losing their credibility on the Swedish institutional arenas where their immediate future would unfold.

CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL PROFILES IN UPPER SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THE CHOICE OF HIGHER EDUCATION


The expanding sector of internationally oriented study programmes seems to involve a sometimes openly visible, sometimes less conscious struggle over the definition of national cultural capital. What value should be attributed to educational and personal investments in knowledge of Swedish society, its history, language, institutions and hitherto legitimate forms of cultural expression? Despite the interviewed students finding themselves only at the threshold of their final educational investments, they struggled, more or less consciously, with the question of the significance of the international in the shaping of their own lives. Since there are no concrete answers, only speculative ones, to the question posed above, we will we end by at least shedding some light on what may be the more final educational investments of the upper secondary students who were interviewed, i.e. on the relation between the choice of school and study programme in upper secondary education in the Stockholm region, on the one hand, and the choice of higher education, on the other hand, including studies abroad. Graph 3 illustrates in a simplified form the result of a simple correspondence analysis of the choice of higher education study programmes by all students attending upper secondary study programmes which prepare for higher education in the Stockholm region in 2003-2006, taking into account their social origin, the upper secondary school they attended and their study programme.[26]

First, the analysis indicates, not surprisingly that the choice of studying abroad is virtually non-existing among students at low-prestigious schools (first axis, left to right). Second, and more interestingly, the choice of higher education at foreign universities is considerably more

[26] The simple correspondence analysis, conducted by Tobias Dalberg, takes as a point of departure the total number of students in all upper secondary education programmes preparing for higher education (Science, Social Sciences, IB and special locally-designed study programmes) per school in the Stockholm region in the years 2003-2006 (rows in the analysed table) and considers their social origin classified in 32 social groups (columns). The first two axes are represented in the graph. While the first, horizontal, axis represents 34.5 %, of the total inertia, the second, vertical, axis, represents 12.1 %, .In a second step of the analysis, students' choice of study area in higher education (humanities, social sciences, economics, science, medicine, law and no higher education) as well as their university of choice (all larger Swedish universities and colleges separated and foreign universities made into one category) within three years after the final secondary exam were projected into the space as supplementary variables. In the simplified graph presented here, only a few typical upper secondary schools and social groups (active in the analysis and represented by small letters), university study areas and universities (supplementary and represented by capital letters in the graph) are represented.

common among students with an origin in social groups where economic capital and proximity to the economic sector have an important weight in the accumulated resources possessed by the family than among students from families where cultural capital dominates. In particular, studies abroad in economics is a characteristic that distinguishes students from economically strong groups from others.

This difference is connected to one between upper secondary schools. The inclination for studies abroad is strongest among students who get their upper secondary diploma at schools characterized by a strong student recruitment from social groups with predominately economic capital. This includes many of the schools offering the IB programme. In contrast, students at schools dominated characterized by a strong recruitment from families for which traditional cultural capital is particularly important in the structure of assets, tend to prefer Swedish higher education institutions before studies abroad. With regard to students' willingness to opt for studies abroad, elite upper secondary schools share a distance to schools with low social and scholarly recruitment, whose students generally are characterized by their exclusion from both national and international higher education.



As a preliminary result, the analysis suggests that – at an aggregated and general level – the internationalisation of educational strategies is, so far, especially an affair for social groups and elite upper secondary schools oriented towards the accumulation and reproduction of symbolic resources connected to the areas of economy, thus threatening, by substitution, the traditional definition of national cultural capital.

REFERENCE LIST

Brooks, R. & Johanna Waters (2015), "The Hidden Internationalism of Elite English Schools", *Sociology*, Vol. 49(2), pp. 212 –228.

Doherty, C. (2012), "Optimising meritocratic advantage with the International Baccalaureate Diploma in Australian schools", *Critical Studies in Education*, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 183–196

Dugonjić, L. (2014), *Les IB Schools, une international élitiste. Emergence d'un espace d'enseignement secondaire au XX^e siècle*. Diss., École des hautes études en science sociales, Paris, and Université de Genève

Fourcade, M. (2006), "The construction of a global profession. The transnationalization of economics", *American journal of sociology*, Vol.112, 1, pp. 145-194.

Halla, S. & L. Appleyard (2011), "Trans-local academic credentials and the (re)production of financial elites", *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 247-264.

Hayden, M. (2001), "Transnational spaces of education: the growth of the international school sector", *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 211-224

Hayden, M. et al (eds.) (2002), *International Education in Practice: Dimensions for National and International Schools*. London: Kogan Page

Igarashi, H. & Hiro Saito (2014), "Cosmopolitanism as Cultural Capital: Exploring the Intersection of Globalization, Education and Stratification, *Cultural Sociology*, Vol. 8(3), pp. 222 –239.

Lauder, H. (2007), "International schools, education and globalization: Towards a research agenda", in M. Hayden, J. Thompson & J. Levy (Eds.) (2007), *The SAGE handbook of research in international education* London, Sage, pp. 441–449

Palme, M. (2008), *Det kulturella kapitalet, Symboliska tillgångar i det svenska utbildningssystemet 1988-2008* [Cultural Capital. Symbolic Assets in the Swedish Education System 1988-2008]. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis

Tarc, P. (2009), "What is the 'International' in the International Baccalaureate?: Three structuring tensions of the early years (1962-1973)", *Journal of Research in International Education*, 8(3), pp. 235–261

Tarc, P. (2009), *Global dreams, enduring tensions: International Baccalaureate in a changing world.* New York, Peter Lang, 2009

Rosengren, M. (2011), *Doxologie. Essai sur la connaissance.* Paris, Broché.

Skolans internationalisering [The Internationalization of Education], Government bill to the Swedish Parliament, Prop. 1992/93:158

Wagner, A-C (1998), *Les nouvelles élites de la mondialisation. Une immigration dorée en France.* Paris, PUF

Wagner, A-C (2007), *Les classes sociales dans la mondialisation.* Paris, La Découverte

Wells, J. (2011), "International education, values and attitudes: A critical analysis of the International Baccalaureate (IB) Learner Profile", *Journal of Research in International Education*, 10(2), pp. 174–188

La *diversité culturelle* : de la défense d'une cause à la construction d'un *capital symbolique transnational*

MAURICIO BUSTAMANTE & CONSTANZA SYMMES, Universidad Internacional del Ecuador et l'EHESS-CESSP

RESUME

Nous exposerons des éléments permettant d'appréhender le contexte social de la circulation des idées entre organismes internationaux, gouvernements et acteurs non-étatiques, à la lumière de l'analyse des acteurs impliqués dans la légitimation internationale du principe de *diversité culturelle.* Ce processus de légitimation est le résultat de la mobilisation de groupes hétérogènes, qui ont su utiliser différents types de ressources discursives, associées aux divers capitaux symboliques accumulés dans leurs champs respectifs d'origine. La mobilisation de différents agents, issus de plusieurs pays, a permis la construction d'une sorte de capital symbolique transnational, qui agissait dans plusieurs espaces. Ce capital fonctionnait comme une sorte de « banque de capital symbolique » qui garantit tous les actes d'autorité des actions individuelles ou collectives de ses adhérents, permettant de dynamiser ainsi leurs actions dans l'espace transnational.
Mot clés : diversidad cultural, capital simbólico transnacional, edición independiente, circulación internacional de ideas, políticas culturales.

ABSTRACT

In this article, we will expose the social context of the circulation of ideas between international organizations, governments and non-state actors, in the light of the analysis of the actors involved in the international legitimization of the principle of cultural diversity. This legitimation process is the result of the mobilization of heterogeneous groups, which are able to use different directories of action and discursive resources, combined with various symbolic capital accumulated in their respective home fields. The mobilization of these agents allow the construction of a symbolic transnational capital. It functions as a kind of "symbolic capital

bank" that guarantees all acts of authority of its members and to stimulate their actions in the transnational space. [27]

Key words: cultural diversity; transnational symbolic capital; independent publishing; international circulation of ideas; cultural policies.

En 2005, l'Organisation des Nations unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture (UNESCO) adopte la « Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles », qui est l'aboutissement d'un processus de reconnaissance internationale de la spécificité des produits culturels[28]. La diversité culturelle est en effet devenue une véritable cause pour une grande majorité des professionnels du secteur culturel, qui voyaient dans cet instrument normatif une manière de reconnaître la valeur culturelle de ces biens, considérés comme irréductibles à leurs seules valeurs marchandes. Dès les années 1990, plusieurs tentatives d'inclure les biens et services culturels dans les accords de commerces ont été envisagées par des organisations intergouvernementales à caractère commercial telles que le GATT, l'OCDE et plus tard l'OMC.

En réponse à cette situation, des agents (hommes politiques, artistes, universitaires, etc.) vont s'engager dans une croisade pour faire de la culture une « exception ». L'UNESCO est alors investie par ce mouvement pour faire adopter, en 2001, d'abord la « Déclaration universelle de l'UNESCO sur la diversité culturelle » avant de se consacrer à la création de la Convention de 2005. Instrument plus contraignant qui réduirait, selon ses promoteurs, la propension de certains secteurs économiques de voir en la culture « une marchandise comme les autres ». Si ce processus a été viable, c'est grâce notamment à l'action collective de plusieurs agents. Parmi les plus engagés, on compte les professionnels de la culture, qui ont joué un rôle important dans la diffusion des idées. Ils ont développé un travail en réseau à différentes échelles (nationale et internationale), tout en déployant des modes d'action dans l'espace public, qui ont produit des réagencements sur la scène politique et culturelle nationale.

Les enquêtes concernant les actions collectives transnationales, comme l'affirment Dezalay et Garth[29], se sont fréquemment efforcées de théoriser ces mouvements en isolant les stratégies internationales des contextes nationaux. En les inscrivant par exemple dans des catégories à

[27] Mauricio Bustamante Fajardo est docteur en sociologie. Enseignant-chercheur à l'Universidad Internacional del Ecuador (UIDE) et membre associé du CESSP-CSE, il a participé à plusieurs projets de recherche, notamment sur les politiques culturelles, la traduction, l'édition et les pratiques culturelles. Il a soutenu en 2014 une thèse doctorale intitulée « L'UNESCO et la culture : construction d'une catégorie d'intervention internationale, du "développement culturel" à la "diversité culturelle" ». Constanza Symmes Coll est chercheuse en sociologie de la culture et notamment de l'édition. Licenciée en gouvernement, gestion publique et sciences politiques par l'Université du Chili, master en études latino-américaines (Université du Chili) et master en sociologie par l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS-Paris). Doctorante en sociologie à l'EHESS (CESSP) sous la direction de M. Yves Dezalay, elle travaille sur une thèse intitulée « Livres, Lecture et Citoyenneté culturelle : l'espace de l'édition indépendante dans un contexte de transition politique au Chili ».

[28] Ivan Bernier, « La négociation de la convention de l'UNESCO sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles » *in* Pierre Lemieux (dir.), *La diversité culturelle : Protection de la diversité des contenus culturels et des expressions artistiques*, Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006, p. 83‑129.

[29] Yves Dezalay et Bryant Garth, *La internacionalización de las luchas por el poder: La competencia entre abogados y economistas por transformar los Estados latinoamericanos*, ILSA, 2002, p. 32.

prétentions universelles telles que « communautés épistémiques[30] » ou « réseaux de défense de cause transnationaux[31] » (*Transnational Advocacy Networks*), lesquelles mettent uniquement l'accent sur le caractère international des acteurs engagés, en décrivant de manière aussi idéaliste que normative l'émergence d'une « société civile internationale[32] ». Selon Dezalay et Garth, la terminologie employée pour décrire ces acteurs n'est pas identique, même lorsque les mots sont exprimés dans la même langue, des termes équivalents peuvent dénoter différentes strates sociales[33]. Cela signifie que ces approches se limitent à souligner le caractère international des agents, laissant de côté les ressources et décisions stratégiques qu'ils doivent à leur position dans leurs champs nationaux respectifs.

Dans cette étude[34], on aborde, en premier lieu, le contexte d'émergence du principe de diversité culturelle, en essayant de décrire le travail des professionnels de la culture dans le positionnement des problématiques liées à la culture dans les négociations des accords de libre-échange. Deuxièmement, on décrira comment le secteur de l'édition indépendant rejoint un mouvement plus large des professionnels dans la « Première rencontre internationale des associations professionnelles du milieu de la culture », qui aboutit à la création d'un réseau des coalitions nationales pour la défense de la diversité culturelle. Enfin, en mobilisant le cas chilien, on souhaite analyser quels ont été les agents ayant participé à ce processus, les formes d'appropriation d'un discours « international », les stratégies d'implantation locale du débat et les effets produits par cette participation sur le repositionnement de ces agents au sein de l'espace national.

Il faut noter que ce processus se développe dans un pays dont le contexte sociopolitique et culturel est marqué par la transition vers la démocratie. Si l'on a choisi de ne pas entrer dans le débat concernant ladite « transitologie[35] », on peut cependant souligner que le processus de transition place les agents sur une scène politique, sociale et culturelle particulière, configurée selon des logiques sous-jacentes à ce processus, déterminée par l'existence de certaines « enclaves autoritaires » et par la continuité, dans la période démocratique, d'un modèle économique néolibéral mis en place sous le régime de la dictature[36].

[30] Emanuel Adler et Peter M. Haas, « Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program », *International Organization*, vol. 46, nº 1, janv. 1992.

[31] Margaret E. Keck et Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Cornell University Press, 1998.

[32] Béatrice Pouligny, « Une société civile internationale ? », *Critique internationale*, vol. 13, nº 4, 2001.

[33] Y. Dezalay et B. Garth, *La internacionalización de las luchas por el poder*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[34] Il mobilise des matériaux empiriques produits à partir de deux enquêtes dans le cadre de nos thèses de doctorat. Il s'agit d'un ensemble d'environ 80 entretiens, dont certains ont été menés conjointement par les deux chercheurs.

[35] Alfredo Joignant, « La politique des "transitologues" : Luttes politiques, enjeux théoriques et disputes intellectuelles au cours de la transition chilienne à la démocratie », *Politique et Sociétés*, vol. 24, nº 2-3, 2005.

[36] Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Hacia una nueva era política : estudio sobre las democratizaciones*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995.

La devise « la culture n'est pas une marchandise comme les autres » jouit d'un large consensus parmi les responsables publics français, depuis que la notion d'exception culturelle est apparue dans la scène internationale[37]. Les politiciens français et canadiens ont employé cet argument pour souligner l'importance de cette exception face à la marchandisation des produits culturels. Cette formule a aussi mobilisé un grand nombre d'acteurs du secteur culturel de ces deux pays, notamment lors de la négociation du Cycle d'Uruguay au sein du GATT. Concrètement, deux clauses ont été la cause de la mobilisation des professionnels de la culture : la clause du « Traitement national » (TN), et celle du « Traitement de la nation la plus favorisée » (NPF). La première consiste à accorder à toutes les entreprises (y compris les étrangères) le même traitement au niveau national. La seconde clause (NPF) établit que l'État accorde à tous ses pairs les mêmes conditions que celles qu'il concède aux plus favorisés d'entre eux. Les professionnels de la culture y voyaient une menace pour l'ensemble de la politique culturelle, largement développée en France et en Europe. À la fin des négociations, en automne 1993, la Communauté européenne (CE) reste très ouverte sur la majorité des services, mais ne prit aucun engagement de libéralisation dans les secteurs de la culture, de la santé et de l'éducation.

C'est à la suite de l'appel du monde artistique, notamment français et belge, que les négociations se sont ébranlées, obligeant en partie, sous la pression des pouvoirs publics de ces deux pays, de reconsidérer la position de la CE, comme l'affirme Claude Michel, représentant de Fédération nationale des syndicats du spectacle, de l'audiovisuel et de l'action culturelle (FNSAC) :

> « On avait organisé un train au parlement à Strasbourg, déjà avec Jack Ralite, qui était un peu le moteur, mais avec beaucoup d'autres à l'époque. Il y avait même de gens comme Catherine Deneuve, Gérard Depardieu, de grosses têtes d'affiche chez les artistes, des réalisateurs comme Bertrand Tavernier, etc. Il y avait tellement des têtes d'affiche en 93, on a tellement fait monter la sauce que le négociateur européen, Leon Brittan[38], qui était un anglais très libéral, ultra libéral, a été obligé de prendre en compte la position du monde professionnel et la position du monde de la politique, qui était très portée par la France. Mais pas seulement, on a été aidés pas mal par les Belges, pas d'autres évidemment. Et Leon Brittan a été obligé de négocier avec le négociateur américain, quelque chose, qu'on a appelé l'exception culturelle, qui était très mal connu et très mal compris ».[39]

[37] Bernard Gournay, *Exception culturelle et mondialisation*, Presses de Sciences Po, 2002, 131 p ; Serge Regourd, *L'exception culturelle*, Paris, PUF, 2004.

[38] Leon Brittan, avocat et politicien anglais né en 1939 à Londres au sein d'une famille juive lituanienne. Il a étudié le droit au Trinity College de Cambridge, considéré comme le plus aristocratique des collèges de Cambridge. Il est élu membre de la Chambre des Communes en 1974. Entre 1979 et 1981, il a été ministre de l'Intérieur puis nommé Secrétaire du Trésor par Margaret Thatcher. Il est renommé ministre de l'Intérieur en 1983, puis ministre du Commerce en 1986. En 1989, il devient membre de la Commission européenne, où il fut nommé vice-président.

[39] Entretien réalisé à Paris, le 26 juillet 2011.

Cependant, l'histoire reprend en 1998 dans la négociation de l'Accord multilatéral sur l'investissement (AMI) au sein de l'OCDE. Le projet d'accord avait pour objectif de donner aux investisseurs étrangers les mêmes droits que les investisseurs nationaux. Le projet de l'AMI est perçu par les professionnels de la culture comme une claire tentative de démantèlement des modalités nationales de régulation publique. Ils y voient une forme de perte des acquis que leur garantissait la perpétuation de leurs métiers dans le territoire national. L'AMI envisageait la libre circulation des services, ce qui incluait l'exportation, l'importation, la distribution de films et autres enregistrements à destination des salles de cinéma ou de la télévision[40]. Dans ce contexte, les syndicats français, essentiellement du secteur audiovisuel, commencent à se regrouper et à se mobiliser, attentifs aux négociations qui touchaient la culture. Cette fois-ci, ils iront plus loin en créant le « Comité de vigilance sur l'OMC et les négociations internationales » avec l'objectif « d'être vigilant par rapport aux offensives états-uniennes sur le champ de la culture […], le comité était là pour préserver l'exception culturelle[41] ». Ce comité donnera lieu, quelques années plus tard, à la Coalition française pour la diversité culturelle.

Le Comité de vigilance va au-delà d'une simple action collective de protestation et se constitue comme mouvement social, ce dernier étant conçu comme une interaction prolongée entre les personnes détentrices du pouvoir et celles qui ne le détiennent pas[42]. Les participants impliqués dans ce mouvement portent leurs revendications devant les autorités et, en même temps, affirment une forme d'identité collective fondée sur leurs trajectoires en tant que groupement de professionnels de la culture, et en se présentant comme acteurs appartenant à un groupe de la « société civile ». Ces groupes donnent, avec grande efficacité, une visibilité à leurs revendications et contribuent à la construction d'une identité propre leur permettant de compenser le manque de ressources politiques pour promouvoir leurs requêtes[43].

D'une manière générale, les contestations collectives et les actions entreprises au sein d'un mouvement se structurent en fonction de répertoires d'actions collectives alternatives, historiquement constituées[44]. Les actions qu'ils entreprennent pour faire entendre leurs revendications devant les pouvoirs publics ne cherchent pas nécessairement la mobilisation massive de citoyens. Formées par des personnalités du monde artistique, ces « têtes d'affiche » dotent leurs revendications d'une grande visibilité dans l'espace public et deviennent des acteurs particulièrement privilégiés et écoutés par le pouvoir politique. Les professionnels de la culture sont dès lors en mesure, dans les limites de leurs ressources symboliques, « d'imposer

[40] Jean-Michel Baer, « L'exception culturelle. Une règle en quête de contenus », *En temps réel*, nº 11, oct. 2003.

[41] Entretien réalisé avec Claude Michel à Paris, le 26 juillet 2011.

[42] Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow et Doug McAdam, « Pour une cartographie de la politique contestataire », *Politix*, vol. 11, nº 41, 1998.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, First Edition Stated., Mcgraw-Hill College, 1978, 384 p ; Doug McAdam, « Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency », *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, nº 6, 1 déc. 1983.

(voire inculquer) des instruments de connaissance et d'expression (taxinomies) arbitraires (mais ignorés comme tels) de la réalité sociale[45] ».

En utilisant la croyance constitutive du champ culturel, souvent sans se rendre compte de sa véritable valeur de pouvoir (comme instrument rassembleur des intérêts communs), les professionnels de la culture réagissent contre ce qu'ils considèrent comme des menaces venues du champ économique ou, pour être plus explicite, comme l'imposition de la croyance constitutive du champ économique. La « culture n'est pas une marchandise comme les autres » est une assertion qui dépasse la simple constatation de la valeur intrinsèque des produits culturels, elle touche le système des croyances fondatrices du champ culturel, le système de croyances souvent revendiqué par les producteurs culturels les plus engagés.

En effet, les professionnels de la culture ont su notamment mobiliser des ressources symboliques spécifiques pour constituer un capital symbolique collectif consolidé. À cet égard, selon Bourdieu « toute espèce de capital (économique, culturel, social) tend (à des degrés différents) à fonctionner comme capital symbolique [...] lorsqu'il obtient une reconnaissance explicite ou pratique, celle d'un habitus structuré selon les mêmes structures que l'espace où il s'est engendré[46] ». Cela signifie que le capital symbolique (l'honneur, l'honorabilité, le prestige, la réputation) est la forme dans laquelle se transforme toute espèce de capital, car elle est méconnue comme telle, c'est-à-dire en tant que force, pouvoir (réel ou potentiel), par conséquent, reconnus comme légitime ou, du moins, marqué d'une certaine légitimité.

Ce capital représente la possession d'une forme de connaissance et de reconnaissance par les autres, mais aussi, comme l'affirme Pierre Bourdieu, la détention du « pouvoir de reconnaître, de consacrer, de parler avec succès de ce qui mérite d'être connu et reconnu et, plus généralement, de dire ce qui est, ou mieux encore, de dire en quoi consiste ce qui est, ce qu'il faut penser, par le biais d'une manière performative de dire (ou de prédire)[47] ». Ces agents se définissent ainsi en tant que « professionnels de la culture », et ils vont se positionner d'une manière affirmée face aux décideurs politiques, en mettant toutes les ressources symboliques cumulées dans leurs champs de production respectifs pour mener à bon port leurs revendications.

Si ce mouvement prend forme d'abord en Europe, le monde culturel canadien commence également, à partir de 1999, à s'organiser en opposition à l'AMI et fonde, peu de temps après, la Coalition canadienne pour la diversité culturelle. La ministre canadienne de l'époque, Sheila Copps, va établir une étroite relation avec le secteur des collectifs professionnels de la culture. Consciente de la place secondaire qu'occupe son portefeuille ministériel, elle comprend rapidement la force que peut donner à sa gestion le débat autour de la diversité culturelle, comme le souligne Charles Vallerand, président de l'époque de la Fédération internationale des Coalitions pour la Diversité culturelle (FICDC) :

[45] Pierre Bourdieu, « Sur le pouvoir symbolique », *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, vol. 32, nº 3, 1977.

[46] Pierre Bourdieu, *Méditations pascaliennes*, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 285.

[47] *Ibid.*

> « Au début du mouvement en faveur de la Déclaration et puis d'un instrument international pour protéger vraiment la diversité culturelle, le responsable politique canadien, la ministre qu'à l'époque, s'appelait Sheila Copps, comprenait toute l'importance d'aller chercher des appuis dans l'opinion publique et dans les mouvements de la société civile, qui sont essentiellement des associations professionnelles, pour qu'elle puise de son côté avoir davantage de pouvoir, de poids politique auprès de ses collègues, qui sont les membres du cabinet, les membres du gouvernement, puisqu'on sait bien que dans la plupart des pays – sauf exception – le ministre de la Culture, c'est un ministre qui n'a pas beaucoup d'influence, qui n'a pas beaucoup d'importance, qui n'a pas beaucoup de budgets. »[48]

En effet, à partir d'une lecture stratégique, Copps engage son soutien à la Coalition en l'appuyant pour la réalisation de la « Première rencontre internationale des associations professionnelles du milieu de la culture » ayant eu lieu à Montréal, en septembre 2001, espace à partir duquel ces associations construiront une plateforme internationale[49]. Sous le titre de « Diversité culturelle, Politiques culturelles et Accords internationaux de commerces », annonçant les trois grands axes du débat, cette rencontre a un caractère embryonnaire dans l'articulation d'un réseau associatif des professionnels de la culture au niveau mondial, qui comptait sur la participation d'une soixantaine d'organisations venues de douze pays.

Au cours de ces rencontres, associées aux initiatives du Réseau international sur la politique culturelle (RIPC)[50] et des pays francophones, la notion de diversité culturelle remplace celle d'exception culturelle qui avait une connotation élitiste et défensive de la culture. Ford de l'appui de ces réseaux, l'UNESCO réaffirme à travers la défense de la cause de diversité culturelle son autorité symbolique. En effet, l'efficacité symbolique du principe de diversité culturelle s'articule dans la relation complexe des propriétés du discours, des individus qui l'énoncent et de l'institution qui autorise à le prononcer.[51] Le processus d'élaboration et de légitimation de ce principe est le résultat de la mobilisation de groupes hétérogènes, qui ont su utiliser différents types de ressources discursives, associées aux divers capitaux symboliques accumulés dans leurs champs respectifs d'origine (culturel, politique, associatif, *etc.*).

Le principe de diversité culturelle s'impose en effet par l'argument selon lequel, pour éviter la standardisation des produits culturels et en conséquence, l'homogénéisation des visions du monde, il faut agir à l'aide de politiques publiques afin de préserver les identités nationales et la cohésion sociale. L'UNESCO est aussi perçue comme la seule institution capable de freiner l'avancement des initiatives entreprises au sein des organisations à vocation commerciale. L'UNESCO devient par la suite une véritable agora qui prendra en charge la promotion d'un débat international sur la situation des industries culturelles et les politiques culturelles. Si la

[48] Entretien réalisé à Paris, le 1er décembre 2010.

[49] Ils vont se réunir par la suite à Paris (2003), à Séoul (2004), à nouveau à Paris (2005), puis à Madrid (2005).

[50] Créé à Ottawa 1998, ce réseau réunit des ministres de la culture et des hauts fonctionnaires, venant d'une quarantaine de pays. Il s'agit des rencontres informelles, qui s'emploient à inscrire la culture parmi les questions de politique à l'ordre du jour internationale. Ils se rencontreront par la suite en Afrique du Sud (2002), en Croatie (2003), en Chine (2004), au Sénégal (2005), au Brésil (2006) et en Espagne (2007).

[51] Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire : L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, Fayard, 1982, p. 111.

notion de diversité culturelle s'affiche dorénavant comme un standard de l'Organisation, c'est parce qu'elle a rencontré une dynamique favorable entre la volonté de certains États et la profonde conviction des professionnels de la culture en voie de transnationalisation, qui ont conduit cette institution à s'affirmer comme tribune pour la défense de la cause de la diversité culturelle[52].

À partir des capitaux des individus s'impliquant dans la défense de la diversité culturelle s'amorce la configuration d'un *capital symbolique transnational*, qui circule par des espaces à différentes échelles (nationale, internationale). Agissant comme une sorte de « banque de capital symbolique » qui garantit tous les actes d'autorité, le mouvement des professionnels de la culture, structuré autour des capitaux individuels des personnalités qui défendent la cause de la diversité, fonctionne comme une instance symbolique qui accrédite, soutient, reconnaît et légitime, les actions individuelles ou collectives de ses adhérents. Les actions entreprises par ces derniers leur ouvrent également des possibilités de produire des effets politiques relativement durables, dans la mesure où la reconnaissance résultante de l'accumulation du capital en question leur ouvre la possibilité de former des alliances fondées sur une idéologie ou des intérêts communs avec les membres du monde politique, renforçant davantage son caractère de pouvoir. Ces alliances ont aussi la capacité de faire irruption dans la routine des processus politiques, c'est effectivement lorsqu'existent des institutions démocratiques stables et une compétition politique ouverte que les stratégies et revendications des mouvements sociaux ont le plus de chance d'être reprises[53].

L'INTERNATIONALISATION COMME STRATEGIE COLLECTIVE DE RESISTANCE

L'Association des Éditeurs indépendants du Chili est un acteur impliqué dans la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle. Elle émerge dans le cadre d'un processus plus large de recomposition de l'espace éditorial international, accéléré, depuis les années 1990, par la chute du mur de Berlin et l'intensification de la circulation transnationale de biens symboliques[54]. Or, ce processus d'accroissement et de multiplication des échanges commerciaux des produits culturels ne transforme pas le mode asymétrique de circulation de ces derniers[55]. En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement le marché du livre, la forte tendance à la concentration des marques éditoriales coexiste avec le surgissement permanent de projets éditoriaux alternatifs[56].

[52] Mauricio Bustamante, *L'UNESCO et la culture : construction d'une catégorie d'intervention internationale, du « développement culturel » à la « diversité culturelle »*, thèse de doctorat en sociologie sous la direction de Gisèle Sapiro, EHESS, 2014.

[53] C. Tilly, S. Tarrow et D. McAdam, « Pour une cartographie de la politique contestataire », *art. cit.*, p. 14.

[54] Gisèle Sapiro (dir.), *Les contradictions de la globalisation éditoriale*, Paris, Nouveau Monde, 2009.

[55] Sur l'asymétrie des échanges, voir : Johan Heilbron, « Échanges culturels transnationaux et mondialisation : quelques réflexions », *Regards sociologiques*, nº 22, 2001 ; Gisèle Sapiro (dir.), *Translatio : Le marché de la traduction en France à l'heure de la mondialisation*, CNRS, 2008.

[56] Sophie Noël, *L'Édition indépendante critique : engagements politiques et intellectuels*, Lyon, ENSSIB, 2012.

Dans ce contexte, les éditeurs indépendants chiliens développent leurs projets éditoriaux, élaborent leurs catalogues et se constituent en tant que nouveau pôle de production. S'il s'agit bien d'une participation mettant en relief l'action collective, le leadership de Paulo Slachevsky, éditeur de *Lom Ediciones*, semble central dans ce développement[57]. Paulo Slachevsky, 50 ans, grandit au sein d'une famille exilée en France, mais il maintient un contact régulier avec son pays. Au milieu des années 1980, il entreprend le travail de photographe indépendant, rejoint l'Association des photographes indépendants (AFI) et couvre la protestation des dernières années du régime d'Augusto Pinochet[58]. En 1990, il fonde avec son épouse *Lom*, une petite maison d'édition familiale qui s'est fait remarquer pour la richesse de son catalogue, structuré en genres peu commerciaux tels que les sciences sociales, la fiction, la poésie, les essais et la photographie.

Au cours des années 1990, Slachevsky rencontre[59], à plusieurs reprises, d'autres éditeurs, avec qui, il crée un collectif régional en 1998 – *Editores Independientes* – formé par quatre maisons d'édition relativement similaires en ce qui concerne leur taille et leur projet éditorial, en l'occurrence *Lom* (Chili, 1990), *Era* (Mexique, 1960), *Trilce* (Uruguay, 1985) et *Txalaparta* (Espagne, Pays Basque, 1986). Ce travail en réseau sera étendu au Chili et deviendra l'Association des Éditeurs indépendants du Chili[60], que Slachevsky a présidée à trois occasions (2000, 2004, 2012). Par ailleurs, cette mise en réseau va s'élargir à un circuit international en 2001 avec la création de l'Alliance internationale des Éditeurs indépendants[61]. Par ce parcours engagé, Slachevsky a été décoré, en 2005, de la médaille de chevalier de l'ordre des Arts et des Lettres du ministère de la Culture français.

Pour expliquer le contexte dans lequel surgissent ces agents, la théorie des champs élaborée par Pierre Bourdieu se révèle pertinente[62]. Elle consiste en un modèle organisé autour de l'opposition entre, d'un côté, un *pôle de grande production* et de l'autre un *pôle de production restreinte*. Dans le premier cas, les critères commerciaux sont prédominants alors que dans le second cas, la production est régie par des critères intellectuels et/ou esthétiques. Les éditeurs indépendants s'inscrivent dans le second pôle et affichent des valeurs associées à la pluralité et à la nature des œuvres produites[63] dont la majorité, d'un faible intérêt commercial, ne serait pas

[57] Constanza Symmes Coll, *La dimension culturelle de la transition politique chilienne : Le cas de la maison d´éditions Lom*, Mémoire de M2 en sociologie sous la direction d'Yves Dezalay, EHESS, Paris, 2009. Voir aussi: Constanza Symmes, « Fundar la Asociación de Editores Independientes de Chile: Una estrategia de resistencia colectiv*a », Comunicación y Medios*. nº 27, p. 128-145, 2013.

[58] Sur son travail photographique voir l´entretien avec Paulo Slachevsy « Le Chili 1973-2013, récits de photographes», http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/miriam-rosen/091013/le-chili-1973-2013-recits-de-photographes-5.

[59] À Francfort (1996), au festival du livre ibéro-américain à Gijón (1998), entre autres.

[60] Fondée au départ par sept d'entre elles : *Lom*, *Cesoc*, *Cuarto Propio*, *Cuatro Vientos*, *Dolmen*, *Pehuén* y *Ril*. L'association adopte en 2003 le nom d'« Editores de Chile, Asociación de Editores independientes, Universitarios y Autónomos ». Actuellement, elle compte près de cinquante membres, représentant la plupart de l'édition nationale.

[61] L'*Alliance internationale des éditeurs indépendants* constitue la référence mondiale dans le monde de l'édition indépendante. Créée à Paris en 2001, elle est structurée en aires linguistiques.

[62] Pierre Bourdieu, « La production de la croyance », *ARSS*, vol. 13, nº 1, 1977 ; « Une révolution conservatrice dans l'édition », *ARSS*, nº 126-127, mars 1999.

[63] Auteurs méconnus ou oubliés, genres peu commerciaux et divers tels que la poésie et les enquêtes sociales.

publiée par le *pôle de grande production,* représenté au Chili par les éditeurs faisant partie de la Chambre chilienne du Livre. Chaque pôle d'acteurs justifie son existence depuis la position – non figée ni permanente – qu'il occupe à l'intérieur du champ éditorial chilien.

La Chambre chilienne du Livre, créée en 1950, est une association corporative réunissant une centaine de membres, entrepreneurs de l'édition, distributeurs, libraires et organisateurs de vente directe. La Chambre jouit d'un prestige lié à son ancienneté dans le champ, qui fait d'elle une institution connue et reconnue. D'autre part, ce prestige s'explique par les relations qu'elle cultive avec les grands groupes transnationaux d'édition présents dans le pays, dont ils font partie de la Chambre. Parmi eux, on peut mentionner le *Grupo Planeta, le Fondo de Cultura Económica, le Grupo Santillana, la Random House Mondadori et Mc Graw Hill.*

Le projet associatif des éditeurs indépendants leur permet de développer des stratégies collectives pour affronter les difficultés rencontrées dans le cadre de la globalisation éditoriale[64]. S'il est évident que le cadre de régulation du milieu culturel est spécifique à chaque pays, il n'en reste pas moins que ce travail en réseau dote les éditeurs indépendants d'un répertoire d'outils communs, allant des diagnostics, des chiffres, un programme de travail, des matériaux juridiques et des propositions législatives, jusqu'à atteindre la constitution d'un langage et d'un dispositif conceptuel partagés.

La réalisation progressive de diverses rencontres[65] et d'échanges d'expériences avec d'autres éditeurs de différents pays, rend possible, pour les *Éditeurs indépendants*, la construction successive d'éléments permettant de se penser à partir de plusieurs optiques, tant depuis le lieu propre qu'ils détiennent dans l'espace culturel national que depuis la position que l'édition indépendante occupe au niveau mondial. C'est par cette grande visibilité que la Coalition canadienne pour la diversité culturelle passe par l'Association des Éditeurs indépendants pour amorcer une prise de contact avec les associations professionnelles de la culture chiliennes, qui seront invitées à la « Première rencontre internationale des associations professionnelles du milieu de la culture ». La délégation chilienne à Montréal était formée par quatre organisations : SIDARTE, le Syndicat des acteurs du Chili, représenté par Mané Nett ; Nano Acevedo pour le Syndicat national des Travailleurs de la Musique du Chili (SITMUCH) ; Bruno Bettati, représentant l'Association des Producteurs de Cinéma et de Télévision du Chili ; et l'Association des Éditeurs indépendants, en la personne de Paulo Slachevsky. C'est la première fois que ces associations chiliennes se réunissent. Elles n'avaient pas forgé de lien allant au-delà d'une simple reconnaissance mutuelle en tant qu'appartenant au même « milieu culturel » national et la connaissance de ce que chacun faisait dans son propre domaine restait minimale.

L'axe thématique central de la réunion de Montréal tournait autour de la diversité culturelle, question alors presqu'inconnue des groupes chiliens. Si l'idée selon laquelle le marché ne devait

[64] G. Sapiro et al., *Les contradictions de la globalisation éditoriale*, *op. cit.*

[65] Depuis la rencontre « Los editores independientes del mundo latino y la Bibliodiversidad » (Guadalajara, 2005), en passant par le « Congrès du Groupe Interaméricain des Éditeurs » (Madrid, 2006), la rencontre des « Éditeurs indépendants » (Gijón, 2007), le Séminaire international « Hacia una política de integración del Libro latinoamericano » (Santiago, 2007), entre autres.

pas être la dimension déterminante de leur activité était déjà présente, ils ne disposaient pas, pour leur argumentaire, d'une esquisse conceptuelle et juridique qu'ils développeraient plus tard. La Rencontre de Montréal joue ainsi un rôle important dans la visualisation de problématiques communes et permet de développer de lignes d'action à mettre en œuvre collectivement. Le débat étant, pour les éditeurs chiliens, particulièrement évocateurs, il leur permet d'élargir leur horizon d'action, comme l'affirme Mané Nett, actrice au théâtre et à la télévision, qui représentait le Syndicat des acteurs du Chili :

> « Nous étions quatre représentants pour le Chili et là, nous nous sommes rendu compte, réellement, du fait que le travail que nous faisions au Chili au niveau des associations professionnelles de la culture était, de manière évidente, dirigé vers l'intérieur, très politique de l'autruche, que nous étions en train de nous regarder nous-mêmes, sans plus. Nous ne voyions pas ce qui se passait dans le monde. Et donc, nous avons commencé à nous rendre compte qu'il y avait une quantité énorme d'éléments, au niveau international, concernant la culture, dont nous n'avions pas idée. »[66].

Comme le suggère Nett, la Rencontre pousse les associations à réaliser jusqu'à quel point elles se trouvaient tournées vers la situation locale et à reconnaître leur désengagement des problématiques que leurs pairs travaillaient au niveau mondial, leur permettant de se voir depuis une autre perspective. L'aspect fondamental de cette journée est son caractère fédératif, instituant un espace d'appartenance symbolique : « le réseau international des Associations de Professionnels de la Culture » (APC). La rencontre de Montréal constitue, pour les associations chiliennes, un tournant qui consolide le récit de leur mémoire institutionnelle, plus ou moins partagée, qui a des effets sur leurs trajectoires individuelles et collectives. Ce réseau permet la création d'un espace concret de référence, support de circulation d'informations et lieu de réflexion d'un ensemble d'instruments (concepts, manifestes, données chiffrées, outils juridiques, etc.) que les associations mobilisent dans leur environnement local. Dans ce sens, Slachevsky rappelle comme la Rencontre le conduit à s'impliquer directement dans le débat sur la diversité culturelle, déterminant sa « prise de conscience et [montrant] le chemin pour les associations culturelles chiliennes qui font face aux traités de libre-échange, sur le point d'être signé [entre le Chili] et l'Union européenne et les États-Unis[67] ».

Cette lecture de l'espace international conduit les associations chiliennes à rédiger une déclaration immédiatement après leur retour à Santiago, intitulée : « Sauvegarder la liberté d'action de l'État chilien dans le domaine de la culture ». Les APC chiliennes se positionnent ainsi sur la scène des négociations, déjà en cours, d'un accord de libre-échange avec les États-Unis. Cette déclaration traduit les principaux débats et inquiétudes dans ce contexte national. Quelques semaines plus tard, en octobre 2001, les associations se constituent en Coalition chilienne pour la diversité culturelle (CDC), la deuxième à apparaître après la coalition

[66] Entretien réalisé en juillet 2009.

[67] Ouvrage collectif, *Des paroles et des actes pour la bibliodiversité*, Paris, Alliance des éditeurs indépendants, 2006, p. 57.

canadienne. Les associations choisissent un directoire, Paulo Slachevsky est élu président et Mané Nett, vice-présidente. La Coalition amorce de suite la préparation d'un programme et se mobilise en affirmant la nécessité d'obtenir une clause de sauvegarde de la culture dans l'accord de libre-échange avec les États-Unis.

Comme on peut l'observer, si les participants chiliens s'identifient rapidement à la lutte contre « la globalisation marchande de la culture », la majorité de leurs initiatives sont profondément enracinées dans des formes nationales d'activisme, développées dans le contexte particulier de la politique locale. Selon Tarrow, l'activisme transnational ne surgit pas comme simple réponse à la globalisation, car les agents identifient des problèmes, formulent des revendications, mobilisent les ressources nécessaires et profitent des opportunités dans des espaces politiques à différentes échelles comme, par exemple, la création de coalitions transfrontières. Les processus de l'activisme transnational lient efficacement les questions mondiales aux problèmes nationaux. L'internationalisation de la contestation contribue à établir une diffusion transnationale des stratégies et tactiques, qui tendent à se projeter vers le haut pour faire entendre leurs revendications[68]. Bien que les prises de décisions des organisations intergouvernementales, comme l'UNESCO, soient encadrées par les États, les débats sur la *diversité culturelle* entamés à l'UNESCO montrent bien qu'elles offrent de nouveaux espaces pour l'activisme transnational. Les APC peuvent ainsi à leur tour faire pression sur les États pour qu'ils réévaluent leurs positions au sein des organisations intergouvernementales.

HOMOLOGIE STRUCTURALE DE POSITIONS D'UN ESPACE TRANSNATIONAL

Dans le cas chilien, pays caractérisé par une forte ouverture économique[69] entreprise par les gouvernements démocratiques, l'irruption de la question de la diversité culturelle dans l'agenda politique coïncide avec le dernier cycle de négociation d'un accord de libre-échange avec les États-Unis. En mobilisant le principe de la diversité culturelle, présent dans l'espace transnational, les professionnels chiliens de la culture introduisent de nouveaux arguments dans la négociation de l'accord de libre-échange. Ils se constituent en une sorte de médiateurs permanents entre le champ politique et le champ culturel, car ils se conçoivent bien comme représentants de la « société civile », porteurs d'une dimension publique de la culture, qui leur donnent de la légitimité aux yeux des agents politiques. L'action de la, désormais, Coalition chilienne pour la diversité culturelle (CDC) se traduit concrètement en trois phases. Une première phase durant laquelle elle s'efforce de s'approprier un discours expert. Une deuxième correspondant au développement de stratégies pour donner de la visibilité à leurs points de vue à travers de la multiplication d'échanges avec divers acteurs engagés dans le débat. En dernier lieu, une action visant à ce que cette visibilité oblige les pouvoirs publics à se positionner vis-à-vis de leurs revendications.

[68] Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[69] Le Chili a signé environ 21 accords commerciaux avec 58 pays. Source : www.direcon.gob.cl

D'acteur relativement peu visible dans l'espace politique chilien, la CDC finit par se constituer en un véritable *lobbying* national qui se situe en opposition aux pressions d'autres réseaux internationaux de groupe d'intérêt, en particulier la Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA). Cette dernière s'immisce dans les négociations alors que la CDC fait pression sur le gouvernement chilien pour repenser la problématique culturelle, notamment en ce qui concerne le statut des produits culturels dans le cadre de l'accord de libre-échange en cours de négociation avec les États-Unis (2000-2003). En effet, les représentants de la Coalition chilienne amorcent un dialogue avec des responsables et des négociateurs de la Direction générale des Relations économiques internationales (DIRECON)[70], département dépendant du ministère des Relations extérieures, qui était chargé d'achever l'accord de libre-échange.

Si les négociateurs de la DIRECON ne sont pas des agents particulièrement réceptifs à la thèse de la CDC, cette dernière jouissait bien de la sympathie de quelques membres du gouvernement et du sénat, la DIRECON cherche alors à introduire des exemptions pour le secteur culturel. Face à cette posture du Chili, les groupes de pression des grandes industries américaines se mêlent des négociations, comme en témoigne un fonctionnaire chilien, qui faisait partie du groupe de négociateurs :

> « L'industrie du cinéma des États-Unis amorça d'intenses manœuvres devant l'Ambassade chilienne à Washington pour empêcher que le Chili réalise une action de ce type [en référence aux exemptions]. Ces actions inclurent une visite de Jack Valenti, président de l'American Motion Pictures [sic], à l'ambassadeur Bianchi, pour lui affirmer que si le Chili persévérait dans son attitude […], il interviendrait personnellement devant le Sénat des États-Unis pour empêcher l'approbation de l'accord de libre-échange ».[71]

Si ces manœuvres n'ont finalement pas atteint leur but, la manière dont les groupes d'intérêt américain les ont menées montre bien l'importance du secteur culturel dans les négociations de ce type d'accords pour l'industrie audiovisuelle nord-américaine. Dans ce contexte de forte pression américaine, la Coalition chilienne se rapproche de la DIRECON, car « [elle] savait que les États-Unis avaient un intérêt offensif sur le sujet et [la Coalition] préférait une exception du style du Canada. La DIRECON devait équilibrer les intérêts internes les plus offensifs – d'exportateurs de services et de biens culturels – avec les intérêts défensifs de la Coalition[72] ». L'équilibre des intérêts auquel fait allusion cette déclaration rend finalement compte de la tension entre commerce et culture, constat sur lequel est érigé l'ensemble du débat de la diversité culturelle et par lequel se nourrit la revendication de la part des associations de professionnels de la culture d'une revitalisation de l'action des États.

[70] La DIRECOM, créée par décret en avril 1979, est une institution cherchant l'ouverture de nouveaux marchés pour les entreprises chiliennes, tout en veillant à faire de même à l'intérieur de leurs frontières. *Cf.* www.direcon.gob.cl

[71] Entretien avec un négociateur chilien de l'accord, juin 2010. Il s'agit d'un avocat, actuellement conseiller à la DIRECON. Il est spécialisé dans les relations avec société civile, notamment sur les questions liées au droit du travail et le commerce international.

[72] *Ibid.*

On essaye de montrer ici que des oppositions entre groupes d'intérêt des réseaux transnationaux s'installent également dans le débat national. Les dispositifs normatifs – d'établissement de règles pour la circulation de biens culturels – sont des espaces de luttes de pouvoir pour imposer une vision légitime du monde social. Si les négociateurs et *lobbyistes* consacrent tant d'efforts à tenter de défendre – ou imposer – leur conception du monde, c'est parce que se trouve au centre des négociations, non seulement des intérêts financiers, mais aussi parce que le résultat de ces luttes affecte directement leur position dans leurs espaces nationaux, aussi bien dans le marché émergent de l'expertise que dans les hiérarchies professionnelles[73]. L'accord de libre-échange signé n'incorpore pas tous les énoncés de la Coalition, mais une réserve concernant la culture, avec les États-Unis, par laquelle le Chili se donne le droit de développer des politiques publiques en la matière, est négociée avec succès. À son tour, en 2005, le gouvernement chilien sera favorable à la création, au sein de l'UNESCO, de la Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles, que le Congrès chilien ratifiera deux ans plus tard.

La création de la Coalition chilienne pour la diversité culturelle s'inscrit dans un mouvement plus large activé à partir de la « Première rencontre internationale des associations professionnelles du milieu de la culture » à Montréal en 2001, point de départ de la conception et de la propagation du modèle des coalitions[74]. À partir de là, le monde culturel associatif commence à exiger des gouvernements une participation plus énergique dans la sauvegarde de la culture comme problème d'intérêt public et national, qui s'est retrouvé en un moment de convergence de deux dimensions : nationale et internationale. Au niveau national, le gouvernement chilien négociait un accord de libre-échange avec le pays le moins disposé à concéder un statut particulier à la culture ; en même temps, il concevait une nouvelle institution publique pour celle-ci : le Conseil national de la Culture et des Arts[75]. Au niveau international, le gouvernement chilien devait se prononcer sur la Convention sur la diversité culturelle, en cours de négociation au sein de l'UNESCO.

Dans ce processus, plusieurs agents interviennent pour faire valoir leurs points de vue. C'est un espace transnational qui s'est forgé dans ce processus, car les échanges entre les agents ne se limitent pas aux frontières nationales. Ceci peut s'expliquer à la lumière du concept d'homologie structurale entre deux espaces que Dezalay et Garth utilisent pour analyser les stratégies présentes dans les importations et exportations d'expertise entre champs nationaux différents, à savoir des États-Unis vers l'Amérique latine. Les auteurs postulent qu'en fonction du degré d'homologie structurale pouvant exister entre deux champs de pouvoir à un moment

[73] Yves Dezalay, « Multinationales de l'expertise et "dépérissement de l'État" », *ARSS*, vol. 96, nº 96-97, 1933.

[74] En 2005, il est créé le « Comité international de Liaison des Coalitions pour la Diversité culturelle », qui aboutit à la création en 2007, durant le Congrès constitutif de Séville, de la « Fédération internationale des Coalitions pour la Diversité culturelle » (FICDC). Cette fédération compte parmi ses membres fondateurs quarante-deux coalitions nationales et comprend plus de 600 organisations de professionnelles de la culture.

[75] Voir à ce propos Maite De Cea, « Genèse d'une institution publique pour la culture au Chili : le Conseil national de la culture et les arts » *in* Philippe Poirrier (dir.), *Pour une histoire des politiques culturelles dans le monde, 1945-2011*, Paris, Documentation française, 2011, p. 133‑154.

spécifique de leur histoire, une alliance – même précaire – s'affirme entre importateurs et exportateurs d'un savoir expert[76].

Dans le cas analysé ici, il s'agit d'une forme d'homologie structurale de positions entre groupes appartenant à des espaces transnationaux complexes, interagissant à différentes échelles (organisations intergouvernementales, États, réseaux internationaux de groupes d'influence et secteurs culturels nationaux). Ils sont en lutte dans différents espaces pour faire valoir leurs visions sur le traitement international de la culture. Les points de convergence et d'opposition sont, bien entendu, la défense de postulats qu'ils considèrent comme légitimes, qui prennent l'apparence de véritables « opérateurs axiologiques », c'est-à-dire, des formes de catégories éthiques de l'entendement scolastique, conférant aux systèmes d'opposition, leur *sens*, dans la double acception de signification et d'orientation dans un espace social déterminé[77]. Ces luttes symboliques internationales, incarnées dans l'objection ou l'adhésion à certains principes, peuvent être considérées comme une sorte d'interaction horizontale entre agents (institutions et individus) qui cautionnent des initiatives pour consolider leur position dans leur espace d'appartenance (voir Tableau 1). Il s'agit des agents qui rivalisent dans des espaces possédant des dynamiques et des structures de fonctionnement différent : supranational, international ou national.

INTERACTION HORIZONTALE

INTERACTION VERTICALE

ÉCHELLE	Espaces d'homologie de positions	Exemples d'oppositions dans les espaces	
Supranationale	Entre organisations intergouvernementales	UNESCO	OMC, OCDE
Internationale	Entre États	France, Canada	États-Unis
Transnationale	Entre réseaux internationaux de groupes d'intérêt	Fédération internationale de Coalitions pour la diversité culturelle	Entreprises multinationales (ex. *Motion Pictures Association of America*)
Nationale	Entre pôles de production (ex. secteur éditorial au Chili)	Éditeurs indépendants du Chili (pôle de production restreinte)	Chambre chilienne du livre (pôle de grande production)

Tableau 1 : Espaces d'homologie de positions des agents dans un espace transnational.

Si les Éditeurs indépendants du Chili ne font peut-être pas le poids face aux initiatives entreprises au sein de l'OMC, ces éditeurs peuvent interagir de manière verticale avec d'autres agents lorsqu'ils trouvent des points d'entente sur la gouvernance mondiale de la culture. Ainsi, le principe de diversité culturelle, élaboré dans une organisation internationale, soutenu à ses débuts par certains pays (particulièrement le Canada et la France), diffusé par les coalitions

[76] Y. Dezalay et B. Garth, *La internacionalización de las luchas por el poder*, *op. cit.*

[77] Gisèle Sapiro, « Le savant et le littéraire » *in* J. Heilbron, R. Lenoir et G. Sapiro (dirs.), *Pour une histoire des sciences sociales : Hommage à Pierre Bourdieu*, Paris, Fayard, 2004, p. 91.

internationales de professionnels de la culture, revendiquée localement par des associations nationales, revient à l'Organisation qui l'a conçu, auréolé d'un capital symbolique constitué dans sa trajectoire et par sa reconnaissance transnationale. D'autant plus qu'en défendant leurs visions du monde, les agents revalorisent également la position qu'ils occupent dans leur champ dont ils sont issus, grâce à l'accumulation d'un capital symbolique transnational.

L'hypothèse de l'homologie structurale est particulièrement efficace pour explorer les niveaux d'interaction pouvant se créer entre espaces différents. Les discours des agents, tout comme leurs espèces de capitaux (individuels et collectifs) de membres défendant certains principes, s'opposent dans le cadre de luttes pour le pouvoir : le pouvoir de définir et de classifier le monde social. Ces luttes à leur tour, qu'ils le veuillent ou non, repositionnent les agents dans leurs champs d'affiliation respectifs (politique, culturelle, associative, etc.). Si les agents appartenant à des espaces différents ne se perçoivent pas comme appartenant à un même monde, puisqu'ils agissent souvent en fonction des dispositions spécifiques à leurs champs d'appartenance, ils se cherchent, se reconnaissent et interagissent dans le but de capitaliser collectivement leurs ressources (sociales, politiques, économiques, symboliques, etc.) pour la défense de leur cause. Cette accumulation de ressources, que l'on peut définir comme capital symbolique transnational, est une forme de pouvoir invisible, car masquée en tant que pouvoir. Pourtant, il donne à ces agents des opportunités pour dynamiser leurs actions en attirant d'autres partisans. Éphémère, mais efficace, ce capital garde sa vigueur tant que la cause reste pertinente dans l'espace transnational ainsi constitué.

Bibliographie

Adler Emanuel et Haas Peter, « Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program », *International Organization*, vol. 46, n° 1, janv. 1992.

Baer Jean-Michel, « L'exception culturelle. Une règle en quête de contenus », *En temps réel*, n° 11, oct. 2003.

Bourdieu Pierre, « Une révolution conservatrice dans l'édition », *ARSS*, n° 126-127, mars 1999.

———, *Méditations pascaliennes*, Paris, Seuil, 1997.

———, *Ce que parler veut dire : L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, Paris, Fayard, 1982.

———, « Sur le pouvoir symbolique », *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, vol. 32, n° 3, 1977.

———, « La production de la croyance », *ARSS*, vol. 13, n° 1, 1977.

Bustamante Mauricio, *L'UNESCO et la culture : construction d'une catégorie d'intervention internationale, du « développement culturel » à la « diversité culturelle »*, thèse de doctorat en sociologie sous la direction de Gisèle Sapiro, EHESS, 2014.

Dezalay Yves, « Multinationales de l'expertise et "dépérissement de l'État" », *ARSS*, vol. 96, n° 96-97, 1933.

DEZALAY Yves et GARTH Bryant, *La internacionalización de las luchas por el poder: La competencia entre abogados y economistas por transformar los Estados latinoamericanos*, ILSA, 2002.

GARRETON Manuel Antonio, *Hacia una nueva era política : estudio sobre las democratizaciones*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995.

GOURNAY Bernard, *Exception culturelle et mondialisation*, Presses de Sciences Po, 2002.

HEILBRON Johan, « Échanges culturels transnationaux et mondialisation : quelques réflexions », *Regards sociologiques*, nº 22, 2001.

JOIGNANT Alfredo, « La politique des "transitologues" : Luttes politiques, enjeux théoriques et disputes intellectuelles au cours de la transition chilienne à la démocratie », *Politique et Sociétés*, vol. 24, nº 2-3, 2005.

KECK Margaret et SIKKINK Kathryn, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Cornell University Press, 1998.

MCADAM Doug, « Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency », *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, nº 6, 1 déc. 1983.

NOËL Sophie, *L'Édition indépendante critique : engagements politiques et intellectuels*, Lyon, ENSSIB, 2012.

OUVRAGE COLLECTIF, *Des paroles et des actes pour la bibliodiversité*, Paris, Alliance des éditeurs indépendants, 2006.

POULIGNY Béatrice, « Une société civile internationale ? », *Critique internationale*, vol. 13, nº 4, 2001.

REGOURD Serge, *L'exception culturelle*, Paris, PUF, 2004.

SAPIRO Gisèle (dir.), *Les contradictions de la globalisation éditoriale*, Paris, Éditions Nouveau Monde, 2009.

——— (dir.), *Translatio : Le marché de la traduction en France à l'heure de la mondialisation*, CNRS, 2008.

———, « Le savant et le littéraire » *in* J. HEILBRON, R. LENOIR et G. SAPIRO (dir.), *Pour une histoire des sciences sociales : Hommage à Pierre Bourdieu*, Paris, Fayard, 2004.

SYMMES COLL Constanza, *La dimension culturelle de la transition politique chilienne : Le cas de la maison d´éditions Lom*, Mémoire de M2 en sociologie sous la direction de Yves Dezalay, EHESS, Paris, 2009.

———, « Fundar la Asociación de Editores Independientes de Chile: Una estrategia de resistencia colectiv*a », Comunicación y Medios*. nº 27, p. 128-145, 2013.

TARROW Sidney, *The New Transnational Activism*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

TILLY Charles, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Mcgraw-Hill College, 1978.

TILLY Charles, TARROW Sidney et MCADAM Doug, « Pour une cartographie de la politique contestataire », *Politix*, vol. 11, nº 41, 1998.

Performing Politics, Producing Privilege: Student Formation at an Internationally Oriented Swedish Upper Secondary School

MARIA TÖRNQVIST, SEC, Uppsala University

ABSTRACT

This text explores the formative conditions at one Swedish upper secondary school characterized by an educative curriculum targeting global equality and sustainability. More precisely, the chapter investigates into how a global ethos enables opportunity structures by means of fostering character. While acting on the school ethos – by engaging in academic debates on the climate crisis, participating in student strikes and developing rhetoric skills through participation in anti-racist manifestations – the students embody a set of dispositions that equal advantage. The chapter particularly discusses the emergence of an anti-authoritative confidence, an analytical agency and an emotional style characterized by self-reflexivity within the school.

INTRODUCTION[78]

The students at the Swedish upper secondary school *Stockholm International* (SI), and presumably their families, cannot be derived from those assemblies of middle- and upper-middle class whites who deliberately seek distinction and advantage (cp. Palme 2008; Weenink 2008). Although the students are high-performing, an important motive for their choice of school is social virtue and openness. In that sense they are reminiscent of the parents studied by Diane Reay, Gill Crozier and David James (2011) who face dilemmas and moral ambiguities due to their choice of multi-ethnic and predominantly working-class inner London comprehensive schools (ibid: 6). The school targets 'parents investing in a different notion of 'the best' for their child: one that valorizes and seeks out difference' (Reay 2008: 1074; cp. Raveaud and van Zanten 2007). Unlike the school choice of these middle-class parents, however, the students who select the SI out of an 'openness to difference' end up at a largely homogenous school in which a majority belong to the white middle-class, the exception being a recently launched program for newly arrived migrant students. In spite of the equality pathos, motivating some of the students to choose the school, they have selected an education that offers exclusivity and advantage. Hence, the SI represents a case in which privilege and elite prospects are enclosed by ambivalence, both from the perspective of the school, as expressed by members of the

[78] This study is part of the VR-financed project 'Globalization and Swedish Upper Secondary Education. A Sociological Analysis of the Shaping and Social Recognition of Study Programs with a Transnational Profile', directed by Mikael Palme at the Department of Education, Uppsala University. Many thanks to Palme and the rest of the research group for constructive discussions throughout the research process.

school board and educators in leading positions, and by individual pupils. The objective of this paper is to explore what the students actually bring from school and who they become after spending three formative years in a high-performing white middle-class school. What kind of symbolic resources are mobilized, in terms of knowledge, networks and subjective dispositions which allow for an expansion of self?

In what follows in this introductory section, I will present the empirical scope of study by addressing the ambivalent notion of privilege and thereafter suggesting the concept of ethos to be a fruitful theoretical avenue. In the first empirical part, I will discuss the institutionalization of shared values. In the second part I will investigate into how the school ethos enables opportunity structures by means of fostering character. This section will be concentrated around three interrelated examples, demonstrating how high-performance and a sense of entitlement is cultivated in the spirit of a global ethos.

AN AMBIVALENT ELITE

I will start with a couple of words about the short but quite astonishing history of the SI. The school was founded in 2004 and at the time had 96 pupils, offering a unique profile in so-called 'global education'. Ten years later the school has become a popular choice and hosts 580 pupils in four study programs: social sciences, natural sciences, aesthetics and the so-called SPRI program for newly arrived migrant students. As the school has gained recognition, the admission rates have rapidly increased. In 2004 the median merit value for students who were accepted at the school was 235 points (out of 320 maximum); in 2010 the median was 310 points.[79] In spite of the school's formal vision of 'diversity', there is a fairly uniform structure, regarding the pupils' social backgrounds. In one study on upper secondary education in Stockholm, the SI is identified within a cluster of schools labeled 'the cultural workers' education', which primarily involves daughters of art producers, journalists and mid-level office holders. Schools within this cluster are characterized by an overrepresentation of very high grades, specially designed programs aiming for higher education and an overrepresentation of pupils with a Swedish background (Forsberg 2015: 46-52).

Turning to matters of opportunity structures, the school offers resources in terms of:

- the selection of *pupils*, being a selected group of predominantly white high-performing young women and men with high grades, who bring their accumulated cultural and social capital, in terms of knowledge, habits, tastes, privileged geographic origins and networks of families and friends, to the school;
- the engagement and efforts made by the pupils' *families*, who pass on their resources, in terms of networks, expertise and credentials supplied by prominent family names (in the case of the SI, well-known politicians and cultural profiles), to their children and by extension to the

[79] We should be careful when using merit values as an indicator of 'success' due to the fact that there has been an inflation in grades over the past decade. Still the development tells us that the school has gained recognition and status within the field of upper secondary education in the Stockholm region.

school and its students. One example of this is the rather common phenomenon that parents give lectures at the school related to their work (such as business leaders, politicians and filmmakers);

- the *educational expertise*, in terms of a university-adapted curriculum and the composition of specially recruited teachers, of which around twenty-five percent hold a Ph.D. or are undertaking graduate studies (during my fieldwork, the two classes I studied attended a standard university course);
- the *institutional affiliations*, such as ongoing collaboration with universities, international organizations and business firms;
- the symbolic credentials rendered by the school's *geographic location* in an architecturally recognized building located in the cultural neighborhood of Södermalm in central Stockholm.

Regarding matters of identification, a vocabulary encircling notions of eliteness is used by some pupils as well as by the founder of the school and the previous headmaster. In the following quote, Alex, a student in the social science program, claims that the SI conveys a kind of 'elite thinking' and that is provides 'elements of an elite school':

> I would say that this is an elite-school. It is a somewhat mixed elite-school but there are definitely elements of an elite-school. Also a kind of elite-thinking among us and that I think is of great importance. We are the best, we should now these things, we are the elite. (…) It is partly the amazing thing of coming to this school. During my first weeks some teacher told me that some of the best students in Stockholm are here. That is just amazing, it provides you with a sense of confidence, you just have to do it. (…) You notice this when we meet other schools or business companies. They say: 'I have never had a class like this before' and that people know (…) Then [during a UN-role play in another Swedish city] it was obvious that we were really fast, fast writers, fast at coming up with arguments. It appeared to us that this is our global knowledge, it was great, everything was in English. And also, everyone expected us to be good. People really respected us. It is easier to perform well when people think you are good.

There are, of course, also striking differences between the school in focus for our investigation and definitive elite schools, such as those closely studied by sociologists and anthropologists like Chase (2008), Gaztambide-Fernández (2009) and Kahn (2013). As already noted, the SI is not demographically elite in the sense that the pupils belong to elite families. Rather, the school can be characterized as a middle-class institution, hosting primarily the children of the culturally-oriented middle-classes. Additionally the school does not promote its education in terms of an elite investment, quite the contrary. On the homepage there are no formal signs of elite schooling. Being a state-run upper secondary school, the SI is formally subordinate to the rules of municipal schools in the region. Additionally, the school vision, as formulated on the homepage, is to transmit a discourse of equality and heterogeneity, rather than elitism and selection.

It would hence be misleading to label the school 'elite'; still, it appears to be a significant producer of privilege. We might advocate the work by Shamus Rahman Khan to discuss this ambivalence. In his book, *Privilege*, he investigates what he calls the 'new elite' forming at the prestigious American boarding school St. Paul's in Concord, New Hampshire. One argument is that

in order to understand the emerging upper-classes, we should no longer only look for 'the arrogance of entitlements' but rather an embodied 'ease of privilege' (2013: 10).

> Instead of *entitlement*, I have found that St. Paul's increasingly cultivates *privilege*. Whereas elites of the past were entitled – building their worlds around the 'right' breeding, connections, and culture – new elites develop privilege; a sense of self and a mode of internation that advantage them. (…) The new elite think of themselves as far more individualized, supposing that their position is a product of what they have done. (…) In being embodied, privilege is not seen as a product of differences in opportunities but instead as a skill, talent, capacity – 'who you are'. Students from St. Paul's appear to naturally have what it takes to be successful. This helps hide durable inequality by naturalizing socially produced distinctions (Khan 2013: 14, 16).

Although the empirical scope of Khan's work is a highly prominent private school dating back to 1855, his findings may help explore schools that were never elite, in the traditional meaning of the word, although they help form 'advantage'. By producing privilege in a similar fashion, i.e. within a meritocratic framework, an educational institution like the recently established SI might be addressed as part of a more dispersed set of 'advantaging' educational institutions. Another ambivalence involves the school's self-understanding. By making a name for itself through the open critique of power structures, the school turns the (re)production of social inequality into a plausible dilemma. As one student, Nils, puts it advantage is something that must be 'hidden': 'The hierarchies must not be shown, that would make people react'. The identities invested in by many students revolve around engagement in matters of equality, and a value base that partly contradicts the notion of an abundance of resources, material and symbolic. The founder of the school and previous headmaster Karl addressed this when he spoke about the quite impressive student achievements. Karl brought up the fact that the pupils organized and led all discussions when top UK politician David Miliband, and other prominent guests, visited the school. He also mentioned the so-called Dag Hammarskjöld competition, announced by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD). Out of six winners, five were pupils at the SI. These students were invited to spend a day at the UD and later to take on a trip to the UN headquarters in New York with Swedish Secretary of State Carl Bildt.

> These students, they are the elite. They have entered the rooms of the elevated [finrummen], and that is because they are really good. (…) You are not supposed to say this today but I will do it anyway: it is like this: these students have damn good conditions for succeeding and they want to do well in school and they want to be something in society. If we then start a school where you can become something and work for a better world and these future issues, we will provide an elite among youths who wish to work with these questions. I think that's pretty good. The alternative option is that they had been undertaking their education at Norra Real [an ancient renowned upper secondary school] and then the School of Economics [Handelshögskolan], so that's not wrong according to me. We have given to those who really want an expertise knowledge in these questions, the global questions, international questions, when it comes to really understanding this and being able to argue and make yourself a position in society. They are getting along as well as possible, these students, they are amazing. (…) These [he points at a group of students in a photo] will become something. Soon we will have acknowledged politicians and others from this school I believe. Many want to be Secretary-General of the UN and that cannot be wrong.

Advantage is here legitimized by a meritocratic and moral discourse: the fact that the students are 'working for a better world' and that they represent excellent standards in 'international matters' justify their plausible 'elite'positions. According to Karl, the school produces a critically and democratically informed top layer of society: an egalitarian elite.

SCHOOL ETHOS AND THE PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGE

What is it that makes certain schools cultivate a particular set of dispositions that pave the way for advantage? In academic literature, the question is often answered in terms of the collected amount of mobilized resources that students bring to their educational institutions. Prosperous schools are characterized by families with important assemblages of economic, cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). With Bourdieu's words, in his book *State Nobility*, an educational institution's relative 'success' depends on the:

> overall amount of its specific (inseparably social and academic) capital as well as the structure of this capital, that is, on the relative weight of both its academic capital (measured in terms of the specific value of the competences guaranteed) and its strictly social capital (linked to the current or potential social value of its student body present and past – its alumni) (Bourdieu 1998a: 198).

This study, however, suggests that we should add an aspect to the list of characteristics, at least for understanding the empirical focus of this investigation. As already mentioned, the SI appears within the cluster of 'cultural workers' education', which primarily involves daughters of art producers, journalists and mid-level office holders. Explaining the relative success of this school, i.e. its reputable name, its student performance and the fact that it is partly recognized as an elite-forming institution, through using the students' background and family assets simply does not seem accurate or sufficient.[80] In this paper I will advocate the notion of *ethos* as a complement to the discussion of the production of privilege. The particular school profile, and the values it embraces, attracts a particular group of students that cannot be characterized primarily by their social origin as parts of the Swedish elite or its refined upper-middle-classes. In fact, the students in my study represent a broad reach of socio-economic positions, covering both business leaders and child care workers. Rather, what forms them into quite a homogenous group is their level of civic engagement, their dedication towards matters of global equality and sustainability and their level of school performance. Although these values are highly classed, in the sense that an awareness of sustainability and global equality primarily define a culturally-oriented (urban) middle-class, the demographic spread suggests that we would miss one chain in the explanation by simply referring the success of the school to the students' class belonging.

Etymologically, the concept of *ethos* derives both from the Greek word *ethos* which equals the character, custom or pattern of social practice, and from the Greek expression *ēthos*, meaning character formation, implying the values and beliefs that guide individuals and institutions (Schüssler

[80] See Törnqvist (forthcoming), for a more thorough discussion on the relation between ethos and class.

Fiorenza 2010: 4-6). A third etymological root aligns the concept with placement. According to Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds *ēthea* implies a space in which character formation takes place, a space 'where one is accustomed to being' (1994: 48; cp McGowan 1998: 167). Turning to an influential essay by Max Weber we find a similar conceptualization, exploring the relation between social structures (economy) and processes of character formation. As formulated in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber demonstrates how ideas constitute powerful forces in history (1905/2005: 48). The particular nature of early capitalism required dispositions for saving and investing, rather than consuming, which appeared to correspond with a subjectivity cultivated within a specific type of religious Protestantism. Thus Weber investigates 'the influence of certain religious ideas on the development of an economic spirit, or the *ethos* of an economic system'. At the heart of this ethos is dedication and duty, a sense of 'calling' for the labor at stake and an 'ethical obligation'. For Weber, ethos is hence a particular quality having to do with 'the character of an ethically coloured maxim for the conduct of life' (ibid: 17) and a 'definite standard of life claiming ethical sanction' (ibid: 23). Advocating these ideas, the present study wishes to investigate the formative consequences of the SI school ethos.[81] To quote Weber, the effective force of such ethos functions through 'practical conduct' and 'the influence of psychological sanctions' derived from a shared belief structure (ibid: 55).[82] Approaching the SI in this way, we find that the tension addressed in the previous section partly dissolves. What the school founder Karl discusses as a tension between *privilege* and *politics* actually seems to merge into a rather productive relation.

Not only does the shared ethos bring a selected group of students together, but it also brings the students to the actual place at which they will further cultivate this ethos. In order to address matters of the conditions for character formation we will advocate Erving Goffman. By reference to his work *Asylums*, a strong ethos is more likely to appear in (semi-)total institutions in which individuals are excluded from other social networks and defined primarily by relations within the institution. Total institutions imply that all 'aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority' (Goffman 1961: 5-6). In this regard, schools are rather interesting arenas since they are places in which people, during a particular period of life, spend a large proportion of their time and in which they do not only evolve their knowledge in different subjects but also undertake civic fostering and cultivate influential social networks. In addition, the structure implies an authoritative

[81] Thereby this study diverges from one common use of the notion of an ethos in regard to internationalized education. See, for instance, Mansilla and Garnder (2007) and McMahon (2001) for a normative take on how to integrate global challenges into teaching.

[82] Although the aim of this paper is not to go in deep dialogue with Weber's way of theorizing values, analogy described with his essay needs to be somewhat modified. In particular, I wish to comment on the implicit line of causality by questioning the idea of motives connected to belief as generating action. Rather, belief can be addressed also as created and constituted by incarnation of practice. We might turn to Bourdieu and his critique of voluntarist theory, and more specifically to his reading of seventeenth-century philosopher Blaise Pascal's advice on how to become a faithful Christian, to elaborate on this. According to Pascal, the 'road (…) to be cured of unbelief' is to mimic believers by performing the everyday practices associated with Christianity. His remedy is to behave *as if* you believe: 'taking holy water, having masses said (…) will make you believe quite naturally' (Pascal, 1966: 152, in Bourdieu, 1992: 49). In order to understand how an egalitarian school ethos can constitute a brick in the production of privilege we should therefore take into account that the students are not only acting upon a motivation stemming from their will to create a more egalitarian society, but the everyday practices within an institution which are permeated by such ethos shape and tune them to a particular will and motivation. This is to say that by acting along the ethos – by believing or not – the students are adjusting their ways of being in accordance with the ethical maxim.

hierarchical dimension through which staff members are entitled to evaluate and execute a form of symbolic violence, in the words of Bourdieu, by means of a constant evaluative government.

However, not all schools are places in which an ethos evolves. From the previous discussion, this appears to require a number of specific conditions. Advocating some strains of boarding school research, we find that these schools, just like the SI, often are formed on the basis of a proper value system, including symbolic rules, internal regulations and hierarchies, but with fewer avenues that interrupt the presence and influence of the school (Gaztambide-Fernández 2009; Larsson 2014; Sandgren 2013). Particularly when addressing a kind of ethos that differs from values embraced by mainstream society, such as traditional upper-class manners or a radical quest for equality, the institutional context is even more important for the creation of a homological universe. Rather than being a matter of spatial demarcation and authoritative rule, as for many boarding schools located far from the pupils' family homes, the SI seems to inform a kind of symbolic and social exclusivity based on the embodiment of shared values. At least for some groups of students, the school seems to become an essential part of their lives and a decisive guideline which is lived and negotiated in their everyday practices regarding taste and aesthetics, social networks, extracurricular activities, reading, food, travel, beliefs and future career tracks. The school appears to be a present structure for many students even when they are out of school.

STUDY DESIGN

The fact that the notion of eliteness partly contradicts the ideals embedded in the school raises a methodological query. How should we study the production of privilege within a context in which privilege is partly misrecognized? One answer is that the research should aim beyond discourse. This inquiry has taken the form of an ethnographic study which encompasses in total a period of twenty months, of which approximately one to two months each semester have been active fieldwork (in sum six months). I began the study when the pupils had just entered their second year, in the fall of 2012, and ended the study when they graduated in June 2014. The ethnographic fieldwork involved participation during classroom teaching with the two selected classes, hallway hang-outs and lunches, particular events (such as student board meetings, the UN role-play and preparation and presentation of field trips). By reaching out to different groups at the school within different school-related arenas and by use of different methodological approaches, the aim has been to explore how the formation of character – the ethos – evolves at interrelated levels: in the formal school program, during classroom teaching and as part of a student culture. In particular, I have joined two social science classes, which represents the most prestigious program at the school as well as a group of students strongly invested in the school ethos c in total around 60 students. Among them I interviewed 28 pupils (19 women and 9 men), some of them on several occasions. Among the students I interviewed, around half of them left the ninth grade (secondary school) with the highest grades possible (315–320 points), while the rest reached between 280 and 315 points. Half of the group attended the so-called 'excellence program' (spetsprogram). I also interviewed the founder and former principle of the school as well as the present principle. In addition, unrecorded informal conversations were carried out with staff

members, primarily educators in the social science program. As a complement, a limited survey has been carried out with students in the two classes. All informants, as well as the school, have been anonymized for ethical reasons.

INSTITUTIONALIZED VALUES: DISTINCTION AND HOMOGENEITY

Theorizing the school in terms of an ethos that informs the behaviors of both staff and students turns our focus towards how a knowledge corpus and a set of values come to define the school and how these values, in turn, are embodied by individual actors. As we shall see, the formation of a common set of values and world-views emerges at interrelated levels. As the current headmaster puts it, part of what makes the SI unique is the strong 'consensus' regarding the educational profile, the values and the opinions embodied by different groups at the school – the school board, teachers and students:

> I have never worked as a school with such a strong and distinct profile that there is an almost complete consensus around. (…) That consensus regarding the common mission here is absolutely unique. (…) The uniqueness comes with the profile (…). It offers an incredible strength to have such a distinct profile, wanting things together and doing them together dedicated. But there are also some risks. We become the club for internal admirers, here are we, we are interested in these questions, we are excellent at this and we are very dedicated, and so we keep going in our protected world. I guess it matters, well I don't know where the students are politically, we are not registering opinions, but when I put my finger in the air my sensation is that our students are red-green. (…) This provides very particular conditions that our students are of the same opinion. (…) I have never worked at a school before with such a consensus in the student group. (…) Since our profile matters also well rooted this is even stronger here.

The headmaster describes a strong connection between the school's educational profile and the opinions held by students, an association between academic knowledge and values as well as an interrelation between different groups and levels within the school organization. The school board, teachers and students are all 'working' towards the same 'goal' due to a common interest and dedication towards sustainability and equality matters. Approaching these levels separately, however, we find, firstly, that the *formal school program*, as formulated on the official homepage, frames the essence of the school in rather normative and value-oriented terms. The school formulates its program out of a sense of ethical obligation, to use Weber's formulation, as to not only acquire a particular type of knowledge but also to encourage 'an ethically coloured maxim for the conduct of life' (1905/2005: 17):

> The SI is for you who have opened your eyes to the global sustainability matters and the inequalities in the world and want to learn more, understand and make an impact. We encourage your dedication and your will to make a change. (…) The vision (…) is that the school should be the best upper secondary school in Sweden, through its pedagogical idea and way of organizing the education and clear structure for democratic procedures to. (It) should also be a forerunner when it comes to developing pedagogical methods that increase young peoples' commitment to global development issues and their capability to affect community development.The vision (…)is that the students, through their education, should gain:

(…)
- insights into global issues, both problems and possibilities for change;
- an understanding of the fact that our future must be built on sustainable development

The ethos is also produced through the actual *education,* in the shape of an orientation towards certain subjects and perspectives, partly informed by their normative vision, and through pedagogic processes in which students are encouraged to actively engage in knowledge production. By means of rating students and providing grades based on their school performance, the knowledge and values that define the school are institutionalized in the form of an evaluating and ranking authority. Regarding the actual content and pedagogics, the SI adds quite a unique example to the chart of upper secondary schools with an international profile (Palme 2015). In the Stockholm region most internationally profiled schools run International Baccalaureate (IB) programs or create a trademark around their language concentration or economic profile. Among such offers, the SI is an exception with its aim to offer internationally informed perspectives on critical contemporary issues around sustainability and global equality. Regarding the actual education, the terms are often thematically grouped, crossing the boundaries of individual subjects. During my fieldwork, the two classes I followed undertook a number of cross-disciplinary courses of which some spent up to ten weeks with teachers from different subjects (natural sciences, humanities, social sciences). One such project was entitled 'Africa' and made the pupils explore various dimensions of the continent from angles such as poverty, political administration, sustainability and gender equality. An additional aspect of the school's international profile is the study travel of students for approximately three weeks to a country in Asia, Africa or Latin America. The field trip normally occurs during the spring term of the students' final year. Framing the SI as a producer of a particular kind of educational capital with an international orientation, we find that the pupils are not primarily fostered to become cosmopolitan citizens (cp. Wagner 1996; Weenink 2008). Language training is not prioritized and travelling across national borders is addressed as a rather problematic practice contributing to climate destruction. Rather the students are trained in analytical skills, regarding the conditions of a globalized world. As one student puts it, the international orientation concerns 'viewing Sweden from a broader perspective' (Hannes), particularly towards issues that transgress national borders such as climate matters and themes of poverty and migration. According to the pupils own perceptions, the global profile will orient them towards a national rather than an international job market, while providing them with a unique type of expertise and orientation.

Characteristic of the education is also how its curriculum addresses broader society. On the homepage, symbolic meaning is created through the help of recognized brands in related fields outside of education. Banners for Amnesty International (announcing that the school is working in accordance with the organization's human rights education policy), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Globalportalen (a webpage that provides information from globally-oriented NGOs) and the Resilience Centre at Stockholm University cover the margins. In addition, the homepage provides examples from school-related activities outside of classroom teaching. We find announcements of visiting esteemed politicians and representatives of international organizations and political organs (such as UN delegates).

Secondly, the school ethos is shaped through activities related to the *student culture*. Many pupils in my interview study and fieldwork told me that they felt connected to 'school spirit', as some of them put it, or: a student ideal revolving around dedication, high performance and egalitarian values such as feminism and anti-racism. Through school-related practices, inside and outside classrooms and teaching situations, the ethos informs the everyday life of the students. For the icon group, i.e. those students who fully embody the ideals and represent the official image of the school, this implies adopting what they describe to be 'a sustainable lifestyle' involving such things as vegetarianism and appreciating secondhand clothing, as well as adjusting their vocabulary towards feminist and anti-racist language which during the period of my fieldwork involved words like 'hen', a feminist gender-neutral pronoun in Swedish with the aim to avoid the masculinized and feminized pronouns 'hon' (she) and 'han' (he). As indicated, embodying these values implies not only certain practices – avoiding meat and consuming less newly-produced items – but possibly also a conversion in terms of bodily dispositions such as taste. The pupils face not only theoretical aspects of the subjects at stake, for instance: how to measure climate hazards, but also how to speak, eat, dress, consume and make friends in ways adjusted to this set of values. In that way, the school makes up an ecosystem that guides, at least selected groups of pupils, through the micro-practices of everyday life, in and out of school.

We should note, though, that there is not one way of embodying the school ethos and becoming an SI student. Rather, the different experiences and backgrounds, in regard to class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality, are open for multiple meaning and ways of negotiating the values at stake. There are alose differences in regard to the level of engagement. However, students who do not belong to the icon group also embrace similar values, although they might not be vegetarians outside of school and although all of them do not identify with the politics of the Feminist Initiative and the Green Party (which hold a majority in the school election). We might also note that manifested difference at times confirms unity. One example being the quarrel regarding how to react towards the anti-immigration party, the Sweden Democrats, who were invited to participate in an information event with all parliamentary parties represented. Although one student group wanted to block them, and later did, another group wished to let them in, the divergence partly dissolved through a collective belief in democratic and anti-racist values. What unites all students is a common dedication to fight the party, although the means to succeed with such a task vary.

EGALITARIAN EXCLUSIVITY

Moving on to a discussion of the necessary requisites for an ethos to evolve and for these values to be institutionalized as guidelines for individual action, a certain kind of organization seems to be in favor. In the following sections, two interrelated elements will be discussed: a) *exclusivity* and the distinction by which a sense of selectivity and distinguished membership is generated; and b) *homogeneity* in regard to the creation of social likeness. Starting with the first element, although SI is a young school it has been quite successful in creating the kind of symbolic markers needed for a school to develop a sense of exclusivity. If we take seriously the claim that spatiality is decisive for

the formation of character,[83] the material embedding of the social relations at stake might be a good starting point for our investigation. The characteristic school building constructed in 1936 by Stockholm architect Paul Hedqvist is located on the top of a small hill with a view over parts of Södermalm, the culturally-esteemed neighborhood of Stockholm. The architecture, typical for the functionalist era, provides a light and spacious building with an open-style stairway covered with large windows on all sides which connect the four floors. The geography breathes cultural composure as well as advantage, as the educational landscape of Stockholm is characterized by a status increase for each inch closer to the center of the city a school is located. However, the building also stands out in relation to the ancient upper secondary schools, housed in ancestral 19th century buildings. The modern architecture in combination with the privileged geography transmits sublimity and grace together with a strong idea of progression. By the choice of location, the school makes no claims of seniority or tradition, like the classic gymnasiums of Norra Real and Södra Latin, nor does it degrade to the suburban low-esteemed secondary schools in concrete buildings from the 1970s.

As a visitor enters the school, the grandiose impression immediately shifts to an intimate experience. Pupils, teachers and guests are asked to leave their shoes at the entrance, a school policy aiming for a clean and comfortable environment. The cultural heritage manifested through architectonic beauty mixes with a deformalizing practice which deemphasizes positions and hierarchies. Walking through the hallway for the first time, in stocking feet, adds to the impression of a school conscious about power relations. Notice boards, lockers, bathrooms and hallway walls are all covered with flyers and posters making the observer aware of political manifestations, queer and antiracist activism and a strong body of pupils' representations in constituent school assemblies. Turning to the homepage, we find a somewhat similar story, marking the school's unique character by highlighting its level of success in terms of prizes and awards achieved by individual pupils, entire classes and the school as a whole. The homepage also conveys information about celebrities visiting the school and media coverage, such as television news reporting on the student strike in the fall of 2012 (calling for higher teachers' salaries) and information about other types of honorable activities, along with the school ethos (such as the student participation in the Swedish documentary television series 'Hungerspelet', the Hunger Game).

Exclusivity is also produced through everyday school practices. Instead of forcing pupils to 'dress-up' and wear a uniform with the school logo, the SI students 'dress down'. Leaving ones shoes on the doormat represents a step into a social and symbolic universe with its own values, rules and rituals. Another marker of seclusion is the vegetarian food served in the lunch cantina. Also students who prefer to eat meat are required to adjust their taste, at least during school hours, in order to follow the school values. In addition, ongoing narrative practices, somewhat similar to those found in more ancient upper secondary schools, play an active role in creating unifying stories and a sense of mythological origin. The stories that were repeated during my fieldwork involved certain key events and individuals who were believed to have made an important impact on the school. Such is the case

[83] 'By extension, ethics can thus be understood not simply to encompass the formation and judgment of character, but also to include the production of a place that character can inhabit. To put it in even more strongly in Arendtian terms, ethics must build on the intimate connection between character and place. Only where we create a certain kind of place can a certain kind of person emerge.' (McGowan 1998: 167).

of the school founder and previous headmaster Karl. One student told me, smiling, that a plaster mask of Karl had been made. Although it seemed to be something of a joke, as to riddle with traditions from more traditional upper secondary schools from which the SI partly wishes to distinguish itself, the story also reveals that the previous headmaster is admired by many. 'He', the student continues, 'holds the status of a god'. Another example that turns up in several interviews, also in my interview with the former headmaster himself, is a female student who seemed to have embraced the school ideal in quite an astonishing way, by being a dedicated pupil engaged in several non-governmental organizations, tremendously high performing in school (during her years at the school she acquired several prizes, partly from the Foreign Ministry), and embodying the right set of standards.

SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY

As already discussed, admission to the school requires extremely high grades. There is, however, an even more exclusive way of entering the school which also may contribute to the creation of a homogenous student group. Since the year of 2009, the school offers admission to the so-called 'excellence program' (spetsprogram). This was originally an opportunity for Swedish upper secondary schools to create elite versions of their study programs and assemble the highest performing students. The schools who wished to use this as a way of forming their own recruitment criteria had to apply through a formal process. The SI was successful, being the first upper secondary in Stockholm that was allowed to offer such a program. But instead of reaching for an elite recruitment, in relation to social background and meritocratic achievements, the school used the freedom to influence recruitment by forming student assemblies primarily based on values. Those students who wish to attend this program are asked to write a personal letter, describing who they are and motivate their wish to attend the school. Out of these letters, selected pupils are called to group interviews in which they are required to discuss randomly chosen social topics (such as drug policies, surveillance, etc.). As described by Karl, this exclusive excellence program has been used as an avenue for those students who do not have high enough credentials to enter the school, but are shown to be 'the right kind' of student [84], i.e. embodying the school ethos.

The same is true for the recruitment of pedagogic staff. The education, with its focus on research-based teaching, places high expectations on the educators to offer up-to-date orientated knowledge within internationally contested areas. This, in turn, requires a high level of expertise in the key subject areas. However, regarding the selection of teachers, embodied values and dedication towards the school vision seems to be prioritized. In my interview with the former headmaster this was also stressed. He pointed out the importance of finding educators with the appropriate engagement and attitudes. He emphasized that the particular knowledge corpus demands expertise, but also said that when the school was launched, he picked teachers straight from their pedagogic education on the basis of their 'devotion'. Also the recruitment process of hiring new teachers, at least during the

[84] However, according to the youths I interviewed, the distinction between ordinary and top education did not seem that important. Possibly because the teachers do not see the difference between the students, and they all attend the same curriculum. Rather it is the school, as such, that seems to evoke the students' feelings of belonging and exclusivity.

school's first formative years, took the shape of group interviews of six applicants formed into a work team. During a three hour long session, together with teachers employed at the school, a psychologist and student representatives, the applicants undertook different assignments to provide examples of their educational profile and personality.

The formation of a fairly homogenous student group also depends on the students' identification with the school values. The reasons brought up when pupils said why they selected the SI are astonishingly similar. A majority stressed the importance of the particular profile, many by claims that they were the 'social scientist' or 'feminist' in their former school, willing to debate political matters but without like-minded friends. In addition, almost all students brought up the particular 'school ambiance'. Some said that they were struck by the 'relaxed and friendly atmosphere' when they visited for the first time. What is also striking in all interviews is that the SI was their first choice of school. The following quotes provide a few examples of how the selection is narrated.

> The SI was an obvious choice. This is where I wanted to be. (…) People regard this as a fine school, good teaching, that I have often heard. You have to work hard but it takes you somewhere. (Isak)

> Many of the children of my parents' friends are at this school so I became really interested. It seemed so good, mostly the atmosphere. (…) Within the generation of my parents the SI is highly esteemed. Well, my parents work in the arts and have many friends working in the arts and many are very politically invested and think this school is just great. (Sonja)

> It was mostly how I perceived the school once I visited. You can feel it once you're here, when you talk with people. That is the important thing, the social, the people who attend the school. You have to rely very much on your feel for it. (Gabriella)

The majority of accounts are based on an embodied sense of belonging and the stories of 'coming home' are primarily accounts of how social groups are formed together in exclusive institutional settings. Implied in this emotional use of language is the students' embodied sense of belonging, through the play with symbols and resources. Decoding the atmosphere as something positive and desirable depends on whether or not the visiting pupils are tuned to the school ethos: if they connect with the language spoken in classrooms and hallways, if they feel welcomed by the aesthetics of the building, and if the values implicitly communicated by stickers on lockers and vegetarian lunches are appealing to them. Parts of the selection can be framed in terms of an embodied 'feel' for a possible familiarity, an incarnated notion of similarity. This is how Gabriella, for instance, addressed her choice of school: in terms of a 'feeling'. Since it is rather difficult to spot the selection of students during a one-day visit, one has to – according to her – trust one's 'feel for it'. In the case of Sonja, a similar story of perceived correspondence or 'match' was stated, but this time secured by the affective response of her parents and their circle of friends. Hence, the narrative of a 'particular ambiance' and a 'right feeling' simply seems to represent a social and symbolic tuning to others with similar backgrounds and interests.

SENSE OF BELONGING

Although the pupils have slightly different reasons for ending up at the school and although they bring different family backgrounds and educational trajectories with them, all of those interviewed expressed identification with the school, although some of them framed it more strongly than others. During interviews some of them raised negative aspects such as the pressure to work hard and 'be successful', some of them also brought up the ideological bias towards 'leftish' values, but not one of them had thought of changing schools. In fact, one indicator of the strong sense of belonging are the low numbers of dropouts and those who change schools, both on the side of the pupils and teachers. When asking students about this, most of them said that it would simply be too difficult to attend the school without embracing certain values. That is to say that if you choose a school with a rather unique profile, you must be willing to accept certain standards and go 'all in'. In a similar fashion, the present headmaster asked, rhetorically, why there was so little destruction and fighting at the school. She then answered herself: 'It is because the students are feeling good here and want to be here. That makes them care about their school and their classmates. It is very rewarding to work at a school where everyone wishes to be, that's not the case everywhere.' Further on in the interview, in a discussion on the similarities between the SI and Swedish boarding schools, she stressed some further positive aspects of the strong sense of belonging.

> You are forming around something, you are coming to these schools for certain reasons. It is very obvious that you want something special and that's also the case here. There is a clearly defined 'we' in all this. That is mostly very positive I think for the pupils' chances to develop and learn. Because it creates a kind of safety and an enthusiasm around the work. But there are some negative aspects that we have to be aware of but maybe it doesn't have to be a problem, being among likeminded, when it provides us with such good prerequisites.

When asking the students about the impact of the school, some claimed that the particular profile, the high expectations from teachers and the focus on analytical skills – learning to learn rather than memorizing facts – radically shaped them. Gabriella, who admitted that this was the assignment for all educative programs, framed the influence of the SI in terms of 'brainwashing'.

> You are very much forced into something, you are very much brain-washed by attending school and particularly a school with a strong profile where you're working really hard. You are very much entering something. I am not quite sure of where I am in relation all this, maybe in two years or so I have enough distance to understand how this has affected me but now I'm just so much part of it. (..) You really learn what you learn, it sticks to your brain. We are working really hard on that, not just facts but analyzing, being critical towards sources and so. You have to change your way of thinking. And that is something of a brainwash, changing your mode of thinking. (…) This [the SI being a politically left and green school] is permeating the education quite a lot. (…) The school has a normative standard which is to hinder further climate footprint but that is actually politically. Also the idea of sharing resources equally is political.

Some pupils spoke of the school's influence regarding a possible personality change in similar terms, but frame it more positively, partly as the enlightened result of an acquired set of knowledge. Once you become informed on the seriousness of the climate crisis, for instance, it is hard not to act

upon that information, some of them reasoned. Also, in other ways, the school profile has implications for the pupils' identity formation. Some described their out-of-school activities along the path of the school ethos. It guides their consumption patterns (second hand, ecological products), their adaptation to particular body styles (queer, androgynous), and cultivates their interest for certain activities (politics, social issues). For those students who embody a life trajectory adjusted to the school ethos, their entrance into the school is connected to less visible changes. For those who enter from socio-demographic positions further from the school ethos, however, the relative seclusion is more apparent. Some students described how the identification with the school was also changing their social life outside of it. They described how they stopped seeing friends from their previous schools and surroundings, and how they now appreciated the company of classmates who carry the same values as themselves. Nathan, for instance, who completed his secondary education in a class-wise mixed suburb, described the 'new' belonging in terms of a 'shared understanding' and a set of new exclusive practices, like 'going for coffee at a café' with 'another guy'. Before entering the SI he thought of this mostly as an expensive 'uselessness' and something odd for a man to do, but two years along the program he had conformed to the urban middle-class lifestyle of most SI students and found this spare-time activity to be 'really nice'. He also reported that he did not see his old friends much anymore, as they were 'immature' and it was easier for him to 'be himself' with other SI pupils.

> You share so much here, you share opinions. This turns into a sense of community. At many schools it is rather separate, you have left-wing opinions and right-wing, all over the place. (…) I was fed up with people from outside of school, they are immature, the level of matureness is just so much higher here. I can be myself here. There are not so many tough people here and never any fights. Here we have a confidence for each other and the school.

EMBODYING PRIVILEGE: CONFIDENCE, ANALYTICAL AGENCY AND INTIMATE EMOTIONALITY

In this section I will provide examples of what the embodying of a global ethos may bring about, in terms of opportunity structures. I will discuss three interrelated aspects of emerging student dispositions targeting anti-authoritative confidence, analytical agency and a particular emotional style informed by a disclosing communicative capacity. Characteristic of these three examples is that they fit well with what Khan discusses as the privileges of the 'new elite'; i.e. 'a sense of self and a mode of interaction that advantage them' (2013: 14). Referring to Bourdieu, they all represent 'dispositions of the body' (1998b: 54; 2000: 177). Being embodied, i.e. inscribed on the students' bodies, implies that this know-how and senses of self are manifested through the vast spectra of the students' ways of being and navigating in the world.[85] Living up to the ethical obligations, by identifying with and embodying the values at the heart of the school, encourages acts and performances that cultivate a

[85] We should be aware that this is a not a study of whether or not the students make actual use of their resources outside of school, i.e. whether or not the dispositions are being converted into study careers, high status jobs or success in other ways. What we can say something about, however, is if the pupils, while students at this particular school, are mobilizing capacities and senses of self that render possible certain types of opportunity structures, and how they make sense of and negotiate these resources.

competitive subjectivity. The students' will to transmit democratic values and resist non-resilient climate development makes them eager to engage in political school debates, student board work and also makes them aim for a both passionate and empathically tuned communication.

CONSTITUTING CONFIDENCE

During several interviews, students account for a positive assurance in relation to various aspects of their future lives. Turning to Gaztambide-Fernández' five E's of elite schooling, many – though not all – students *envision* themselves pursuing stimulating careers, assuming university courses of their selection and later on 'getting a challenging job'.[86] These kinds of visions can partly be related to the students' sense of entitlement. Among some pupils the hard work and the dedication they put in is believed to grant them certain opportunities. As Isak put it: 'One has to work hard but this will take you somewhere'. It is along a meritocratic discourse that he and others reflect upon their claim to higher education and challenging jobs further ahead (cp. Khan 2013: 4–10). No matter where they actually end up and what they spend their working life doing, the ability to envision success and opportunities must be acknowledged as a resource and a privilege.

Participating in the students' everyday school life provided additional examples of this kind of assurance. Just watching them walk the hallways and listening to them talk, a variety of expressions of self-reliance was revealed. The students looked at each other in the eyes when talking and did not seem afraid to make their points, even though they might have diverged from the main argument within a group discussion or even though the opinion conflicted with the teachers' or an invited guest speakers' view. During classes, which normally took the shape of group settings with 30 pupils (or 60 pupils), there were intensive public student-to-teacher and student-to-student dialogues. A majority of pupils engaged with comments, questions and at times rather advanced and expanded reflections. The same was true for lectures and seminars with invited guest speakers from politics, business, media and culture, among them Nobel Prize winners, prominent politicians and cultural personas. One illustrative example was the yearly assembly of the student board (elevkår), to which Mona Sahlin, former Vice Prime Minister and previous party leader of the Social Democrats, was invited as a speaker during the fall 2013. First of all, the fact that the students invited her, and not a less acknowledged and less busy politician, reveals their level of ambition. The fact that she accepted the invitation communicates, in turn, something about the status of the school, being acknowledged as a 'politician education', and as one student suggested in an earlier quote, a renowned institution among the generation and the class represented by politicians like Sahlin. More astonishing, though, was that Sahlin was not the star of this almost three hour long session. Instead, she waited for almost two hours, in a front row seat, to take the stage.[87]

[86] Not all students perceive of their future in terms of prestigious careers within top positions. Some of them, particularly women, speak of possible future career tracks within mid-level education and in practical professions in the health sector.

[87] It is important to stress that this way of relating to teachers and visiting speakers must also be elucidated in light of the middle-class context. In a rundown mixed suburb school, for instance, this mode of performing self and relating to the world would probably not be associated with advantage but with the inability to behave respectably.

A kind of anti-authoritative confidence can be seen as part of both the educative program and the informal student culture revolving around a strong pupils' representation. 'In the highest decision and policy making body, the School Conference, both staff and students are represented in equal numbers, which means that the students are truly able to influence their own school situation,' states the school homepage. We also find that this attitude mirrors the deformalized and rather nonhierarchical structure of the school. In classrooms and hallways, students and staff meet each other barefoot. The students are allowed to 'hang out' in the teachers' staffroom and put their milk in the staff fridge. These examples, and others, are mentioned in an interview with the present headmaster where she stressed the egalitarian foundation of the school.[88]

> The unique thing here is the relation towards others and the human encounters at the school. I think it has been very clear from the start of the school that this is our common working place. We have different assignments and different areas of responsibility but we have equal value and what you think is important is important to me and vice versa. It doesn't matter if you're a teacher, a student or the concierge. (…) We want our students to have the tools to be present and have an impact and make a change. We think that our students are important and believe that they will make a difference and we want to give them the tools and the appropriate knowledge but also a belief in their own capacities, a capacity on how to act to influence and impact on society. (…) If you provide the students with responsibility, they will be responsible. I always had that vision. Students are wise. If we listen to them we will get a better education.

The embodied confidence can also be addressed as a consequence of the exclusivity transmitted by the school, i.e. by the fact that the students have been selected by a high-performing and well-renowned school. One example of this comes from one of my first days of fieldwork. I was accompanied by a group of pupils on my way to the lunch cantina, when one of them asked me about my first impression of the school. I said, truthfully, that I was rather impressed by their level of argumentation during the early morning class. The student answered that this is the way all 'outsiders' perceive of the school. 'People are normally really impressed by us, we are used to that'. The function of such a mirroring of success comes with, according to some students, an eagerness to perform at 'ones best'. Nina supports such a view. She explained the high degree of self-confidence among the pupils as a result of the level of expectations.

> If I would attend a low-performing school where no one cared about grades or being dedicated, the people in those schools are not provided with confidence. It doesn't matter at all what they are doing.

In an earlier quote by Alex, he recounted something similar. By referring to the SI as an 'elite school' inside which students sense that 'we are the best, we should know this, we are the elite', they internalize a feeling of entitlement to certain privileges. Alex' account also suggests that the selection

[88] The anti-authoritative confidence became a topic also in regard to my socio-reflexive address in my fieldwork and presence at the school. Instead of making the students feel uncomfortable, I experienced that my attendance as a researcher was something that they cared little about. Very few of them acted 'shyly' or in an avoiding manner when I approached them. Instead, they told me that they were 'used to university people' from visiting guests at school and their own families. Some of them were interested in knowing more about my background while others raised critical questions regarding my research.

of pupils is decisive for the evolution of such culture of assurance and that the strong sense of belonging helps transmit symbolic capital from one student to another. Identifying with other students and mirroring the achievements of others, makes the success of individual pupils transmit onto the school, and – in turn – onto other students. In that sense we might suggest that the exclusivity and distinctions, as such, contribute to a sense of entitlement.

The students' confident manner must, however, also be derived from their families. As stated by educational sociologists, the possibility to envision the future in terms of a series of opportunities that one has to administer in appropriate ways is typical for the (upper) middle-classes (Atkinson 2013; Palme 2008: 57, 74, 96). Many of the SI students seem to be familiar not only with the ideas but also with the ways of talking, acting and staging oneself, ways of being that are closely related to expertise and authority, incorporated by celebrities in the top areas covered by the families represented at the SI. As one student puts it, her mother being a law professor and her father an official at the Swedish National Audit Office, the impact of the school is not ascribed any larger significance: 'I believe I will have a job and that things will turn out very well for me. It doesn't really matter that much if I attend the SI or not' (Sofie). For most students, however, I would assume that the rather confident self-understanding is a result both of their family background and their selection of school. This sense of not only belonging to the world, but possibly being at the top of it, together with an expanded horizon of possibilities, is a striking class marker in our time and a symbolic resource that the SI students seem to embody.

Analytical agency

One related aspect has to do with the analytical skills and verbal capacities embodied by many students, together with a particular agency and drive. Embodying such abilities is acknowledged both in relation to the school curriculum, by teachers in their assessment of students, and in regard to status credentials within the student culture. Starting by a discussion on dedication, we might summarize this with the help of one student, Charlotte, as an ambition and ability to express oneself. Speaking of the 'typical' SI-student , she concludes: 'Very conscious, enjoying discussing, lots of statements.' As we have already noted, the school also acknowledges such a 'drive' as an important trait of character. In a homepage section addressing potentially new pupils some of the keywords are 'visions', 'commitment' and a 'will to make a change'. The education is said to provide the students with abilities to: 'think creatively, critically and analytically; to acknowledge their qualities and development opportunities; experience that she/he is evolving together with others and learn from others; work in order to realize her or his visions and to reflect over her or his actions.'

During my fieldwork I faced several examples of how such agency is cultivated. One example was the UN climate role-play. This is a symbolically important part of the SI curriculum, as announced to me during my first days at the school, both by students and teachers. I had the chance to take part in the 2013 event, which assembled pupils in their second year in the auditorium for two intense days.

> Quite far from the casual dress-code, but surprisingly natural and with great pride, the female students made entrance in elegant dress-suits and high heels whereas the young men were wearing black suit and ties, accompanied by discrete suitcases. Some delegates appeared in traditional headscarves, veils and saris. On advance the pupils had been grouped country-wise, as to represent one nation in this fictive UN assembly on sustainability matters. They had prepared their performances and strategies for a couple of days and were noticeably up-beat. Day one starts with each country pleading for its cause, in the shape of a speech given from the impressive aula stage. A majority of students speak in English, a few in the languages of the countries they are representing. They all appreciate respect for the person in the speaker-chair and adjust their vocabulary as to suit the task. Thereafter the countries seek out for partners with whom they can negotiate their demands. A majority of the pupils are active in making claims for their country, also in groups of thirty participants and more. The students are well informed, regarding policy matters and technological aspects, and with seeming ease adjust to the formal and informal communicative rules of the international institution. In fact, many seem perfectly fit to perform the kind of tolerant authority that is needed in order to 'win' support among other countries. One example is the seven-country-large discussion of how to work out a patent legislation on green technological inventions, in which the delegates balance between the effect of market mechanisms, as enforcing a sustainable development, and the importance of spreading technology to poor countries and thereby making inventions 'free'. 'From our country's perspective, we find the resolution unacceptable,' one student declares magisterially. Some delegates loudly oppose the claim, others start whispering and make notes on their computers in order to prepare for the next move. Until the very last minute of the time restricted for lobbying, the pupils are engaged in negotiating their demands with possible alliances.
>
> All students seriously take on the task, for some it does not even appear to be a role they play, but a responsibility. In that sense the assignment seems to create a symbolic break with the everyday school reality. By use of clothing and language, a symbolic shift is created and the students are temporarily cut lose from their roles and expectations. (Field note, December 5, 2013)

In a playful way the UN exercise transmits a sense of exclusive self and also trains the students in certain capacities, the most obvious one being a familiarity with the conditions of international politics. The students are informed about political and administrative work in international organs, they are trained in the actual proceedings and the technical vocabulary (what is a resolution? how to perform a so called speakers'-chain?). One educative point is that the concepts and organizational structures are not approached theoretically but in an embodied mode. The assignment is to live the manners, rites and chaos of international politics. By doing so, the students are trained in participating in public debates, making speeches in front of large assemblies, as well as seeking out compromises, creating alignments and acting strategically within the logic of a powerful international institution. The character of the role-play teaches the students to bridge theory and practice, combining factual arguments with the type of subjectivity that is adjusted towards the conditions of political negotiations.

One concrete skill being trained in this exercise is verbal rhetoric. This appears to be an important feature of the school. Alex, for instance, stated that the strong position of verbal communication was one of the reasons why he chose the school.

> I believe the SI is a lot about words. That was one of the reasons for choosing the SI, I understood that here I will get a theoretical background and the words. Words are really

> important. This is a very verbal school. We speak a lot during classes and people here are very interested in verbal communication and theory. Arguing in favor of your opinion is very important. And I knew I hadn't that before. At the same time I hate it, it is a language of power, that is what it is. And at the same if you're arguing over politics, the words are justifying that you have a theoretical backdrop for what you're saying. (…) I don't want to fool people [by using this language] but later on I will use this langue. I already do, it is nothing I reflect over. That's the way it works with words, it is so quick. At times I feel that this is a problem at the SI. You have the words, on the surface, but not the knowledge. You are very quick with the right words and make people believe that you are very good at things.

Apparently it is not only the actual content, the selection of words, that Alex referred to, that is important but a particular way of being – the confidence, the possibility to affect and influence others, the competitive edge – that comes with a 'power language'. One ritualized event, through which the pupils are trained in mastering such a language, although separated from the formal school curriculum, are the so-called lunch debates. During my very first days at the school, I was made aware of this phenomenon. The lunch debate, I was told, is a social gathering at which a topic, often revolving around one of the typical school matters such as global equality, racism, feminism or sustainability, is discussed by a number of pupils. Despite the actual impact of this informal discussion club, in terms of how often it occurs or how many students that actually are involved, from the ways in which the students talked about it, its mythical reputation reveals some key elements to understanding the status of 'winning an argument'. In the following dialogue with Nina and Sofie we find that this practice is bound with 'prestige' and the kind of 'power' that Alex refers to in the previous quote.

> Sofie: Those who want to win an argument, not just because they can, because anyone can. (…) It is so much prestige, it is a lot of prestige to win a debate.
>
> Nina: Those who manage win an argument know their things. Like wow. I find the people who know a lot at this school to be really awesome. I hope I learn things from that person. (..) But sometimes it is tedious when so much focus is put on winning a debate.
>
> Sofie: It is rather competitively oriented. Some people wanted to form a debate-club here, that would be fun. (…) I would attend. It is not just to argue you also need the knowledge. Knowledge is highly esteemed. Knowledge is power and that is very evident at this school. (…) It is something that is being evaluated. That is something you know here. Being intellectual is huge and sometimes you would find that someone is looking down on a person that is not intellectual, that do not care. (…) It is not about getting a particular job, it is about executing power over other people. If I am really good discussing I can get you over to my side even though you don't know what I'm talking about. It's about power. (…) This is nothing that the teachers talk about during class. It is unofficial. It takes place outside of class.

According to Nina and Sofie, taking a stand, conveying commitment and being rhetorically strong render 'prestige', regardless of what actually is being advocated. The students give words to an ideal of dedication, agency and intellectual excellence, summarized by Sofie: 'Knowledge is power'. As Nina stated, this is a skill that one is working toward at school: 'You develop a rhetoric capacity. Well, when I accomplished ninth grade it was really difficult for me to give a speech, but now it's not a big thing, I can do it in the aula, with ease. I feel that I have developed tremendously in this respect,

regarding my rhetoric capacity'. Such skill is acquired through school projects such as the UN role play but as both Nina and Sofie stressed this is mostly generated outside of classroom teaching, in 'non-official' ways. As Sofie put it: 'This is what we do, we talk a lot.'

For people like Alex and Sofie the art of arguing is a craft related to power. This is confirmed in an interview with the school headmaster who stated that the rhetoric capacities must be related to the students' will to have an impact on society. Only by acquiring such 'tools' will they be listened to by others. The prestige connected with the argumentative battles also has to do with a strong sense of belonging. The fact that the students identify with a collective 'we', brings the play of recognition and esteem to a much closer personal level. As expressed by almost all students in my interviews, aspiring for recognition by other members of school, classmates or teachers is highly important. Returning to the student board meeting and the official 'school vision' which addresses dedicated and engaged pupils, we might conclude that the fostering of democracy – in the shape of a strong and active student voice, the engagement in ongoing school debates and the incarnation of communicative rules of international politics – involves a fostering of agency. At the SI the value base for becoming a person entitled 'to change the world' is formulated from the angle of a quest for equality and sustainability, hence rather different from the cultural nobility and business elite. Although the framing differs, the SI also seems to foster a student subjectivity that is powerful to make claims, act confidently and speak with authoritative language.

INTIMATE EMOTIONALITY

The confidence and agency typical for the students is balanced out by a 'softer' emotional style as the confident speeches during role-play and authoritative rhetorical practices are accompanied by an intimate way of relating to others. This we might also partly derive from the education which does not only train the students in the art of confidently expressing their worldviews, but also focuses on collaboration and communication. Most projects are formed as teamwork in which part of the aim is to find ways to create a successful fellowship. Also during the UN role-play, one pedagogic objective is to make the pupils train their capacities in compromising and building bridges between different interests. This is also evident in the bonds of friendship which evolve at school. The pupils are equally skilled at making space for their own voices and arguments as they are at engaging in intimate conversations regarding more personal matters. They also seem confident when it comes to trusting one's own emotional experiences. In fact, part of making – and staging – oneself as an 'SI student' is the ability to perform a disclosing intimacy, meaning a capacity to share personal reflections with others and engage emotionally in others' experiences. Many of the students I interviewed and spent time with are skilled in this kind of attentive dialogue that requires an emotional presence; it might take the shape of an analysis of how an educators' pedagogic style affects a students' learning capacities, the evolvement of a hierarchical friendship relationship, family matters or a love quarrel. Regarding school subjects, some of them state that the years at the SI have rendered a curiosity for knowledge areas that addresses personal relations and identity, such as psychology, social psychology and philosophy.

By engaging in such areas and communicative styles, the students develop a set of emotional skills such as self-reflection, expressive communication and creativity. Using the vocabulary of Eve Illouz (2007), we might conceptualize these performances in terms of an *emotional style*; a style that, according to Illouz, renders advantages and privileges in late-modern capitalist societies (cp. Skeggs 2004). What is sometimes labeled 'emotional intelligence' enables climbing the career ladder in various sectors. Moreover, today's flexible job market demands that people are capable of handling failures and rejections as well as expanding their social networks. This, Illouz argues, is intimately connected with class. The type of emotional style required in various job markets and cultural sectors is representative for the (upper) middle-classes. To conclude: being and staging oneself as an engaged intellectual involves not only a confident defense of ideas and values, but also a set of class-tuned competences in the area of relational work. The sociality cultivated at school appears, in other words, both as 'soft' and 'competitive'. Embodying the school ethos implies succeeding with this kind of balancing act, sensing when to perform an authoritative agency and when to take on a more intimate mode of conduct. Being capable of handling the switch between different emotional states – from the performed authority during the UN-conference to the intimate relation-building hangouts in the hallway – is part of fostering privilege.

Conclusion

Rather than being defined solely by 'leftish' values, student formation at the SI seems to revolve around a particular subjectivity characterized by high performance, dedication and confidence. Although the icon group is made up of politically invested students and although they will possibly remain an important part of the school, that creates its unique profile out of a set of distinct values, some pupils will graduate, not necessarily as more politicized or more radical environmental activists but, just as other SI students, with a mindset and an emotional style adjusted to meet the challenges of late-modern capitalist societies. These pupils appear as rather similar to students of other high-performing schools with elite reputations. Just like Viktor Rydberg and Norra Real, which enroll students mainly from economically wealthy families, the SI offers symbolic resources that equal opportunity. Becoming an SI student, i.e. a student that identifies with and embodies the values embraced by the school seems to allow for a mobilization of resources in terms of: a) *subjective dispositions:* the students are trained to evolve analytical and critical capacities adjusted to university standards, to be good and confident speakers and to cultivate a flexible and communicative self that is ready to engage in collaborations with others; b) specialized *knowledge and skills* oriented towards the international and more specifically excellence towards the presumably increasingly important sustainability matters, transnational politics and economics; and c) *networks* of other high-performing (upper) middle-class students (current and alumni).

Turning to the question of how a set of school-related values might contribute to the production of privilege we must ask about the mechanisms at work. It seems, from the examples discussed in this paper, to be a matter of three interrelated aspects: a) the global ethos revolving around ideals of social engagement and particular kinds of knowledge emerges as a *driving force* for pupils to develop

competences and skills. This is to say that for at least some of the students the embodied motives for developing, for instance, rhetoric excellence is derived from a will to 'change the world'. As some of them put it, 'power language' and 'global expertise' are necessary resources for successful civic engagement. Acquiring such competence is hence explained partly as a means to convey to others the dangers of the climate crisis or the moral default of racist ideology; b) the relation between a school ethos and the production of privilege must be addressed in terms of ongoing *identity-work* and processes of identification. A strong affective bond with values that are perceived by the students as normatively sanctioned (i.e. the quest for equality and sustainability) creates in itself a sense of entitlement and exclusivity; c) the students' *quest for recognition* by others who share the same ethos, is an additional push for hard work and dedication along with the school values.

This, we should be careful to note, is not to say that the nature of the students' social engagement is less 'real' for those involved. Rather the point is that the investments with a global ethos – in terms of a particular notion of dedication and excellence – is producing not only a radical green left-wing subjectivity, but also a kind of personhood seemingly well-adjusted to the labor market and other areas of contemporary western societies. We should also acknowledge, once again, that the school ethos is embodied in quite different ways by different groups of pupils. Some students are not necessarily politically active but rather embrace the SI vision by being excellent pupils, performing very well in their core subjects. By engaging in such practices they obtain recognition, if not from the icon group, than from teachers and staff in the shape of high grades. Others are committed to civic assignments but approach the questions from different perspectives than the icon group. As an example, one student politically affiliated with a liberal party addresses questions of taxes and regulations in quite different ways than those affiliated with the Social Democrats or the Green Party. Still, this student embodies a global ethos, asserting a strong dedication for the issues at stake.

Finally, we might conclude that it is fairly remarkable that a recently launched public school, which is making itself a name through a focus on global equality and sustainability matters, is competing with traditional and well-regarded Stockholm *gymnasium* such as Kungsholmen and Södra Latin for some of the most high-performing and dedicated students in the greater Stockholm area. According to the founder and former headmaster Karl, the SI is now facing an identity dilemma due to this success. The fact that the admission grades have undergone a dramatic rise over the past ten years makes high performing students with top grades, who are not necessarily invested in the profile issues, willing to choose the school. If this tendency is further stretched, the success will possibly undermine the values that provide the school with its unique reputation. Whatever the future that awaits, the school is an intriguing case of how politics and privilege conflict as well as merge together as a productive formative force.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, Will (2013) 'Class Habitus and perception of the Future: Recession, Employment Insecurity and Temporality', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 64(4): 643–661.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992) *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1998a) *State Nobility*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1998b) *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action.* London: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron (1977) *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage.

Chase, Sarah (2008) *Perfectly Prep: Gender Extremes at a New England Prep School.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Forsberg, Håkan (2015) *Kampen om eleverna. Gymnasiefältets omvandling och skolmarknadens framväxt i Stockholm, 1992–2011*. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

Gaztambide-Fernández, Rubén (2009) *The Best of the Best. Becoming Elite at an American Boarding School*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Goffman, Erving (1961) *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates.* New York: Penguin Books.

Illouz, Eva (2007) *Cold Intimacies. The Making of Emotional Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jarratt, Susan C. and Nedra Reynolds (1994) 'The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of Ethos', in *Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory* (ed.) James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press.

Khan, Shamus Rahman (2013) *Privilege: The Making of an Adolescent Elite at St. Paul's School*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Larsson, Esbjörn (2014) 'Karlberg as a Total Institution: The Royal Swedish War Academy in the 1800s', in *Beyond the Classroom: Studies on Pupils and Informal Schooling Processes in Modern Europe*, eds. A. Larsson and B. Norlin, Peter Lang: Frankfurt am Main.

Mansilla, Veronica Boix and Howard Gardner (2007) 'From Teaching Globalization to Nurturing Global Consciousness' (Pages: 47–66), in *Learning in the Global Era*: *International perspectives on globalization and education* (ed.) Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McGowan, John (1998) *Hannah Arendt: An Introduction*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McMahon, Margery (2001) *International Education. Educating for a Global Future.* Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press.

Palme, Mikael (2008) *Det kulturella kapitalet: studier av symboliska tillgångar i det svenska utbildningssystemet 1988–2008*. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

Palme, Mikael (2015) 'The Valorisation of 'the International' in the Elite Segment of Swedish Upper Secondary Education', in this volume.

Raveaud, Maroussia and Agnès van Zanten (2007) 'Choosing the local school: Middle Class parents values and social and ethinc mix in London and Paris', in *Journal of Education Policy*, 22(1): 107–124.

Reay, Diane, Gill Crozier and David James (2011) *White Middle-Class Identities and Urban Schooling*. Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reay, Dinae (2008) 'Psychosocial Aspects of White Middle-Class Identities: Desiring and Defending against the Class and Ethic 'Other' in urban Multi-ethnic Schooling', *Sociology* 42(6): 1072–1088.

Sandgren, Petter (2013) 'Internatens värld består av isolering' in *Svenska Dagbladet*, 3 September.

Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth; Richards, Kent Harold (2010) *Transforming Graduate Biblical Education: Ethos and Discipline*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Skeggs, Beverley (2004) *Class, self, culture.* London: Routledge.

Törnqvist, Maria (forthcoming) 'The Making of an Egalitarian Elite: School Ethos and the Production of Privilege.'

Wagner, Anne-Christine (1996) 'De internationella skolorna och utbildningspraktikerna: specifika konstruktioner av det nationella', Presentation at the *'Formation des élites et culture transnationale' conference, Moscow, 26–30 april 1996.*

Weber, Max (1905/2005) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* New York: Routledge.

Weenink, Don (2008) 'Cosmopolitanism as a Form of Capital: Parents Preparing their children for a Globalizing World', *Sociology* 42(6): 1089–1106.

The interplay between national and transnational capital in the education of the Irish elites[89]

ALINE COURTOIS, Université de Paris 1

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the apparent paradox between Ireland's economic globalisation strategy and the relatively discreet promotion of international cultural capital and mobility in both its second-level elite schools and its higher education sector. Ireland's international education policy is largely dominated by short-term strategic goals aimed at generating revenue, in line with the rampant commercialisation of the sector. Unsurprisingly, third-level student mobility remains the preserve of a privileged minority but the neighbouring (and culturally similar) UK is by far the preferred destination and strategies of distinction are not easily discernible in these mobility patterns. In comparison to the third-level sector, the second-level sector – where elite institutions are distinctly visible – is still attached to a form of cosmopolitan cultural capital partly informed by the European humanist tradition. However it is largely overshadowed by other principles of distinction based on social and moral capital and by the continued primacy of the national over the cosmopolitan/international in the (overlapping) national and international fields of power. The national is not devalued by those who identify as the global Irish elite; instead it is deployed strategically in international business settings where Irish habitus and Irish cultural capital are perceived as carrying more symbolic power and as being more valuable and profitable resources than the cosmopolitan capital and mind-set cultivated in more traditional elite circles. This may be due to its proximity to American business culture, to the strategic role of the Irish diaspora in bridging the national and international and to the increasingly aggressive marketing of the Irish habitus and culture. In both discourse and policy, the national interest and the advancing of global capitalism are inextricably tied; key national players and those identifying as the global Irish elite have a strong commonality of interests cemented both by a belief in the neo-liberal ideology and by their cultural identification to Ireland. This paper does not argue that international capital is side-lined entirely but calls for an interrogation of its nature and uses and highlights the need for further research into international mobility strategies in Ireland.

[89] Working paper. Please do not quote.

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Irish economy has been hailed repeatedly as one of the most globalised in the world, coming second only to Singapore on a number of occasions. Ireland scores high on a variety of globalisation indicators including openness of the economy, volume of and lack of restriction to economic flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), gross domestic product (GDP), technological development, volume of travel, etc. The Irish strategy based on low corporate taxes and labour flexibility has been successful in attracting thousands of high-profile multinational companies and in making Ireland a notorious if understated tax haven, where billions of Euro transit quietly on their way to the Cayman Islands, Barbados and the Isle of Man. In the context of the ongoing economic crisis, Irish leaders have renewed their vows to develop a knowledge economy and to boost Ireland's status as a choice destination for FDI, in a bid to resuscitate the economic prosperity of the 1990s and 2000s.

While globalisation has prompted elite schools in several other countries to adopt internationalising practices (e.g. Aguiar and Nogueira 2012; Koh and Kenway 2012; Wagner 1998), there is surprisingly little evidence of such a process being undertaken in Ireland. Some prestigious second-level Protestant schools are keen to attract pupils from abroad but do not promote their international orientation on the home market. As for the leading Catholic schools, they remain focused on their traditional Irish Catholic clientele. In the third-level sector, internationalising practices are focused on the imperative of attracting foreign students to generate revenue. This paper is an attempt to understand this paradox. It draws on the Bourdieusian notion of capital and in particular Wagner's reconceptualization of international capital (2012) and seeks to interrogate them in the light of the Irish situation. It is informed by fieldwork conducted in Irish second-level fee-paying schools between 2007 and 2012 (Courtois 2012, 2014) and work currently underway on Irish students' international mobility. As such it is largely exploratory in nature. For the purpose of this paper, recent policy documents concerning the internationalisation of the third-level sector (in particular the Department of Education and Skills 2010, 2013) were analysed as well as position papers issued by the Global Irish Network and video recordings of the 2013 Global Irish Economic Forum meeting, available online. The Global Irish Network, launched in 2010, gathers 350 senior Irish and Irish-connected business people based in over 40 countries. Its role is to provide international business expertise and to promote FDI in Ireland. It has been instrumental in a number of initiatives such as the "Invest in Ireland" event hosted by Bill Clinton in New York in 2012 (www.globalirishforum.ie). A number of Irish government members and other State officials as well as the presidents or provosts of seven Irish universities were present at the 2013 forum, where the purpose and direction of education were keenly discussed.

Firstly I seek to outline the policy orientations which frame the internationalisation of education in Ireland. Secondly I explore available evidence on the international strategies of elite students and schools and finally I attempt to re-examine the nature and perceived value of

international cultural capital and its interplay with national capital in the context of Ireland's global economic strategy as illustrated by the Global Irish Economic Forum.

NEOLIBERALISM, GLOBALISATION AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE IRISH EDUCATION SYSTEM

Irish economic policy has long been neoliberal in nature, even before the UK's neoliberal turn in the 1980s (O'Hearn 1998). The promotion of the knowledge economy at European level and the emphasis on global competitiveness accelerated and legitimated the deployment of neoliberal policies throughout the higher education sector. In Ireland these are channeled through the Higher Education Authority (HEA), a statutory body in charge of funding and advising the third-level sector. In its policy statement, the HEA lays out its goal to achieve a "transformation" of the sector and to produce "empowered, dynamic, entrepreneurial, well-resourced and autonomous higher education institutions" (HEA 2008, p. 5). Under its aegis and against a background of reduced State funding, the move towards commercialisation, privatisation, managerialism and casualisation has accelerated dramatically (Allen 2007; Lynch *et al.* 2012; Courtois and O'Keefe 2015).

The second-level sector underwent a less spectacular transformation given that long before neoliberal reforms came to prominence internationally, the system in Ireland was already characterised by local management of schools and a fully functioning education market as the post-primary education system had emerged principally from local, private initiatives with minimal state interference (Power *et al.* 2013). Yet educational policy issued by the Department of Education and Skills (DES) took an increasingly neoliberal stance over the years, which, after the 2010 bank bailout, culminated in a renewed push for managerial methods of evaluation, control and unabated casualisation of the workforce (Mooney Simmie 2012).

In this context it is perhaps unsurprising that the internationalisation of education in Ireland is envisaged primarily as part of a broader economic strategy to generate revenue, as already noted by Khoo (2011). International students are estimated to contribute €1 billion to the Irish economy[90], with international students in higher education contributing around €700m (of which €240m constitute tuition fees) and English language students in private schools around €300m (Education in Ireland 2012, p. 4, p. 9)[91]. It is suggested that incoming international students could generate the revenue cash-strapped colleges desperately need to maintain baseline services (DES 2010), which is consistent with the dominant ideology. According to this ideology, instead of relying on public funding, universities should operate according to business principles and generate their own resources. As a response to a paper reviewing the

[90] In comparison, international students represent a *cost* of €3 billion to the French state (Fauconnier 2014) although presumably this figure does not take into account their contributions as consumers.

[91] In a pattern similar to that observed by Altbach (2013) in Australia, the unregulated private sector allowed sham institutions to proliferate and issue fake attendance certificates for the purpose of non-EU visa renewals. A dozen such institutions have closed after such practices were exposed and failed to refund fees already paid, leaving thousands of non-EU students without visas or money (ICOS).

current progress made towards these strategic goals (DES 2013), the Irish University Association regretted that the DES failed to adequately emphasise "the vital source of foreign earnings for the state" and the "increased purchasing power" represented by incoming foreign students. Throughout the paper, foreign higher education systems were referred to either as "competitor brands" or as "priority markets" (IUA 2013) rather than as partners. This suggests higher education managers broadly concur with the instrumental, commercial view of international student mobility promoted by the DES. In this context, the fact that increasing numbers of Irish students are lured by British universities can even be perceived as a potential loss of revenue (Irish Independent 2012b)[92].

It is hoped that beyond the direct economic contribution during their stay in Ireland, some international students will become "advocates for Ireland" upon return to their home countries. Thus a key proposal in the strategic plan of the DES is to "identify and target" students who are "likely to become the next generation of leaders, entrepreneurs and decision-makers in countries of importance to Ireland" (DES 2010, p. 57). To this effect a number of scholarship schemes have been put in place in order to draw high-calibre students from target countries in various regions of the world. This strategy was discussed further at a meeting of the Global Irish Economic Forum in October 2013, where the deputy Prime Minister gave the example of 5,000 Brazilian students who had been "put up for tender" by their government and "won" by Ireland. He highlighted the opportunity they represented for future FDI from Brazil and suggested that further effort be made to draw students from other high-growth economies (RTÉ News 2013). At this event, participants spoke confidently of education as a "business" (RTÉ 2013) and of the financial opportunities represented by "exporting our education system". At the core of Ireland's strategy lies a belief that fostering a sentiment of loyalty in future global elites will help influence and manipulate their future financial decisions in favour of Ireland. This gives further credence to Geuens' argument that, far from being disembodied, global financial flows are negotiated by real individuals in the context of personal interactions within restricted social networks (2007 as cited in Wagner 2007a). Although in the present case it is difficult to predict how this loyalty will be fostered or how it will play out in practice.

Higher education institutions, whether State-funded or independent for-profit, are supported in their efforts to internationalise by Enterprise Ireland, the government organisation responsible for subsidising Irish businesses targeting world markets (it took over this particular role from the International Education Board Ireland in 2009, another indication of this paradigmatic shift), and by a broader effort to promote "the Education Ireland brand" (DES 2010). English language schools, for their part, are promoted under the umbrella of Tourism Ireland. The flourishing private for-profit higher education sector is particularly active in establishing partnerships with institutions abroad. However, these tend to be one-way relationships in which the Irish college sets up an offshore branch and delivers Irish qualifications in 'target markets' such as Malaysia, Bahrain and Russia (OBHE 2005a, 2005b,

[92] At the same time, given the present funding crisis, the capacity of the third-level sector is questioned as student/staff ratios approach critical levels (Humphrey 2014).

2008). These relationships do not necessarily entail any travel or contact between Irish and foreign students. In addition it is estimated that 3,000 students are enrolled on online courses in Irish-based private for-profit colleges and that the proportion of distance students is growing (Education Ireland 2012). Other examples reported by the Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (OBHE) include new degrees in Irish colleges financed by multinational companies such as Pfizer and Intel and the acquisition of the Dublin Business School by the American private education provider Kaplan (OBHE 2003, 2005a). Multinationals Education Study Group and Education First also run lucrative operations in Ireland, with the former operating in partnership with two State-funded universities. Although these are clear indicators that the Irish higher education sector is taking on a global dimension, evidence that this fosters a culture of outward student mobility is lacking.

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES IN EDUCATION

Student mobility has become a mass phenomenon and the object of an increasing body of research worldwide. Yet existing literature on Irish students' mobility tends to be quantitative rather than qualitative, to focus on incoming rather than outgoing students and/or to frame arguments solely in terms of national economic strategic goals (e.g. DES 2010, 2013, Education in Ireland 2012, HEA 2013a). In a report entitled "Investing in Global Relationships: Ireland's International Education Strategy 2010–15" (DES 2010) less than two pages are devoted to both staff and student outward mobility in an 80-page document encompassing the targets and strategic actions necessary to make Ireland a choice destination for international students. The explicit rationale for encouraging outward student mobility is in fact to increase inward mobility as, beyond the individual benefits accrued to mobile students, two-flow systems are preferred by foreign 'client' institutions and recommended at EU level; and foreign students are more at ease in institutions where they can mix with local students who have experienced student mobility themselves (DES 2010, p. 62).

According to the latest available figures, in 2012–13, Ireland received 6,277 Erasmus students and interns but there were only 2,762 outgoing students and interns (www.ec-europa.eu). Most Irish universities have now embarked on active promotion campaigns to encourage students to avail of these exchange possibilities.

Degree mobility seems to be more widespread than programme mobility (sources differ widely in their estimates) which is atypical in the European context (Erlich 2012) but it remains a largely spontaneous and under-researched phenomenon. Sources indicate that 9% of current Irish students have studied abroad and a further 12% (Harmon and Foubert 2009) or 16% (HEA 2013b) intend to do so. Geographical distance to college(s) within Ireland increasingly constrains third-level choices (Cullinan et al. 2013) and Irish students are more likely to rely on their families or partners for income than students in any other European country (UIS 2009), which suggests international mobility, no matter how desirable, is out of reach for many. Available data (Harmon and Foubert 2009; HEA 2010; UIS 2009) indicate that as is the case

in other countries (Erlich 2012), or perhaps even more so, student mobility might be affordable only to a select few.

As previously mentioned, available research largely overlooks outward degree mobility and as such fails to capture students' circumstances, motivations, strategies and experiences. One thing we know is that the preferred destination for degree mobility is by far the UK. Over 80% (15–18,000) of Irish students enrolled abroad were located in the UK in 2010 (OECD 2001, p. 337). English-speaking countries typically draw disproportionately high numbers of incoming students from non-English speaking countries as many seek linguistic immersion in addition to a cultural experience. Obviously movements from Ireland to the UK are underpinned by different motives and point to various possible strategies such as strategies of distinction or avoidance/re-appropriation of the institutional field at the national level. The limited number of places available on highly-sought courses in Irish universities and the high number of points required for admission prompt financially privileged, academically average students to apply for equivalent courses in British universities, thus bypassing the merciless centralised application system (CAO). UCAS, the British counterpart of CAO, allows Irish students to convert their leaving certificate points into 'tariff points' applicable for entry to British higher education institutions. Some British universities, such as the University of Edinburgh and Bangor University, are particularly active in recruiting Irish students. A lower cost of living, lower point requirements and geographical and cultural proximity are core arguments in their self-promotion to Irish second-level students (Irish Independent 2012b)[93], selling points which depart significantly from the cultural discourse promoting European exchange programmes. Another emerging 'avoidance' strategy is to enrol in Eastern European colleges. Many offer medical, dentistry and veterinary courses in English – Budapest and Prague being among the most popular destinations for Irish students, who organise their own social networks and shared accommodation before leaving the country via internet boards and social networks. It is unclear however whether Irish graduates returning from Eastern European colleges can then re-integrate and re-appropriate the Irish institutional field or job market, which is saturated in some of these targeted medical sectors. Whether anticipated professional outcomes motivated these particular mobility decisions and whether such strategies proved successful is unknown[94].

The choice of a British university might also be motivated by specific strategies of distinction. In the UK, degree mobility is associated predominantly with high achievers looking for top-ranked universities (Gordon 2001, Brooks and Waters 2014a). Presumably Irish students applying to top British (or American) universities have a similar profile. Oxford had 133 Irish applicants in 2012 (Irish Independent 2012a). The total number of Irish students at Oxford and Cambridge is currently slightly below 500. Of these a meagre 31 were accepted at undergraduate level (Fan 2013). King et al. (2010) found that in the UK students of independent

[93] Conversely Irish universities are courting UK students, promoting their lower fees (Collison 2012).

[94] Board and social network discussions suggest that this is the main concern for students considering medical courses in Eastern Europe. Some share the difficulties they faced in trying to secure internships in Ireland and a number of participants finally opted for a career in Eastern Europe although it was not their initial plan.

schools were twice as likely to apply for university abroad as students of State schools. These are also notoriously over-represented in Oxbridge. Similarly in Ireland, secondary students applying for courses in Oxford and Cambridge are likely to be found in fee-paying schools. The present fee-paying sector consists of 56 schools of varying sizes, two-thirds of which are Catholic (the others being mainly Protestant). They cater to slightly over 7% of the school-going population. As indicated by the figures mentioned above, however, even if all 31 Irish students in Oxbridge were from these schools, it would still represent a tiny fraction of their student numbers[95]. Interviews at leading Catholic schools revealed that staff members encouraged students to apply for Irish-based universities, in particular the two most prestigious. Although, one guidance counsellor admitted that occasionally students opted for courses abroad which were less competitive than those in Ireland. Rarely did students of Catholic elite schools envisage studying abroad as a strategy of distinction, which is congruent with the local (day schools) or national (some boarding schools) institutional ethos also evident in their recruitment patterns. Focused on their traditional Irish, Catholic, wealthy clientele, these schools do not market themselves abroad. One boarding school in particular takes care to recruit students from all Irish regions in order to reflect the geographical diversity of the country, and I have argued elsewhere (Courtois 2013) that it remains faithful to its historical mission to train future Catholic national leaders and fosters a sense of duty to the nation. While there is not necessarily a contradiction between being attached to the national interest and becoming a key player in the globalisation of the economy (the dominant discourse now frames the national economic recovery as dependent on the continued expansion and acceleration of global capitalism), the national remains the primary frame of reference in these schools. By contrast, Protestant schools actively encourage their students not to limit their choices to the Irish higher education landscape but to look "further afield" to the UK, the US or other countries. These schools also market themselves abroad and in some of them 30% of students are foreign. They have now adopted the international, multicultural features that international schools present in other national contexts, (e.g. Wagner 1998) although this requires some monitoring and negotiating: two principals reported racial tensions within their schools, and one suggested that his school was criticised for its high intake of foreigners. All interviewed principals were prompt to mention that a large proportion of their foreign students were in fact Irish by descent. Furthermore, as in the UK (Brooks and Waters 2014b), these features remain discreet in the schools' promotional material, and it should also be noted that in comparison to their Catholic counterparts Protestant schools operate on a secondary market.

Nonetheless, both elite Catholic and Protestant schools take part in international competitions and events and organise school trips abroad. School trips tend to fall into two categories: on the one hand cultural or leisure tourism, mainly in Europe, as is typical of international socialisation practices in privileged families (Wagner 2007b), and on the other hand charity work in developing countries, in line with the missionary work historically carried

[95] Another entry route is via a British public school. Only one Irish primary school operates according to the British prep school model, sending about 1 in 3 of its pupils to public schools.

out by the religious orders associated with these schools. Exchange programmes, where they exist, are organised with private schools in Europe in line with denominational affinities and with a traditional curricular offer in languages (French, Spanish and German). Latin and Greek are taught predominantly (for Greek, exclusively) in fee-paying schools, which signifies their attachment to the European humanist tradition, in accordance with the aristocratic understanding of cosmopolitan cultural capital. However, while it is understood they are not mutually exclusive, national forms of social and moral capital are valued more highly and play a more prominent role in the construction of elite identity in these schools (Courtois 2015).

NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ELITE STRATEGIES

The Irish *Who's Who* (Phelan 2006) compiles short biographical notes for 1,390 "influential" Irish individuals and an approximately 250 additional individuals of Irish extract around the world. Only 29 of these individuals appear to have been educated in British public schools. Furthermore, these are predominantly academics, clergymen, artists and journalists rather than politicians or business people. Of those who went to an elite Irish Catholic school, very few went on to study abroad and these were also more often involved in the arts or media than in business or politics. Overall, Irish elites who have achieved strategic positions of power in Ireland (which often signifies their involvement in economic globalisation) were educated at home at both the second and third level. While the Irish economy has gone global, the national field of power seems largely defined by national rather than international capital. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that even for Ireland's internationally mobile elite, a traditional Irish boarding school education is still the preferred choice[96]. In addition, only one second-level school offers the International Baccalaureate programme. The only self-styled international school is a small, independent primary school, whose application for state funding failed. The international school model is therefore strikingly underdeveloped in Ireland at second level, while existing elite schools, and secondary schools in general, do not display a strong international orientation (Courtois 2014)[97].

One possible explanation for the relatively low priority given to the construction of a cosmopolitan or international cultural capital could be the fact that Irish national capital has become a valuable currency not only within but also beyond national borders. Inglis argues that the Irish are viewed as one of the most successful and popular ethnic groups in the world, a success due to "the increased value of embodying an Irish habitus – an Irish way of being in the world and presenting oneself – and accumulating Irish cultural capital in the form of music,

[96] For instance, Peter Sutherland, former EU Commissioner, head of WTO and now chairman of Goldman Sachs International, enrolled his sons in one of Ireland's top boarding schools while he was based in Brussels.

[97] By contrast, one of the leading Irish business schools, in its promotion to international students, boasts an "international blend of students" and highlights the opportunities this blend provides for building international professional networks. Its international accreditation and respectable global ranking are also used to assert its position as a strong player on the international education market, in another effort to draw selective education consumers.

literature, art and so forth" (Inglis 2008, p. 92–93). Based on the biography of Akio Morita, Wagner (1998) suggests that acquiring an American way of managing social and symbolic capital is what guarantees success in international business circles but according to Inglis, Irish cultural capital may now have acquired a higher value than American cultural capital.

This reliance on the popularity of Irish cultural capital and the Irish habitus is at the core of Ireland's strategic economic thinking. "Culture Ireland" was established in 2005 in order to promote Irish culture and arts internationally and ultimately to "utilise Ireland's [global] cultural profile as a driver of trade and investment" (DAHG 2012, p. 5). A young member of the Global Irish Economic Forum, who organised the first Saint Patrick's parade in Singapore, explained that her primary goal in doing so was to promote "the fantastic opportunities for FDI in Ireland" and to "send business home" (RTÉ 2013b).

The Irish diaspora is expected to play a key role in Ireland's economic recovery, firstly as a 'target market' for both tourism and education, and secondly as an active player in the promotion of Ireland for FDI. Descendants of the Irish diaspora enjoy preferential treatment. Currently, there are plans at government level to fast-track their visa and citizenship applications in order to strengthen their connection to Ireland – as well as to increase the inflow of international students. Yet a 2004 referendum removed the right to citizenship for those born in Ireland to non-Irish parents[98]. This again suggests that the national dominates the international as even the international diaspora is defined culturally as primarily Irish for strategic reasons.

The official 'Education Ireland' promotional video states that "we are the warmest friendliest people in the world" – a theme which also runs through tourism advertising. It is a similar construct of Irish habitus which is deployed on the international business scene. Members of the Global Irish Economic Forum believe Ireland's status as an ex-colony and the friendly, debonair behavioural characteristic of the Irish habitus are valuable assets in business negotiations. An Irish businessman based in Paraguay thus commented on the "extraordinary affinity between Irish people and people in Latin America". He continued: "we get in the door before everybody else, in trading situations we regularly beat the French, we regularly – always actually – beat the English and we almost always beat the Americans and that is because we are seen as a country with a colonial past as they have and we are easy to deal with". Irish symbolic capital is also advantageous to the Irish in Africa; while the Chinese are perceived as "too opportunistic", the Irish enjoy a "tremendous reputation" thanks to the "goodwill from missionaries in the past". Ireland's history is thus also mobilised in the construction and presentation of this positive Irish identity.

Cosmopolitan cultural capital, in comparison, was devalued during the forum discussions. The Irish's poor record in foreign languages was raised by the floor as a potential barrier to international trade on a number of occasions. Such concerns were dismissed by a speaker whose account suggested that the Irish habitus might exempt the Irish from mastering foreign

[98] On this Loyal (2003) warns that the "hegemonic construction" of Ireland as "an open, cosmopolitan, multicultural, tourist friendly society" must be mitigated by strong evidence of racism and by the persistence of exclusionary cultural nationalism inherited from the post-colonial context.

languages. He reported a personal anecdote from a business meeting in Venezuela, where he attempted to say a few introductory words in a very poor Spanish and actually said that he was "pregnant by a Spanish man", which provoked the audience's benevolent hilarity. He used this anecdote to highlight the fact that his poor attempt and his humorous demeanour were welcome as further evidence that he did not think of himself as "a conquistador". This contrasts with the common understanding of cosmopolitan cultural capital as a valuable asset in elite circles. Cosmopolitan capital signals a transnational worldview, knowledge of the world and its languages – in line with the aristocratic ethos – and often as well, a critical distance to national capital. To the global Irish, this form of cosmopolitan cultural capital may not be pertinent on the global business scene: "If you do business the European way you're going to fail miserably" said another panel member at the forum. As someone on the floor suggested dropping Irish from the school curriculum in order to make way for more useful languages, one panel member answered that Irish had another part to play, namely that of defining "what it means to be an Irish person" and that therefore it should be kept. "With no disrespect to our European colleagues", he went on to say, "we should think twice about teaching people a language where they can get to speak to, if you're lucky, 20 million people" (presumably referring to French and German, the most frequently taught languages at secondary level, with Spanish) and suggested that these be dropped from the curriculum in favour of Spanish, Chinese, Russian and Hindi (RTÉ 2013a), thus putting a final nail in the European coffin.

Such views may not be unanimously held within the Irish business community. A past pupil of an elite Catholic school, now a prominent national businessman with significant international experience, viewed both the moral teaching he received in school and his international experience as key to his ability to rise above the "pettiness" of local networks and cronyism and to understand "the bigger picture". Cosmopolitan capital and moral capital are associated in this account, which also echoes a more traditional conception of international experience and cosmopolitan capital as key elements of elite status and legitimacy. Furthermore, the emergence of student mobility as a strategy of distinction (of which unfortunately we know little), suggests that national and international capital are not necessarily mutually exclusive but may well have a cumulative effect.

Conclusion

In spite of Ireland's deliberate economic strategy focused on facilitating global financial flows, Ireland does not encourage outward student mobility in any significant way and its elite schools are largely focused on the national rather than the international. In this regard the Irish situation contrasts sharply with that of Singapore as described by Koh and Kenway (2012). Given that the benefits of economic globalisation for the nation are widely contested (e.g. Allen 2007), Koh and Kenway's title "deploying the transnational in the national interest", could almost be reversed. It is in fact the national, rather than the international, that constitutes symbolic power in Ireland. Irish habitus and cultural capital are thus deployed strategically in international

business settings in order to advance economic globalisation and consequently to further the interests of the Irish and global Irish elites.

The symbolic power of the Irish habitus on the international business scene could be attributed to the cultural proximity of the Irish and American business cultures, a proximity further cemented by the Irish-American diaspora and by the circulation of Irish cultural products. Furthermore, national leaders and those identifying as the global Irish elite on both sides of the Atlantic have a strong commonality of interests enhanced not only by their cultural identification to Ireland but also by their strong belief in the neo-liberal ideology.

The discourse of Ireland's leaders betrays a distinctive if mild form of cultural imperialism. Irish cultural capital and Irish habitus are invested with such symbolic power that they are perceived as instrumental in business negotiations to the extent that they could significantly influence strategic financial decisions in particular in the developing world.

While the strategic deployment of an Irish habitus constitutes a helpful if partial explanation for the paradox outlined in the introduction, it should not obscure the fact that national and international capital are not mutually exclusive. There are indications that cosmopolitanism and international student mobility are valued by certain privileged fractions, and their motivations and strategies deserve further attention. The career trajectories of those who identify as global Irish would also require closer examination; although these promote and embody an Irish habitus, other modalities of distinction and strategies are at play in the construction of both national and international elite careers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aguiar, Andréa; and Maria Alice Nogueira (2012). "Internationalisation strategies of Brazilian private schools", *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 22/4, pp. 353–368.

Allen, Kieran (2007). *The Corporate Takeover of Ireland*, Dublin: Dublin Academic Press.

Brooks, Rachel; and Johanna Waters (2014a). *Student Mobilities, Migration and the Internationalization of Higher Education*, Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brooks, Rachel; and Johanna Waters (2014b). "The hidden internationalism of elite English schools", *Sociology*, advance online publication 2 April 2014.

Collison, Patrick (2012). "Save £25,000 at university and join the 'tuition fee refugees'", *The Guardian*, 17 August.

Courtois, Aline (2012). *Educating Elites: Power, Privilege and Excellence in Ireland's Top Fee-paying Schools*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, UCD and Paris 1.

Courtois, Aline (2014). "Internationalising practices and representations of the 'other' in second-level elite schools in Ireland". Submitted article.

Courtois, Aline (2015). "'Thousands living at our gates': Moral character, legitimacy and social justice in Irish elite schools". *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 36, no. 1, 2015.

Courtois, Aline; and Theresa O'Keefe (forthcoming 2015). "Precarity in the ivory cage: neoliberalism and casualisation of work in the Irish Higher Education sector." Journal of Critical Education Policy Studies, Spring issue.

Cullinan, John; Flannery, Darragh; Walsh, Sharon; and Selina McCoy (2013). "Distance Effects, Social Class and the Decision to Participate in Higher Education in Ireland", *Economic and Social Review*, 44/1, p. 19–51.

Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht (DAHG) (2012). "Government Decision to critically review Culture Ireland with a view to its functions being merged into the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht".

Department of Education and Skills (DES) (2010), "Investing in Global Relationships: Ireland's International Education Strategy 2010–15", Dublin.

Department of Education and Skills (DES) (2013), "Review of Ireland's International Education Strategy 2013", *Consultation Paper*, Dublin.

Education in Ireland (2012), "International Students in Higher Education in Ireland 2011/12".

Erlich, Valérie (2012). *Les Mobilités étudiantes*, Paris, La Documentation française.

Fauconnier, Patrick (2014) « Renflouer nos universités grâce aux étudiants étrangers ? », *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 26 March.

Fan, Xin (2013). "Irish students at Oxford doubled over last decade", *Cherwell*, 1 March, 2013.

Gordon, Jean (2001). "The internationalisation of education – Schools in Europe and the SOCRATES Programme", *European Journal of Education*, 36/4, pp. 407–419.

Grabher, Angelika; Wejwar, Petra; Unger, Martin; and Berta Terzieva (2014). "Student Mobility in the EHEA. Underrepresentation in Student Credit Mobility and Imbalances in Degree Mobility", *report to the Institute for Advanced Studies*, Vienna.

Harmon, David; and Olivier Foubert (2010). "Eurostudent Survey IV. Report on the Social and Living Conditions of Higher Education Students in Ireland 2009/2010", *report to the Higher Education Authority*, Dublin

Higher Education Authority (HEA) (2008). "Strategic Plan 2008–2010", Dublin.

Higher Education Authority (HEA) (2013a). "Higher Education Key Facts and Figures 2011/12", Dublin.

Higher Education Authority (HEA) (2013b). "The Irish Survey of Student Engagement (ISSE) Summary Report", Dublin.

Humphreys, Joe (2014). "Universities warn student-staff ratios near 'critical levels'", *Irish Times*, 15 February.

Inglis, Tom (2008). *Global Ireland: Same Difference*, New York, Routledge.

Irish Independent, "So just what do you have to do to get into Oxford", *Irish Independent*, Education section, 25 November, 2012 (a).

Irish Independent, "Irish students head to UK over fee fear. Applications to British and Northern Irish colleges have surged by 14%", *Irish Independent*, Education section, 27 November, 2012 (b).

Irish Universities Association (IUA), "IUA Response to Review of Ireland's International Education Strategy 2013 Consultation Paper", *report to the HEA*, Dublin, 2013.

Khoo, Su-Ming (2011). Ethical globalisation or privileged internationalisation? Exploring global citizenship and internationalisation in Irish and Canadian universities. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 9(3–4), 337–353.

King, Russell; Findlay, Allan; and Jill Ahrens (2010). "International Student Mobility Literature Review", *report to HFECE*.

Koh, Aaron; and Jane Kenway (2012). "Cultivating national leaders in an elite school: deploying the transnational in the national interest", *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 22/4, pp. 333–351.

Lynch, Kathleen; Grummell, Bernie; and Dympna Devine (2012). *New Managerialism in Education: Commercialization, Carelessness and Gender*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

O'Hearn, Denis (1998). *Inside the Celtic Tiger: The Irish Economy and the Asian Model*, London, Pluto Press.

Loyal, Steven (2003). "Welcome to the Celtic Tiger: racism, immigration and the state", Colin Coulter and Steve Coleman (Ed.) *The End of Irish History? Critical Reflections on the Celtic Tiger*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp. 74–94.

Observatory of Borderless Higher Education (OBHE), "Kaplan strides into Europe with the acquisition of the Dublin Business School", December, 2003.

Observatory of Borderless Higher Education (OBHE), *Other News from Around the World*, 28, May, 2005 (a).

Observatory of Borderless Higher Education (OBHE), *Other News from Around the World*, 30, July, 2005 (b).

Observatory of Borderless Higher Education (OBHE), *Other News from Around the World*, 141, April, 2008.

OECD, *Education at a glance 2011*, OECD Publishers, 2011.

Power, Martin; O'Flynn, Michael; Courtois, Aline; and Margaret Kennedy (2013). "Neoliberalism and Education in Ireland", Dave Hill (dir.), *Immiseration Capitalism, Activism and Education: Resistance, Revolt and Revenge*. Brighton, Institute for Education Policy Studies.

RTÉ News, "Panel Debate: Trade, Tourism and Investment with High Growth Markets" (live streaming), *Global Irish Economic Forum 2013*, October, 2013 (a).

RTÉ News, "Farmleigh Fellow Laura O'Connell talks about her success – and the success of the Irish community – in Asia" (live streaming), *Global Irish Economic Forum 2013*, October, 2013 (b).

Unesco Institute of Statistics (UIS), "The Bologna Process in Higher Education in Europe. Key Indicators on the Social Dimension and Mobility", *report for the European Commission*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009.

Wagner, Anne-Catherine (1998). *Les nouvelles élites de la mondialisation: une immigration dorée en France*, Paris, PUF.

Wagner, Anne-Catherine (2007a). *Les classes sociales dans la mondialisation*, Paris, La Découverte.

Wagner, Anne-Catherine (2007b). « La place du voyage dans la formation des élites », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 5/170, pp. 58–65.

Wagner, Anne-Catherine (2012). « L'internationalisation de la formation des élites: vers une recomposition des classes dirigeantes? », M. D. Gheorghiu, *La mobilité des élites. Reconversions et circulation internationale*, Iasi, pp. 79–96.

Des investissements internationaux incertains. Les étudiants mexicains en gestion ou en science politique dans les grandes écoles françaises

ANNE CATHERINE WAGNER & DOMINGO GARCIA GARZA

Si les États-Unis, par leur proximité géographique et leur emprise culturelle, restent la première destination des étudiants mexicains à l'étranger attirant toujours plus de la moitié d'entre eux, les flux vers la France ne sont pas négligeables. La France occupe, selon les années, la troisième ou quatrième place des destinations des étudiants mexicains à l'étranger, conservant notamment un rôle important dans la formation doctorale ou postdoctorale des chercheurs mexicains (Didou-Aupetit & Gérard, 2010).

Ce ne sont pas seulement les disciplines artistiques, littéraires ou scientifiques qui y attirent les Mexicains mais aussi, et même surtout, la gestion, l'administration des affaires, la finance, le marketing ou les sciences politiques. Entre 2006 et 2011, près d'un Mexicain sur trois qui obtient un visa « étudiant » pour la France s'inscrit dans ces disciplines[99], majoritairement dans des écoles de gestion ou de commerce, privées ou semi privées : seuls 15% des étudiants en gestion sont à l'université.

Quels sont les facteurs qui font l' « attractivité » de la France dans ces offres de formation très internationalisées, où les modèles de formations dominants sont avant tout états-uniens ? Quelle est la logique de ces échanges académiques mobilisant essentiellement des institutions privées, ou du moins en dehors de l'université ? Dans quelle mesure le choix de la France est-il celui d'un capital international spécifique, distinct du capital international accumulé dans les *business schools* américaines ? Quelle est la rentabilité de ces investissements éducatifs spécifiques ?

Pour répondre à ces question nous nous appuierons, d'une part, sur l'exploitation de données fournies par *Campus France*[100] sur l'ensemble des 4104 étudiants mexicains qui ont obtenu un visa en France de 2006 et 2011 pour s'inscrire dans une école de commerce, de gestion ou de management ou dans un Institut d'études politiques. D'autre part, une enquête par entretiens a été conduite auprès d'étudiants ou d'anciens étudiants dans ces disciplines et

[99] Source : Campus France, données sur les étudiants Mexicains ayant obtenu un visa pour la France entre 2006 et 2011. Dans l'ordre, les disciplines sont la gestion et le management (12,7% de l'ensemble des étudiants s'inscrivant en France), le commerce (10,6%), l'économie et la finance (3, 6%), le marketing (2,6%). Les inscriptions en sciences politiques concernent 3,5% des étudiants mexicains sur la période.

[100] Pour des analyses de cette base et une synthèse des évolutions entre 2006 et 2008 voir Gérard (2009).

auprès de responsables des échanges internationaux dans différents établissements universitaires en France et au Mexique (voir encadré)[101].

Le corpus d'entretiens

Entre juin 2011 et juin 2013, une cinquantaine d'entretiens ont été conduits, en France et au Mexique, avec des étudiants ou anciens étudiants mexicains qui ont suivi en France des études dans des écoles de gestion ou à Sciences Po, ainsi qu'avec des représentants des écoles dans les deux pays.
Sur les 19 étudiants en gestion interrogés, 6 sont venus en France pour y faire un MBA (à HEC, à l'INSEAD, à l'Ecole de management de Grenoble) ; 9 pour faire un master (à l'ESCP, l'ESCE, l'ESC Rennes, la Skema Business School) ; 4 étaient en échange dans le cadre de leur licence (à HEC, l'ESG, l'INSEEC, le CESEM).
Les 11 étudiants de Sciences Po interrogés sont venus en France pour y passer un master (6 d'entre eux) ; dans le cadre d'un échange d'un ou deux semestres (3 enquêtés) ou pour y faire tout leur cursus universitaire (2 entretiens).
Des entretiens ont été conduits avec des responsables des échanges dans des écoles de commerce où la présence d'étudiants mexicains est importante - on a cherché à visiter aussi bien les plus « grandes » écoles (HEC, ESSEC, ESCP), que des écoles moins prestigieuses, mais relativement prisées par notre population (IESEG Lille, ESCE)- ainsi qu'à Sciences Po-Paris et sur le campus euro-latino-américain de Sciences Po-Paris situé à Poitiers.
Au Mexique, ont été rencontrés les responsables des échanges dans les principales écoles de gestion privées dans la région de Mexico et à Monterrey (l'ITAM, l'Universidad Iberoamericana, le TEC de Monterrey, l'EGADE et l'IPADE).
Les entretiens ont été réalisés, le plus souvent en binôme, par les deux coauteurs, en français ou en espagnol selon les contextes.

Dans un premier temps, on montrera la construction d'un champ international des études de gestion et on présentera la position des écoles françaises et mexicaines dans ce champ ; on cherchera ensuite à comprendre les logiques du choix de la France dans ces disciplines, avant d'analyser les conditions très restrictives de rentabilisation de ces investissements internationaux.

1. La position de la France et du Mexique dans un espace international des formations a la gestion.

Depuis les années 1990, en France comme dans la plupart des pays industrialisés, les établissements d'enseignements supérieurs sont de plus en plus nombreux à délivrer des spécialisations autour des finances ou de la gestion : MBA, MS, MIB, Exécutive finance program. Ce succès s'accompagne d'une légitimation croissante de savoirs qui ont longtemps été considérés avec mépris par le pôle dominant du monde académique[102].

[101] Cette enquête a pris place dans le cadre d'un programme Ecos-Nord « Mobilités et réseaux scientifiques France-Mexique » (2011-2014), coordonné par Etienne Gérard (CEPED) et Sylvie Didou (CINVESTAV).

[102] Aux États-Unis en 1908, l'installation d'une *business school* au sein de la prestigieuse université d'Harvard a suscité l'indignation des universitaires et des intellectuels qui estimaient que des filières où il s'agit d'apprendre

La construction d'un champ internationalisé des études en gestion participe de cette valorisation. Les écoles se situent en effet de plus en plus par rapport à un espace de concurrence et de reconnaissance international, structuré par un ensemble d'accréditations et de classements internationaux. L'AACSB (American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business) accrédite depuis 1915 les écoles d'affaires nord-américaines. A partir des années 1990, l'AACSB élargit son champ géographique d'action et s'intéresse aux écoles non américaines. Actuellement, 672 institutions dans le monde sont accréditées par l'AACSB, parmi lesquelles 80% sont aux États-Unis. L'EFMD (European Foundation for management dévelopment) basée à Bruxelles délivre le label EQUIS (European Quality Improvment System) depuis 1997 et regroupe plus de 90 membres dans 81 pays. L'AMBA (association des MBA) est une association britannique qui accrédite des MBA et des masters dans plus de 200 business schools dans près de 80 pays. Ces accréditations prennent en compte des critères divers : le niveau de formation des professeurs, le nombre de publications dans des revues américaines internationalement reconnues, le degré d'internationalisation, etc. Le protocole d'évaluation est coûteux, comme son renouvellement (40 000 euros par an pour la seule AACSB). Pourtant, beaucoup d'écoles recherchent désormais ces labels, qui accroissent leur valeur symbolique (et permettent une augmentation de leurs frais de scolarité) (Cret, 2007). Les MBA et les masters en management font en outre l'objet de nombreux classements dans la presse spécialisée : les recruteurs et les candidats prennent de plus en plus en compte les classements de *Financial Times*, *Business Week*, *US News*, *The Economist*, de la *Princeton Review*, du *Wall Street Journal*, ou de *Forbes*. On peut parler d'un marché concurrentiel et hiérarchisé. Les candidats font leur choix en prenant en compte une offre mondiale, et en comparant les prix, la durée des formations, la valeur académique des formations, le salaire à la sortie, les taux des prêts des banques, le coût de la vie dans le pays de destination, etc.

Cette mise en concurrence a pour effet d'homogénéiser le contenu de la formation des écoles, qui se plient progressivement à des normes communes (Amdam *et al.*, 2003). Le contenu des enseignements, les méthodes pédagogiques et les références sont ainsi très semblables d'un pays à l'autre, ce qui facilite la mobilité des étudiants et des enseignants Ce contexte international transforme en profondeur la position de l'enseignement de la gestion en France et au Mexique, et structure les relations entre institutions de formations de ces deux pays.

Le succès des études de gestion en France

Les écoles de gestion en France ont longtemps été considérées comme des écoles de second rang dans l'espace de l'enseignement supérieur français. En mettant en avant leurs liens avec l'entreprise et en revendiquant une rupture avec les « carcans scolaires », ces écoles qui sont créées en grand nombre dans les années 1960 ont souvent d'abord offert aux enfants de la

à s'enrichir n'avaient pas leur place dans l'université ; la bibliothèque par exemple ne voulait pas héberger des livres de commerce. Aujourd'hui, les rapports entre universités et *business schools* se sont presque inversés : alors que la gestion est la deuxième discipline la plus choisie par les étudiants américains en master (après l'éducation), les prestigieuses *business schools* – comme la *Harvard Business School*- n'entravent plus le crédit académique des universités américaines qu'elles contribueraient plutôt à renforcer (Khurana, 2007).

bourgeoisie économique évincés des grandes écoles les plus sélectives un moyen de contourner la concurrence scolaire tout en évitant l'université publique (Bourdieu, 1989).

Au fur et à mesure que leur audience s'élargit, un certain nombre d'entre elles tendent désormais à affirmer leur légitimité académique, entrant progressivement en concurrence avec les écoles les plus consacrées scolairement. Le secteur des écoles de commerce et de gestion est aujourd'hui à la fois en expansion et extrêmement hétérogène. En 2010, 211 écoles forment près de 135 000 jeunes aux métiers du commerce et de la gestion, et les effectifs des écoles ont augmenté de 40% en 10 ans. Seules la moitié des écoles sont reconnues par l'État et délivrent un diplôme visé. Les plus grandes écoles (HEC, l'ESSEC, l'ESCP) ont pour leur part fortement renforcé leur position dans l'espace des écoles d'élites, occupant une place de plus en plus importante dans la formation des plus hauts dirigeants (Dudouet et Grémont, 2010).

Les écoles de commerce ou de gestion, privées ou semi-privées, délivrent un capital scolaire spécifique, très dépendant du capital économique : on le vérifie au prix des scolarités, au contenu des enseignements qui portent toujours, d'une façon ou l'autre, sur les moyens de faire fructifier le capital économique, aux liens étroits avec les entreprises qui participent à l'élaboration des enseignements ou encore à l'accent mis sur les espérances de salaires à la sortie. Les scolarités doivent beaucoup de leur valeur au réseau d'anciens élèves et aux positions professionnelles des anciens : le capital social qui se forge dans ces écoles occupe, dans les classements et dans les critères de choix des élèves, une place au moins aussi importante que celle des savoirs qui y sont transmis (Marceau, 1989 ; Chessel et Pavis, 2006 ; Blanchard, 2012).

La recherche de légitimation internationale a été un des éléments décisifs de la valorisation des écoles de commerce et de gestion, qui s'engagent précocement dans la négociation d'accords et partenariats avec des établissements étrangers, cherchant à accroître la mobilité de leurs élèves, à attirer des élèves et des enseignants étrangers (Wagner, 1997 ; Lazuech, 1999). En offrant des formations « internationales » (le terme, non labellisé, autorise les pratiques pédagogiques les plus diverses), des petites écoles privées ont pu jouer la carte de la rupture avec les verdicts scolaires nationaux pour améliorer leur position dans l'espace de l'enseignement supérieur. Ces stratégies se sont diffusées vers le haut de l'espace scolaire. Les plus grandes écoles sont désormais en compétition avec des institutions étrangères prestigieuses et s'engagent elles aussi dans la recherche de reconnaissance internationale (Darchy Koechlin, 2012). Ainsi, des institutions qui ont longtemps réservé l'admission aux élèves, pour l'essentiel français, passés par les classes préparatoires, s'ouvrent à d'autres profils : les étrangers constituent en 2012 un quart des effectifs des élèves du programme « grande école » d'HEC ; à Sciences Po-Paris où 30% des enseignements sont donnés en anglais, le cycle du diplôme a été transformé en 2000 en master de type anglo-saxon composé d'un premier cycle de trois ans dont la dernière année se déroule à l'étranger. D'autres écoles mettent en place des dispositifs originaux. Ainsi l'ESCP a fusionné en 1999 avec l'EAP, créée en 1973 par la chambre de commerce de Paris avec l'ambition d'en faire une école internationale. Dès sa création, l'école est située sur plusieurs sites (en France, en Grande Bretagne, en Allemagne, en Espagne), et

elle compte rapidement plus de la moitié d'étrangers parmi ses étudiants. En 2011, plus de 2500 accords ont été signés par les écoles de commerce avec des partenaires internationaux, qui ne recouvrent pas toujours des partenariats concrets (Cour des comptes, 2013).

A partir de la fin des années 1990, avec l'expansion mondiale des formations en gestion et la concurrence accrue dans la recherche de partenariats, les écoles cherchent à diversifier l'éventail géographique de leurs réseaux. C'est à cette époque que se développent les partenariats avec les institutions mexicaines.

> *« À l'époque, les écoles de gestion françaises étaient encore victimes du tropisme anglo-saxon, jusque dans les années 1990. Les accords étaient surtout signés avec l'Amérique du Nord. Puis on a compris qu'on ne pouvait pas se limiter à cela. Il y a des établissements d'excellence en Amérique latine, qui recherchaient aussi des accords en Europe. Et si on ne réagissait pas, ils signeraient avec des établissements ailleurs en Europe, en Grande Bretagne, en Espagne. C'est un marché où il faut être concurrentiel ». Responsable Amérique latine de l'ESCP*

La privatisation de la formation des élites au Mexique

L'espace de l'enseignement supérieur mexicain est lui aussi caractérisé par sa structure duale. Cette dualité n'oppose pas, comme en France, universités et grandes écoles, mais les universités publiques qui accueillent les jeunes des classes populaires et moyennes, et un petit nombre d'universités privées qui accueillent les jeunes de milieux favorisés[103].

Cette division est relativement récente. Les institutions éducatives étaient en effet essentiellement publiques jusqu'aux années 1950. L'« élite du pouvoir » s'est formée jusqu'aux années 1960, dans les grandes universités publiques, notamment l'UNAM (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*) (Camp, 2002). Le point d'inflexion a été sans aucun doute l'année 1968. Cette date symbolique marque l'abandon par les élites de l'université publique en faveur des universités privées, créées dans les années 1940. Les principales raisons évoquées sont l'instabilité politique, la « politisation » de la vie universitaire à gauche et l'inadéquation entre l'enseignement de l'économie à l'université et les représentations idéologiques des élites (Babb, 2004). Parmi les universités privées les plus importantes figurent le *Colegio de México* (1940), le TEC et l'IBERO (1943) et l'ITAM (1946) (voir encadré « Les écoles huppées de la formation aux affaires au Mexique »). A l'exception du Tec de Monterrey, toutes ces institutions sont situées à Mexico. Ces institutions privées attirent progressivement les fractions les plus aisées de la société mexicaine. Les cadres supérieurs des entreprises privées et les chefs

[103] Il faut noter que coexistent, dans le secteur privé d'enseignement supérieur, des écoles « refuge » scolairement peu exigeantes et des établissements se définissant désormais comme élitistes à la fois socialement et scolairement (Didou-Aupetit 2003).

d'entreprise sont aujourd'hui formés essentiellement dans ces universités. Il faut noter néanmoins que les titres privés sont pour la plupart, des gages d'une origine sociale élevée plus que d'un capital scientifique, lequel continue d'être principalement produit par les grandes universités publiques.

L'université publique reste un lieu de formation de très haut niveau notamment dans la recherche fondamentale. L'UNAM est ainsi la seule université latino-américaine à paraître dans les classements internationaux[104]. Si les frais de scolarité y sont faibles, les universités publiques sont sélectives scolairement : depuis 1973, il existe un concours à l'entrée de l'UNAM. Les universités publiques proposent aujourd'hui environ 70% de l'offre universitaire et couvrent tous les domaines du savoir. Les chercheurs et les cadres intermédiaires des entreprises publiques et privées sont formés majoritairement dans les universités publiques.

L'enseignement supérieur privé a connu une seconde vague de développement dans les années 1990 (Levy, 1995), parallèlement à la mise en place de politiques néolibérales et à l'emprise du secteur privé national et nord-américain sur la définition des politiques publiques, ce qui conduit certains à parler d'une « privatisation de l'éducation supérieure » (Aboites, 1997 ; De Garay, 1998 ; Kent, 2007 ; Olivier, 2011). L'État se dessaisit progressivement du monopole qu'il exerçait sur plan éducatif. Ces institutions privées de la seconde vague, toujours en forte expansion, se caractérisent par un niveau académique souvent faible. Une partie des institutions éducatives privées n'ont pas véritablement le statut d'« université ». Elles offrent ainsi une sorte de « refuge » pour ceux qui refusent d'aller à l'université publique (ou y sont refusés). Le cas le plus emblématique est celui du Président de la république actuel, qui a fait des études en droit à l'*Universidad Panamericana* perçue comme une école « moyenne » choisie par la petite bourgeoisie.

Plusieurs enquêtés insistent sur la place des facteurs sociaux et non scolaires ou académiques dans leur choix des écoles privées. Comme l'explique Alberto, ancien élève de l'ITAM et de HEC :

> « L'UNAM est la meilleure université d'Amérique latine, d'après les rankings. C'est une université sélective, de très haut niveau. Mais c'est le pire choix pour un Mexicain ! Ce n'est pas pour les gens de mon milieu socio-économique. Les classements tiennent compte des prix Nobel, des publications… mais l'image ici est celle d'une université pour les classes populaire, des grèves. On est un pays avec la plus grande séparation du monde ! ».

L'international joue traditionnellement un rôle important dans la formation des élites mexicaines : les enfants de la bourgeoise sont scolarisés dans des établissements d'origine

[104] Comme par exemple l'ARWU (*Academic Ranking of World Universities*) de Shanghai ou le *World Universities Ranking* édité par *Times Higher Education*.

étrangère installés au Mexique, par ordre d'importance l'école américaine, française, allemande, suisse et japonaise. Les États-Unis accueillent ainsi un grand nombre d'étudiants mexicains, du fait de la proximité géographique, de l'influence culturelle et de l'absence (jusqu'aux années 1980) d'universités régionales au Mexique (Camp, 2002: 159). La fraction dominante de la classe dominante continue à se former aux États-Unis, au MIT, à Stanford, à Harvard.

Les nouvelles institutions d'enseignement supérieur ont saisi l'internationalisation comme une stratégie de positionnement et légitimation scolaire sur le marché mondial (Gacel, 2005). Comme en France, les petites et nouvelles institutions se saisies très tôt des possibilités de partenariat avec les établissements étrangers, avec des institutions des États-Unis d'abord, puis à partir des années 2000 avec l'Europe et notamment la France.

Aujourd'hui, les accords et partenariats entre établissements mexicains et français sont particulièrement nombreux dans le domaine de la gestion des affaires, du commerce et de la finance : 184 conventions et accords d'échanges entre établissements d'enseignement supérieur français et mexicains concernent ces disciplines (sur un total de 536), d'après un comptage à partir du *Guide des formations en France* édité par l'Ambassade de France en 2010[105].

Au Mexique, 74 de ces 184 accords impliquent l'ITESM, couramment appelé « Tec de Monterrey ». Cette dernière institution est organisée en réseau d'établissements dans la plupart des régions du pays et, dès sa fondation, a mis en place une politique d'internationalisation active pour asseoir sa fragile légitimité en se conformant aux normes nord-américaines (Garcia-Garza, 2003). Le Tec fait ainsi valoir son insertion dans l'espace universitaire américain, avec des accords signés avec la Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS)[106] en 1950 et l'International Cooperation Agency (ICA)[107] en 1959. L'institution s'intéresse désormais aussi à l'Europe comme en témoigne la mise en place d'un bureau de liaison à Paris pour gérer ses partenariats avec les universités européennes.

[105] Les autres accords concernent les sciences et ingénierie (135 accords), les humanités (53), les sciences politiques, administration publique, relations internationales (35), les arts (22), le tourisme (12), et 95 accords sont multidisciplinaires.

[106] La SACS est une association des universités du sud des États-Unis (Alabama, Floride, Géorgie, Kentucky, Louisiane, Mississippi, Caroline du Nord et du Sud, Tennessee, Virginia et Texas) qui assure un processus d'accréditation universitaire.

[107] L'*International Cooperation Agency* (ICA) est l'ancien nom de l'*United States Agency for International Development* (USAID). Cette agence américaine cherche à promouvoir le développement économique et social des pays étrangers en voie de développement.

Les écoles huppées de la formation aux affaires au Mexique

Les établissements les plus réputés pour la formation aux affaires ont en commun leur frais d'inscription élevés et la sélectivité sociale de leur recrutement. Ils se différencient par des positionnements différents dans le champ. Le TEC de Monterrey (et ses deux campus de Mexico), créé par des anciens élèves du MIT et avec l'appui du MIT, est reconnu comme « l'école des entrepreneurs », participant à l'inculcation chez les étudiants d'un *ethos* entrepreneurial adapté au capitalisme global (Garcia-Garza, 2013). C'est l'institution la mieux insérée dans des réseaux d'accords internationaux, avec 1600 accords avec des établissements étrangers. Le TEC forme des étudiants dès la *preparatoria* (l'équivalent des dernières classes de lycée) et prépare plusieurs baccalauréats internationaux (dont l'*International Baccalaureate*). En 2010, les formations en master de gestion du TEC s'autonomisent pour fonder l'EGADE Business School (*Escuela de Graduados en Administración y Dirección de Empresas*) qui propose des MBA. L'EGADE est accrédité par l'AACSB, Equis et EMBA et revendique le rang de la « meilleure *business school* latino-américaine ».
L'ITAM (*Instituto Technológico Autónomo de México*), peut lui aussi faire valoir sa triple accréditation internationale. Il se distingue du TEC par les fondements plus académiques de son prestige. Créé en 1946, l'ITAM a formé une partie de la classe politique mexicaine (notamment deux anciens ministres des finances, Pedro Aspe Armella et Francisco Gil Díaz, et l'ancien président Felipe Calderón) et est considéré comme une des meilleures facultés d'économie de l'Amérique latine.
Plus éloigné du pôle académique, l'*Universidad Iberoamericana* dite « Ibero », institution privée et onéreuse, créée en 1943 par la Compagnie de Jésus et localisée à Santa Fe, est réputée pour ses frais d'inscription, très élevés, plus que pour ses exigences scolaires. Elle accueille les jeunes de la bourgeoisie fortunée de Mexico.
Enfin, l'IPADE (*Instituto Panamericano de Alta Dirección de Empresas*) est la *Business School* de l'Universidad Panamericana (une université privée, fondée en 1967 par un groupe d'hommes d'affaires mexicains, liée à l'Opus Dei). Il s'agit d'une école luxueuse, créée avec le soutien de la *Harvard Business School*, située dans une belle hacienda du XVIIème siècle et qui propose des MBA à prix fort à des hommes d'affaires mexicains. L'école a aussi entamé un processus de demande d'accréditation internationale.

Les accords signés ne recouvrent pas toujours des partenariats concrets. Les plus fréquents sont des accords d'échanges qui permettent aux étudiants mexicains de suivre en France quelques mois d'enseignement (l'équivalent d'un semestre en général) ensuite validés par l'établissement d'origine et, réciproquement, aux étudiants français d'accumuler des crédits dans l'établissement mexicain. Se développent également des doubles diplômes, voire des cursus tripartites.

Certaines écoles, notamment des petites écoles récentes, ont mis en place des processus d'intégration poussés. L'ESCE en France et l'Université Valle de Mexico, deux institutions privées qui occupent des positions analogues, relativement dominées du point de vue académique, dans les espaces français et mexicain de l'enseignement supérieur, ont été rachetés tous deux par un même groupe international et ont entamé un processus d'homologation de formations qui a débouché sur le programme comprenant trois ans d'études au Mexique puis

deux ans en France, dans le cadre d'une forme renouvelée de mondialisation de l'enseignement supérieur privé.

Laureate International Universities
L'ESCE, université privée depuis sa fondation, a été achetée par le groupe Laureate en 2001. Elle intègre alors un réseau mondial composé par 69 universités privées dans le monde, dont 31 en Amérique latine. L'offre académique concerne surtout les domaines des affaires, du management et du marketing international et dans une moindre mesure les « sciences sociales appliquées » (droit, communication, pédagogie, relations publiques, etc.), la santé, l'ingénierie, l'art, le design et le tourisme. Les universités du réseau mettent l'accent sur la dimension internationale de leurs étudiants. Le groupe profite du prestige de son *Honorary Chancellor*, l'ancien président nord-américain, William Clinton, pour asseoir sa légitimité.

Au haut de la hiérarchie scolaire, les accords mettent l'accent sur la recherche. Une trentaine d'accords relient les Instituts d'Études Politiques français avec des institutions mexicaines : Sciences Po-Paris a signé des accords avec le Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE), le Colegio de México (COLMEX), l'ITESM (Campus Cd. de México, Campus Monterrey), l'ITAM, l'UNAM et l'Universidad de las Américas de Puebla (UDLA). En 2009, un accord entre Sciences Po et le COLMEX prévoit la création de deux chaires, l'une dans chaque établissement, pour permettre aux enseignants et chercheurs de passer des séjours de recherche et d'enseignement à Mexico et à Paris ; un fonds commun finance des projets de recherche conjoints.

Ces accords reposent sur l'hypothèse d'une équivalence des formations délivrées par les partenaires : les institutions se reconnaissent mutuellement comme de même valeur, puisqu'elles délivrent leur diplôme pour valider des cursus faits dans l'institution partenaire. On retrouve ainsi, sans surprise, les hiérarchies scolaires nationales dans les accords, qui participent de la construction d'un champ mondial des formations en gestion, avec les écoles d'excellence en réseau, se reconnaissant mutuellement comme excellentes dans les différents pays (Sciences Po-Paris, HEC, l'ESSEC ont des accords avec le *Colegio de México*, le CIDE, l'ITAM ou le TEC de Monterrey et de México), et des écoles de second rang engagées dans des accords avec des écoles dont la position est homologue (les petites ESC de province ou des écoles totalement privées avec des universités moins cotées au Mexique).

2. Accumuler du capital international en France : les logiques des choix mexicains.

Une population socialement sélectionnée

Comment des étudiants mexicains se saisissent-ils des stratégies d'internationalisation des écoles françaises et mexicaines ? Cette population mobile est socialement sélectionnée. Au Mexique, moins du tiers d'une classe d'âge accède à la fin du secondaire et, parmi eux, seul un

étudiant sur 100 étudie à l'étranger (Unesco, 2010). L'accès à l'internationalisation est très inégal, et ce malgré des mesures prises pour favoriser les études à l'étranger (Murphy, 2007). Le financement public au Mexique destiné à l'internationalisation de haut niveau, qui concerne des étudiants de milieux favorisés, contribuerait même à l'augmentation des inégalités sociales (Andere, 2004). Les étudiants vers les écoles de management sont sans doute encore plus socialement sélectionnés que les autres étudiants mexicains internationaux. En effet, ils viennent en majorité d'établissements privés, suivent en France des scolarités payantes[108] et sont rarement boursiers (moins de 5% d'entre eux d'après les données de Campus France.

D'autres facteurs concourent à la sélectivité sociale de ces trajectoires. L'entrée dans une école de commerce française ou dans un Institut d'Études Politiques suppose la possession préalable d'un capital international, notamment linguistique. Or, la maîtrise de l'anglais, et plus encore du français, est au Mexique une compétence socialement clivante, acquise principalement dans l'enseignement privé, ou par des cours privés ou des séjours à l'étranger.

Néanmoins, plusieurs éléments laissent à penser que les étudiants inscrits en France ne font pas partie des catégories sociales les plus élevées au Mexique. Le haut patronat et les dirigeants mexicains restent pour l'essentiel formés aux États-Unis ou dans les établissements privés au Mexique109. Etudier la gestion des affaires en France est un choix relativement atypique, qui n'émane pas des fractions dominantes de la classe dominante. Les étudiants ou anciens étudiants rencontrés proviennent de milieux sociaux diversifiés, avec une forte représentation d'enfants de cadres d'entreprises, de chefs de petites ou moyennes entreprises, mais aussi des jeunes d'origine plus modeste qui se sont endettés et ont fait appel aux solidarités familiales pour financer leur séjour en France. L'inscription dans des écoles de gestion françaises s'inscrit dans des stratégies d'internationalisation diverses en fonction de ces positions de départ.

L'investissement dans un capital international « français »

Le choix d'étudier en France, tout au moins dans ces disciplines et ces types d'établissements, ne peut se comprendre sans faire référence à la construction d'un champ mondial des formations en gestion. La constitution de ce champ se vérifie à la manière dont les étudiants mexicains font leur choix. C'est le plus souvent après avoir réfléchi à d'autres destinations, en consultant des

[108] Les prix varient selon les écoles et les diplômes préparés. Les MBA sont les plus onéreux. À titre d'exemple, en 2012, les frais annuels de scolarité sont de 58 000 euros à l'INSEAD, 48000 euros à HEC. À Sciences Po, les frais acquittés pour l'inscription en master par les étrangers non européens peuvent varier entre 9 000 et 20 000 euros. Les frais d'inscription en master dans une école de commerce sont de 17000 euros à l'ESCP, 14000 euros à l'ESC de Rennes, 8 600 à l'ESCE. À noter que cette question des frais d'inscription ne se pose pas pour les étudiants en échange, qui paient dans leur institution d'origine et non en France.

[109] D'après les données de Roderic Ai Camp, au début des années 2000, 40 % des plus grands patrons mexicains diplômés sont formés au Mexique, 50% aux États-Unis, 8% en Europe, principalement en Grande Bretagne ou en Espagne (Camp, 2002: 154).

palmarès internationaux, en pesant les avantages et les inconvénients des différents établissements et pays possibles qu'ils se décident. S'il va de soi que la manière dont les enquêtés expliquent leur choix de la France en disent plus sur la manière dont les étudiants perçoivent et mettent en scène leur position actuelle que sur le processus de décision antérieur, ils n'en donnent pas moins à comprendre la structure de ce champ mondial des formations en gestion (la mondialisation de l'espace des formations en sciences politiques étant moins achevée).

Les paramètres du choix varient selon l'origine sociale et scolaire de l'étudiant, le degré d'avancement de ses études quand il arrive en France et le cadre institutionnel dans lequel s'inscrit sa mobilité. D'après les données fournies par Campus France, rares sont les étudiants qui font en France tout leur cursus universitaire en gestion : ils viennent majoritairement en France en échange dans le cadre de leur licence (2 cas sur 3). Les séjours sont de courte durée : 39,3% sont venus pour un semestre ou moins, généralement dans le cadre d'échanges ; plus de la moitié (55%) pensent rester moins d'un an. Il s'agit d'une circulation d'étudiants qui illustre bien une tendance actuelle : de plus en plus les mobilités n'ont pas comme but principal l'immersion dans un autre système éducatif ni même l'obtention d'un diplôme, mais avant tout la réalisation de stages de formation ou de courtes périodes d'études à l'étranger (Didou-Aupetit, 2001). Cette mobilité de courte durée et non diplômante est particulièrement fréquente dans le domaine de la gestion : en école de management, selon l'enquête de la Conférence des grandes écoles, plus de la moitié (54%) des élèves étrangers sont inscrits dans des formations non diplômantes, alors que ce n'est le cas que de 23% des étrangers en écoles d'ingénieurs (CGE, 2009).

Ces flux dépendent étroitement des réseaux d'accords entre établissements. Ce ne sont pas les plus grandes écoles de commerce, qui pourraient sembler plus connues à l'étrangers, qui accueillent le plus d'étudiants mexicains. Si Paris est privilégié par les étudiants en sciences politiques (plus de la moitié sont inscrits à Paris, auxquels il faut ajouter ceux qui sont inscrits sur le site de Poitiers), ce n'est pas le cas des étudiants en gestion, qui s'inscrivent pour les trois quarts d'entre eux en province, à Lille, à Rouen, à Nîmes et à Rennes[110] , dans des écoles dont les spécialisations sont associées à la « marque France » (l'école Vatel de tourisme à Nîmes – dont le diplôme n'est pas reconnu en France), soit d'écoles liées par des accords avec des universités mexicaines.

Pour les étudiants inscrits en *bachelor* (*licenciatura*) dans des universités privées mexicaines, passer un semestre en France dans un établissement partenaire n'engage pas forcément un projet professionnel : il s'agit de profiter d'un séjour en Europe, à moindre coût économique et scolaire (les étudiants en échange règlent les frais de scolarité à leur université d'origine où ils passent leurs examens à leur retour ; ils suivent en France des cours en

[110] Les écoles accueillant le plus de Mexicains au cours de cette période sont, en partie grâce aux accords de partenariat signés avec le TEC, dans l'ordre : l'IESEG de Lille (347 étudiants), l'ESC Rouen (235), Vatel Nîmes (199), l'ESC Rennes (175), l'INSEEC Paris (161), l'école de management de Grenoble (157), l'ESCP (156), l'ESCE (123).

anglais [111]) et dont ils espèrent des profits symboliques ou du moins une parenthèse enchantée dans leur parcours de formation. Ce sont en effet « des raisons culturelles » qui attirent vers la France selon la responsable des échanges à l'ITAM qui restitue un parcours international type : « Les Mexicains vont aux États-Unis pour faire des études de Master. Mais au niveau de la *licenciatura*, ils préfèrent aller en Europe, découvrir un autre continent, une culture. Les écoles européennes attirent plus d'étudiants mexicains au niveau bachelor et les États-Unis en master ». Le responsable des échanges internationaux de l'Ibero confirme cette tendance s'appuyant sur l'enquête Patlani (Maldonado, 2012). Le passage par la France n'est pas pensé en termes de rentabilité professionnelle à court terme ; il s'inscrit dans un système de valeurs internationales privilégiant l'ouverture, la curiosité, l'esprit d'aventure (Wagner, 2007).

La situation est différente pour les étudiants qui viennent en France pour y préparer un diplôme, un master ou un MBA le plus souvent. La position dominante des États-Unis se lit à l'omniprésence de ce pays quand les Mexicains réfléchissent aux destinations étrangères pour y préparer un diplôme. Chez quasiment tous nos enquêtés, c'est par une comparaison multidimensionnelle avec les États-Unis que se construit la présentation du « choix » de la France. Les frais de scolarité et le coût de la vie à l'étranger sont des variables de poids dans ces paramètres. Ainsi les frais de scolarité pour préparer un master ou un MBA sont sensiblement plus élevés aux États-Unis, en Grande Bretagne ou même au Mexique qu'en France. Les frais de scolarité dans les écoles supérieures de commerce de province varient entre 8000 et 15000 euros par an, soit deux fois moins que dans une université « moyenne » des États-Unis. Les grands MBA français sont moins onéreux que leurs homologues américains ou même mexicains (le coût du programme MBA de l'IPADE est de 80000 dollars)[112]. Les étudiants ont fait de calculs sophistiqués, dont ils nous ont quelquefois longuement exposé les détails, intégrant le coût et la durée des études, les différentes sources de financement, le taux d'intérêt des prêts qu'ils souscrivent, le coût de la vie en France, le coût d'opportunité d'avoir arrêté de travailler pour faire un master ou un MBA pendant un ou deux ans, la durée du remboursement des prêts et le retour sur l'investissement en fonction du salaire attendu après leur formation. Le critère économique pèse indéniablement dans la décision d'étudier en France.

Les critères académiques d'admission semblent par ailleurs aussi plus souples dans les écoles françaises que dans d'autres pays. Alors que le concours a longtemps été en France la voie nationale par excellence d'adoubement scolaire, d'autres modes de sélection sont prévus pour les étrangers, n'excluant pas un déplacement du jury pour auditionner les candidats. À Sciences Po, les candidats de la filière internationale, sélectionnés à partir de leur dossier, passent un entretien devant un jury composé d'un représentant de Sciences Po et de « personnalités du monde économique et politiques », anciens élèves expatriés ou personnel

[111] Les échanges vers la France se sont considérablement développés à la fin des années 1990 quand certaines écoles de commerce ont offert des cursus entièrement en anglais.

[112] Les frais d'inscription en MBA sont en moyenne de 80,000 dollars pour deux ans aux États-Unis. Ce coût n'est pas forcément plus élevé que celui des MBA français les mieux classés (58 000 euros INSEAD, 50,000 euros HEC), mais les formations en France sont plus courtes (dix mois à l'INSEAD, 18 mois à HEC), ce qui réduit les frais de séjour. D'après un de nos enquêtés inscrit à HEC et qui avait fait des calculs très élaborés, un MBA en France est 25% moins onéreux qu'un MBA de même qualité aux États-Unis.

diplomatique de l'Ambassade de France. De la même manière à l'ESCP, les candidats étrangers au master sont préalablement choisis par l'établissement partenaire, puis ils passent une audition devant une représentante de l'école qui se rend au Mexique pour éprouver l'adéquation du profil des candidats (« leur motivation, leur personnalité, leur potentiel ») aux formations proposées.

Le choix de la France n'est pas uniquement motivé par ces raisons économiques et pratiques. Les étudiants en espèrent des profits de distinction, justement à cause de l'originalité de cette destination par rapport au choix le plus commun : « Je voulais quelque chose de différent. Je me suis dit, je ne vais pas être un Mexicain de plus aux États-Unis » (José, MBA à HEC). Ces profits prennent appui sur un système de valeurs spécifique. Les étudiants sont nombreux à célébrer la richesse culturelle et touristique de l'Hexagone, dont le prestige rejaillit sur ceux qui y sont passés. Ce sont des raisons esthétiques qui sont mises en avant par Mónica, pour expliquer son choix de Sciences Po : « Deux personnes sont venues au TEC pour présenter Sciences Po, avec des photos. Et j'ai adoré ce côté vieux, château, ancien. Car le TEC c'est très moderne ».

Comme le dit Marisol, ancienne élève de l'ESCP : « Faire des études aux États-Unis, c'est un investissement, le but est de revenir avec un haut salaire. Alors que le choix de la France est une expérience de vie qui pour moi était plus importante ». La France s'oppose aux États-Unis comme la culture à l'argent ou « l'expérience de vie » au carriérisme. Faisant en quelque sorte de nécessité vertu, certains étudiants affirment se sentir éloignés d'un modèle américain mercantile, où l'argent conditionne la possibilité d'étudier et « contamine » selon eux les relations sociales. Cette attirance s'explique souvent par une histoire ou des réseaux familiaux.

Le cas de Sofia : émerveillement et cosmopolitisme

Sofia, fille de diplomate, a eu une bourse du MAE pour étudier en France parce qu'elle avait eu une mention au baccalauréat préparé dans un lycée français en République Dominicaine. Elle y fait toute sa scolarité à Sciences Po, sur le site de Poitiers d'abord, puis en master de management public international à Paris. Elle estime que la France est un pays généreux. Elle a envisagé d'aller aux États-Unis, mais il est beaucoup plus difficile d'avoir une bourse pour les États-Unis, où les frais de scolarité sont plus élevés. Paris est « une ville super pour un étudiant étranger. Nous, on est en émerveillement permanent devant la beauté de la ville, devant des choses qui sont banales peut-être pour un Parisien. Le fait que ce soit si cosmopolite. A Mexico, c'est une grande ville, mais il n'y a pas un quartier comme Belleville où on peut manger vietnamien (…). Mon père est arrivé à Paris en 1966, il a connu mai 68. C'était une époque dorée pour les étudiants. Il en a toujours gardé la nostalgie ».

La valeur de l'ancienneté prend un sens spécifique au Mexique : les études européennes incarnent en effet une tradition aristocratique des élites latino-américaines jadis formées en Allemagne, en Angleterre et en France. Certains étudiants en sciences politiques citent les noms des personnes ayant fait des études en Europe et qu'ils admirent, ou du moins, qui les ont inspirés, comme Marcelo Ebrard, Manuel Bartlett et Porfirio Muñoz Ledo. Notons que pour la

plupart ce sont (ou ont été) des membres du Parti de la Révolution Démocratique (PRD), ou du PRI d'avant le tournant néolibéral, dont le profil politique est plutôt associé au modèle social-démocrate[113].

Le choix de la France peut ainsi être retourné en choix politique. Le modèle social français ou européen, le système de santé, d'éducation seraient plus proches des valeurs et aspirations mexicaines, voire des exigences l'administration mexicaine. Cette vision est très prégnante chez les étudiants en sciences politiques, elle est portée notamment par de nombreux enseignements du campus de Poitiers, « le repère de l'extrême gauche de Sciences Po » selon la plaisanterie d'un ancien élève.

L'attraction des Mexicains pour la France s'inscrit, en partie, dans une lutte contre l'emprise culturelle exercée par les États-Unis sur le Mexique en général, et sur les élites en particulier. C'est aussi un moyen d'échapper à l'image d'une nationalité dominée dans un pays dominant.

> « Je n'aime pas les États-Unis, ils sont racistes avec les Mexicains. Je n'aime pas leur manière de penser, de se comporter dans les relations internationales. Ici on n'est pas du tout considéré pareil. Il y a une bonne image des Mexicains : pour un Français, le Mexique c'est la fête, une image sympa, les sombreros [rires]. Aux États-Unis, on est vu avec une toute autre image, être Mexicain, c'est très négatif. Ici on déclenche des sourires, on est exotique [elle mime] : 'Waouh, tu es mexicaine… c'est super !' » (Mónica, en échange universitaire en licence, Sciences Po-Paris).

Alors qu'aux États-Unis, les Mexicains sont associés aux travailleurs agricoles ou aux immigrés clandestins, en France, ils échappent à ce stigmate, parce que, comme l'expliquent souvent avec lucidité les enquêtés, ils sont peu représentés parmi les classes populaires et que d'autres nationalités font les frais du racisme.

> «Ici personne ne comprend ce que je suis, car je ne suis pas arabe, je ne suis pas français. Aux États-Unis, il y a beaucoup de stéréotypes sur les Mexicains. Être mexicain aux États-Unis, c'est comme être arabe ou turc en France » (Ricardo, Master, Sciences Po-Paris).

La spécificité du choix français pourrait être mise en rapport avec un autre trait morphologique de la population étudiée : les femmes représentent les deux tiers des effectifs des étudiants s'inscrivant en écoles de gestion entre 2006 et 2011 (65,7%), et plus de 60% de

[113] Jaime Aragón (2013), à partir de l'étude des parcours de formation de 1884 députés et sénateurs mexicains, montre que la France a longtemps été le pays de prédilection des membres du PRI, même si son importance décline dans la dernière législature (2012-2015).

ceux qui s'inscrivent en IEP. La surreprésentation des femmes est plus marquée que pour les étudiants français (en moyenne, les femmes représentent 52% des effectifs dans les écoles de management) ; elle contraste avec les caractéristiques des étudiants au Mexique, où la part des femmes est inférieure à celle des hommes, mais aussi aux États-Unis où les hommes sont plus nombreux (Gérard, 2011). On pourrait faire l'hypothèse selon laquelle la possession d'un capital international à dominante culturelle, obtenu en France, serait une manière de contrecarrer la domination masculine. Cette division sexuée des choix géographiques met en relief une opposition entre un pôle culturel et dominé d'un côté (féminin), et un pôle économique et dominant de l'autre (masculin) [114].

3. Un capital international a faible rentabilite ? Desillusions et difficultes de conversion

Si le capital international français se distingue d'un capital plus commun accumulé dans les universités américaines, son rendement est aussi nettement plus incertain. C'est ce qui se dégage des entretiens menés avec d'anciens étudiants mexicains : les scolarités dans les écoles de commerce françaises semblent procurer, du moins à court terme, un profit limité que ce soit en France ou au Mexique.

La petite taille du corpus d'anciens étudiants interrogés (16 étudiants ont été rencontrés à Mexico en juin 2013, contactés à partir de l'échantillon de l'ensemble des étudiants mexicains inscrits en master dans une école de gestion en France entre 2008 et 2011) rend difficile une généralisation des résultats. En revanche, la récurrence des difficultés rencontrées par ces enquêtés pour valoriser professionnellement leur diplôme français invite à interroger la pertinence du concept englobant de capital international et à souligner les conditions très restrictives qui permettent de transmuer une expérience internationale en capital.

Le choix d'une école à l'étranger, qui plus est en France, requiert à la fois la possibilité de mobiliser des moyens financiers souvent élevés et des dispositions à la mobilité. Il est aussi d'autant plus efficace que les étudiants peuvent mobiliser des réseaux internationaux de soutien et d'information. Ce n'est pas propre aux étrangers. Mais si ces réseaux sont aussi utiles aux élèves français au moment notamment du choix de l'école, leur importance pour les candidats mexicains est accrue par la distance géographique et par la méconnaissance du système des écoles françaises. Ceux qui sont les plus dépendants des publicités sur les sites web et des promesses faites dans les salons ou Ferias de Postgrado depuis Mexico font souvent état de leur désillusion, une fois arrivés en France. Carlos a par exemple découvert le MBA qu'il a fait en France lors d'une présentation des masters organisées par Campus France. Arrivé en France, il s'aperçoit que le programme n'est pas celui annoncé dans la brochure, les durées des cours sont plus courtes, les professeurs ne sont pas ceux annoncés sur les brochures, sa classe compte 100

[114] Une enquête sur les étudiants suédois vers les États-Unis et la France montre de la même façon la différence dans les représentations des sexes dans les deux pays, le choix des États-Unis étant plus masculin et celui de la France plus féminin (Börjesson *et al.*, 2011).

participants et non 20, le service des carrières n'existe que sur les publicités. Il comprend aussi en France que ce n'est pas le MBA mais la *Graduate School* de son école qui est cotée dans les palmarès internationaux (Carlos G., parents cadres n'ont jamais quitté le Mexique, licence de commerce au TEC, MBA en France, en recherche d'emploi).

Les anecdotes attestant de telles déceptions ont été nombreuses : Mónica s'est aperçue que le prix qu'elle avait payé pour son école (6000 euros) ne l'autorisait qu'à suivre les cours, et qu'elle devait verser le double si elle voulait passer et obtenir un master. Elle revient au Mexique avec un simple certificat de scolarité (Monica L., père inconnu, mère employée, en recherche d'emploi). Edith, quant à elle, avait cru sur parole la représentante de son école à Mexico qui lui disait que la connaissance du français n'était pas nécessaire pour réussir et qu'elle bénéficierait d'un tutorat en cas de difficulté : or elle s'aperçoit que les normes scolaires sont très différentes de ce qu'elles sont au Mexique (« il faut beaucoup écrire pour développer ses idées, il y a cette méthodologie du plan qui est si différente »). Elle redouble et doit donc trouver un financement non anticipé pour passer une deuxième année en France, puis échoue finalement la deuxième année aussi à cause de son mémoire. Les démarches qu'elle tente atteste bien de son éloignement par rapport aux normes scolaires (elle écrit en vain au Ministre de l'Education nationale, puis à l'ambassadeur de la France au Mexique). (Edith R., père agent de sécurité, mère au foyer, actuellement en recherche d'emploi). Si ces cas ont valeur de cas extrêmes d'investissements qui peuvent sembler perdus, tous les enquêtés rencontrés ont attesté de leur double désillusion : leur scolarité ne se valorise comme ils l'attendaient ni en France, ni au Mexique.

Un capital scolaire peu rentable dans l'espace français

Le contexte économique et politique explique sans doute en grande partie les difficultés des étudiants mexicains à faire valoir leur diplôme en France. Les étudiants rencontrés sont venus en France entre 2008 et 2011, période où ils se trouvent confrontés à la crise économique et à la fermeture du marché du travail français aux diplômés étrangers[115]. Alors qu'une des sources d'attraction des écoles françaises est le stage obligatoire, qui n'existe pas dans beaucoup de pays et laisse espérer une expérience professionnelle en Europe, les enquêtés ont eu les plus grandes difficultés à trouver un stage en France. Edith R. a cherché pendant six mois en vain, et n'a finalement trouvé que grâce à une association de bénévoles qui aide les étrangers à la mairie. Mónica L. a finalement renoncé à trouver un stage en France et obtient l'autorisation de son école de faire son stage à Mexico. Quant aux quelques « chanceux » qui ont trouvé un premier emploi en France après leurs études, ils se sont tous heurtés à un refus de visa.

Si les scolarités suivies ne semblent pas conférer d'avantage spécifiques en France, c'est aussi parce qu'elles se déroulent dans des filières à part , très rarement dans les programme « grande école » des ESC (qui recrutent à 90% des Français), plus souvent dans des mastères,

[115] Le 31 mai 2011 une circulaire des ministères de l'intérieur et du travail dite circulaire « Guéant » restreint l'accès au marché du travail des étudiants étrangers.

masters spécialisés ou MBA, où les étrangers représentent respectivement 24,4%, 28,7% et 45,7% des effectifs (Blanchard, 2012: 481). Les cours que suivent les Mexicains, généralement en anglais, leur donnent peu l'occasion de connaître la langue ou le système scolaire français ou de se familiariser avec les codes sociaux et professionnels du pays d'accueil : « Les cours que je suis ici, je crois que ce sont les mêmes que j'aurais dans une autre *business schools*, en Europe ou en Amérique, ce sont des enseignants qui ne sont pas français, les cours sont en anglais : les affaires, c'est un peu partout la même chose ! » (Étudiante ESCE). Les formations MBA sont sans doute un exemple extrême de déterritorialisation : ces formations sont presque totalement calquées sur le modèle nord-américain, leur recrutement est international, les Français constituant moins de 10% des effectifs. Pour les étudiants résidant sur les campus de Jouy-en-Josas (HEC) ou de Fontainebleau (INSEAD) relativement excentrés par rapport à la capitale, accueillant principalement des étrangers, la France est certes le pays de résidence, mais les étudiants restent en réalité pendant toute leur scolarité dans une enclave internationalisée où ils voient rarement le pays et ses habitants (hormis le personnel de service). Cette extranéité dessert les candidats quand ils cherchent un poste ou un stage en France, même depuis les écoles les plus prestigieuses : Rodrigo, après avoir obtenu son MBA à HEC s'est vu débouter par plusieurs employeurs potentiels parce qu'il n'avait pas eu l'occasion d'apprendre le français.

Une grande partie de la valeur du capital accumulé dans les écoles d'élites tient dans « l'esprit de corps » qu'elles suscitent et le capital social qu'elles permettent d'accumuler (Bourdieu, 1989). Or cet esprit de corps et ce capital social sont définis de manière restrictive, à partir du programme grande école. Le cloisonnement des étudiants français, souvent relevé dans les entretiens, tient sans doute beaucoup aux parcours des élèves des grandes écoles, passés par des classes préparatoires intégratrices où se nouent des amitiés fortes, exclusives (et hexagonales) et se tissent des réseaux et un système de valeurs spécifique (Darmon, 2013). Les associations d'anciens élèves (à Sciences Po comme dans la plupart des écoles de commerces) sont réservées aux élèves qui ont suivi toute leur scolarité dans l'école et excluent les élèves s'y inscrivant seulement pour un master ou un double diplôme et *a fortiori* ceux qui viennent dans le cadre d'un échange de courte durée.

Si les Mexicains ont peu rencontré de Français, le cosmopolitisme du recrutement des écoles est souvent présenté comme un des apports du séjour en France. Il pourrait être l'occasion de constituer un capital social international, de nouer des réseaux qui seront utiles dans la vie professionnelle et d'apprendre à gérer ce réseau, à manier les interactions avec diverses nationalités.

> « Ici on apprend la culture française, mais surtout la culture d'autres pays. Côtoyer des gens de plus de 50 nationalités, c'est très important. Toutes les deux semaines, on a un événement culturel hindou, chinois, mexicain, japonais. Les Japonais nous ont montré la manière dont ils boivent le thé, les Chinois ont amené les dragons […]. Ces choses-là sont très importantes car elles montrent comment tisser des liens avec des gens d'autres cultures, la manière de se comporter […]. C'est aussi une

> préparation à la vie professionnelle dans une entreprise multinationale » (Ricardo, MBA à HEC).

Dans beaucoup de petites écoles privées, néanmoins, ce cosmopolitisme est restreint à quelques pays où l'école a tissé des partenariats, ce qui restreint fortement la « diversité » des filières pour étrangers : sur les 29 élèves de la promotion de Jorge dans son ESC, 25 étaient Chinois ; dans la classe de Sofia, 20 élèves étaient Chinois et 9 Mexicains ; dans une autres école de province, Carlos était dans une filière où les Indiens représentaient plus de la moitié des élèves.

Le recrutement plurinational des écoles ne garantit pas en lui-même la constitution de réseaux internationaux. Le capital social international, comme toutes les formes de capital social, repose sur la cohésion préalable du groupe, soudé par la similitude des habitus et des intérêts objectifs et suppose un travail actif et continu d'entretien et de gestion. Les échanges instituant l'inter-reconnaissance suppose la reconnaissance d'un minimum d'homogénéité objective (Bourdieu, 1980). La coprésence en salle de cours, pendant le temps de la préparation d'un master, d'étudiants venant d'horizons linguistiques, culturels et scolaires très différents ne suffit pas à créer un esprit de corps et les dispositions nécessaires pour l'entretenir. Les étudiants ont gardé peu de contact avec leurs condisciples d'études. Les responsables d'écoles rencontrés déplorent tous la fragilité des réseaux d'anciens à l'étranger. Lors d'une rencontre organisée à Mexico par la responsable des échanges internationaux de l'ESCP pour réunir tous les *alumni* d'Amérique latine, seules deux anciennes sont venues, Michèle sa sœur Marisol qui s'amusent au cours de l'entretien à se présenter comme « le » réseau latino-américain de l'école.

> « Je sais que le réseau est important. Mais on le perd quand on va à l'étranger, car on ne peut pas aller aux événements qui sont en France, aux salons. A l'étranger, ton réseau est rétréci, nous on est le mini réseau des sœurs C. (rires). Du coup, on n'a pas payé les 90 euros pour être dans l'association des anciens, ça fait cher pour retrouver sa sœur ! (rires) »

Les conditions de la rentabilisation au Mexique d'un capital international « français »

Rentrés au Mexique plus tôt qu'ils le pensaient du fait de la fermeture du marché du travail français, les anciens élèves se heurtent à la difficulté à faire reconnaître des diplômes inconnus sur le marché du travail mexicain. Comme le note Sofia, élève de Sciences Po : « C'est vrai qu'au Mexique la France a beaucoup de prestige, mais c'est un prestige culturel. Si je parle de Sciences Po ou de l'ENA au Mexique, personne ne va connaître. Ils connaissent la Sorbonne ! ». Même les anciens élèves des plus grandes écoles de commerce françaises, comme HEC, l'ESSEC ou l'ESCP, font l'expérience de la méconnaissance de leurs titres et leur faible rentabilité en dehors de l'Hexagone. Les places dans les palmarès internationaux ne suffisent pas à faire la valeur effective des titres, qui dépendent bien plus de la connaissance personnelle

que les employeurs peuvent avoir du système français et des propriétés sociales de leurs détenteurs.

Environ 400 entreprises françaises sont implantées au Mexique (la plupart des grands groupes français) et plusieurs de nos enquêtés y ont trouvé un emploi. Néanmoins, même dans ces entreprises, ils ont souvent le sentiment que leur diplôme n'est pas reconnu comme il le devrait. Marisol ancienne élève de l'ESCP vient de trouver un poste de cadre en marketing dans une multinationale de cosmétique française à Mexico. Elle remarque avec amertume que son salaire (7000 pesos par mois soit 400 euros) est le même que celui d'une de ses jeunes collègues de 22 ans qui n'a ni master, ni expérience de l'étranger.

> « L'ambiance est lourde ici. Car tous les hauts postes sont pour les Français qui sont privilégiés. Le problème est que les Français de ma boîte ont fait des moins bonnes écoles que moi, des écoles de commerce dont je n'ai jamais entendu parler ! Et ils me regardent de travers quand je dis que j'ai fait l'ESCP ».

L'expérience de cette enquêtée confirme la fragilité du capital social international des anciens élèves puisque son directeur général est diplômé de l'ESCP, mais n'a pas réagi quand elle a tenté d'activer une solidarité d'école. Les individus ne bénéficient du capital social attaché à leur groupe que dans la mesure où ils restent liés par des liaisons permanentes et utiles, dont l'instauration et la perpétuation reposent sur la reconnaissance de leur proximité. On vérifie bien que si chaque agent participe du capital collectif, c'est toujours en proportion de son apport effectif ou potentiel.

Les difficultés rencontrées par les Mexicains diplômés d'école de commerce contrastent avec la situation, au Mexique, des Français diplômés des mêmes écoles. Les quelques anciens élèves français rencontrés au Mexique sont chefs d'entreprises, hauts cadres dirigeants, et estiment au contraire bénéficier dans ce pays d'un statut privilégié par rapport à celui qui serait le leur en France.

Autoportrait d'un entrepreneur français au Mexique

A. a 37 ans et préside au Mexique l'association des anciens élèves d'une petite école de gestion privée en France. Issu d'un père d'origine populaire qui a connu une ascension sociale dans sa banque dans une petite ville de province, et d'une mère professeur de langue au collège (« J'ai pas été élevé à Ginette ou dans le 78 »), il choisit son école car il est un élève « moyen ». Il occupe d'abord à Mexico des postes d'encadrement dans des entreprises françaises et mexicaines, puis il « renonce à (son) confort » de cadre salarié et fonde son entreprise qui importe au Mexique des produits cosmétiques français. Il est par ailleurs impliqué dans les échanges entre son école et une université privée mexicaine de second rang (« On va dire que ce n'est pas la meilleure, mais c'est la plus commerciale »), où il donne un cours de management interculturel. Il anime également une association qui organise des rencontres festives pour développer les marques françaises à l'étranger et consolider les réseaux internationaux d'entrepreneurs français.

Le long entretien prend la forme d'un récit épique, où il se met en scène comme entrepreneur et aventurier (« Je suis entrepreneur de mes *business* et je me suis fait tout seul »), opposant le Mexique, espace de tous les possibles, à la rigidité de la structure sociale française trop « sécurisée » (« Ils sont tous sous Lexomil »), où les positions sont strictement déterminées par les diplômes : l'entretien est émaillé de sarcasme contre les « X Ponts », « toujours sur leurs tableaux Excel ».

« Comme toutes les grandes aventures, je suis arrivé ici par erreur (…) Le Mexique m'a donné ce qu'on ne donne pas aux Français : une certaine confiance en soi. Confiance en soi pour ne pas demander le chômage, confiance en soi pour dire : La sécu française, je m'en fous (…). Ici, si tu fais tes preuves, après quelques années, c'est le jackpot. Je vaux beaucoup plus cher au Mexique qu'en France. (…) Tu tentes ta chance au Mexique, tu as 90% de chances d'y arriver. Ici on t'ouvre la porte. Le Mexique donne aux jeunes ce qu'on n'a plus en France ni aux États-Unis : la vraie liberté d'être eux-mêmes. En France, on ne veut pas que tu sois différent. On veut que tu aies le parcours… Dès le début on te dit : il faut que tu fasses prépa (…) Moi, j'ai fait comme Cortès, j'ai brûlé les bateaux pour ne plus revenir ».

Cette vision romantique du Mexique comme le pays des aventuriers (opposée à la France des savoirs académiques), au sens d'un pays libéral où le droit du travail est moins pesant, mais aussi d'une société comme libérée des déterminismes sociaux puisque les réussites les plus fulgurantes sont possibles, n'est pas incompatible avec un discours critique sur les Mexicains, qui n'auraient « pas le commerce dans leurs gènes ». De fait, le modèle de cet enquêté est celui des conquistadors. Il reconnaît vivre en partie « de (sa) couleur de peau et de (son) pedigree ». Être Français confère des ressources spécifiques : un crédit symbolique, mais aussi des infrastructures et des réseaux constitués.

Pour les Mexicains diplômés en France, la concurrence avec les Français sur place est d'autant plus redoutable qu'elle va avec une forte asymétrie des investissements linguistiques et interculturels : le choix de la France et du français est relativement rare et risqué pour un Mexicain, alors qu'à l'inverse, l'espagnol est une langue couramment apprise par les

Français[116], ce qui réduit très fortement la portée distinctive du bilinguisme dans lequel ont investi les Mexicains.

Concurrencés par les diplômés des universités américaines plus immédiatement reconnues au Mexique, par les Français sur place, les diplômés des écoles françaises découvrent également qu'ils sont en plus mauvaise posture que leurs anciens condisciples restés dans les écoles privées mexicaines qui ont construit des réseaux utiles dans les milieux d'affaires du pays. « Car ici ce n'est pas comme en France, les offres d'emplois ne se publient pas, c'est par contact. Et je n'ai pas beaucoup de contacts mexicains finalement » (Marisol, ex ESCP). Carlos, titulaire d'un MBA français compare ainsi sa situation à celle de son frère qui a choisi le MBA de l'EGADE du TEC :

> « Il a payé 45 000 dollars. C'était plus cher que moi, mais il n'avait pas la vie en France à payer, et il pouvait travailler en même temps car c'était part time. Mes parents me conseillaient de faire comme mon frère, mais j'avais cette envie de partir à l'étranger. Quand mon frère a fini, il a tout de suite eu un poste important au Canada, 6 mois et ensuite il est entré à Telmex au Mexique, et il est haut manager, il gagne plus de 4000 euros par mois et il va encore monter. Par contre il n'a pas appris de langue comme moi, il parle espagnol et anglais, moins anglais car les cours au TEC sont en espagnol. Mais c'est un MBA qui est bien connu ici et sur le continent. Bon son MBA lui a bien servi… Alors j'attends ! (rire) ».

Dans ce cas, l'investissement dans un capital international (capital linguistique, expérience de la vie en Europe) semble à court terme moins rentable que l'investissement dans un MBA mexicain (peu internationalisé puisque les cours sont en espagnol et que l'essentiel des participants sont mexicains) qui permet de consolider un capital social et assure plus facilement un crédit symbolique dans le pays.

Au sein du petit échantillon d'anciens élèves rencontrés, les positions de départ – l'origine sociale, le capital scolaire mexicain- sont déterminantes pour rendre compte des différences de parcours professionnels. Les jeunes détenant le moins de ressources familiales et scolaires (origines populaires et petites classes moyennes, petites universités au Mexique) sont ceux qui valorisent le plus difficilement leur passage par la France : ils sont en recherche d'emploi, envisagent de reprendre d'autres études, ou acceptent des salaires très bas, tout en continuant à rembourser les emprunts contractés pour leur scolarité en France. Les enquêtés issus de familles plus aisées ont de meilleures situations, presque tous dans des entreprises familiale : Rodrigo, après un MBA à HEC après avoir vainement cherché un travail pendant quelques mois, rachète une entreprise de cours interactif avec trois associés : sa femme, son beau-père et un ami de ce dernier. Michèle, ancienne élève de l'ESCP, a finalement un poste de direction dans l'entreprise de ses parents, et avoue en riant « qu'elle avait toujours su que cela arriverait un jour ! » ; Alberto (ITAM et HEC) n'a pas renoncé à une carrière internationale, mais « en attendant », il

[116] Les deux tiers des élèves français choisissent l'espagnol comme seconde langue. Source : DEP.

est cadre dans l'entreprise de construction de son oncle où il perçoit un salaire supérieur à celui qu'il pourrait espérer « à l'extérieur ».

Dans ces dernières trajectoires, le capital international ne semble pas jouer de rôle direct. Aucun des enquêtés petits entrepreneurs ou cadres d'entreprise familiale rencontré n'utilise dans ses activités professionnelles le savoir, les réseaux ou le titre obtenus dans les écoles françaises. Tout se passe comme si le séjour en Europe, dans des écoles de gestion peu reconnues au Mexique, avait surtout eu pour fonction de meubler un temps de formation personnelle et d'attente dans la jeunesse avant d'hériter, sur le modèle du voyage d'initiation des aristocraties européennes.

Il faudrait poursuivre cette enquête afin d'intégrer la dimension du temps, qui peut conduire à nuancer le constat fait de la rentabilité professionnelle limitée des investissements en France de deux points de vue. D'une part, ces résultats peuvent tenir à un effet de période : les anciens étudiants rencontrés sont venus en France dans une conjoncture économique et politique très défavorable (la crise et la fermeture aux diplômés étrangers). D'autre part, il est possible que ce capital accumulé dans des écoles peu connues soit moins immédiatement rentable qu'un capital scolaire nord-américain ou mexicain, mais qu'il produise ses effets sur les trajectoires professionnelles à plus long terme. C'est ce que laissent supposer les quelques entretiens avec des cadres venus étudier la science politique ou les affaires en France dans les années 2000 et qui, après quelques années d'emplois peu payés, ont occupé des positions plus élevées au Mexique. Dans tous les cas néanmoins, on retrouve l'importance décisive des capitaux de départ et, semble-t-il, la nécessité de compléter l'expérience française par d'autres expériences internationales.

4. Conclusion

La circulation internationale des étudiants en gestion et en sciences politiques découle d'un mode spécifique de mondialisation du champ de l'enseignement supérieur, avec des réseaux mondiaux d'universités souvent privées sur le modèle américain et la mise en concurrence généralisée des écoles.

Le choix de la France se révèle plutôt être un second choix, saisi par des fractions économiques dominées de la classe dominante. Ce choix est assorti d'un bagage historique et symbolique représenté par la culture française et plus largement européenne. Les formations en France offrent un profit de distinction, à dominante culturelle et symbolique. Cette option vient quelquefois préparer ou couronner un parcours fortement internationalisé, qui cherche à se diversifier par une formation différente (linguistique et méthodologique notamment). Elle est plus risquée quand elle n'est pas complétée par d'autres stratégies d'accumulation de capital social ou scolaire international. La décision d'étudier en France participe de la construction d'un capital international spécifique (linguistique, culturel, institutionnel, social), qui peut jouer un rôle de multiplicateur de ressources initiales, quand il est le corollaire d'une formation dans

un établissement d'élites mexicain ou nord-américain, mais qui ne se rentabilise directement que sous des conditions très restrictives.

Cette recherche conduit ainsi à rompre avec une représentation routinisée de la notion de capital international et à souligner la place des ressources et conditions qui rendent possible la conversion d'une expérience internationale ou d'un diplôme étranger en capital. D'une part, l'idée de l'existence d'un champ international de la formation de dirigeants internationaux doit être fortement nuancée. Les écoles de commerce françaises se sont certes ouvertes aux étrangers, mais les capitaux sociaux et symboliques qu'elles confèrent restent, dans une large mesure, sélectifs et réservés à une partie des élèves nationaux : les frontières nationales et sociales restent extrêmement prégnantes dans la distribution et dans le fonctionnement du capital social. D'autre part, les investissements dans un capital international ne rapportent pas mécaniquement leurs profits. Les rapports de force entre pays et entre nationalités déterminent étroitement les conditions de la rentabilisation de ce capital comme l'attestent les différences entre les positions des Français et des Mexicains ayant les mêmes diplômes, que ce soit en France ou au Mexique. Enfin, en France comme au Mexique, et comme sans doute dans d'autres pays, le capital international ne concurrence pas les positions dominantes des élites nationales, formées dans les institutions où se concentrent et se cultivent de longue date les sources du pouvoir.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Aboites, H., 1997. Viento del norte: TLC y Privatización de la educación superior en México, México, UAM-Xochimilco-Plaza y Valdés.

Agulhon C., 2009. « La adaptación escolar y social de los estudiantes latinoamericanos en Francia ; ¿un proceso específico ? », pp. 175-188. In Sylvie Didou-Aupetit & Etienne Gérard (eds.), Fuga de cerebros, movilidad académica, redes científicas. Perspectivas latinoamericanas, México, IESALC-CINVESTAV-IRD.

Albouy V. et Waneck T., 2003. « Les inégalités sociales d'accès aux grandes écoles », *Economie et Statistique*, n° 361, pp. 27-52.

Amdam, R., Kvålshaugen, R., Larsen, E., 2003. *Inside the Business Schools: The Content of European Business Education*. Abstrakt forlag.

Andere, E., 2004. « The International Higher Education Market: Mexico's Case », Journal of Studies in International Education, vol. 8(1), pp. 56-85.

Aragón, J. 2013. **«** Où se forment les législateurs mexicains : le cas comparatif de trois législatures » communication au Séminaire ROMAC-Sudelites, Paris, CEPED, 25 septembre.

Babb, S., 2004. Managing Mexico. Economist from Nationalism to Neoliberalism. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Blanchard, M., 2012. Socio-histoire d'une entreprise éducative. Le développement des Ecoles supérieures de commerce en France (fin du XIXème siècle-2010), thèse de sociologie, EHESS.

Börjesson M., Blanck D., Broady D. et alii, 2011. « Étudiants et chercheurs suédois aux États-Unis et en France. Stratégies transnationales collectives et individuelles », in M. Leclerc Olive et al., Les mondes universitaires face au marché. Circulation des savoirs et pratiques des acteurs, Paris, Karthala, pp. 31-47.

Bourdieu, P. 1980, « Le capital social, notes provisoires ». Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 31, p. 3-6.

Bourdieu, P., 1989. La Noblesse d'État. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps, Paris, Minuit.

Camp, R., 2002. Mexico's Mandarins. Crafting a Power Elit From the Twenty-first Century, Berkeley, University of California Press.

Chessel M. E. et Parvis F., 2001. Le technocrate, le patron et le professeur. Une histoire de l'enseignement supérieur de gestion, Paris, Belin.

Conférence des Grandes Écoles, 2009 et 2011. Les grandes écoles sur la scène internationale.

Cour des comptes, 2013. « Les écoles supérieures de commerce et de gestion (ESCG) : un développement à réguler », Rapport public annuel, février.

Cret, B., 2007, « Stratégie d'établissement, stratégies d'accréditation », Revue française de gestion, n°178-179, p. 233-250.

Darchy-Koechlin, B., 2012. L'accueil des étudiants étrangers entre attraction et contrôle : logiques institutionnelles et stratégies individuelles, thèse de sociologie, Sciences Po Paris.

Darmon, M., 2013, Les classes préparatoires. La fabrique d'une jeunesse dominante, Paris: La Découverte

Didou-Aupetit, S., 2003. L'internationalisation des universités au Mexique, Paris, l'Harmattan.

Didou-Aupetit, S. 2011. « Une analyse de la mobilité étudiants : l'exemple des échanges entre le Mexique et la France », Campus France, Repères n° 9, octobre.

Didou-Aupetit, S. & Gérard E., 2010. El sistema nacional de investigadores, veinticinco años después. La comunidad científica, entre distinción e internationalización, México, ANUIES.

Dudouet, F.-X. et Grémont, E., 2010. Les Grands patrons en France. Du capitalisme d'État à la financiarisation, Paris, Lignes de Repères.

Gacel, J., 2005. « La internacionalización de la Educación Superior en América Latina : El caso de México », Cuadernos de Investigación en la Educación, n° 20.

Garay de, A. 1998. « Privatización de la educación superior o distribución tácita de la demanda ? » in ANUIES, Revista de la Educación Superior, n° 107.

Garcia-Garza, D., 2003. « La culture d'entreprise et l'esprit entrepreneur dans l'éducation supérieure privée à Monterrey : le cas du Tec », Paris, EHESS, mémoire de DEA (sous la direction de Monique de Saint Martin).

Garcia-Garza, D., 2013. « Aportaciones para el análisis de la cultura empresarial en la universidad mexicana : el caso del TEC de Monterrey », Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa, vol. XVIII, n° 56, pp. 191-221.

Gérard, E., 2013. « Dynamiques de formation internationale et production d'élites académiques au Mexique », *Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances*, vol. 7(1), pp. 317-344.

Gérard, E. 2011. « L'égalité des sexes par le savoir ? Une approche des trajectoires universitaires d'hommes et de femmes de l'élite scientifique mexicaine », Autrepart, n° 59, pp. 75-89.

Gérard, E. & Maldonado E. 2009. « Factores de movilidad de una comunidad 'internacionalizada' », *Reencuentro*, n° 54, pp. 101-109.

Kent, R. 2007. « Mapping Private Sector Expansion in Mexican Higher Education » in Jürgen Enders and Ben Jongbloed (eds.). Public-Private Dynamics in Higher Education. Expectations, Developments and Outcomes, London, Transaction.

Khurana, R., 2007. From higher aims to hired hands. The social transformation of American Business schools and the unfilled promise of management as a profession, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lazuech, G. 1999. L'exception française. Le modèle des grandes écoles à l'épreuve de la mondialisation, Rennes, PUR.

Leclerc-Olive, M., Scarfò Ghellab, G. & Wagner, A.-C., 2011. Les mondes universitaires face au marché. Circulation des savoirs et pratiques des acteurs, Paris, Karthala.

Lévy, D., 1995, La educación superior y el Estado en Latinoamérica. Desafíos privados al predominio público, México, CESU/Porrúa.

Maldonado, A., 2012, Patlani. Encuesta Nacional de Movilidad Estudiantil Internacional de México, México, CINVESTAV.

Marceau, J., (1989) A Family Business: The Making of an International Business Elite?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and Paris: Editions de la MSH.

Murphy, M., 2007. « Experiences in the Internationalization of Education: Strategies to Promote Equality of Opportunity at the Monterrey Tech », *Higher Education*, vol. 53(2), pp. 167-208.

Olivier, María G. (coord.), 2011. Privatización, cambios y resistencias en educación. Hacia la demarcación de escenarios en la educación pública y privada en la primera década del siglo XXI, México, UPN.

Unesco, 2010. « Les notes de Campus France », n° 26, octobre.

Wagner, A.-C., 1997. « L'enseignement international et la préparation aux affaires », Entreprises et histoire, n° 14, pp. 111-121.

Wagner, A.-C., 2007. « La place du voyage dans la formation des élites », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n° 170, pp. 58-65.

Preparing for Transnational Power? The Existence and Efficiency of "Transnational Capital" in French Preparatory Schools

MURIEL DARMON, CNRS-EHESS-Paris I[117]

SUMMARY

Drawing from an ethnographic study of the French Preparatory Schools, this article examins the role played by international capital within this institution. In business prep schools, where internationalization is implicitely or even explicitely a school « subject », transnational capital can even challenge cultural capital. However, transnational capital is only *a* dimension of the entrepreneurial culture that is taught and upheld in these schools, and its value can be limited and redefined in line with traditional conceptions of excellence.
Key words: Elite education – transnational capital – new enterprise

RESUME

A partir d'une enquête ethnographique ayant porté sur les classes préparatoires aux grandes écoles, cet article examine le role joué par le capital international dans cette institution. Dans les classes préparatoires économiques, où "l'ouverture au monde" fait partie, implicitement ou même explicitement, des matières au programme, le capital international peut en venir à concurrencer le capital culturel. Toutefois, le capital international n'est qu'une des dimensions de la culture entrepreneuriale enseignée et valorisée dans ces classes, et sa valeur peut être limitée et redéfinie par les conceptions traditionnelles de l'excellence.
Mots clés : Classes préparatoires – capital international- nouvelle entreprise

[117] Sociologue, directrice de recherche CNRS, CESSP (CNRS-EHESS-Paris I). Sur le même sujet Muriel Darmon a notamment publié *Classes préparatoires. La fabrique d'une jeunesse dominante*, La Découverte, Paris, août 2013, et « Sélectionner, élire, prédire : le recrutement des entrants en classes préparatoires », *Sociétés Contemporaine*s, n ° 86, 2012/2, p. 5-29, trad. anglaise « Selecting, Electing, Predicting: How Students Are Chosen for the Classes Préparatoires », http://www.cairn-int.info/resume.php?ID_ARTICLE=E_SOCO_086_0005)

INTRODUCTION

The internationalization of the French 'grandes écoles' has been a well-known case study since Gilles Lazuech's groundbreaking study at the end of the 1990's, when internationalization was 'one of the least studied social processes in the field of sociology' (Lazuech, 1998, 1999). But the same question has never been raised about the institution that leads students to the 'grandes ecoles', specifically 'prep schools'[118].

The first reason for this is that since the research conducted by Bourdieu and Saint Martin's at the end of the 1960's (and its publication in *State Nobility*), very few studies have been devoted to the Grandes ecoles and even less to prep schools. Statistical data has been gathered, but it pertains only to the enduring social selectivity of prep schools' recruitment practices. Ultimately, there have been no studies on internationalization in prep schools because until recently there have been no (or very few) sociological or ethnographic work on prep schools.

However, another reason comes to mind: contrary to the Grandes ecoles, prep schools are often thought of (both in scientific terms and in common understanding) as scholastic 'islands', dominated — for better or for worse— by the unchallenged hegemony of cultural capital and preserved from any kind of external or mundane influence, as witnessed by their spatial and institutional setting: high schools. In an article on the most prestigious business school (i.e. business Grande ecole), Y-M Abraham shows how HEC aims at de-scholasticizing its students and at teaching them to « play the manager » instead of being « good students », which is supposed to be entirely new to them (Abraham, 2007). Yet, students have already, albeit partially, been taught the ways of « managerial seriousness » in prep schools, where (some) anticipatory socialization to managerial dispositions takes place (Darmon, 2013). Prep schools are in fact no scholastic island, they are at the very least peninsulas open to external influences, and therefore the question of the existence and the efficiency of transnational capital within their walls is one worth raising.

[118] I have chosen in this text to keep the usual translation – so to speak – of Grandes écoles by « grandes ecoles », but to switch from the usual « preparatory classes » to « prep schools » which I think is better (even at the risk of being confused with the American « prep schools »).

Settings and fieldwork

Prep schools and grandes ecoles in France are institutions of elite higher education that are institutionally distinct from universities. Prep schools prepare post-baccalaureate students (who are roughly between 18 and 20 years old, and constitute around 5% of their age group) to take the nationwide competitive exams, which give access to the Grandes ecoles. The prep schools are located in the Lycées. Grandes ecoles mainly fall into two categories, Engineering schools and Business schools, and there are consequently two main kinds of prep schools that prepare for each type of Grandes ecoles: 'scientific' prep schools (with a large focus on hard sciences) which prepare students for the examinations of engineering schools and 'business' prep schools (with a focus on mathematics, history, economics, philosophy, literature and general knowledge) that prepare students for business schools. All of these prep schools are very socially selective, with more than half of the student body originating from the upper-classes (one-sixth of the active population), and only 2 to 5 % of the students coming from working-class families.

This communication draws from a two-year ethnographic study of scientific and business prep schools within a French Lycée. For two years, I sat in on classes, observed oral or written exams, attended meetings aimed at discussing the evaluations of each and every student, and whenever I could spent time with students during formal or informal activities within the institution. Simultaneously, I conducted repeated in-depth interviews with 40 students, at various stages of their two years at the institution, as well as with teachers and officials (94 interviews). The students I followed mostly came from upper class and upper-middle class families, consistent with the general recruitment of prep schools.

I have already published a book based on this research (Darmon, 2013), which aims at showing how prep schools are apparatuses for not only selecting, but also transforming individuals. By teaching them specific attitudes towards time, knowledge or life and the social world, they teach them how to occupy dominant positions and "prepare them for power" — to paraphrase Cookson and Persell (1985).

In this brief and tentative paper, I want to focus on two aspects underdeveloped in the book: internationalization and international capital. Are prep schools also preparing students for "transnational" power? What is the role, if any, played by international capital within this institution and the socialization processes that take place within it?

1. PREPARING FOR TRANSNATIONAL POWER

Although my research tackled both scientific and business prep schools, I will concentrate on the latter in this paper, because of their specificity regarding struggles between different kinds of capital and the identification of symbolic capital.

1.1 The specificity of business prep schools

The specificity of business prep schools I'm referring to is the fact that they institutionally organize (or at least tolerate) the challenge of cultural capital within the classroom. Teachers and officials present business prep schools as « atypical », compared to other prep schools, because they not only allow but also require students to « have a life outside the classroom », be that an interest in the state of the world, cultural interests ranging from movies to the opera, art to fashion, or even partying (teachers say they « tolerate » parties on the condition that students are capable of being alert in class the next day, but in fact they do more than just tolerate them when in scheduling exams they take into account parties or organized week-ends to the countryside). Students have to be good and hard-working, but they also have to participate in extra-curricular activities like Junior Enterprises or student councils (for example, a student with the highest grade point average all year long was reproached by teachers for not being « a leader » of the class, « not having sufficiently participated in the collective life of the class », etc.). In the definition and ranking of students, even in the institutional and faculty discourse, cultural capital is therefore challenged by youth culture and by an entrepreneurial definition of culture, which I have studied elsewhere (Darmon, 2013). More interestingly for us today, it is also challenged by transnational capital.

1.2 Transnational capital as challenging traditional cultural capital

Internationalization as a school "subject"

First, internationalization is taught explicitelty in business prep school, in Economics and History classes, but also in a more idiosyncratic school exercise, the « personal interview ». It is one of the key oral exams that takes place regularly during the school year, and it aims at training students for the similar oral examinations organized by the grandes ecoles. Some of the personal interviews are explicitly devoted to working on the students' « openness to the world » and to broadening their international horizons. Students are asked which countries they are interested in or where they would like to travel to, together with questions on international cultures, news, events and leading figures. Parochialism is vividly and explicitly contested, for example when Mrs. M., a teacher in the class, evaluates and debriefs a student after the interview: « *You talk too much about your family, your brothers and sisters, your little village, you're much too centered on these things, the « international » test is not a total success… You have to work on openness, diversity, on showing that you take an interest in this vast world* ».

Fabienne, a 18 year old student of working-class origin, describes precisely during the interviews with me how she feels she has « learned 'international-ness' » (« appris l'international ») in prep school:

> *In English, for example, I was always first in my class in high school, but here they don't ask for the same thing, I got 6 out of 20 at the beginning in prep school, they want you to become fluent, nobody asked me that before! And I*

> *can't afford the 4000 euros of a "Prep school specific" refresher course in the US! (…) I knew nothing, but really nothing, about the world we live in, and I've learned to follow the news, to listen to what's happening elsewhere, etc. (…) And I will spend one month this summer in London (baby-sitting, because I could not afford not to). And I'm sure I will appreciate English much more when I will know the country, because I've never been there, and it's easier to appreciate the language when you know the country.*

So, it's not only the language that she has learned, it is a relationship to the world that links language and culture, together with the necessity of experiencing life abroad: this was not part of her previous socialization, unlike those students from upper-classes families studied by Anne-Catherine Wagner[119].

In the prep schools studied here, students therefore learn — or when they have already learned it during family socialization, are validated in,— the international culture of the Elite. It can take different forms, such as the familiarity with foreign countries (as seen above), a kind of transnational corporate culture (when they are taught how "companies think" here or there), but also a globalized vision of sustainable development or the praise of « fair trade » as a mean to reconcile entrepreneurial spirit and humanitarian concerns — lots of students distance themselves from cut-throat capitalism, and express their interest in fair trade or sustainable development, thus displaying not an anti-entreprenurial spirit, but in fact one that more ressembles a "new enterprise" (Boni-Le Goff, Laurens, 2013).

Internationalization as a valued identity

But internationalization is not only an academic subject in theses schools; it is also a biographical asset valued by the educational institution. For example, the geographical or national origin of the students is explicitly dealt with in class, as part of the insistence on the « outside world » in these prep schools and their so-called atypical character. In personal interviews, students are supposed to work on « who they are », « where they come from », and on their job « project », and more importantly to learn how to present these things in a way congruent with entrepreneurial definitions of « personality ». Geographical or national origins are a big part of such identity work, as can be seen in this excerpt from an interview with one teacher:

> I train them for the personal interviews (…) They connect with where they come from. When they arrive, they're very « high school »: they want to blend in. And they learn to embrace what makes them different. For example, we often have students from mixed origins. In high school, nobody was allowed to say they're black, that would have been seen as racist. In prep school, the first thing we say: « oh great, he is of a different color », we treat

[119] « Some processes of international socialization produce a set of dispositions that incline people to consider relationships to foreigners as part of a social identity ». More generally, the propensity to read or watch international news is linked with social position and members of the upper-classes are the most interested in international questions (Wagner, 2007, 45-46).

> them as adults. In business prep schools, we ask them to understand the world, so they have to follow the news, what's going on in the world, and for example we study what's happening in Lebanon. And this year there's a girl from Lebanon, so immediately it becomes (she insists) personal, for the whole class » [Mme M].

National and cultural diversity is therefore praised as an important value, both in teachers' and in students' discourses, and constitutes a display of a « new ethos of diversity praise » (un nouvel ethos d'éloge de la diversité » (Wagner, 1998)), as in this excerpt from an interview with Léa, an 18 year old student:

> *Frankly, I love it here, I mean I like the people, my fellow students, they're really interesting people. They're really, really open-minded. They come from different circles, some of them are not even French, there are lots of different cultures, I think it's cool.*

Internationalization as a capital on the school market

Together with diversity praise, a specific kind of cultural capital is highly valued, once again by teachers and students alike: an international or transnational capital. During selection committee, students having spent some time abroad, briefly or more substantially, are seen as good assets for the prep school. For example, a student who has spent one year in an American high school (but with a so-so grade sheet) is highly ranked, both because of the language skills and because of the « experience » he is supposed to have gained —such an experience would go largely unnoticed in scientific prep classes.

International cultures are therefore « praised because they constitute elements of an international linguistic, cultural, social and symbolic capital » (Wagner, 1998, 93), that can even challenge traditional definitions of scholastic excellence. This is how business prep classes partake in the new forms of celebration and accumulation of transnational capital. By producing and re-producing these kinds of competences among their socially privileged students, they therefore "prepare them for power" — transnational power that is.

1.3 An "Americanization" of business prep schools?

As the call for papers states, the importance of international capital is not a new phenomenon for the elite, who have traditionally detained and upheld considerable international assets. But what seems newer is the way this circulation and the symbolic value of transnational capital take place within what appears to be a more generalized process of Americanization of this segment of elite higher education.

First, we already know that international cultures are unequally celebrated, and that international symbolic capital evolves in a space of cultural domination.

In business prep schools, the USA (as in "the year abroad in an American high school") is far from being just another example of « diversity », and it appears much more structurally

prominent in the definition of symbolic capital than Lebanon — to cite a country also referred to above. The USA is definitively the « foreign » place to be, as is shown in this critical description of who belongs to the in-crowd made by Marion, a 18 year old student:

> *So, there's this clique, let's call them the « popular crowd » [« le groupe, on va dire, des populaires »], these are the guys who dress right, who listen to the right music, who have lived the right life…*
>
> *MD: What kind of life should people have lived to be in this clique?*
>
> *Actually, they have travelled a lot. For example, there's this guy who went to live to the USA for 7 years and… So I've discovered, the school spirit is not at all anti-American. In this group they have like a deep fascination for the United States. So you've got to listen to American rap, for example. And it's weird because they're very good in English and very good in Math. Yes, to belong you've got to be very good in English. And they also are [in English]* fashion victims*, a bit rap, a bit chic: the [US] basketball jacket worn over the shoulders, you know?*

The importance of « American » capital oozes from the very words Marion utters to express it: the use of the word « popularity » imported from American English (which is a new way of framing the juvenile social hierarchies in France), the idea of the « right » clique (which clearly comes fromAmerican high school culture), or even the expression « fashion victims ».

More generally, such American references are part and parcel of the day-to-day or more festive life of business prep school. One of the official « parties » during the school year is called [in English] « *Prom Night* » (and yes, it entails tuxedos, shiny dresses and perhaps even « corsages »), another is called [in English again] « *Love Party* ». One could argue that the very form of the traditional French « concours », as far as business prep schools are concerned, has evolved into something akin to their American counterpart, be that American high schools or elite boarding schools. Because of the symbolic importance of the personal interviews in the « concours » to enter business schools, extra-curricular activities (such as sports or junior enterprise) « count » much more than they used to — and yet they still count for absolutely nothing in scientific prep schools. Moreover, the personal interview (which not so long ago used to be defined as an exam in « general knowledge », « épreuve de culture générale ») has supplemented the French traditional competitive examination (and its « no personal disclosure of any kind » policy) with a much more biographical and personal evaluation, and an obligation for students to talk about what « they » themselves think and who they are. This could therefore be interpreted as bearing witness to « the evolution of the definition of scholastic excellence towards new international norms » (Wagner, 2007).

Yet, one should refrain from pronouncing too hastely the omnipotence of transnational capital and its complete victory in today's struggles between forms of capital. More specifically, one should not overlook obstacles that restrain the circulation and the legitimacy of transnational capital.

2.1 "Plus mon petit Liré que le Mont Palatin": A capital that is itself challenged

First, transnational capital is only *a* dimension of the entrepreneurial culture that is valued and taught in prep schools. During personal interviews, in mock and real examinations, students must display (1) transnational assets together with (2) classical culture and (3) local knowledge or provincial spirit: they must be able to elaborate on famous monuments in their birth place in France, or on the traditional delicacies of the school's city, and also on local successful businesses. If parochialism is fought against, as we have seen before, « localism » is conversely a value and can be turned into an asset. Sometimes, a competition between capitals can even be spotted, for example when a student is talking about his love for travels, humanitarian missions and cultural diversity during a mock interview and one of the jury members (a local entrepreneur) stops him: « let's snap back to reality, could you tell me about a successful local business here and not 20 000 kilometers away? (…) What kind of cakes do they bake here? ».

This three-headed culture (classical, international, local) could actually be interpreted as the three-dimensional culture of an economically endowed bourgeoisie, and is subject to internal struggles such as this one between localism and internationalism.

2.2 The re-scholarization of transnational capital

Second, transnational capital can also be challenged by classical cultural capital. I have suggested above that teachers could acknowledge and establish the legitimacy of transnational capital even against their scholastic interests, and at the very least against the kind of cultural capital they possess. But there are also numerous instances when cultural capital fights back and wins, as these two excerpts bear witness to:

> *During a personal interview training session: The student has spent one year in New York before his prep school years. He has been making several hints during the interview about the United States, trying to lead the interview towards this subject (and most probably towards his own experience, his relationship to the US, his take on political life or the entrepreneurial spirit there, etc.]. At one point, the teacher seems to fulfill his wish: « OK, so obviously you want to speak about the United States, so let's do that… [Suddenly, rapid-fire] So New York, how many inhabitants? And Boston?*

What is the second language spoken there? What about the Dow Jones? What about the dollar? »

Teachers' meeting on how the students are doing, their result and their grades:

Mrs. M.: She comes from Lebanon, she has been there and here, she has lived something special… It has not been always easy for her…

Mr. C: She is dynamic and she tests very well.

Mrs. M: It has not been easy for her, sometimes she's homesick, but it's a great experience…

Mr. C, with an irritated tone: Well, independently or not from all this, she tests well, she's sophisticated and interesting, so that's that.

So the situation must not be mistakenly interpreted as the definitive diffusion and landslide victory of "new" transnational norms replacing "old" and traditional forms of culture in prep schools. There are obviously struggles here, some probably specific to transnational capital, and some related more generally to the dual nature of Business prep school, which are part scholastic islands (dominated by traditional definitions of cultural capital) and part pathways to Business school and the entrepreneurial world (Darmon, 2013).

CONCLUSION: TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL AND BUSINESS PREP SCHOOLS

The case of business prep schools seems like a good opportunity to contribute to the reflection on the nature of transnational capital: is transnational capital a capital in its own right (Neveu, 2013)? As suggested by Neveu, here it appears indeed as a combination of the three basic kinds of capital: social (cf. the practical and symbolic use of "friends and families" abroad), economic (it is often accumulated by costly language study vacations) and cultural, which is its main manifestation in prep schools (language and accent, knowledge and familiarity with foreign countries, diversity ethos…). Transnational capital is also, in the context studied, symbolically charged and given value as symbolic capital for both teachers and students. It detains an important symbolic power in defining and institutionalizing hierarchies, and constitutes a new way of challenging the dominance of academic criteria in these hierarchies.

Business prep classes can be seen, for numerous reasons (the more flagrant of which being their equal sex ratio), as « moderns » prep classes, more attuned with today's world. They certainly are when they're training children of the bourgeoisie in recognizing, valuing, and reinforcing their transnational assets. Compared with scientific prep schools, they are "the place" where transnational capital is given the most value and operates as a symbolic capital — one could say that for scientific prep schools, it functions only as a cultural capital and as

knowledge about languages and civilizations, with little or no specific symbolic value. This may have to do with the fact that business prep schools are also the most socially elitist in their recruitment (nearly 2/3 of students are from upper-classes families, compared to 1/2 of the students in scientific prep classes), *and* that they tend to recruit students from families that are relatively better endowed with economic capital, be that in the upper, middle or even lower regions of the social space. Sociologically, prep schools are usually seen as an old way for old Elites to reproduce their position in society. The growing prominence of both business prep schools and transnational capital in their midst may be one of the « new » ways old and new Elite alike are working towards the same goal.

References

Y.-M. Abraham, « Du souci scolaire au sérieux managérial, ou comment devenir un 'HEC' », *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 48, 1, 2007, p. 37-66.

I. Boni-Le Goff, S. Laurens, « Les entrepreneurs de la 'nouvelle entreprise' : acteurs, pratiques et dispositifs d'une écriture institutionnelle », *Sociétés Contemporaines*, 2013, n° 89, p. 5-15.

P. Cookson, C. Persell, *Preparing for power. America's Elite Boarding Schools*, Basic Books, 1985.

P. Bourdieu, *State Nobility*, Stanford UP, 1998 [1989].

M. Darmon, *Classes préparatoires*, La Découverte, Paris, 2013.

G. Lazuech, « Le processus d'internationalisation des grandes écoles françaises », *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, n° 121-122 mars 1998, p. 66-76

G. Lazuech, *L'exception française : le modèle des grandes écoles à l'épreuve de la mondialisation*, PUR, Rennes, 1999.

E. Neveu, « Les sciences sociales doivent-elles accumuler les capitaux ? », RFSP, vol 63, n° 2, 2013, p. 337-358.

A.-C. Wagner, *Les Nouvelles élites de la mondialisation*, PUF, Paris, 1998.

A.-C. Wagner, *Les Classes sociales dans la mondialisation*, Paris, La Découverte, 2007.

Le cosmopolitisme tourné vers l'intérieur : une stratégie de distinction d'élites brésiliennes

ELISA KLÜGER, Universidade de São Paolo[120]

RESUME

S'appuyant sur l'analyse d'exemples de rapports entre fractions de l'élite brésilienne et espace international dans trois périodes, le texte présente les variations dans le sens, les stratégies et les modalités de leur internationalisation. La relation de dépendance culturelle des élites périphériques vis-à-vis du centre sera l'objet central de l'analyse. Pour accumuler des atouts cosmopolites – ce qui leur permet de participer à la division internationale du travail de domination et de se distinguer nationalement – ces élites incorporent les savoirs et la culture dominante au niveau international. Les cas choisis montrent que, au fil du temps, les formes de transmission des capitaux cosmopolites se modifient et que de nouvelles couches sociales accèdent à l'international. Nonobstant ces modifications, il y a un élément invariant : l'emploi des capitaux cosmopolites dans les enjeux en cours à l'intérieur de leur État national.

Mots-clés : Capital cosmopolite, Élites brésiliennes, Relation centre-périphérie

SUMMARY: AN INSIDE ORIENTED COSMOPOLITANISM: A STRATEGY OF DISTINCTION OF BRAZILIAN ELITES

Based on the analysis of three examples of relations between fractions of the Brazilian elite and the international space in three periods, the text presents the variations of meanings, strategies and modalities of their internationalization. The relation of cultural dependency of the periphery elites *vis-à-vis* the center will be the center object of analysis. To accumulate cosmopolitan trumps – which allow them to take part at the international division of the labor of domination and to distinguish themselves nationally – these elites incorporate the knowledge and the culture that are dominant at international level. The chosen examples show that, with time, the form of transmission of cosmopolitan capitals is modified and that new social groups gain access to the international space. Nevertheless, there is an invariant element: the use of cosmopolitan capital in the games played inside the national states.

[120] Elisa Klüger est doctorante en sociologie à l'Universidade de São Paulo et a été chercheur invité à l'Université de Picardie Jules Verne et à l'University of California at Berkeley.

Keywords: Cosmopolitan capital, Brazilian elites, Center-periphery relation

INTRODUCTION

La mondialisation est présentée, assez fréquemment, comme un moment de croissance des flux internationaux de personnes, idées, capitaux et technologies (CASTELLS, 1998 ; CHESNAIS, 1994). Elle favorise l'acquisition, par des élites globalisées, d'atouts cosmopolites, acquis aussi bien dans les voyages et les études réalisées à l'extérieur que par le culture/usage quotidien des capitaux linguistiques et des connaissances relatives aux usages et coutumes d'autres pays et cultures. Les travaux des historiens permettent de soutenir, toutefois, que l'internationalisation des capitaux, le cosmopolitisme et l'établissement de liens entre aristocrates, clercs, commerçants, intellectuels et banquiers de différents pays, ne datent pas de la période actuelle (ARRIGHI 1994 ; BRAUDEL 1979). Les stratégies d'internationalisation sont mobilisées depuis des siècles pour renforcer les rapports entre les groupes dominants et pour élargir la surface territoriale sur laquelle ils exercent leurs pouvoirs politiques et économiques (WAGNER 2003, pp. 33-34 ; 2007 pp. 10-14 ; PINÇON et PINÇON-CHARLOT 2006, pp. 123-150).

À cause de leur origine coloniale, les élites brésiliennes, elles aussi, sont cosmopolites depuis la genèse du pays, c'est-à-dire, il y a au moins deux siècles. Le format et le sens de leur cosmopolitisme, néanmoins, a des particularités dues à la position périphérique et dépendante occupée par le Brésil dans le système international et, conséquemment, par son élite dans la division internationale du travail de domination (BOURDIEU 2011, pp. 126-139). Les capitaux accumulés par ces élites leur permettent d'être dominantes dans leur territoire et de participer, en général dans une position subordonnée, à la division internationale du travail de domination ; en revanche, ils ne donnent presque jamais accès au pouvoir au niveau global. Si l'élite brésilienne n'est pas parvenue à faire concurrence aux élites anglaises, françaises ou nord-américaines, elle a su, continuellement, utiliser les modes de vie, coutumes et certifications importées de ces nations pour nier sa provenance périphérique et occuper la position de centre dans son pays (FERNANDES 2006 ; CARDOSO 1964).

Les rapports de dépendance des élites de la périphérie se manifestent tant sur le plan économique que culturel. Cette dépendance est à l'origine de l'imitation systématique des savoirs et styles de vie des pays qui exercent l'hégémonie culturelle (SCHWARZ 1992 ; FURTADO 1974 pp. 80-81). Telles importations[121] sont motivées aussi bien par la croyance selon laquelle la culture des pays développés devrait être adoptée pour combattre ce qui était considéré comme une situation de retard, que par le rôle des atouts cosmopolites dans les enjeux de pouvoir et distinction en cours dans les espaces nationaux (DEZALAY et MASDEN 2008, pp 5-15 ; DEZALAY 2004, p. 6).

[121] Le texte ne portera que sur l'importation par les élites brésiliennes. Il ne sera pas possible de thématiser l'engagement des pays du centre à l'exportation culturelle.

Cet article se concentrera sur les relations de dépendance culturelle et montrera comment les modalités et le sens de l'internationalisation des fractions dirigeantes et intellectuelles des élites brésiliennes, surtout celles de Rio de Janeiro et de São Paulo, se sont modifiés au fil du temps, en soulignant les caractéristiques de ce cosmopolitisme périphérique. Pour ce faire, des exemples, à partir de trois moments historiques, représentatifs de trois types de rapports entre ces élites et l'espace international seront analysés:

1) Le XIXème siècle, caractérisé par la progressive importation de biens, usages et savoir-faire professionnels européens;

2) La première moitié du XXème siècle, marquée par un processus de recomposition des élites provoqué par l'exigence de titres et qualifications spécialisées pour atteindre les positions dirigeantes au sein de l'État et par la création d'un mouvement intellectuel et esthétique dénommé « moderniste » où symboles nationaux et étrangers sont mêlés ;

3) La fin du XXème siècle et début du XXIe, quand il est possible d'observer une diversification des groupes qui ont accès à l'espace global et des modalités et parcours d'internationalisation.

LES ELITES BRESILIENNES EN TANT QUE PORTE-PAROLE DE LA « CIVILISATION »

> La re-européisation du Brésil a commencé par faire pâlir dans notre vie l'élément asiatique, africain ou indigène, dont le coloré éclatant se mettait en évidence dans le paysage, dans les vêtements et dans les usages des hommes [...]. Tout cela qui donnait une tonalité si orientale à notre vie de tous les jours est devenu pâle dans le contact avec la nouvelle Europe ; est devenu gris ; est devenu exceptionnel – couleur des jours fériées, des jours de fête, des jours de procession, du carnaval, et défilé militaire. La nouvelle Europe a imposé à un Brésil encore lyriquement rural, qui cuisinait et travaillait avec du bois, le noir, le brun, le gris, le bleu foncé de sa civilisation carbonifère (FREYRE 2003, pp 432-433, *traduction par moi*).

Le changement de la couleur des vêtements, des objets, des maisons, l'abandon du coloré brésilien de source indienne, africaine, maure et l'adoption du noir bourgeois des grandes villes de l'Europe accompagnaient la tendance plus générale à la transposition de tout ce qui était européen et au rejet, simultané, des coutumes locales. L'adoption des gros manteaux, des chaussettes en soie, des gants, de la laine et des couleurs sombres dans la chaleur des tropiques est un exemple emblématique de la fonction symbolique des biens apportés de l'Europe, dans la mesure où ces vêtements sont peu adaptés aux températures élevées du Brésil.

Les élites brésiliennes cherchaient à se faire élites « à l'image et à la ressemblance» européenne. Elles l'étaient par leur rapidité, efficacité et subtilité dans l'importation des manières aristocratiques, de tous les modes et bibelots fabriqués en France ou en Angleterre et des idées européennes que les élites néocoloniales intégraient et qui les distinguaient symboliquement des couches moyennes et des nouveaux riches (SCHWARZ 1992, p. 17). La

capacité à assimiler le savoir-vivre et les idées de la « civilisation »[122] fonctionnait comme un indicateur d'aptitude à l'exercice du pouvoir (CARVALHO 2013) sur un territoire que les élites brésiliennes, ainsi que le colonisateur européen, considéraient comme barbare, retardé, sans passé ni culture (NEEDELL 1993, p. 72).

La conversion des dominants périphériques en avatars européens supposait l'acquisition à l'extérieur d'une parcelle significative des biens consommés par ces élites. Ils importaient non seulement les objets : vêtements, meubles, aliments, livres, machines etc., mais également la culture et les personnes qui transmettaient ce patrimoine culturel : tuteurs, écoles, idiomes, cuisiniers, opéras, arts, sports, architecture, urbanisme, c'est-à-dire, l'ensemble des biens, savoirs et modes du monde « civilisé » (FREYRE 2003, p. 461; NEEDELL 1993; SEVCENKO 1992; VASCONCELOS 2007; REIS FILHO 1965).

L'éducation était un des instruments essentiels de la transmission du goût et de la façon européenne de vivre. Les écoles étaient d'autant plus valorisées qu'elles étaient capables de reproduire les paramètres européens, ce qui explique pourquoi elles importaient professeurs, manuels, textes, méthodes d'enseignement. Comme tout y était écrit, soit en français, soit en anglais, soit en latin, il fallait d'abord acquérir des capitaux linguistiques, essentiels pour accéder aux savoirs de la « civilisation ». De plus, la scolarisation était un moyen d'apprentissage de l'entre-soi des élites (PINÇON et PINÇON-CHARLOT 1989, pp. 141-146 ; 2006 p. 115). La forte sélectivité de l'enseignement assurait l'homogénéité sociale des élèves et favorisait l'établissement d'alliances entre ceux qu'ils allaient rencontrer tout au long de leurs trajectoires.

Les jeunes qui se côtoyaient à l'école allaient ensuite fréquenter les mêmes universités. Le Portugal, à la différence de l'Espagne, n'a pas autorisé la création d'universités dans ses colonies. Les élites brésiliennes étaient donc obligées de se déplacer vers la métropole pour y réaliser leurs études supérieures. Puisque le titre de « *Bacharel*[123] » était la condition d'accès à la haute fonction publique, la plupart de ces élèves fréquentaient les filières juridiques de l'Université de Coimbra. Réunis dans un même bâtiment, pendant quatre ou cinq années, ils renforçaient leurs liens et cultivaient des idéaux communs[124], ce qui était décisif pour la construction d'une élite fortement homogène. L'expérience outre-mer encourageait, de plus, l'absorption des modes de vie français et anglais, fortement valorisés par les Portugais – qui étaient aussi importateurs de culture en conséquence de leur position périphérique au centre (HOLANDA 2006, pp. 17-31; FREYRE 2003 p. 254). Ce voyage, réservé aux élites qui avaient des capitaux culturels et économiques en grand volume, était alors une sorte d'initiation au cosmopolitisme (DEZALAY et MASDEN 2008 p. 12; CARVALHO 2013, pp. 21, 65-79 ; NEEDELL 1993, pp. 84-86).

[122] Le concept de civilisation est employé ici dans son acception plus générale, qui inclut aussi bien *kultur* que *zivilisation* (ELIAS 1977, pp. 12-18).

[123] *Bacharel*, à l'époque, était celui qu'obtenait son diplôme d'enseignement supérieur en Droit.

[124] Selon l'interprétation de José Murilo de Carvalho (2013), la forte cohésion de ce petit groupe, socialisé à la européenne, peut être interprétée comme un des éléments les plus essentielles pour l'adoption de paramètres politiques communs qui ont contribué à la manutention, après la dissolution du lien colonial, de l'unité du vaste territoire brésilien.

La création des premières universités au Brésil, au début du XIXème siècle, n'a pas affaibli la cohésion sociale et intellectuelle des élites brésiliennes : seules deux filières de droit ont été créées, à São Paulo et à Olinda, et elles réunissaient presque la totalité des aspirants aux postes de député, sénateur, diplomate, parmi d'autres cadres d'État. L'européisation n'a pas été affaiblie, puisque la « Faculté de Droit opérait toujours comme intermédiaire dans l'importation et la diffusion de la production intellectuelle européenne» (MICELI 2001, p. 115).

L'entre-soi de ceux qui avaient été socialisés dans les mêmes institutions éducatives était renforcé par la fréquentation d'espaces mondains pratiquement et symboliquement imperméables. Les membres des classes dominantes habitaient dans les mêmes quartiers, travaillaient dans les mêmes lieux et profitaient de loisirs dans des espaces dont l'accès était restreint (PINÇON et PINÇON-CHARLOT 1989, p. 114): les cercles auxquels seuls les *gentlemen* pouvaient appartenir, le Jockey Club, réservé à ceux que possédaient un volumineux patrimoine ; les spectacles apportés de l'extérieur, où il fallait s'habiller à la dernière mode parisienne; les réceptions dans des salons où la décoration et les rituels d'interaction étaient régis par la vogue européenne, etc. Ces espaces jouaient un rôle primordial dans l'entreprise de gestion et d'amplification du capital social, puisque dans ces lieux exclusifs s'entretenait le prestige et se forgeaient alliances et mariages (NEEDELL, 1993, pp. 100-110).

Le capital social était décisif pour tisser les trames du pouvoir dans le Brésil du XIXème siècle où le recrutement pour les postes dirigeants ne résultait pas de la possession de savoirs administratifs mais de la combinaison du titre de « *bacharel* », qui était une sorte de lettre de recommandation, et d'une position centrale dans les réseaux de relations sociales des groupes dominants – qui dépendait, à son tour, de la capacité de maîtriser de façon désinvolte les codes du monde européen-aristocratique (MARTINS 1987, pp. 65-87 ; HOLANDA 2006, p. 172 ; MICELI 2001, pp. 79, 114). En bref, le domaine du cosmopolitisme était une condition *sine qua non* pour s'insérer dans le monde exclusif des élites et pour participer à la haute fonction publique.

MODERNISATION ET MODERNISME

Au début du XXème siècle, deux inflexions, l'une dans le champ intellectuel et l'autre dans l'administration publique, ont modifié le rapport des élites brésiliennes à l'espace international. La première était l'éclosion du « modernisme », mouvement qui revendique une pratique artistique d'inspiration et de thématique nationales. Les éléments régionaux commencent à apparaître dans les arts, mais ils sont toujours représentés selon le cadre esthétique construit par les avant-gardes européennes et, parfois, nord-américaines. La deuxième était la modernisation administrative qui impliquait d'acquérir à l'extérieur, en plus du vernis culturel, des diplômes, progressivement requis pour accéder aux postes dirigeants[125].

[125] Il faut mentionner que la séparation entre les artistes et les intellectuels et la haute fonction publique a eu lieu dans ce processus de modernisation de l'État et de spécialisation de l'administration.

> Ce qu'on voit à São Paulo, à ce moment là, était une recherche avide de creuser jusqu'aux racines traditionnelles et de rétablir une « mémoire » de coloration coloniale ; un engagement pour la récupération et l'identification avec une culture populaire, surtout de type "*sertanejo*"; […] et un curieux modernisme parisien, qui enseignait à mépriser la vieille Europe moribonde et à aimer la puissance de l'Amérique et la "magie des tropiques" (SEVCENKO 1992, pp. 254-255, *traduction par moi*).

Dans la première moitié du XXème siècle, le rapport à l'international a été transformé par la recherche d'une identité nationale (HOBSBAWM et RANGER, 2008, pp. 14-22). L'élan pour transformer le national en principe de cohésion sociale de la population, la récupération mythique des couleurs, rythmes, visages et paroles de l'indigène-nègre-*sertanejo-caipira*-métisse-brésilien dans les arts s'instaure au Brésil dans le cadre de l'incorporation de l'exotique par les avant-gardes européennes. Le rapport de dépendance culturelle explique pourquoi les populations natives, la végétation exubérante, les traditions populaires, symboles, masques et couleurs provenant des régions coloniales et des ex-colonies ont été incorporées à l'art brésilien d'avant-garde seulement après avoir été admis par les Européens.

C'est par la circulation internationale et la fréquentation des étrangers qui, au moment des guerres mondiales, se sont installés au Brésil, que les intellectuels brésiliens ont redécouvert leur propre pays (SEVCENKO 1992, pp. 217, 236-237; MICELI 2003). Les principes esthétiques qui niaient l'élément européen et incitaient à rechercher le national ont été portés, en partie, par de jeunes intellectuels qui, par leur éducation cosmopolite et le mécénat, avaient accès aux avant-gardes internationales (Tarsila do Amaral, Oswald e Mário de Andrade, Manuel Bandeira, Di Cavalcanti, Heitor Villa-Lobos) et, en partie, par des étrangers qui arrivaient au Brésil avec des dispositions esthétiques européennes, combinées à l'expérience de migration, qui étaient les bases à partir desquelles ils construisaient leurs illustrations du paysage social et naturel de leur nouveau lieu de vie (Lasar Segall, Victor Brecheret, Anita Malfatti[126]).

Un exemple de cette entreprise d'invention du national à travers des formes développées à l'étranger est le *Manifesto Antropófago* (1928) dans lequel Oswald de Andrade défend l'inclusion des langues natives, des coutumes et de l'esthétique régionale en contrepoint aux héritages portugais, missionnaires, aristocratiques, élitistes et répressifs qui avaient été transportés par les caravelles. Pour autant la forme même du « Manifeste » utilisée par Oswald est importée. Elle suit le modèle créé par les avant-gardes européennes, futuristes (1909), cubistes (1913), dadaïste (1916) et surréalistes (1924) pour exposer leurs programmes artistiques. En s'appropriant de façon anthropophagique Sigmund Freud, l'art d'avant-garde européenne, des mots d'origine anglo-saxonne, et en les mélangeant à une palette de symboles

[126] Malfatti a été incluse dans ce groupe, même si elle était née au Brésil, car sa famille était immigrante et a vécu en plusieurs pays, de sorte qu'elle a eu l'expérience de l'immigration.

de multiples régions et cultures brésiliennes, Oswald cherchait à créer une nouvelle forme de représentation du national[127].

Dans cette deuxième période, même si le contenu et la forme de la culture portée par ces élites se « nationalise », la stratégie distinctive de mobilisation des signes culturels valorisés dans les centres internationaux reste intacte. L'avant-garde brésilienne, qui luttait pour conquérir son espace dans le champ artistique émergent de son pays, allait chercher les dernières tendances au centre, comme l'élite néocoloniale qui se distinguait en exhibant les plus récentes ornementations européennes. De plus, une telle stratégie était toujours réservée à ceux qui, richement dotés de capitaux cosmopolites, avaient accès au sommet de l'espace international.

À la tentative de constitution symbolique de la nation par les « modernismes » artistiques s'ajoutaient, à partir des années 1930, des efforts orientées vers la modernisation de l'appareil d'État et vers la construction de la nation. La quête du national résonnait dans la vie politique où elle acquérait des tonalités populaires et nationalistes (SEVCENKO 1992, p. 256). Une bureaucratie nouvelle, capable d'unir la haute culture et les liens sociaux dans le milieu des élites d'une part, et les certifications des compétences scientifiques, culturelles et techniques acquises dans des universités brésiliennes et étrangères d'autre part, se chargeait de la structuration d'un État-nation interventionniste, engagé dans la production d'un développement socio-économique national (MICELI 2001, pp. 77-79, 197-199). Le cadre typique de la bureaucratie modernisée n'était plus l'avocat-politique. Ce sont d'abord les ingénieurs, et ensuite les économistes, qui vont occuper les positions bureaucratiques les plus prestigieuses (LOUREIRO 1997 ; GOMES 1994).

> L'élite bureaucratique, l'*intelligentsia* qui absorbe les techniques du capitalisme industriel, préoccupée par l'efficience de la modernisation économique et sociale, essaiera de s'autonomiser, en méprisant les politiques, pour elle simples agitateurs, ignorants, incapables, corrompus. Dans un pays qui est entré récemment dans le groupe des nations indépendantes, l'administrateur sorti de l'université européenne s'étonne que le politique veuille orienter la planification économique, lui qui n'a jamais fréquenté un cours postuniversitaire (FAORO 1975, p. 743. *Traduction par moi*).

Le processus de rationalisation de l'État a été accompagné par la création des institutions éducatives délivrant ces certifications. A cette période sont créées l'Université de São Paulo (1934) et l'Université du Brésil (1937), qui sont à l'origine de deux des principaux complexes d'éducation et recherche du pays. Le développement progressif d'un champ universitaire modifiait mais ne supprimait pas le rapport de dépendance culturelle, puisque les modèles universitaires français et allemand ont été imités et que des professeurs étrangers étaient invités

[127] Les romantiques, eux aussi avaient fait des efforts pour concevoir un national de racines locales et primitives selon le modèle du romantisme européen. Modernisme et romantisme sont, en outre, deux moments « culminants de particularisme littéraire dans la relation dialectique du local et du cosmopolite ». (CÂNDIDO 1970). Le « Modernisme reprend le projet romantique mais en le portant à ses limites, c'est-à-dire en en inversant les valeurs et les signes, en le parodiant ». (RIVAS 1979).

pour coordonner l'enseignement et la production scientifique (PAULA 2002 ; ARANTES 1994 ; LEFEBVRE 1990 ; MARTINS 1987, p. 20). Parce que les professeurs, techniques, livres et systèmes d'université étaient toujours transplantés, les nouvelles certifications gardaient l'emblème de l'Europe et étaient vues comme des armes pour combattre le retard du monde périphérique.

En complément de la politique de réception de professeurs étrangers, élèves, professeurs et chercheurs étaient envoyés dans des universités à l'extérieur, surtout aux États-Unis qui ont créé et financé des programmes de coopération scientifique et de bourses d'études. Les motivations des deux parties dans ces échanges étaient tout à fait distinctes : les États-Unis, jouant au niveau global dans le contexte de la Guerre froide, exportaient savoirs, idéologies et styles de vie du capitalisme de masse, et essayaient de conquérir des zones d'influence; les élites brésiliennes, jouant plutôt sur le plan national, étaient incitées à combler les lacunes scientifiques, technologiques et culturelles de leur pays et motivées par la nécessité croissante d'acquérir des certifications éducatives plus prestigieuses, ce qui contribuait à maintenir l'ordre social établi et à garder la distance avec les membres des couches moyennes en ascension et avec les élites en voie de déclassement, qui étaient en train de parcourir une trajectoire d'ascension sociale par la voie des études supérieures au Brésil (MICELI 1993 ; FARIA et COSTA 2006).

DIVERSIFICATION ET HIERARCHISATION DES MODALITES D'INTERNATIONALISATION

Jusqu'à la moitié du XXème siècle, la quête de certifications éducatives à l'extérieur était une stratégie de distinction réservée aux élites, parce qu'elle requérait aussi bien des compétences culturelles et linguistiques que des capitaux économiques. La création des programmes de master et doctorat, des accords de coopération, des agences scientifiques nationales et des bourses d'étude ont permis à quelques étudiants de haut niveau de s'internationaliser sans avoir, nécessairement, le capital économique qui leur aurait permis de le faire de manière autonome.

La mondialisation, ensuite, a rendu la circulation internationale plus accessible aux fractions non intellectuelles des couches moyennes en ascension et aux élites en déclassement. Même si de nouveaux groupes sociaux arrivent à voyager par le monde, la voie et, surtout, la temporalité de leur internationalisation n'est pas identique à celle des élites anciennes et intellectuelles. Le fait de voyager n'est plus, *per se*, l'élément distinctif. Ce sont, maintenant, les modalités[128]d'internationalisation (quand, où et comment) qui vont séparer symboliquement les cosmopolites plus anciens de ceux dont l'accès à l'espace international n'est pas accompagné d'un *habitus* cosmopolite cultivé depuis le berceau.

Pour signaler les principales différences entre ces modalités, j'aurai recours à une typologie idéal-typique. Chaque type idéal va être illustré par un cas, construit à partir d'un ensemble

[128] Les modalités de la pratique, c'est-à-dire, la façon d'agir, les manières, les détails sont aussi importants pour la classification sociale que la pratique elle-même (BOURDIEU 1979). Sur les modalités d'internationalisation des Brésiliens voir : ALMEIDA 2004.

d'enquêtes faites auprès de spécialistes en économie qui ont occupé des positions dirigeantes dans un organisme économique central de l'État brésilien dans les trente dernières années. Les trajectoires choisies sont celles de trois personnes qui ont presque le même âge et qui sont allées vivre dans une même région des États-Unis [129] où ils ont fréquenté la même institution universitaire. Ils l'ont fait, pourtant, à des époques distinctes, l'âge qu'ils avaient lors de cette expérience n'était pas la même, la durée de leur séjour variait, aussi bien que le type d'activité qu'ils y réalisaient.

Le premier type est celui des fractions d'élite qui ont à la fois des capitaux économiques et des capitaux culturels en grand volume. Il évoque le cosmopolitisme des élites de la période néocoloniale: cultivé dès l'enfance, dans l'espace domestique, dans des écoles où le recrutement est très sélectif, à travers les voyages en famille et par le contact avec des personnes, objets, films, livres, concerts, œuvres d'art d'autres pays. Il y a un investissement fort et délibéré à l'apprentissage des idiomes étrangers combinant, usuellement, les études linguistiques au collège et la fréquentation d'écoles de langue et de cours particuliers. De plus, l'acquisition précoce des capitaux cosmopolites est fréquemment renforcée par les expériences de longue durée à l'extérieur, au début de la vie adulte.

1. Lorsque Luc[130] est allé vivre aux Etats-Unis, au début des années 1970, avec l'objectif d'acquérir le titre de docteur, il avait 27 ans. Il y est resté pendant 3 ans et demi pour suivre des cours et écrire sa thèse. Ce voyage a été fait après la fin du master obtenu dans une université publique[131] prestigieuse au Brésil. Antérieurement, il avait fréquenté uniquement des collèges privés où il a étudié, depuis tout petit, le français et l'italien. L'espagnol, à son tour, fut acquis lors de voyages et de cours réalisés à l'étranger. Luc a commencé à apprendre l'anglais, un peu plus tard, dans une école de langues, et il s'est perfectionné aux États-Unis. Le cosmopolitisme acquis dans un collège qui appartenait à une colonie d'étrangers était renforcé par l'apprentissage des usages européens au sein d'une famille immigrante riche. Quand il a été interrogé à propos de ses loisirs préférés dans la jeunesse il a répondu, avant tout: voyager. Il raconte que sa famille voyageait beaucoup de sorte qu'il a eu l'opportunité de bouger par le monde et de connaître d'autres cultures depuis tout petit. À la maison, ses parents, qui exerçaient des professions libérales, gardaient les habitudes de leur pays d'origine. Son père, à la fin du dîner allait fumer la pipe, lire et écouter de la musique classique. Les enfants pouvaient rester avec lui en silence, c'était une forme de familiarisation avec ces pratiques culturelles apportées d'Europe.

Le deuxième type correspond à une internationalisation qui envisage, en premier lieu, l'acquisition de ressources éducatives rares. Cette modalité a beaucoup profité de la

[129] Le champ de la science économique est fortement unifié et hiérarchisé au niveau international, les États-Unis étant tout à fait au centre. Pour un spécialiste brésilien en économie, vivre et étudier aux États-Unis permet d'acquérir des certifications et des savoirs particulièrement valorisés et à la pointe. La logique des transferts de savoirs et idéologies entre les États-Unis et la périphérie n'est plus celle de la Guerre Froide mais elle est orientée vers l'ouverture des territoires au capitalisme financier. L'idéal de libéralisation exprimé au « Consensus de Washington », a été diffusé par les échanges de spécialistes et savoirs qui se multiplient et se diversifient à la période de la mondialisation. Voir: LEBARON 2000; DEAZALAY et GARTH 1998.

[130] Les prénoms ont été changés.

[131] Dans la période considérée, les écoles privées sont devenues en général plus valorisées que les écoles publiques. Les universités publiques, en revanche, étaient plus prestigieuses que les facultés et universités privées.

multiplication des chaînes de circulation et des financements d'études depuis la moitié du XXème siècle. Sont compris dans ce type ceux qui, même sans avoir un volume élevé de ressources économiques, ont accumulé du capital culturel à l'école en quantité suffisante pour s'internationaliser et expérimenter une trajectoire d'ascension sociale. C'est grâce à l'école qu'ils ont pu, peu à peu, acquérir des connaissances cosmopolites, apprendre comment reconnaître les emblèmes de la haute culture et s'insérer dans les fractions intellectuelles de l'élite.

2. À la fin de ses études supérieures dans une université publique, Tom a réussi l'épreuve pour devenir fonctionnaire public dans une bureaucratie assez prestigieuse de l'État brésilien. Il a travaillé trois ans avant de commencer son master et, la fin du master, encore cinq années jusqu'au début de son doctorat. Il avait 36 ans quand, au début des années 1990, il a eu l'opportunité de rester un an dans une université nord-américaine comme chercheur invité. L'institution où il travaillait encourageait ses fonctionnaires à poursuivre les études et concédait des congés rémunérés pour réaliser spécialisation, masters et doctorats. Grâce à cette politique et à la bourse d'étude offerte par le gouvernement il a pu étudier à l'extérieur sans être d'une famille riche. Ses parents, fils d'immigrants pauvres, n'avaient en effet pas eu une instruction scolaire longue. Sa mère travaillait comme secrétaire et son père comme vendeur dans un magasin. Tom avait étudié dans une école publique et dans un collège confessionnel qui appartenait à une communauté d'immigrants. Sa famille, qui n'était pas propriétaire de leur maison, a fait de grands efforts pour offrir une bonne éducation aux enfants, car l'école était vue comme une voie de salut et d'intégration dans le nouveau pays. Outre des investissements proprement scolaires, la famille encourageait les études linguistiques. Tom a étudié l'anglais et le français, initialement à l'école et ensuite dans des écoles de langues. Au-delà du français et de l'anglais, il lisait en espagnol et a suivi, beaucoup plus tard, des cours particuliers d'allemand dans le but de lire dans cette langue. Lire était depuis tout petit son loisir préféré, ce qui est cohérent avec les forts investissements scolaires et la faible disponibilité de capital économique.

Le troisième type, qui se consolide dans la dernière période, est celui de l'internationalisation des fractions non intellectuelles des couches moyennes en ascension ou des élites en déclassement, réalisée tardivement, après l'entrée dans le monde du travail, fréquemment, dans le but de fréquenter des cours de spécialisation de courte durée. Ces individus qui n'ont ni capitaux économiques ni capitaux culturels en grande quantité, ne circulaient pas internationalement jusqu'à la période récente, puisque les deux voies de l'internationalisation, l'accumulation économique et la réussite scolaire, leur étaient fermées. La mondialisation a réduit le coût de la circulation internationale et a créé de nouveaux parcours qui n'exigeaient ni de grandes compétences culturelles et linguistiques ni beaucoup d'argent : spécialisations, voyages en sac-à-dos, *work experience*, échanges d'études de courte durée, résidences d'artistes, cours de langue, parmi d'autres.

3. Abe avait 53 ans lorsque, à la fin des années 2000, il a eu l'opportunité de circuler internationalement pendant trois mois. Après avoir fini l'enseignement supérieur, il a travaillé pendant quelques années dans des sociétés privées. Simultanément, il a fait un master mais n'a pas fini son mémoire. Il est entré dans le secteur public grâce à un concours et y a travaillé pendant plusieurs années. La réalisation d'une spécialisation en business dans un autre pays, a été possible après sa sortie définitive de l'organisme public. Dans son milieu familial, il n'a pas eu de contact avec les cultures et les idiomes étrangers. Ses parents et grands-parents étaient nés au Brésil. La famille de son père descendait d'une famille d'oligarques déclassée du nord-est du pays. Son père était avocat et sa mère ne travaillait pas. Il a étudié dans un collège traditionnel public qui perdait alors, peu à peu, son prestige. Il a ensuite fréquenté une université privée qui n'occupait pas une position centrale dans le système éducatif. Il a suivi des cours d'anglais à l'école et a eu des professeurs d'anglais au travail, mais il ne considère pas avoir une bonne connaissance de cette langue, la seule qu'il a étudiée. Son loisir préféré dans sa jeunesse était un sport collectif populaire. Il allait beaucoup à la plage et, en vacances, fréquentait les résidences que ses oncles avaient en dehors de la ville. Ses loisirs préférés, donc, n'étaient ni culturels ni cosmopolites.

En comparant ces trois cas, on constate que le prestige des activités réalisées à l'extérieur décroit, l'âge augmente et la durée des circulations baisse. Les variations observées ont pu être associées à des dotations distinctes en capitaux cosmopolites préalables, à des formes divergentes d'acquisition de ces capitaux et à des investissements familiaux dissemblables. Les distances sociales ne disparaissent pas malgré l'amplification de la possibilité de circuler internationalement car, chaque fois que les prétendants avancent, les établis ont déjà créé de nouvelles formes de différentiation (ELIAS, 1977 ; BOURDIEU, 1979). Dans la population étudiée, presque tous ceux qui sont arrivés aux positions les plus prestigieuses de l'État ou de l'université ou ceux qui ont eu précocement des positions éminentes dans le monde des entreprises, ont eu des trajectoires qui se rapprochent du premier et, parfois, du deuxième type. Ceux qui ont suivi le troisième parcours, en général, ont occupé des postes dans la bureaucratie où ils ont fait leur carrière sans accéder presque jamais aux postes les plus importants. C'est seulement quand ils ont quitté la fonction publique, plus tardivement, qu'ils ont profité des possibilités professionnelles obtenues dans le secteur public et des certifications acquises à l'extérieur, surtout des MBA, pour pantoufler, c'est-á-dire, pour occuper des postes de direction dans de grandes entreprises privées et accumuler du capital économique.

La diversification des voies de circulation au fur et à mesure de l'intégration des espaces nationaux n'a donc pas annulé la capacité des plus dotés en capitaux cosmopolites de se distinguer de ceux qui s'internationalisent plus tardivement. Les distances entre ces groupes ne disparaissent pas, parce qu'il ne suffit pas de s'internationaliser pour se distinguer, il faut le faire précocement, sur une longue période, il faut parler des idiomes étrangers depuis tout petit, il faut suivre les cours les plus prestigieux, etc., ce qui permet aux élites qui ont les apprentissages cosmopolites les plus anciens et les plus approfondis de garder leur distance par rapport aux nouveaux arrivants. Ainsi les détails et les temporalités deviennent les indicateurs à partir desquels il est possible de connaître la valeur de chaque modalité d'internationalisation :

si tout le monde est cosmopolite, il faut savoir comment être cosmopolite et avoir les ressources pour le faire de la meilleure manière possible.

Conclusion

Le cosmopolitisme ne date pas de la mondialisation des XXème et XXIème siècles. Au contraire, c'est une stratégie de distinction sociale employée depuis des générations par des fractions de l'élite brésilienne. Le format et le sens de leur cosmopolitisme, pourtant, ne sont pas identiques à ceux des élites du centre, elles aussi internationalisées depuis longtemps. Même si, de temps en temps, les Brésiliens arrivent à se faire connaître internationalement par leurs éléments exotiques, la végétation tropicale ou la musique *tropicaliste*, de manière générale l'expansion de la surface sur laquelle les élites exercent leur pouvoir et la conquête d'une position dominante au niveau international ne sont pas à leur portée. Les pratiques cosmopolites de ces élites périphériques, c'est-à-dire l'importation des savoirs et la syntonie avec les dernières modes en vigueur dans le centre, sont plutôt des stratégies mobilisées dans les enjeux de domination en cours au Brésil. Ces stratégies se sont modifiées au fil du temps. De nouvelles modalités d'internationalisation surgissent et coexistent avec les premières, de nouvelles fractions de l'élite accèdent à l'international. Malgré ces transformations, la raison d'être de ce cosmopolitisme tourné vers l'intérieur, c'est-à-dire, sa fonction de distinction et de légitimation des élites – surtout des élites politiques, artistiques, bureaucratiques et intellectuelles, plus dépendantes de l'accumulation de capital culturel – reste intacte.

Bibliographie

ALMEIDA A. M. F. (dir.) (2004), *Circulação internacional e formação das elites brasileiras*, Campinas, Editora Unicamp.

ARANTES P. E. (1994), *Um Departamento Francês de Ultramar*, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra.

ARRIGHI, G. (1979), *The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times. London, Verso, 1994.*

BOURDIEU P. (1979), *La Distinction, Critique Sociale du Jugement*, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit.

BOURDIEU P. (2011), « Champ du pouvoir et division du travail de domination », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, vol. 190, pp. 126-139.

BRAUDEL, F. (1979), *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme – XVe-XVIIIe*, Paris, Armand Colin.

CÂNDIDO A. (1970), *Literatura e cultura de 1900 a 1945*, São Paulo, ECA.

CARDOSO F. H. (1964) *Empresário Industrial e Desenvolvimento Econômico no Brasil*, São Paulo, Difel.

CARVALHO J. M. (2013), *A Construção da Ordem: a elite política imperial. Teatro de Sombras: a política imperial*, Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira.

CASTELLS, M. (1998), *L'ère de l'information. Vol. 1, La société en réseaux*, Paris, Fayard.

CHESNAIS F. (1994), *La Mondialisation du* Capital, Paris, Syros.

Anne-Catherine Wagner, « La bourgeoisie face à la mondialisation ». *Mouvements*, 26, 2003, p. 33-34;

DEZALAY Y. (2004), « Les courtiers de l'international » Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de l'impérialisme et missionnaires de l'universel ». *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, vol. 151-152, pp. 4-35.

DEZALAY Y. ; GARTH B. (1998), « Le "Washington consensus" », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, vol. 121-122, pp. 3-22.

DEZALAY Y. ; MADSEN M. R. (2008), « Espaces de pouvoirs nationaux, espaces de pouvoirs internationaux : Stratégies cosmopolites et reproduction des hiérarchies sociales ». *Comunicação Colóquio Internacional Saber e Poder*, Campinas, pp. 5-15.

ELIAS N. (1977), *La civilisation des mœurs*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy.

FAORO R. (1975) *Os Donos do Poder: formação do patronato político brasileiro*, São Paulo, Edusp.

FARIA L. ; COSTA M. C. (2006), « Cooperação Científica Internacional: Estilos de Atuação da Fundação Rockefeller e da Fundação Ford ». *DADOS*, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 159-191.

FERNANDES F. (2006), *A Revolução Burguesa no Brasil : ensaio de interpretação sociológica*, São Paulo, Globo.

FREYRE G. (2003), *Sobrados e Mucambos : decadência do patriarcado rural e desenvolvimento do urbano*, São Paulo, Global.

FURTADO C. (1974), *O Mito do Desenvolvimento Econômico*, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra.

GOMES A. C. (dir.) (1994), *Engenheiros e Economistas: novas elites burocráticas*, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

HOBSBAWM E. ; RANGER T. (2008), *A invenção das tradições*, São Paulo, Paz e Terra.

HOLANDA S. B. (2006), *Raízes do Brasil*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras.

LEBARON F. (2000), *La Croyance Économique: les économistes entre science et politique*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2000.

LEFEBVRE, J. P. (1990), « Les professeurs français des missions universitaires au Brésil (1934-1944) », *Cahiers du Brésil Contemporain*, vol. 12.

LOUREIRO M. R. (1997), *Os Economistas no Governo: gestão econômica e democracia*, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

MARTINS L. (1987), « A Gênese de uma Intelligentsia : os intelectuais e a política no Brasil 1920 a 1940 », *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, vol. 2 no. 4, pp. 65-87.

MICELI, S. (1993) « A aposta numa comunidade científica emergente: a Fundação Ford e os cientistas sociais no Brasil », in S. MICELI (dir.), *A Fundação Ford no Brasil*, São Paulo, Editora Sumaré.

MICELI S. (2001), *Intelectuais à Brasileira*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras.

MICELI S. (2003), *Nacional estrangeiro. História social e cultural do modernismo artístico em São Paulo*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras.

NEEDELL J. (1993), *Belle Époque Tropical : sociedade e cultura de elite no Rio de Janeiro da virada do século*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras.

PAULA M. F. C. (2002), « USP e UFRJ. A influência das concepções alemã e francesa em suas fundações », *Tempo Social Revista de Sociologia da USP*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 147-161.

PINÇON M. ; PINÇON-CHARLOT M. (1989), *Dans les Beaux Quartiers,* Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1989, p. 141-146.

PINÇON M. ; PINÇON-CHARLOT M. (2006), *Grandes Fortunes: Dynasties Familiales et formes de richesse en France*. Paris, Éditions Payot & Rivages.

REIS-FILHO N. G. (1965), *Arquitetura Residencial Brasileira no Século XIX*, São Paulo, Museu Paulista.

RIVAS P. (1979), « Modernisme et primitivisme dans Macounaïma », in ANDRADE M. *Macounaïma le héros sans aucun caractère*. Paris, Éditions Flammarion.

SCHWARZ R. (1992), *Ao Vencedor as Batatas : forma literária e processo social nos inícios do romance brasileiro*, São Paulo, Livraria Duas Cidades.

SEVCENKO N. (1992), *Orfeu extático na metrópole: São Paulo sociedade e cultura nos frementes anos 20*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras.

VASCONCELOS M. C. C. (2007), « A educação doméstica no Brasil de oitocentos ». *Revista Educação em Questão*, vol. 28 no. 14, pp. 24-41

WAGNER A. C. (2007), *Les classes sociales dans la mondialisation*, Paris, Éditions la Découverte.

The Field of the Business Elite in the Netherlands, 1976 and 2009

ROB TIMANS, Erasmus Centre for Economic Sociology (ECES), Erasmus University

1. INTRODUCTION

This contribution focuses on an empirical investigation of the economic field of power in the Netherlands in the years 1976 and 2009. These specific dates provide two clear points of measurement of this field that are separated by more than 30 years, a span of time that has been witness to some profound changes within the Dutch economy. To provide a context for the discussion on the analysis of this field, some of these fundamental changes will be discussed in the second section. Various authors have analysed the consequences and contents of these changes for the governance of companies (Fligstein 1990; 2001), board interlocks (Windolf 2002, Heemskerk 2007), the structure of the economic field (Bühlmann *et al*. 2012) and elite participation in societal affairs (Mizruchi 2013). One of the aims of this paper is to add to these analyses by providing an interpretation of the changes in the Dutch economic field of power from 1976 to 2009. The construction of this field as a research object will be discussed in section 3. Another aim is to apply, for the first time, the tools of Geometrical Data Analysis (GDA) to the case of the Dutch corporate elite in both eras. This will be done in two ways. First, a separate geometrical analysis will be performed on data of the members of the elite who held positions in the most important Dutch corporations and financial institutions in 1976 by using MCA as a technique of GDA. This analysis will be presented in section 4. Second, in section 5, the two cohorts from both years are compared to each other in a joint analysis in order to assess the differences that occurred in the 33 year time period.

2 A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY

To external observers, the Dutch economy can seem to be composed of puzzling elements that defy some well-known dichotomies of capitalist economies defined in the literature on the varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) or comparative capitalism (Albert 1993): the European brand of organized capitalism (or the 'Rhineland system' or 'coordinated market economy') and the market-orientated US ('Anglo-Saxon' or 'liberal market economy') variant.

For instance, in 2014 *The Economist* described the Netherlands as a country with two visions about its national identity: "on the one hand a liberal, business-friendly country that invented modern capitalism, on the other an egalitarian, labour-friendly social democracy" (The Economist 2014). A historical look into the subtleties of the Dutch economic system reveals a much more complex structure that exemplifies features of both the Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon systems. In this section, I would like to give a short historical overview of the Dutch economy understood as a National Business System (NBS) (Whitley 1999). While the NBS research programme also works with ideal types (Morgan 2007: 131), there is a much more refined unravelling of the institutional and organizational features that constitute a certain national business system than in the varieties of capitalism or comparative capitalism approaches mentioned above. Briefly, the NBS approach focuses on the position of firms within a larger context of national institutions that include the state, the financial system and the norms and values within a society that govern trust and authority relations. National business systems are distinct because of the specific way in which the economic functions of control and coordination are shaped by this historically grown context and are ultimately arranged within and between firms. Various forms of cooperation between employers and employees, between owners and managers, and between different firms and industries are possible and give rise to a unique institutional arrangement in each country. The NBS approach therefore also offers an alternative to the Chandlerian thesis of convergence (Chandler 1977). Chandler, whose writings were popular among management consultants in the period after the Second World War (see below), concluded that the multi-divisional organizational form of the firm had emerged as the most efficient answer to the strategic challenges posed to large industrial firms. Based on this conclusion, the convergence hypothesis states that, while there may be different national varieties of capitalism and firms, they will all eventually converge into this form. The NBS perspective in contrast argues that firms are part and parcel of the national institutional environment in which they operate. Rather than being isolated islands of strict hierarchical control and economic rationality, for Whitley, firms are "units of economic coordination and control under common, unified ownership that develop distinctive capabilities through the authoritative direction of employees on the basis of employment agreements." (Whitley 1999: 66) Rather than being concerned with strict firm boundaries *sui generis*, Whitley consequently is interested in the systemic location of the capacities that are formally located within the legal entity of the firm, and the effects this placement has on different configurations. These differences are then reflected in the firms that operate within a business system. Firms can thus be seen as agents of and within a particular business system, emergent shapes that carry salient features of their surroundings with them. For instance, the degree to which coordinative functions are located within the firm or operate outside strict individual firm boundaries can vary across different business systems.

The paradoxical state of affairs described by *The Economist* can be understood with such a perspective at hand. Although I realize that the arrangements of the Dutch economy have a long tradition that goes back much further than recent history, in the next section I will try to describe

its most salient features by highlighting some key developments of the Dutch business system after the end of the Second World War, with an emphasis on firms and elites.[132]

A domestic social economy

The Netherlands emerged from the Second World War with its infrastructure and industry considerably damaged, but also with a strong tradition of an open economy focused on international trade, a favourable geographical position and a somewhat diversified economic base. These features allowed for a relatively quick economic recovery after the end of the war. The loss of the prime colony of Indonesia (or the Dutch East Indies as it was known while under colonial rule) in 1949 seemed at the time to be a setback for the much desired economic growth, but the effects on trade and profits were relatively limited to a few sectors and companies that were focused on trade with the colony (Wubs 2012). The main thrust of international trade had already shifted to other parts of the world before the outbreak of the war. Supported by generous financial assistance from the US (in the form of the Marshall Plan, of which the Netherlands received a relatively large share), the country's rebuilding efforts focused mainly on the industrial sector. The reasoning was simple: expansion of industry could provide much needed jobs and, through export revenues, build up foreign currency reserves. The geographical situation of the Netherlands as "the port to Europe" was consistently built upon by emphasizing the development of the port of Rotterdam and Schiphol-Amsterdam airport.

The efforts aimed at reindustrialization and the rebuilding of infrastructure particularly benefited regions in the North and the South of the country which had relatively large industrial and agricultural sectors. Employee wages in those regions, which had traditionally been relatively low, started to catch up with levels in the West. The economy in the latter part of the country (mainly comprised of the provinces of North- and South Holland and Utrecht) traditionally was dominated by the international service- and financial sectors that suffered disproportionately from the severed links with the German economy in the years immediately after the end of the war. The path back to pre-war levels of income in the West was consequently a longer one. All in all, this had the effect of alleviating the rather large regional wage differences that had existed prior to the war.

This national convergence in income levels was accompanied by the demise of the regional differentiation of the nation's economic elite. Historically, different regions of the country were dominated by specific forms of economic activity, which in turn provided a basis for the formation of specialized elites. Traditionally, an industrial elite based in the East (Twente), where a concentration of large family firms in the textile industry was located, is distinguished from an Amsterdam elite orientated towards finance and trade with the colonies, and a Rotterdam elite based on firms in the transport sector and shipbuilding industry. All these sectors suffered in some way from the independence of Indonesia in 1949 which, combined

[132] The overview in this paragraph is based largely on Van Zanden and Griffiths (1989) and Van Zanden (1997).

with the move towards central economic coordination described below, contributed to the de-regionalization of the economic elite.

The convergence in wages and regional economies was accompanied, and further strengthened, by state policies and initiatives from employers' organizations and trade unions that had the combined effect of centralizing the process of wage setting and setting the basis for the expansion of the Dutch welfare state. Interestingly, representatives from individual employers and labour organizations had already begun to institutionalize central wage negations and rudimentary welfare arrangements before the war. This seems to have been motivated in large part by a common desire to minimize state involvement in these affairs (van Bottenburg *et al.* 1995: 21). Shortly after the war, these private initiatives were solidified in the 'Labour Foundation' (*Stichting van de Arbeid*) in which unions and employers' organizations sought to cooperate on a number of tasks. This initiative provided a critical counterbalance against efforts of the first post-war administration to introduce more central planning of the economy (with a strong role for a newly-created agency, the Bureau for Central Planning, or CPB) and a rigid vertical structuring of industries through corporative bodies, so-called 'industry organizations' (*bedrijfsschappen*). Subsequent negotiations resulted in a watered down proposal and the installation of the Social-Economic Council (*Sociaal Economische Raad*, or SER, the acronym under which it is better known) that united employers, trade unions and government officials (the 'social partners') into a central body that was mainly designed to provide policy advice to the government on social-economic issues. The CPB would eventually assume a quite different role as an independent advisor on economic policy, but wage bargaining would become even more strongly centralized. Collective labour agreements (CAOs) between representatives of employers and workers could, by decree of the Secretary of Labour Affairs, be made obligatory for entire industries.

Based on this institutional structure, the welfare state (the contours of which were formed in the period around the First World War, partly through the combined efforts of employers and unions) was gradually expanded by various coalition governments in the period after 1945. This development was spurred by the fact that, for the first time, the Social Democrats were accepted as a viable coalition partner by the other (faith-based and liberal) political parties in the years after the end of the war. This emancipation of the socialist movement and its acceptance among the political elite was a significant change from the years before the war. The position of the Dutch elite traditionally was a somewhat peculiar one. Until well into the 1960s, Dutch society can be described as pillarized (Lijphart 1968). The Protestant, Catholic, liberal and socialist parts of the population were organized in 'pillars' in which their social, economic and political lives were organized around institutions specific to the demeanour of their own pillar. Thus there were, for instance, separate Catholic, Protestant and socialist trade unions, employers' organizations, broadcasting organizations and political parties. Typically, interaction among the members from different pillars was low, except on the level of the elites. There, coordination of policies and compromises provided the framework for the relatively stable political and economic climate that characterizes the Netherlands for much of the 20th century, with, for instance, one of the lowest number

of strikes in Europe after the war and the lowest inflation rates (Van Zanden and Griffiths 1989: 11; 15). However, although interactions between the members at the top of their respective pillars was relatively frequent, it is also important not to lose sight of the significance of these pillars in structuring the outlook on life, the framing of opportunities and the career paths of these representatives. The pillars provided representatives with an institutional system of schools, political parties, civil associations and other organizations in which they were socialized and that endowed them with cultural and social capital that were different from that of their counterparts from other pillars. One of the features of such an institutional decentralization is the absence of a system of national elite schools that is an important selection mechanism for the elites in, for instance, France and the UK (Hartmann 2007). The educational careers of elites in the Netherlands were much more embedded in the pillars that provided a ladder of education from elementary school to university. The selection of elites in the Netherlands takes place in other associations like student fraternities (see e.g., Dronkers and Hillege 1997).

A liberal international economy

Compared to other small economies, the Netherlands has a relatively high number of large multinational firms that have their roots in companies that were incorporated in the period from 1870 to 1920, the time of the second industrial revolution (Chandler 1990). From very early on, these firms often were orientated towards expanding their business on international markets (Sluyterman 2003: 46; 51; 65). After the First World War multinational companies quickly became of great importance to the Dutch economy. The value of the assets of the 100 largest Dutch firms as a percentage of Dutch GDP rose from 20% in 1913 to its peak of 88% in 1973 (Van Zanden 1997: 59). This figure is higher than in other countries (Sluyterman 2003: 212). Firms such as Philips (electronics), Royal Dutch-Shell (oil), Unilever (food and soap products), DSM (chemicals), Akzo (chemicals) and Hoogovens (steel) (the 'Top 6') employed growing numbers of people in the Netherlands and abroad, until a decline set in after 1973.

Understanding why these multinationals exist in the Netherlands is key to understanding the dual nature of the Dutch economy. The openness to international trade and investment cannot only be seen in terms of foreign investments in the country, – which grew rapidly after the war, especially from the US which became the largest investor in the country by 1970 (De Goey and Wubs 2006: 154) – but also by the large sums Dutch firms invested abroad, again mostly in the US. For example, the Netherlands ranked consistently in the top 4 of origin countries with foreign direct investment in the US, resulting in the situation that Dutch investment in the US in the period from 1950 to 1970 was larger than US investment in the Netherlands. This pattern was not reversed until 2002 (Wilkins 2005: 220; 233–34). Especially Royal Dutch Shell, Philips and Unilever resumed US activities almost immediately after the war, in large part through their strong (and relatively independent) subsidiaries. In the 1990s they were followed by banks like ABN AMRO, Rabobank and Nationale Nederlanden/ING (Wilkins 2005; Westerhuis 2008), and the retailer firm Ahold.

These developments on a company level were accompanied, throughout the entire post war development (and, in effect, well before that), by policies of the Dutch government which were crafted with a sharp eye on the country's international (competitive) position. This resulted in conservative policies aimed at controlling wage and price levels as much as possible. Implemented within the domestic institutional structure described above and supported by a shared outlook of employers and trade unions, these policies also proved effective, contributing to a prolonged period of strong competitiveness on world markets. Domestically, low levels of unemployment, low inflation, a low governmental deficit and the growing reach of the welfare state gave rise to the "golden years" in the Netherlands (Van Zanden 1997: 183).

Another example of the openness of the Dutch economy and the economic elite to international (and, especially in the beginning, American) influences is ideological. Sluyerman (2003) refers to the influence that management consultants had on the development of the largest Dutch firms. Inspired by the writings of American business students like Alfred Chandler, these consultants often propagated the management-controlled multi-divisional firm (see also Whittington and Mayer 2000). To a large degree, the managerial elite of large firms turned increasingly to the US to learn new management concepts. But the US also proved to be a fertile ground for new business ideas for challengers to the established firms. For example, Karel van Eerd, a self-made entrepreneur who built a large chain of supermarkets across the Netherlands, went on a study trip to the US in 1961 and returned with a ideas on how to introduce the American-style supermarket in his home country (Beernink and Parker Brady 2012: 16; 97). In the early and mid-1970s, Dutch financial entrepreneurs frequently visited Chicago, home of the first options exchange in the world (the CBOE) to learn the trade from the American innovators.

The practices of corporate governance also changed during the post-war expansion, partly in continuation of trends that had started before the war. The role of families as financiers and managers of companies declined; in its stead came an increasing reliance on bank credit and the issuance of shares as sources of finance, as well as the governance of companies by professional managers (Steier and Morck 2005 :22). Although banks became more important, their role in corporate governance never attained the importance that was seen in, for instance, Germany. That is not to say that the market for corporate control ever attained the degree of sophistication of Anglo Saxon economies. Dutch firms proved to be quite resourceful in devising anti-takeover measures such as the issuance of preferential shares that were subsequently held in trusts, or stripping shares of their voting rights. These measures have been criticized by institutional investors, shareholders organizations and academic economists alike. They were seen as diminishing the shareholder value of companies by protecting the incumbent management and preventing takeovers by more efficient firms. The notion of "shareholder value" as a conception of control (Fligstein 1990) was introduced in the Netherlands in the 1980s by Pierre Vinken, the CEO of Elsevier (a large publishing company which is now an Anglo-Dutch company, Reed Elsevier). The principle of maximising shareholder wealth as the most important goal of a company initially encountered resistance, but by the end of the 1990s

most public companies had adopted this principle (Bezemer *et al*. 2012). However, criticism directed at the governance of firms increased after a number of accounting scandals in the early 2000s. The most notorious of these was the reporting of inflated profit numbers at the retailer firm Ahold in 2003. In the same year a commission headed by a former CEO of Unilever (the Tabaksblat Commission) issued guidelines that were designed to improve the corporate governance of public companies. The initiative echoed similar attempts in other countries (e.g. the UK's Cadbury Report of 1992) to critically examine corporate governance practices after crises (Hill 1995: 258). In general, the proposals were aimed at improving the position of shareholders *vis-a-vis* management.

For the domestic economy the post-war period or the 'economic Eldorado' of steady economic growth accompanied by low inflation and a strong currency started to unravel in the middle of the 1960s, and came to a definitive end in the beginning of the 1970s. In 1963, wages started to rise, which, combined with higher taxes, contributed to companies making heavy investments in labour saving technologies. At the same time, the rising domestic costs and the strong Dutch guilder forced firms to accept very low margins on their export products to keep (or expand) their market share on world markets. The pressures of maintaining a strong international position in the face of rising costs also evoked a merger wave, as some firms sought ways to enhance efficiency and achieve economies of scale to remain competitive on world markets (Sluyterman 2003: 206). Large firms started to downsize: Philips, for instance, had around 40,000 employees in 1929, some 400,000 in 1970, but only 115,000 in 2009 (Quak 2012: 81; van Zanden 1997: 60). This trend was accelerated in the following decade. With few exceptions, economic developments between 1973 and 1982 were marked by sluggish or non-existent growth in GDP. The openness of the economy became a liability in light of the increasingly turbulent international situation. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971 and imported inflationary pressures from rapidly rising oil prices in 1973 are two examples of developments that brought to light the domestic problems in the economy that had more or less been masked by the strong exports. Like in many other countries, 'stagflation' was the neologism used to describe the new phenomenon of inflation combined with a stagnating economic growth. The ensuing recession was characterized by high levels of unemployment and rising state deficits that subsequent governments tried to eliminate by cutting expenditures, mainly through reducing the size of the welfare state which was now viewed as a disincentive for seeking work, and the financing of which had become a serious burden to the state budget and company profits. Especially for industrial companies, the recession hit hard; despite the sometimes high levels of government support (for instance for the shipping industry), a number of large industrial firms went bankrupt or had to downsize significantly. When economic growth picked up again after 1983, the role of industry – as expressed in the number of people employed and the share of GDP – had clearly diminished (Sluyterman 2003: 258).

In retrospect, 1982 is often seen as a turnaround year for the Dutch economy. After years of antagonism, negotiations between labour unions and employers in the town of Wassenaar resulted in the Wassenaar Agreement, in which the unions accepted slight wage increases in

exchange for a reduced working week and other benefits. According to Hollanders and Ziesemer (1999), the Netherlands recorded higher growth rates than most other European countries mostly thanks to this wage moderation. The success of the Dutch economy in the early 1990s led to increased international attention for the specific mix of the Dutch system of economic government, which soon became known as the 'polder model'. No doubt the embodiment of this metaphor was formed by the two consecutive 'purple coalition' administrations of right wing and left wing liberals together with social democrats from 1995 to 2002. Headed by Prime Minister Wim Kok, a former leader of the main labour union, these were the first administrations after the war without a Christian party as a coalition partner, and can be viewed as the ultimate success of cooperation among the political elite. A business-like approach to government, without ideological constraints, aimed at consensus and focused on job creation seemed to be, at the time, the definitive answer to weather economic storms.

Summarizing, the Dutch business system can be described by the elements of a strong domestic tradition of pacification through elite cooperation across the pillars of Dutch society, the generally cooperative nature of the relation between representatives of employers and employees and a strong international orientation exemplified by the international outlook of business supported by a liberal approach to international trade and investment of government. The large number of jobs provided by the large, export-orientated firms in the years immediately after the war until the mid-1970s, and their large interests abroad meant that consecutive governments defined the international position of the Netherlands predominantly in economic terms and with an eye on the competitiveness of Dutch firms. As a small country with an open economy, this orientation left the economy vulnerable to international developments. Domestically, this position translated into a relatively coordinated system of economic development, based on largely moderate wage levels and stable employment conditions, as well as a relatively diversified economy with an important position for the sectors of international service provision and transport and logistics. This fits within the logic of small countries that have to attune their policies quickly to changes in global economic conditions (Katzenstein 1985).

This overview makes clear that the two cohorts of the Dutch business elite studied in this chapter came of age and pursued their careers in different economic environments. The education and careers of the CEOs of 1976 mostly took place in the years after the Second World War when the rebuilding effort and the transformation of the Dutch business system from a colonial power to an export-orientated economy took place. Most of the CEOs of 2009 started their careers in the early and mid-1970s, when the pillarized system started to unravel and the internationalisation of the economy accelerated. This historical context helps to interpret the results of the data analysis in this paper. The data collection and analysis in this paper was carried out with the aim of modelling the field of the Dutch business elite. I will now turn to a short discussion of the conception of a field in this context in the next section.

Authors that use a field approach have often applied MCA to prosopographical data to derive maps from the data based on the relative positions of variables and individuals (for economic elites see, e.g., Bourdieu and Saint Martin 1978; Bourdieu [1989] 1996; Mach, David and Bühlmann 2011; Bühlmann, David and Mach 2012, 2013; Ellersgaard, Larsen and Munk 2013; for an application in a study on various elite groups see, e.g., Hjelbrekke *et al*. 2007; Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet and Thine 2011). All these studies employ Bourdieu's ([1989] 1996) concept of the field of power as an analytical tool to frame the analysis, interpreting the study of the top positions in the economic field as a study of the "the economic pole of the field of power" (Ellersgaard, Larsen and Munk 2013: 1053). The field of power can be understood as consisting of the highest positions in the most important fields in society (such as the economic field, political field and the cultural field). It thus is a social space that captures the agents who are dominant in their respective fields (Bourdieu [1989] 1996: 264). When it comes to modelling these dominant positions in the national economic field, all of the studies mentioned above have included the CEOs of the largest corporations in their analysis, conceptualising it as, for example, the subspace of business elites in the larger economic field of power (Ellersgaard, Larsen and Munk 2013: 1053).[133] The power base of these positions, and, hence, the basis for the selection of the individuals to be included in the analysis, is assumed to be found in a nation's largest corporations. This way, the authors analysed data on the CEOs of, respectively, the top 200 French firms (Bourdieu and Saint Martin 1978) by sales volume, the top 110 Swiss firms by turnover (Bühlmann, David and Mach 2012) and the largest 82 Danish firms by turnover and number of employees (Ellersgaard, Larsen and Munk 2013).[134]

However, the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this power basis is still somewhat problematic.[135] Most researchers starting from a field approach have relied on one or two measures of firm size to define their population without much reflection on the way in which this captures the notion of power (i.e. the possession of capital) in the field under study. Viewing firms as the most important actors in the economic field, Bourdieu, in his later work on the economy (Bourdieu 2005: 193; see also Maclean *et al*. 2010), explicitly refers to the volume and structure of capital that companies possess, including technological, juridical and commercial forms of capital – in addition to the more well-known species of economic (financial), cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1986). In his own analysis of companies that were active in the French housing market, Bourdieu notes the difficulties he and his collaborators encountered in finding and obtaining good measurements of variables that could be used to unravel the underlying structure of the economic field (Bourdieu 2005: 43–45). Moving beyond the confinements of a particular economic sector modelled as a field, these

[133] Bühlmann *et al*. also included the chairpersons of the boards of directors.

[134] Focusing his analysis on firms, Fligstein (1990) based his analysis on changing conceptions of control in the field of large US firms on the 100 largest firms (in 7 sample years) according to various lists (like the Fortune 500) ranking the firms by asset size (Fligstein 1990: 328).

[135] I thank Bertrand Réau for raising this issue at a discussion during the 2013 conference on Education, Elites and Globalization in Stockholm.

considerations translate into a question of what companies in which positions can be considered to be the most dominant economic actors in a national field. An understanding of the economic field in these terms can subsequently guide the selection of the agents (i.e., the CEOs) that are to be included into the analysis (as holders of the most powerful positions in the field). The difficult part (as demonstrated by Bourdieu) is to find the appropriate variables as measures of the kinds of capital that can (theoretically) be identified as structuring the economic field. Moreover, these considerations can be carried over to the analysis of the subspace of the business elites in the field of power. Lebaron and Bonnet (2014) refer to this step as "constructing the research object" in the sense of Bourdieu *et al*. ([1968] 1991). It can be seen as an integral part of the methodology of field approaches as it is part of the reflexive element of such an approach, drawing attention to the choices that are made to model a field (see in this respect also Bernhard and Schmidt-Wellenburg 2012: 31; 49).

The space of firms

Recently, researchers have begun to explore the issue of the dimensionality in the power of the firms that provide the power base for the corporate elite (Maclean *et al*. 2010; François and Lemercier 2014). Maclean *et al*. (2010: 333) designed a composite index to capture corporate power that included total capital employed, turnover, profit-before-tax and employment. François and Lemercier (2014: 5) call attention to the fact that the resources for the corporate elite are generated within the space of firms. They modelled this space using the network of interlocking directorates between the 120 largest firms listed on the Paris stock exchange, arguing that the field of the corporate elite consists of the CEOs of these firms and the directors that created interlocks between the firms.

In this chapter a different approach is taken. The rationale for a different methodology for the assessment of power is the singular nature of the Dutch business system described in section 2. Although the Amsterdam Stock Exchange is the oldest stock exchange in the world and has traditionally been a source of finance for Dutch firms, focusing solely on firms listed on the exchange leaves out important firms that have never gone public, relying instead on bank finance or replenished earnings to finance their activities. Amongst these are large family firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms. The large presence of the latter category of firms is also the reason why the Maclean *et al*. index is problematic in the Dutch context. Their criteria are not capable to distinguish between the different forms of corporations within the category of subsidiaries of foreign firms. Some transnational corporations (TNCs) use a Dutch entity to coordinate their European activities, while others have chosen to base their headquarters in the Netherlands while keeping their production facilities and main administrative functions elsewhere. The different forms of foreign–based firms that are active within the Dutch setting provide an insight into the way 'globalisation' materialises within the national context of a relatively small economy like the Netherlands. A more thorough discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is useful to note the different ways in which the companies

on the list impact the national corporate field. Whilst all of them make a significant contribution to the Dutch economy in some way (in terms of, for example, absolute levels of tax payments or as employers), there is clearly a difference when it comes to their national presence as strategically relevant entities in terms of corporate governance. For example, some subsidiaries of foreign firms have a clearly identifiable (national) profile, in the sense that they have a certain degree of independence from their headquarters abroad. Other companies have grown out of the merger with, or by the takeover of formerly exclusively Dutch firms and thus have a traceable Dutch origin that in most cases is still emphasised in corporate communications, although important decisions are predominantly made abroad. The difference is particularly pertinent when it comes to assessing the degree to which the managers of these companies can be counted as members of the corporate elite in the sense of being part of the field of power. Being a chief executive, or serving on the board of a relatively more independent and autonomous entity obviously allows more freedom in making or assessing decisions that have the potential to affect the Dutch economy.

There is another, rather notorious corporate form, i.e. the so-called 'post box firms'. Especially since the 1990s TNCs have become more and more adept at choosing the legislative space that best suits their needs (Davis and Marquis 2005; Palan *et al*. 2010). Amongst the most important considerations in this respect is the choice of the most attractive national tax regime for the different activities of the firm. TNC practices of routing cash flows through 'shell corporations' with the aim of minimizing tax payments has recently drawn heavy criticism from international organisations, politicians and the public alike. Since these firms have a large presence in the Netherlands, it is important to be sure that they are left out of the analysis of the economic field of power.

Selection procedure

Initially a list of the 100 largest companies in 2009 by sales volume was compiled to be included within the analysis. A relatively large number of the firms on this list consisted of entities that had been created by foreign companies as part of their tax engineering efforts. To avoid undue influence by these firms, the selection of companies was restricted by imposing, besides minimum levels of annual sales (turnover), minimum values of shareholder value, number of employees and assets for the year 2009. Furthermore, all firms managed by a trust firm were dropped from the list, as well as firms that only act as (financial) holding companies. To further differentiate between subsidiaries of foreign firms, and especially to assess the degree to which they form the basis for access to the Dutch field of power, an approach based on the degree of 'national embeddedness' of a firm within the Netherlands has been chosen. While Granovetter (1985) originally developed the concept of embeddedness as a way to capture the importance of the social surroundings of economic actors (expressed in terms of interactions with others) in response to overly 'economic' and 'sociological' conceptions of these actors, it is also possible to apply it in a symmetrical way to assess the importance of an economically-defined actor for its surroundings. Seen in this way, and making use of later developments and

extensions by, for instance, Zukin and DiMaggio (1990), Heilbron and Quak (2012) and Quak (2012), it also lends itself to capture a broader notion of the presence of a company within a national context. Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) propose four kinds of embeddedness of economic action, namely; cultural, political, structural and cognitive embeddedness (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990: 15–18). The remaining subsidiaries of foreign firms on the list were assessed using these notions of embeddedness. Firms that were originally independent Dutch firms, but that had become part of a foreign company because of a takeover or merger were retained. For the remaining subsidiaries, five criteria were used to assess the significance of the firm's activities in the Netherlands. The first was the visible presence of the firm's Dutch headquarters: does it conduct its affairs from an office building that clearly displays the firm's logo and/or does it refer to its Dutch offices or activities on its website? The second criterion chosen was the role of the company's CEO or managing director (MD) within the firm. Specifically, if a CEO was only employed within one subsidiary and not, for example, also active as a CEO/MD at various other subsidiaries of the mother firm, this was taken as an indication of the meaningful and relatively independent status of the subsidiary. The same reasoning applies to the third criterion, which was if there was a board of directors, and, if so, whether this board contained any independent members (not affiliated to one of the companies in the corporate group). Fourth, if a subsidiary had any production facilities, R&D centres or other branch offices in the Netherlands, this too was interpreted as an indicator of national embeddedness. Finally, the media occurrence of the firm in the major national Dutch newspapers in 2009 was categorised (occurrence or no occurrence) using the LexisNexis database.[136] This way, a very simple 5 point scale resulted that was used to assess the degree of embeddedness of a subsidiary. Only firms that scored 3 or higher were included in the final analysis. Employing this procedure to the 250 largest firms, the following subsidiaries were selected: Cisco Systems International B.V., Esso Nederland B.V., Sabic International Holdings B.V., CRH Nederland B.V., Smurfit International B.V., Canon Europa N.V., Otra N.V., Archer Daniels Midland Nederland B.V., Cargill B.V., Sara Lee International/Douwe Egberts B.V., Tata Steel Nederland B.V., ND Logistics Nederland B.V.,Vodafone Libertel B.V., DAF Trucks N.V., Dow Benelux B.V., E.ON Benelux N.V., Aramco Overseas Company B.V., Metro Distributie Nederland B.V., IBM Nederland B.V., Tommy Hilfiger B.V., Connexxion N.V., Cofely Nederland N.V., Mercedes-Benz Nederland B.V., Siemens Nederland N.V., Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. Ziggo N.V., Maxeda Nederland B.V., Organon BioSciences Nederland B.V., Ardagh MPH B.V., Cofely Nederland N.V., HEMA B.V., Sanoma Media B.V. and Capgemini N.V.

For the analysis presented in this paper, only the CEOs of the selected companies were considered. Doing a separate analysis for this group makes sense for a number of reasons. First, the importance of the CEO function within the corporate hierarchy has increased over the last 20 to 30 years in the Netherlands. The traditional role of the *president-directeur* (Chairman of

[136] The newspapers were scanned for company names and the names of the members of the executive board. The following newspapers were used: *Algemeen Dagblad*, *Dag*, *Dagblad De Pers*, *De Telegraaf*, *De Volkskrant*, *Het Financieele Dagblad*, *Het Parool*, *Metro*, *Nederlands Dagblad*, *NRC.Next*, *NRC Handelsblad*, *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, *Spits* and *Trouw*.

the Executive Board) as a *primus inter pares* has steadily given way to the CEO role with a greater concentration of executive power within a single person. Second, most of the studies mentioned above have focused their attention mainly or solely on this group. For reasons of comparability of the results of this study with the results of the aforementioned studies, an initial focus on the CEOs is desirable. Lastly, the Beekenkamp-Dronkers study (2002) that provides the basis for the longitudinal comparison also focused on the *president-directeuren* of the largest Dutch companies (albeit the Top 250). The main results of that study, as well as a descriptive comparison between the 1976 and 2009 data will be presented next.

4 THE DUTCH ECONOMIC FIELD OF POWER 1976 AND 2009 – A DESCRIPTIVE PICTURE

Prelude

Most studies of the Dutch corporate elite have mainly relied on network analysis of board interlocks to study the structure of these elites (Helmers *et al*. 1975; Fennema and Schijf 1979; Stokman, Wasseur and Elsas 1985; Heemskerk 2007). As exceptions, prosopographical data have been used by Dronkers (1983) and Beekenkamp and Dronkers (2002). Dronkers (1983) used data from the Dutch Centre of Directors (NCD) on the attributes of 173 CEOs and their companies. He applied the PRINCALS method (Gifi 1990) to reduce the dimensionality of, first, data on the CEOs and the companies separately, and, second, the combined data. He found that for the CEOs, two dimensions were important: the first one relating to the volume of social and cultural capital, and a second one differentiating between religious and non-religious dispositions. In the combined analysis, Dronkers was able to nuance his findings of the separate analyses: the first of three dimensions he analysed could be interpreted as an opposition between old and new firms, while a second dimension could be designated as an 'organised religion' dimension, mainly opposing Catholic CEOs from companies located in the south of the Netherlands from non-religious CEOs from companies in the north. A third dimension was interpreted as constituting an opposition bearing on the volume of cultural capital.

Beekenkamp and Dronkers (2002) used data on the background, careers and positions of 249 CEOs in 1976 to extend the previous study by Dronkers in the same way as Bourdieu and Saint Martin (1978). Primarily interested in the two reproductive strategies which gave access to elite positions in the economic field identified by Bourdieu and Saint Martin (i.e., those based on economic capital and scholarly capital), they identified eight career patterns of the CEOs (adding cultural capital and type of company as signifiers of a distinct career trajectory to the four patterns that are derived from cross tabulating economic and scholastic capital). Regarding the attributes of the CEOs, they used PRINCALS to study the underlying dimensions of the variables describing social background (family), educational and career themes. This way, they derived a number of separate, two-dimensional spaces that captured most of the variability in the data. This then provided a way for them to classify the variables and the CEOs into the four quadrants defined by the two axes. They then used these classifications to relate them to the

career patterns identified earlier in the study. Their main findings regarding the three spaces pertaining to the attributes of the CEOs are summarised in

Table 1.

Theme	Interpretation dimension 1	Interpretation dimension 2
Social background (family background)	High versus low standing (high levels of economic and cultural capital versus low levels) (44%)	Economic versus cultural capital (22%)
Education	High versus low education (87%)	Substantive versus form orientated subjects (9%)
Career	Broad versus narrow career (54%)	External versus internal career (16%)

Table 1: Dimensions reported by Beekenkamp and Dronkers (2002) for the 3 attribute related themes together with their interpretation of the axes. The explained variance (in percentage of the total variance) is displayed in parentheses.

Following Beekenkamp and Dronkers' interpretations, the two dimensions of the 'family' theme correspond exactly to Bourdieu's ([1979] 1984) model of social space. The CEOs are positioned according to the volume (first axis) and composition (second axis) of their capital, and in this sense the economic field anno 1976 is a homologous reflection of the class structure in social space. The educational space is primarily formed by the opposition between high and low (or no higher) education on the first axis, and between, in their words, more 'substantive subjects' (like accounting or engineering) and 'form-orientated subjects' (like law) on the second axis. Finally, the authors interpreted the first dimension in the career space as an opposition between 'broad careers' (long duration, involving multiple sectors) and a 'narrow pattern' (relatively quick career in one sector only), while the second axis was interpreted as opposing mostly long careers within the same company to faster careers in multiple companies.

In order to assess the structure of the field of the corporate elite two databases have been used. The first containing data on the CEOs of the 249 largest Dutch corporations in 1976 was assembled by Gerbert Beekenkamp (see Beekenkamp and Dronkers 2002). Data on the corporations in the selection were collected by Frans Stokman (Stokman, Wasseur and Elsas 1985; Heemskerk 2007) on the basis of the volume of sales in 1976. The other dataset is based on the VKS/ECES database and contains information on the CEOs of the 113 most important Dutch industrial and trade corporations by sales, as well as the 20 largest financial organisations by volume of their assets.

There are a number of issues that need to be discussed regarding the analysis of the data, as they are important for the comparisons between the two constructed fields. Most importantly, it proved to be impossible to link the individuals in the 1976 dataset to the companies they were affiliated with. Unfortunately these records were lost. This means that the comparison is made

on the basis of two sets of different sizes as far as the number of cases is concerned. Furthermore, in a number of cases the precise meaning of certain categories, and the procedure followed to construct them, could not, for the above reason, be retraced. Although efforts have been made to facilitate the comparison between the two datasets by (re)coding the Beekenkamp and the VKS/ECES data in a similar way, and thereby increasing the comparability between the two constructed spaces, it has not always been possible to maximize their substantive overlap. Therefore, the interpretation of the comparisons between the two spaces must be carried out with a degree of caution. Second, some of the data that are relevant for the construction of the geometric spaces under study – such as international career patterns – were not recorded in 1976.

4.1 Comparisons – 1976 vs. 2009

Before the constructed spaces of the CEOs in 1976 and 2009 are compared, the frequencies of the modalities of the most important active and supplementary variables can be compared in a descriptive analysis.

4.1.1 Comparison of variables

Some descriptive statistics of the variables that have been used in the MCAs will be presented below. After some general, structural variables (gender, age and nationality), the list has been ordered according to the kind of capital they measure: cultural and educational capital, social capital, career capital and symbolic capital. This is, of course, a simplification: in Bourdieu's work, the various forms of capital are always interrelated and cannot be interpreted solely in a single unequivocal way. The categorisation below is therefore best interpreted as an approximation.

General

Gender

Gender was not among the variables recorded for the 1976 group; in 2009, only one of the CEOs was female, making the field extremely gendered. Because of this, there is obviously no rationale for including a gender variable in the GDA.

Age

The median age of the 249 CEOs in 1976 was 53; the youngest CEO in the group was 35, the oldest 74 (standard deviation 7.13). In 2009 the median age had risen slightly to 54, with the youngest being 31and the oldest 75 (standard deviation 7.05). A categorised age variable was constructed for the analysis to be used as a supplementary variable.

Nationality

In 1976, the field of CEOs consisted predominantly of Dutch nationals: over 92% were of Dutch nationality, with the remainder predominantly having a nationality from another West or North European nation. In 2009, the percentage of those with Dutch nationality had dropped to close to 80%. This was still a significant majority of CEOs in the 2009 selection, and seemed at odds with the widely spread notions of rampant globalisation or internationalisation of the market for executive talent. Moreover, the majority of the CEOs of foreign nationality came from other European countries. It seems, therefore, that there has been a level of internationalisation among the Dutch business elite during the period 1976 to 2009, but less than could be expected on the basis of the debate about internationalisation and globalisation.

	Nationality (1976)		**Nationality (2009)**	
Nationality	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
The Netherlands	230	92.4	107	80.5
West and North Europe	10	4.0	18	13.5
United States	4	1.6	5	3.8
Other	5	2.0	3	2.3
Total	249	100	133	100

Number of Children

Apart from age, the number of children was recorded as a variable indicative of a position in social space.

Demographics/cultural capital

Place of Birth

The coding of the place of birth for the 1976 CEOs is an example of a coding scheme that was hard to reproduce for the 2009 cohort. For the 1976 group the choice was made to include categories such as *randgemeente* (loosely translated as ‘suburb’) and *villaplaats* (‘villatown’). Since the meaning of these terms is somewhat ambiguous, these have been recoded into aggregate categories to facilitate comparison (see below).

	Place of Birth (1976)		Place of Birth (2009)	
Category	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Randstad	64	25.7	45	33.8
Large (provincial) town	74	29.7	47	35.3
Rural area	50	20.1	26	19.5
Small (provincial) town	47	18.9	10	7.5
Unknown	14	5.6	5	3.8
Total	249	100	133	100

The geographical origins of the CEOs seem to be roughly comparable between the two groups; although for 2009 the relative share of CEOs born in the *Randstad* (the agglomeration of the largest and most important cities in the western part of the Netherlands that includes Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) and other large towns seems to have grown slightly.[137]

Religion

The religion variable has been defined as the religion of the parents of the CEO and thus provides a measure of the religious milieu in which these individuals grew up. The largest differences between the two periods occurred in the case of the 'Catholic' category. The relatively recent rise of a number of large companies (such as Jumbo Supermarkets, Sligro, VION, VDL and Sabic) in the southern part of the Netherlands (which is predominantly Catholic) may offer a partial explanation for this phenomenon. Furthermore, the opening up of new career patterns away from the more traditional routes organised within the pillars may have contributed to the emancipation of the Catholic business elite.

[137] Following Beekenkamp and Dronkers (2002), only thee three cities mentioned form this category, although a more common definition would also include a city like, for instance, Utrecht. Note that no CEOs of foreign nationality can be assigned to this category, making it the only modality of this variable that is only applicable and meaningful for Dutch nationals. Because the original place of birth for the 1976 cohort could no longer be determined, for comparative reasons the original coding has been adopted for the joint analysis.

	Religion (1976)		Religion (2009)	
Category	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Protestant	80	32.1	46	34.6
Catholic	49	19.7	46	34.6
Other	45	18.1	21	15.8
Unknown	75	30.1	20	15.0
Total	249	100	133	100

Father's occupation

Another variable that can be understood as a measure of cultural capital (which allows for the differentiation between individuals that grew up in an environment relatively rich in cultural capital and those that were raised in households more focused on economic capital) is the occupation of the father of the CEO.[138] Comparisons between the cohorts are made below.

	Father's occupation (1976)		Father's occupation (2009)	
Occupation	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Politics, civil service, professions	44	17.7	19	14.3
Entrepreneur, SME owner[139]	58	23.3	35	26.3
Lower and middle management	11	4.4	8	6.9
Top management	57	22.9	1	0.8
Manual labour	12	4.8	13	9.8
Unknown	67	26.9	57	42.9
Total	249	100	116	100

[138] The focus on economic capital in a family situation goes beyond the strict drive to obtain or maintain it. It also captures a family culture that is more orientated towards economic or materialistic concerns and issues (e.g., in discussions at the dinner table) than 'cultural issues' in a narrow sense. This connects in some ways with Inglehart's (1997) thesis on the effect of economic (family) conditions in the growing up phase on values held later in life. See also the next note.

[139] SME stands for small and medium-sized enterprise.

The largest difference between the two groups occurred in the top management category; while in 1976 over 22% of the CEOs had a father who had also held a position in top management, in 2009, I could only confidentially categorise 1 individual with such a background. To a certain degree, this result can probably be ascribed to the reluctance of successful individuals to indicate that they come from an upper class (economic elite) background, lest people might interpret their current position as the result of favours and a privileged upbringing. Therefore, amongst those in the 'unknown' category there may well be a relatively large amount of people with such a background. Additionally, these CEOs may be inclined to downplay their father's position (thus ending up in the second category of small business owners). However, the relatively large amount of people from a working class background (9.8% in 2009 as compared to 4.8% in 1976) does provide some support for an interpretation cast in terms of a decreased degree of reproduction of economic capital across generations in the 2009 cohort. There seems to have been, at least to some degree, an opening of the route to the top of the largest corporations in the Netherlands from 1976 to 2009 in the sense of a more meritocratic career trajectory (note also the sharp decline of the percentage of CEOs without any form of higher education below). This interpretation would be in line with several other studies in different countries. Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2010) found that for the British case, 36% of the corporate elite they studied over the period from 1998 to 2003 came from lower and lower-middle class backgrounds; for France, the percentage was 23%. If, for the Dutch case in 2009, most of the SME owners could be categorised as lower-middle class, the figure for the UK is comparable to the numbers found in the Netherlands (but higher than in France; see also Hartmann 2010 for the case of Germany).

To counter the effect of these coding issues, two alternatives were explored. In the first the fathers of the 1976 CEOs who were assigned to the category of 'top management', but those who were also the CEO of the family firm in which the son was his successor, were recoded into the category of 'entrepreneur and SME owner'. That way, 32 fathers formerly assigned to 'top manager' were excluded from the category (leaving 10% in the top-management category).

The other alternative (reported in this paper) consisted of collapsing the categories of 'lower and middle management' and 'top-management' into one category labelled 'management'. The logic behind this recoding is in line with the exploration in footnotes 8 and 9, as in a relatively more pronounced 'economic orientation' towards life that, in this case, is orientated towards bureaucratic career paths at firms in the field. The variable *Father's Occupation* can then be seen as an approximation of the focus of family life during the CEO's upbringing: relatively more orientated towards cultural capital (the first category), economic capital (the second category), bureaucratic careers and organisational capital (category three) and a context of relative deprivation of economic and cultural capital, as well as of a career orientation (the 'manual labour' category).

Patrician and nobility background

Of the 249 individuals in the 1976 dataset, 16 (6.4%) were part of, or connected to (through marriage), a family contained in the Dutch patrician or nobility registers. Of this group, 9

individuals were children of fathers with an entry in one of these registers, while for 2 CEOs both their mother and father were descendants from patrician or noble ('titled') families.
Of the 2009 cohort, only 2 individuals (1.5 %) belonged to families contained in these registers and in only one case the entry was for both the mother (nobility) and father (patriciate) respectively. This result corroborates the interpretation of the *Father's Occupation* variable above; there seems to be a lesser degree of reproduction of elite structures across generations than previously, at least for the group under investigation within the chosen time frame. Since the number of people contained in this modality was too small to be used as an active modality in an MCA for the 2009 cohort, the two individuals were joined by another 7 CEOs whose family or themselves were mentioned in the most recent Dutch *Wie is Wie* volume (1996–1997). This volume was the result of an attempt to mirror the well-known *Who's Who* publications in other countries, but this ambition was never fulfilled. Cooperation of the elites to be contained in the volume was low, and the profiles that were presented in it are in some cases sketchy and incomplete. After the second issue, no other volumes were published. However, since it is the only source in the Netherlands that is somewhat comparable to the *Who's Who* sources for other countries, an entry in the volume has been taken as an indication of some degree of elite status attributed to the entrant.

Family firm

Lastly in this category, a (supplementary) variable indicating a CEO position in a firm owned by the CEO's family or by himself (*FamFirm*) was used in order to define cultural capital more clearly as a contrast to economic capital.

Educational-Cultural Capital

Education

A significant faction of the CEOs in 1976 (slightly over 23%) had not completed a form of higher education (defined as bachelor level or higher). Of those that had completed higher education, degrees in economics and related subjects (30 %) and law (17 %) were the most common. In contrast, in the 2009 group those with no higher educational diploma only constituted 8.3 % of the total. Here too, degrees in economic subjects were the most frequent and subsequently gained in importance compared to 1976. Additionally, engineering and related degrees (a close second at 36% of the total) became more significant at the top. Law graduates formed a group of declining importance in terms of frequencies, a fact that has also been demonstrated in the context of Switzerland (Bühlmann, David and Mach 2012).

Grouping together subjects related to economics, technical fields and engineering, life and earth sciences, social sciences and law respectively the frequencies were as follows:

	Education (1976)		Education (2009)	
Subject	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
No higher education	58	23.3	11	8.3
Economics, business and accounting	76	30.5	53	39.8
Engineering, agriculture and other technical fields	43	17.3	48	36.1
Social sciences and humanities	9	3.6	7	5.3
Law	43	17.3	13	9.8
Other	10	4.0	-	-
Unknown	10	4.0	1	.8
Total	249	100	133	100

Secondary school

In addition to the form of tertiary education for all the CEOs in 1976 and 2009, secondary education has been recorded along with a profile of subjects in which the individual graduated from secondary school (as a supplementary variable). Regarding the latter, a differentiation has been made between the so-called 'alpha' and 'beta' profiles. The first profile consists mainly of subjects in the areas of economics, languages and humanities, while the beta profile emphasises mathematics and natural science subjects.

The main modality of this variable of interest regarding elite reproduction through the educational system is the *Gymnasium* category. The *Gymnasium* level of secondary education is roughly equivalent to a grammar school in the British context. In the absence of elite universities in the Dutch educational system, completing secondary schooling at a *Gymnasium* is the closest substitute for achieving elite differentiation through educational institutes. In 1976, 18.1% of the CEOs were known to have had completed such an education, while in 2009 14.3% had.[140]

[140] For foreign nationals, the equivalent of a *Gymnasium* education was coded as 'Gymnasium', following the scheme applied by Beekenkamp and Dronkers.

PhD

Apart from completing a form of higher education, having a PhD is another indicator of cultural capital obtained through the education system. It can also be conceived of as an indicator of scientific capital in the sense of Bourdieu (1988: 78-79), although this form of capital, of course, assumes a different pertinence and meaning in the economic field as compared to the academic field. However, whereas a PhD is widespread among the heads of large corporations in, for instance, Germany (Hartmann 2010), in the Dutch economic field it is a rare phenomenon. Therefore, a PhD can be interpreted as a form of symbolic or intellectual capital in the specific context of the Dutch economic field. This issue will be addressed in the interpretation of the axes of the MCAs below.

Of the 1976 cohort, 18 CEOs (7.2% of the total) were known to have a PhD, while 194 (77.9%) were known not to have one (in 14.9% of the cases it was unknown whether or not the individual had completed a PhD). In 2009, 8 individuals (6.0%) had a PhD (125, or 94.0%, did not), which would suggest that a relatively stable (albeit small) proportion of the CEOs in both time periods held a PhD.

Academic/Intellectual Cultural Capital

University

As has been mentioned several times in this text, the Netherlands has no tradition of elite institutes of higher education comparable to, for instance, the British or French situation. In this context, the educational system is comparable to the cases of Germany (Hartmann 2007; 2010) and Denmark (Ellersgaard, Larsen and Munk 2013). However, there are some differences related to tradition, specialisation and religious denomination of the universities in the Dutch field of higher education. This meant that the universities are categorised in the following way. The first category is comprised of the classical universities of Amsterdam, Groningen, Leiden and Utrecht. These are among the oldest universities in the country, and some have traditionally been connected to particular elite groups. For example, members of the royal family have often studied at the University of Leiden (including the current King and his mother, the former Queen), while members of the *patriciaat* have traditionally been linked to the University of Utrecht. The second group consists of the faith-based universities of Amsterdam (the Free University of Protestant-reformed denomination) and the universities of Nijmegen and Tilburg (Catholic).[141] The third category contains the universities specialising in technical and engineering disciplines (Delft, Eindhoven and Twente-Enschede) and agricultural and life sciences (Wageningen). A fourth category holds the less traditional, newer universities of Nyenrode (specialised in business subjects), Maastricht and Rotterdam (with a strong orientation towards economics).[142] Nyenrode is a private university in the Netherlands, founded

[141] These three universities are institutes of special education under Dutch educational law.

[142] For the 1976 CEOs, this category only contains the University of Rotterdam and Nynerode. The University of Maastricht was not yet established.

in 1946 by a number of "Dutch captains of industry".[143] Finally, one category captures all foreign universities.[144]

Comparing the two groups, the traditional universities were the most popular in 1976: 21.3% of the individuals completed their academic education at one of these institutions (which amounts to 34.9% of all the CEOs who were known to have attended university). Apart from the engineers, the largest mono-disciplinary institution was the University of Rotterdam: all 30 CEOs who studied in Rotterdam held a degree in economics or a related subject. In 2009, the traditional universities lost their top position, dropping to fourth place (13.5% of the CEOs, or 16.8% of all CEOs with an academic education and from whom their *alma mater* was known). The most popular group in 2009 was that of the technical universities. Economics was still the most dominant subject in the category of the 'new' universities, but less so than in 1976: 72% of the individuals who studied at one of these universities obtained a degree in an economics related discipline.

Fraternity membership

Membership of a fraternity is classified here as a variable pertaining to accumulated academic capital. Alternatively, it can be seen as a form of social capital, but within the Dutch context the meaning is slightly ambiguous. The reason for this is that, bearing in mind there is no national tradition of elite universities, elite reproduction has often been viewed as occurring through membership of fraternities, especially the traditional *corpora*. Dronkers and Hillege (1997) indeed found that holding the position of chairperson of one of these traditional fraternities increased the probability of an elite position in later life, especially an elite position in business. From the data to hand, only the membership of a(ny) fraternity was recorded.[145] For 1976, 21.7% of the CEOs were known to be a member, while for 2009 the percentage was 22.6%, indicating a stable share of former fraternity members among the Dutch business elite.

Authorship

There are greater differences between the two groups where the authorship of a publication is concerned. In the 2009 group, only 4 individuals (3.4%) had published a book by the time they were CEO (discounting dissertations)[146]; by comparison, in 1976 74 (almost 30%) were recorded as having one or more publications on their CV. Adding the dissertations as publications, six more executives could be categorised as authors in 2009, bringing the tally to 8.6%: still a lot less than in 1976. Because of the large discrepancy between the two datasets, and the unknown proportion of this that can be attributed to coding decisions, this variable has been used as a supplementary variable in all of the analyses presented below.

[143] http://www.nyenrode.nl/About/Pages/Our-Philosophy.aspx.

[144] Of the 1976 CEOs, one foreign CEO attended a Dutch university, while four Dutch nationals attended a foreign university. In 2009, three Dutch CEOs completed their entire higher education abroad (two in France and one in Ireland), while no foreigners even attended a Dutch university.

[145] I thank Frithjof van der Heide for his valuable assistance in collecting the data for the 2009 CEOs.

[146] The amount of publications has been determined using the online catalogue of the Royal Dutch Library and Google books.

Career (Segments)

Directorships

The number of directorships is another well-known indicator of the business elite's social capital. It corresponds to the degree measure of the members of the networks of interlocking directorates discussed in Chapter 2. However, for the purposes of this chapter, independent directorships of smaller companies (not being subsidiaries of the company the CEO was in charge of) were included as well. Two variables were measured: the total number of directorships held before 1976/2009 and terminated before the acceptance of the CEO position (as *DirPre*), and the total number of directorates held in 1976/2009 (as *DirOn*). The latter variable was included as a supplementary variable in the analysis. Comparison of the data for 1976 and 2009 confirms the pattern found in network studies of interlocks (see especially Heemskerk 2007 who constructed the 1976 network of interlocking directorates based on the same selection of companies as the ones used by Beekenkamp and Dronkers); CEOs in 2009 had less directorates than their counterparts in 1976.

Careers outside of business

In addition to the variable described above, two variables were devised to record career trajectories that included non-business organisations: one to indicate a political career (*PolCar*) and another to indicate a career in the (semi-)governmental sector (*GvtC*). Because of the low frequencies of the modality of *PolCar* indicating a political career, the two variables were merged for the comparative analysis.

Sector changes

Alongside variables of career length in the economic field and within the organisation, another variable was constructed. This recorded the number of changes in the sector of economic activity the individual was employed in before being made CEO, indicated by the main heading of the NACE coding system. Of the 1976 cohort, 51% had changed sectors 2 or more times. In 2009, only 25% of the CEOs had changed their careers this way 2 or more times, which would suggest that by this measure the degree of specialisation has increased over the past 30 years.

Other memberships

Three other supplementary variables were used to capture the social capital of the executives: membership of an employer's organisation (*EmplOn*), presence on a governmental advisory committee (*GvtAdvOn*) and affiliation with an academic or research institute (*AcRec*).

Career (general)

Career path

Two variables have been constructed specifically to measure the career path of the CEOs. The first of these (*CEO3*) recorded the number of years (measured from the start of the career) it took before the position of CEO was held for the first time. The second (*CEO4*) measured the number of years the individual spent their most recent company before the CEO position was reached. This can be viewed as an indicator of organisational capital that executives accumulate as they spend time in a firm.

	Careers (1976)		**Careers (2009)**	
	Number of years before first CEO position (*CEO3*)	**Number of years in company before CEO position (*CEO4*)**	**Number of years before first CEO position (*CEO3*)**	**Number of years in company before CEO position (*CEO4*)**
Non-missing cases	211	196	131	132
Mean	20.06 years	12.39 years	22.14 years	10.01 years
Median	21 years	11 years	22 years	7 years
Minimum	0 years	0 years	0 years	0 years
Maximum	49 years	43 years	41 years	36 years
Standard Deviation	9.51	10.41	7.71	10.27

Comparing the two periods, it seems that the overall duration of the time before the first CEO position is obtained has not changed dramatically. The mean value for the 2009 cohort is approximately 22 years, 2 more than in 1976; then, just as in 2009, it took on average roughly 20 years to reach the top. The difference in the amount of time future CEOs spent in the company that they ended up leading does seem more pronounced. This seems to reflect a higher number of CEOs who start as 'hired hands', entering into the company from outside at a later point in their career. For 40 CEOs (30.3% of the non-missing cases) in the 2009 group, it was the case that their first job with the company was in fact that of CEO. This compares to only 26 individuals (13.3% of the non-missing cases) in the 1976 cohort.

Moreover, when comparing the two groups on the *CEO3* variable, it is the case that for a larger number of the 1976 CEOs, the position was actually their first or almost their first job (13 people obtained their first CEO position within 3 years, being 6.2% of the non-missing cases) than for the 2009 group (only 2 individuals reached the CEO position within 3 years). This result can probably be attributed partly to the much larger 1976 sample, which included more small-sized family and owner CEO firms. But it may also capture the tendency of CEOs of family firms and as well as those that founded their own company to first spend a portion of

their career outside the confinements of these businesses. The data provide support for this trend; while in 1976 43 (out of 44) CEOs that headed firms that they or their family owned spent all of their career in those firms, in 2009 only 7 out of 12 did. This would suggest that a socialisation in the economic field via experience in other organisations has become more valuable, or at least, career paths in family firms have become less self-sufficient than previously.

Symbolic Capital

Finally, two variables were constructed to capture symbolic capital in the form of a decoration from the Dutch state (*Decor*) or a state other than the Netherlands (*ForeignDec*). These two variables were designated as supplementary variables in the analysis.

4.1.2 Conclusion of descriptive analysis

Summarising the comparisons presented above, the CEOs in both groups appear to be, firstly, a demographically homogeneous group. They are almost exclusively men, predominantly in their fifties with the vast majority of them holding Dutch nationality. Compared to 1976, some degree of internationalisation had occurred in 2009; the share of Dutch nationals declined from close to 92% to almost 81%. This decline, however, is far less than what would be expected given the discourse on internationalisation. Moreover, the internationalisation observed here is mostly Europeanisation instead of true globalisation.

The large percentage of Dutch CEOs also seems to contradict the popular perception of an international market for top management talent. This perception, which comes up frequently as a rationalisation for large salaries and compensation packages for CEOs, certainly cannot be supported by the data presented here. If the market for management talent were truly global, surely one would observe a much larger percentage of non-Dutch CEOs heading Dutch companies in the 2009 selection. The alternative is being forced to accept the notion that the compensation levels are set just high enough to stop the vast majority of Dutch talent from seeking a top position abroad, but low enough to avoid a large influx of foreign nationals. A more reasonable conclusion seems to be that the national economic field of power is still a more attractive context for the actualisation of accumulated capital than are fields in other national contexts.[147] It does, however, seem true that this market has become less static: the percentage of CEOs who were hired from outside the company straight into the top position doubled over the period under consideration.

Another important conclusion pertains to the education of the business elite. Far fewer CEOs had reached the top without a degree in higher education in 2009 than in 1976. Then, just

[147] It is, however, most likely true that the international focus of various aspects of doing business has indeed increased. For example, a significant portion of the CEOs spent some time abroad during their career. Because this variable was not recorded in 1976, no comparison can be made; however, the fact that at that time it was not deemed worthwhile or feasible to document this aspect of the career trajectory may indicate the relative unimportance of this aspect of business.

in 2009, for foreign CEOs an academic degree certainly seems to be imperative. Only one foreign national in 1976 had not attended university, while all foreigners in 2009 held an academic degree (which for 58% of them meant a degree in economics or a related discipline). Overall, there were relatively more economists and engineers holding top executive positions in 2009 than in 1976, while the importance of a law degree declined from 1976 until 2009. This can be explained by the declining need for generalists in the board of directors (or those with a 'form-orientated' education as Beekenkamp and Dronkers maintain), but it can also point more specifically to the increased international focus of the business world. It stands to reason that law, which generally is one of the most nationally orientated academic disciplines would lose to other disciplines that translate better (or at least are perceived as such) across national borders. Meanwhile, other indicators of educational strategies (such as the choice of secondary school types and fraternity membership) seem to have remained stable over the 33 year time period.

Finally, the last conclusion also seems to hold for the itinerary of the route to the top, at least as far as its duration is concerned. However, in the 2009 cohort there seems to be less emphasis on organisational capital as a way to gain access to a company's upper echelons. On average, the CEOs spent less time in other positions of the company they eventually came to lead.

5 GEOMETRIC ANALYSIS

In this section, the data of Beekenkamp and Dronkers will be used to perform a new analysis for the 1976 CEOs employing recent insights from GDA. In doing this, the effect of using another method of data analysis can be assessed by comparing the interpretations of the original authors with my own. Although the basic approach to data analysis of the PRINCALS method is similar to that of MCA, recent developments in GDA have increased the realm of interpretative techniques applicable to MCA (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004; 2010). Furthermore, the results of the MCA for the 1976 data can be compared to the results obtained for 2009 by integrating both data sets in the same analysis. This way, structural changes in the economic field of power can be studied using the same method of data analysis.

Additionally, I will use the method of MCA much more explicitly than Beekenkamp and Dronkers have done in their PRINCALS analysis as a way to model the economic field of power. So, instead of constructing different spaces per 'theme', the analysis in this chapter will focus on an integrated analysis of the data. As indicated, Beekenkamp and Dronkers were primarily interested in the role of education in elite reproduction (as were Bourdieu and Saint Martin in their original analysis), whereas the analysis in this chapter follows the contributions mentioned in the introduction in attempting to unravel the structural oppositions in the field as a research goal in itself.

5.1 The field of 1976

The field of the business elite can be viewed, to a large degree, as the space of the different trajectories travelled in order to access the top of the largest firms in the economic field at a given point in time. It reflects the historic career trajectory and socialisation in educational institutions and the family, as well as institutions related to the educational field such as fraternities and universities. In order to model the career space for the Dutch business elite of 1976, a specific MCA was performed on the data contained in the Beekenkamp database on the 249 CEOs using the variables described above and translated into the measures represented in the table below. In this way, the individuals were measured using 21 variables with a total of 62 modalities. Of these 21 variables, 14 were used as active variables, i.e., used to construct the space of the Dutch business elite. The remaining 7 variables were maintained as supplementary variables in order to be used as structuring factors that provide additional insight for the analysis of the results achieved by the active modalities.

The MCA analyses in this chapter were done in R, using the combined FactoMineR and GDAtools packages developed at the University of Rennes 2 (Lê, Josse and Husson 2008), and the SPAD statistical package. These packages allow for a geometrical interpretation of the MCA results that are in line with the approach proposed by Le Roux and Rouanet (2004, 2010) (see also Escofier and Pagès (2008) and Husson, Lê and Pagès (2009)). Some additional analysis was done using the CA package (Nenadic and Greenacre 2007) and the SOC.CA package (Larsen, Ellersgaard and Andrade 2014).

5.2 Results

The first four dimensions explain 27.7% of the total variance; this amounts to 73% of the adjusted variance. The scree plot reveals a relatively sharp drop in the adjusted variance explained after the fourth dimension, a reason to limit the interpretation to the first four axes (the scree plot of the first seven dimensions is shown below). The plane that is formed by the first two axes is depicted in Figure 5.1a, while the plane formed by axes two and three can be seen in Figure 5.1b below.

Scree plot: SpMCA, 1976 data

1. *31.8%* **********

2. *18.4%* *********

3. *12.9%* ******

4. *9.9%* *****

5. *5.1%* **

6. *4.6%* **

7. *3.3%* **

The interpretation of the axes follows the guidelines set out by Le Roux and Rouanet (2004) and Le Roux and Rouanet (2010). Specifically, after the decision is made on the number of axes to be interpreted, the individual axes are described using the modalities that have an above average contribution to the axis. These contributions have also been used to calculate the contribution achieved by the opposing ends of a 'question' (i.e., theme or form of capital) in the context of the aggregate contribution of the question to which these modalities belong (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 51–52). If needed, additional modalities of a question are added to get to a balanced interpretation. Finally, the calculated correlations and squared cosine values of the modalities have been used as measures to assess the quality of description of modalities by the axes (Husson *et al*. 2009).




Figure 1a: Plane of axes 1 and 2, 1976. Only the modalities with an above average contribution are shown.



Figure 1b: Plane of axes 3 and 4. All active modalities are shown.

Interpretation of the first axis

The modalities that contribute above the average to the negative side of the first axis are a degree in law, study at a traditional university, membership of a fraternity, secondary education at a *Gymnasium*, a PhD/authorship, a governmental career, Protestantism , the longest career path, having worked in two different sectors of business before the current sector, belonging to the oldest cohort, a father employed in professions, having 3 or 4 children and coming from a

Patriciaat/noble background. On the opposing side are the modalities of no higher education, not having attended university, no authorship, belonging to the youngest cohort and only one other sector of employment before the current one (see Figure 1a). The items related to the pre-conceptualised groupings of educational and academic/intellectual capital clearly contribute most to this axis, with 28.3% and 29.1%, respectively, of the total variance along this axis. The contribution of the main deviation between the most important components contained in these two groupings relative to the total for that grouping stand at 85.2% and 84.0%, respectively (see Table 2). Looking at the deviation per item, the *Education* variable contributes almost 15% to the total variance along the axis, with the opposition between law and no higher education accounting for almost 95% of this contribution. In addition, *University* contributes 13.7%, and the opposition between no university and the classical universities accounting for 89.8% of this contribution.

The first dimension can therefore be interpreted in terms of an opposition between individuals (on the negative side of the axis) with high amounts of educational and/or intellectual capital, that are, moreover, in both a cultural and symbolic sense materialised in the more traditional or classical forms (a law degree and *Gymnasium* education), and individuals who do not possess significant amounts of this form of capital. The first group typically consists of CEOs who attended a classical university, studied law, were members of a fraternity, came from a family relatively rich in cultural capital (as measured by the father's occupation) and had links to the *patriciaat* or nobility. The second group has not completed any higher education and therefore does not possess educational or intellectual capital in any of the senses mentioned above. The members of the first group also include the oldest CEOs with career paths partially located outside of the economic field (i.e. the (semi) governmental sector), while, in contrast, the second group contains the youngest CEOs with careers involving none or only one change of sector. They can be seen as self-made men that predominantly depended on one form of (economic) capital and a notion of entrepreneurship that is opposed to the more institutionalised forms of capital on which the members of the first group have relied. This adds substance to the interpretation in terms of components of cultural capital, with the first group possessing a less strictly economically grounded power base in comparison to the second group.

	Left	Right	Coordinate	Frequency	Contribution of deviation (to theme/capital total)
Educational cultural capital					24.12 (85.23%)
No higher education		7.5	1.05	58	
Law degree	6.7		-1.14	43	
Gymnasium	5.6		-1.02	45	
PhD	5.4		-1.58	18	
No gymnasium or HBS		1.4	0.61	31	
Academic cultural capital					24.46 (84.04%)
No university		6.8	0.83	83	
No authorship		2.4	0.34	175	
Authorship	5.8		-0.81	74	
Fraternity membership	5.9		-0.96	54	
Classical university	5.9		-0.97	53	

Table 2: The contribution of the main deviation between the most important components contained in the capital groupings relative to the total for that grouping along axis 1.

Interpretation of the second axis

The second dimension reveals an interesting opposition between, on the one hand (Right), the technically-educated CEOs, a non-*Gymnasium* secondary school education, the longest career path, a Protestant religion, those originating from an entrepreneurial or working class home, a previous career in the government sector, authorship, the oldest CEOs and the largest amount of sector changes, and on the other hand (Left), those with the two most traditional forms of educational capital that were identified within the first dimension: a law degree and a *Gymnasium* secondary school, as well as study at one of the classical universities. The other modalities that contribute most to this pole are a top manager father, the fastest career path, fraternity membership, a Catholic religion, belonging to the *patriciaat*/nobility, study at a faith-based university, being born in a large town and the smallest number of sector changes. The variables contributing most are (in descending order) *Secondary School*, *Education*, *University* and *Father's Occupation*. Especially within *Secondary School* the opposition is stark: all three active modalities have an above average contribution to the axis, and *Gymnasium* is clearly separated from the other two (the deviation between the *Gymnasium* modality and the

barycentre of the two other modalities is 1.82 along this axis). Likewise, the main opposition within *Education* now is between a technical/sciences education and a law degree, with the deviation between them capturing almost 92% of the contribution of this variable.

When the groupings of the variables are analysed, the groupings of educational cultural capital (31.0%) and inherited cultural capital (24.1%) contribute most to the second axis. As expected, within educational cultural capital, the opposition is almost exclusively between Gymnasium secondary schooling/ law degree on one side and other forms of secondary schooling/technical education on the other side (accounting for more than 97% of the contribution of this grouping; see Table 3). Within inherited cultural capital, the opposing modalities depicted in Table 2 hint at an opposition between an economic elite background and a family less entrenched in the economic field. Especially within the *Father's Occupation* variable this opposition is clear: the deviation between the working class and small business backgrounds on the one hand and the top management background on the other accounts for 99.65% of the contribution to the variable of the axis.

This axis can thus be interpreted as an opposition between a more meritocratic personal form of capital that is based on specific, substance-based knowledge (e.g. engineering sciences), and an orientation that is based on the more 'reproduction-prone' traditional elite forms of cultural and economic capital. The notion that the second dimension captures different amounts of economic capital within the social milieu in which the individuals were brought up is corroborated when the supplementary variable that indicates whether the firm of which the individual is CEO is a firm owned by his family is used as a structuring variable. The concentration ellipses drawn around the individuals in the two groups indicate that the midpoint of the CEOs in the 'family group' is located further to the positive axis on the first and more to the negative on the second dimension than the 'non-family' group (see Figure 2).

	Left	Right	Coordinate	Frequency	Contribution of deviation (to theme/capital total)
Educational cultural capital					30.08 (97.02%)
HBS secondary school		4.9	0.58	98	
Technical education		3.9	0.79	43	
Gymnasium	9.1		-1.18	45	
Law degree	9.0		-1.2	43	
No gymnasium or HBS		3.0	-1.18	31	
Inherited cultural capital					20.69 (85.86%)
Father small business owner		4.8	0.76	58	
Father working class		1.8	1.03	12	
Protestant		3.0	0.51	80	
Father top manager	5.3		-0.80	57	
Born in large town	3.1		-0.53	74	
Patriciaat/nobility	1.8		-0.87	16	
Catholic	1.8		-0.51	49	

Table 3: The contribution of the main deviation between the most important components contained in the capital groupings relative to the total for that grouping along axis 2.




Figure 2: Concentration ellipses of the 1976 CEOs of family firms (1) and non-family firms (0) in the plane of axes 1 and 2.

Interpretation of the third axis

The third dimension is tilted heavily towards the positive side of the axis (contributions are distributed 61/39 along the axis; see Figure 1b). This positive side is dominated by technical education/university, HBS secondary education, the second fastest career trajectory and having 3–4 children. On the negative side the modalities of no higher education/no university, the longest career patterns, the oldest CEOs and no *Gymnasium*/HBS secondary education are located with an above average contribution. Apart from the second dimension, the contribution of the general career grouping is highest on this dimension (15.3%). Overall, the dimension opposes the most practical, technically-specialised and 'intensive' educational and career orientations and the other, more 'extensive' (in competences, duration and number of sector changes) career alignments. This interpretation also follows from the structuring of the *Sector Changes* variable along this axis; this ordinal variable is ordered along the axis in the cloud of individuals, with the modality having the smallest number of changes on the positive side (Figure 3a). The third dimension is also related to age; the birth cohorts follow the axis from right to left in ascending order (Figure 3b).

Interpretation of the fourth axis

On the positive side of this axis a Catholic family situation, an education orientated towards economics, study at a faith-based university and the University of Rotterdam (as a secular university with an emphasis on economic disciplines) go together with a political career, the largest number of sector changes and having 5 or more children. On the negative side – a law degree, no higher education or a study at one of the classical universities are accompanied by belonging to the *patriciaat*/nobility, the oldest cohort, being born in the *Randstad*, no HBS/Gymnasium secondary education, the second categories of children and sector changes and a long stay in the company that the CEO in question was working for in 1976. The dimension appears to oppose newer, 'alternative' career patterns to the more traditional career patterns that are based on (family) economic capital and cultural capital based on individually orientated convictions (e.g., Protestantism and humanism) to the route that leads members of the Catholic pillar through the secular or faith-based universities. This last trajectory can be summed up as an avoidance of the trajectory that includes traditional disciplines (like law) and associated universities, into the then somewhat newer and emerging disciplines of economics and related subjects. However, apart from this religion-based interpretation, it is quite possible that this is a more straightforward opposition between the South of the country (predominantly Catholic) and the West and the North (mainly Protestant). This interpretation is supported by looking at the contributions and coordinates of the place of birth variable. The modality indicating the CEOs who were born in the three largest cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague is located at the negative side of the axis, while the main contributing modality on the positive side is that of being born in a large provincial town.

Interpretation of the fifth axis

On the final and last dimension to be interpreted we find on the positive side of the axis the modalities that are associated with a marked profile in the public/academic sphere, e.g., a political career, authorship of a book and a PhD. These are markers of a career pattern that is located partially outside the economic field. The negative side of the dimension can be associated with a less publically pronounced career: technical education, no authorship and a less prolonged career before obtaining the first CEO position. This reveals a career pattern much more focused on the economic field. The axis can thus be seen as capturing the border between the economic and (mainly) political field, where the faction of CEOs that enter the economic field with relatively large amounts of political capital can be found.

Additional structural analysis


The supplementary variables can be used to bring to the fore additional elements that structure the individuals in the career space modelled with the active variables. Concentration ellipses are a tool for such a structured data analysis. In the space of individuals they capture – for an approximately normally shaped cloud – close to 80% of the individuals described by the modality, and can be thought of as depicting the within-variance of a specified set of individuals

(Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 69–70). This way, the concentration ellipse, based on the supplementary modality that indicates whether or not an individual received a state sanctioned decoration (from the Dutch government), can be used to describe the sets of CEOs that did receive such a decoration in relation to those that did not (the individuals for whom the value of the variable is unknown can also be represented this way). The subcloud for the first group has a mean point somewhat more to the southeast in the plane with dimensions 2 and 3 (Figure 5). This supports the interpretation of these dimensions provided in the previous section.

When turning attention to the variables related to social capital, an interesting result occurs. Using, for instance, the number of directorates the individuals in the field held at the point of reference, there is no notable difference between the mean points of the subclouds indicating, respectively, zero, one, two or three directorates. This result holds for all the planes constructed using the first four dimensions. Merely the group holding three directorates (the maximum number of directorates in the total 1976 group) has a slightly more eccentric concentration ellipse in the plane of dimensions 2 and three (Figure 3), indicating a smaller amount of within-variance in this particular group in the selected plane.

The other supplementary variables that are associated with social capital reveal a similar pattern. The indicator for membership of a governmental advice committee, for example, also has a more extended and eccentric concentration ellipse along the plane of dimensions 2 and 3, with a mean point slightly more towards the northeast quadrant. In the plane of dimensions 3 and 4, the mean point of the subcloud containing the majority of the CEOs with a position on a government advisory committee again experiences a slight shift towards the northeast quadrant compared to the subcloud with the individuals without such a position (Figure 4a/4b). This supports the interpretation of the fourth dimension as a public-political dimension, but may not be expected given the interpretation of the third dimension. The movement along the third axis, however, is only very small.[148]

[148] A similar observation can be made for the variable indicating membership of an employers' organisation.






Figure 3a (top): Number of sector changes of individuals in 1976 in the plane of axes 3 and 4. 1=lowest amount of changes, 4=highest.
Figure 3b (bottom): Birth cohorts of individuals in 1976 in the plane of axes 3 and 4. 1=oldest cohort, 4=youngest cohort.




Figure 4a Subclouds of individuals based on membership of a governmental advisory committee in 1976 in the plane of axes 3 and 4.




Figure 4b Subcloud of individuals who were members of a governmental advisory committee in 1976 in the plane of axes 3 and 4.




Figure 5 Subclouds of individuals based on having received a decoration in or before 1976 in the plane of axes 2 and 3.

Field of 1976: Coda

One of the objectives of this paper was to compare the results from the specific MCA presented in paragraph 5.2 and the interpretation Beekenkamp and Dronkers gave to the results from their PRINCALS analysis. In general, the subspaces they found correspond broadly to the ones identified using MCA. Specifically, their first axis for the education theme (high vs. low levels of education) is reproduced on the first axis found using MCA, while the second axis within this theme (opposing 'substance' and 'form') can be traced on the second axis of the MCA (a further indication of this is that the economists can be found on the same side as the engineers, while the holders of a law degree are on the opposing side). The theme related to the social background of the CEOs was marked by an opposition between different volumes (large and small) and kinds of capital (cultural vs. economic). This structuring of the field is slightly more concealed in the MCA, although it can probably be most clearly seen on the second axis where economic and cultural capital were located on one side with more technical career patterns on the other.

Finally, the opposition between longer and shorter careers was clearly seen on the fourth axis of the MCA. It is also here that the advantages of this kind of analysis are most evident. Rather than positioning careers relative to each other based on other career variables, the present analysis allows us to link these patterns to the other variables that were assigned to different themes in the original analysis (in particular the ones indicating cultural/intellectual capital).

5.3 Analysing the differences between 1976 and 2009

In this section the CEOs of the 2009 cohort will be compared to the 1976 CEOs who were studied above. The CEOs from both years will be joined together in three different ways: first in a combined analysis in which the CEOs from both cohorts will be forming the space together (i.e. all as active individuals) (paragraph 5.3.1). The logic of Structured Data Analysis (SDA; see Le Roux and Rouanet 2004; 2010) will be used here to analyse the main differences between the cohorts in this field. Second, a Class Specific Analysis (CSA; see Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 64ff.) will be performed on the combined data (paragraph 5.3.2). In a CSA, the differences between a specific class of individuals (understood here as the 2009 cohort) can be examined in relation to the entire cloud of individuals (i.e. composed of all CEOs from both years) constructed through a (specific) MCA. In essence, a new analysis (including the computation of principal axes) is performed on the specified class of individuals with the purpose of highlighting the differences with the combined cloud. Third, the results of a clustering analysis will be used to interpret the main differences between the two cohorts (paragraph 5.3.3).

5.3.1 Structural analysis of the joint cloud

In this sub-section, the positions of the two cohorts of CEOs will be combined in a joint analysis. Here, the logic of the analysis is an experimental one that approaches the issue from a standpoint of unsupervised learning: is it possible to separate the two cohorts in the analysis if we introduce knowledge about the cohort to which each CEO belongs after the analysis? The construction of a joint cloud can thus be thought of as an experimental setup, intended to tease out the main structural differences between the two cohorts, which is better interpretable than comparing two separate spaces. Since the distances between individuals and variables in two different analyses cannot be compared directly, it makes sense to combine the two groups. However, it must be emphasised that this is not a proper field analysis; the individuals are not from the same field and therefore do not form a field as a meaningful social space.

In order to align the two cohorts for the analysis presented below, some compromises concerning the coding had to be made. Therefore, not all the variables collected for the 2009 group could be included in the joint analysis. Furthermore, since there are 249 individuals in the 1976 group and 133 individuals in the 2009 group, I decided to weigh the individuals in the latter group. This way, both cohorts get the same weight in the MCA solution. In the joint analysis, the first four dimensions explain 70.0% of the adjusted variance, and these were retained for analysis. They will be interpreted briefly below.

Scree plot, joint data

1. *35.4%* **********
2. *15.9%* ********
3. *10.7%* ******
4. *8.0%* ****

The interpretation of the first dimension is a familiar one. Just as in the 1976 and 2009 cases taken separately, the 'joint space' is structured along the first axis in terms of volume of cultural/educational capital, with a law degree, *Gymnasium* schooling, fraternity membership and a father who was occupied in one of the occupations relatively rich in cultural capital amongst the modalities that contribute most to this axis on the positive side, and No Higher Education and No Academic Degree on the negative side. The second axis is related to the opposition between the old (+) and the young (-). On the negative pole, the oldest CEOs can be found, along with the longest career trajectories and a technical education, while on the positive side the youngest CEOs, the fastest career patterns and an economics degree are located. As before, CEOs with Fathers who were small business owners appear on the negative side of the axis, while CEOs with Manager-Fathers are on the opposite side. This would indicate a more management career-orientated disposition on the '+' side of the dimension, which seems to be in line with the other modalities located at this pole.

The third dimension opposes more specialised career trajectories and broader, more general careers. The careers in the first group seem to be based mainly on an economics or technical degree and involve no sector changes (and, hence, also no careers outside of the economic field), while on the opposing side are careers in government and 2 or more sector changes. On that side we also find the longest paths to the top and the longest careers within the same company, although the latter modality does not make an above average contribution to the axis. The third dimension is therefore interpreted as an opposition between the 'specialists' with specialised forms of capital (+) and the 'generalists' with more diversified portfolios (-). The difference between those of Dutch and non-Dutch nationality is most pronounced on this axis, with those possessing a foreign nationality located more on the positive side. Finally the fourth dimension seems to differentiate between the more stable, or focused careers (-) and the diversified careers (+). On the positive side are 3 or more sector changes, a career in government, an economics degree and study at a new university, while on the negative side no sector changes, a technical or law education and the longest careers (both in terms of the time it took to get to the top and the career within the current company) can be found.

Since the interest in this paragraph predominantly lies with the differences between the two cohorts, some of the tools of SDA have been used to further investigate the cohorts. To calculate the differences between the mean points of the subclouds of the 1976 and 2009 cohorts, the calculated coordinates of the two modalities of the supplementary variable *Cohort* were used in the second transition formula (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 42). Table 4 shows the coordinates along the four axes selected for interpretation.

Cohort	Mean point coordinates			
	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4
1976	0.0599	0.0397	-0.1220	0.0689
2009	-0.0599	-0.0397	0.1220	-0.0689
Scaled deviation	0.268	0.203	-0.667	0.391

Table 4: Mean points and scaled deviations of the subclouds of the two cohorts along the first four axes. Joint analysis of all individuals.

The largest scaled deviations can be observed along axes 3 and 4, where the deviation along axis 3 can be classified as 'notable' (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 71). Figure 6 therefore shows the two concentration ellipses in the plane of axes 3 and 4.




Figure 6: Concentration ellipses of the 1976 and 2009 cohorts in the plane of axes 3 and 4. Joint analysis of all individuals.

Furthermore, although along all of the dimensions the cohorts exhibit a much larger within variance than between variance, the difference is smallest along dimensions 3 and 4. Consequently, the η^2 measure (the ratio of the between variance to the total variance of the cloud; see Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 22; 24) is largest on these two dimensions (at

respectively 0.174 and 0.057; see Table 5), indicating that the difference between the two subclouds is the most pronounced on these dimensions. In line with this result, the subcloud of 2009 CEOs can be regarded as 'atypical' of the overall cloud along dimensions 3 and 4 (the test statistic for the specificity test in this plane is significant at $\alpha = 0.01$, two-sided test).

	dimension 3	dimension 4
1976 cohort	0.065	0.079
2009 cohort	0.063	0.056
within variance	0.064	0.071
between variance	0.013	0.004
total variance	0.078	0.076
η^2	0.174	0.057

Table 5: Variances of the subclouds of the two cohorts along axes 3 and 4. Joint analysis of all individuals.

The oppositions along axes 3 and 4 in terms of the cohorts can then be summarised as follows. The 2009 CEOs are more concentrated in the 'specialised' quadrant, indicating that their careers on average have a more specialised character (in terms of, for example, fewer sector changes). They also are more concentrated along axis 4 towards the pole described by more stable, focused career patterns. With the knowledge of the position of the mean point for the 2009 cohort, it becomes clear that especially axis 3 sums up the main descriptive differences between the two cohorts: a general move towards less sector changes, an economics or technical degree and a study at a foreign university, and a move away from having no higher education, a career in government and a career with more frequent (2 or more) sector changes.

5.3.2 Class Specific Analysis

As was mentioned in the introduction to this section, in a CSA the specific characteristics of a subgroup of individuals can be studied in relation to the cloud consisting of all individuals. In this case, this means that the overall cloud is still constructed from the measures on the individuals from 1976 and 2009. Again, it must be emphasised that for this reason, the analysis presented here is not a study of a specific field. The measures for the CEOs are taken out of context in the sense that the distances constructed between them also involve individuals that do not share the same space with them. Rather, the construction of the overall cloud must be thought of as a model of the average of two cohorts, used to highlight the difference of one cohort from this average cloud.

The CSA was performed with the subcloud of the 2009 CEOs as the designated specific cloud. The first two specific axes created for this group explain 52.48% of the adjusted variance, and I will focus here on the interpretation of these two axes in order to find the most salient differences between the 2009 CEOs and the average cloud. The first specific axis shows the now familiar opposition according to the amounts of cultural capital of the CEOs. Its correlation with the first axis of the overall cloud is 75.23%, indicating a reasonably close overlap between

the axes. The second specific axis is more differentiated. Its highest correlation is with the third axis of the overall cloud (55.88%), which was interpreted as an opposition between specialised and broad career patterns. The most contributing modalities on the second specific axis are: No sector changes and Study at a foreign university. These results are in line with the conclusion from the previous section: the specific group of the 2009 CEOs in this analysis differs from their peers in 1976 mainly because of a higher degree of internationalisation and specialisation.

5.3.3 Cluster analysis

Finally, the structural differences between the two cohorts have been studied using the Ascending Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) algorithm in SPAD (version 8) to form clusters based on the distances between individuals in an MCA solution. The following procedure was used. First, a separate specific MCA was performed on the 2009 CEOs alone. This way, a proper model of the field in 2009 was constructed, with the positions of the individuals of the 2009 cohort based on the relative distances to each other. Using this MCA solution as a basis, an AHC clustering analysis was ran, restricting the solution to 4 clusters. Several active modalities were retained for the interpretation of the cluster, depending on 2 criteria: first, the difference between the percentage of cases that chose a particular modality, and the percentage of these cases of the total number of individuals had to exceed 0.05. Second, the typicality test had to result in a *p*-value ≤ 0.025 (Le Roux 2014: 337). The results are depicted in Table 6.

Cluster 1		**Cluster 2**	
Variable	**Characterising category**	**Variable**	**Characterising category**
Fraternity	Yes	University	Foreign university
Education	Law	Sector changes	3 or more
University	Faith-based university	Years until first CEO	17 – 28 years
University	New university		
University	Classical university		
Education	Economics		
Patriciaat/nobility	No		
Religion	Catholic		
Years until first CEO	7 – 16 years		
Previous directorates	2 or more		

Cluster 3		Cluster 4	
Variable	**Characterising category**	**Variable**	**Characterising category**
University	Technical university	University	No university
Education	Technical and natural sciences	Fraternity	No
Years until first CEO	29 – 49 years	Education	No higher education
Years in company until CEO	28 – 43 years	Patriciaat/nobility	No
Patriciaat/nobility	No	Place	Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague
Previous directorates	No previous directorates	Occupation father	Manual labour

Table 6: Overrepresented modalities used for the interpretation of the 4 clusters in the field of the 2009 CEOs.

The first cluster can be characterised as an academic and educational capital cluster. Individuals who had a relatively fast career and more than 2 previous directorates are overrepresented in the cluster. Looking at the supplementary variables it is notable that all individuals assigned to this cluster are Dutch, so I have called this cluster 'Dutch academic/educational capital'. Almost all foreign CEOs, on the other hand, are contained in the second cluster. The group with the largest number of sector changes is overrepresented in this cluster, as well as a relatively long career path and not being on the board of an employer's organisation (a supplementary variable). I have designated this cluster 'international capital'. The third cluster is labelled 'technical capital', since the categories of technically-educated CEOs with long career trajectories (both in the company they were CEO of and overall) were overrepresented. The categories of no patriciaat/nobility and no previous directorates were overrepresented as well. Finally, cluster 4 is a 'practical' cluster; having no higher or academic education are overrepresented, as well as being born in one of the three largest cities and having a father with a blue collar employment.

Together, the 4 clusters provide insight into the distances between individuals in the 2009 field. As a next step, for each individual I recorded the assigned cluster value. This yields a categorical variable 'cluster 2009' with 4 modalities. This variable was used in the joint analysis as a supplementary variable in order to use information on the distance between the 2009 CEOs for the joint analysis. Since the 1976 CEOs were not assigned to any cluster, they were all assigned the value of '0' for the cluster variable (extending the number of modalities to 5). This

way, the zero modality of this variable corresponds to the value of '1976' for the cohort variable defined earlier. Meanwhile, for the 2009 CEOs the cluster variable can be thought of as a more detailed look into the 2009 cohort, using information about the structuring of the 2009 field. The result for the plane of axes 3 and 4 can be seen in Figure 7.




Figure 7: Concentration ellipses of the 1976 and 2009 cohorts with the cluster assignments in the plane of axes 3 and 4. Joint analysis of all individuals.

As can be seen, the CEOs that are farthest to the right on axis 3 are those that were assigned to the 'international capital' cluster. They are also the furthest away from the 1976 cohort mean point on the axis. In contrast, the 'entrepreneurial capital' cluster is closest to the 1976 cohort on the axis, suggesting that they are the most similar to their 1976 counterparts along this dimension of all the 2009 CEOs. On axis 4, especially the 'technical capital' cluster seems to be related to the more stable career patterns, while the mean points of the clusters of 'Dutch academic and educational capital' and 'international capital' are closer to the mean point of the 1976 cohort. Based on this analysis, I conclude that the tendency of the 2009 CEOs towards more stable, focused career patterns mainly comes from the group relying more on technical capital, while the members of the 'international capital' cluster pull the entire group upwards along axis 4 (towards a more diversified career pattern).

6 Conclusion

In this paper, the field of the 1976 CEOs in the Netherlands was analysed using the general methodology of GDA and the method of MCA in particular. The results indicate that the field was structured along a primary opposition between CEOs with strongly institutionalised forms of cultural and educational capital, and CEOs relying more on economic capital and practices related to it (such as entrepreneurship and experience in a certain line of business). The second axis clusters these two opposing groups together in a differentiation to individuals with more technocratic capital, while the third axis opposes more specialised to broader career patterns. The fourth dimension captures a religious/regional opposition, while the fifth axis relates to the connection of the economic field to the political field.

In connection to the historical basis of the Dutch NBS, a few things are notable when examining these relational structures. Although there is a religious/regional opposition along the fourth axis that can be connected to the pillarisation of Dutch society, it is clearly not the most important structuring the field. The main opposition exists between the institutionalised forms of capital and the more entrepreneurial ones, referring to a difference between an established elite that derives its position from state sanctioned capital (e.g. in the form of higher education) and its closeness to the state sector as exemplified by, for example, a law degree and a political career, and a more 'self-made' elite that is much less related to the state. Second, the interpretation of the second axis reveals the particular status of a technical/engineering knowledge base as opposed to other forms of expertise. This is an often overlooked aspect of the Dutch economy: the existence of a large base of engineering proficiency that is also relevant for the structuring of the economic field of power.

In comparison to the separate PRINCALS analysis employed by Beekenkamp and Dronkers, an MCA allows for a richer topological interpretation of the main oppositions between the individuals in the selection by taking into account the relational structure between the different components of the forms of capital. Rather than splitting up the analysis in different themes, the interaction between these variables can now be taken into account to interpret the geometrical solution. For example, instead of the separation of the dimensions of volumes of economic and cultural capital, and high versus low education, they can now observed to be combined on the first axis of the MCA.

In comparing the changes that have occurred between 1976 and 2009, a combined analysis showed that the main variables separating the two cohorts relate to the degree of career specialisation and career focus, and a higher degree of internationalisation. However, the comparison between two fields and the assessment of the structural changes that exist between them remains somewhat problematic. Although it can be argued that the two cohorts are in some way homologous – as they both contain the profiles of the CEOs of Dutch firms to measure the economic field of power in the Netherlands, albeit at two different points in time – they are not in fact part of the same field. Although distances within the joint space can be compared, it is more problematic to say the same for the modalities chosen by the individuals:

an economics degree in the context of the field in 2009 is different from the 'same' degree in the context of 1976. I have tried to compensate partly for this by using the technique of clustering analysis, but clearly more work is needed to come to a better understanding of the main structural changes in the fields of the business elite.

REFERENCES

Albert, M., 1993, *Capitalism Against Capitalism*, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.

Beekenkamp, G., and J. Dronkers, 2002, *President-directeuren, Posities en Patronen. Een Studie Naar de Rekrutering van de Leiders van de 250 Grootste Ondernemingen in Nederland*, Edited by J. Dronkers & T. Dronkers-Vlaming, Amsterdam: Askant.

Beernink, M., and R. Parker Brady, 2012, *Mijn Naam is Karel van Eerd en ik bewijs dat het wél kan - De visie van de Oprichter van Jumbo Supermarkten*, Doetinchem: Het Boekenschap.

Bernhard, S., and C. Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2012, 'Feldanalyse als Forschungsprogramm', in Bernhard, S., and C. Schmidt-Wellenburg (eds.), 2012, *Feldanalyse als Forschungsprogramm 1: Der Programmatische Kern*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Bezemer, P., S. Peij, G. Maassen and H. Van Halder, 2012, 'The changing role of the supervisory board chairman: the case of the Netherlands (1997–2007)' *Journal of Management & Governance* 16(1), pp. 37–55.

Bourdieu, P., [1979] 1984, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P., [1989] 1996, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P., 1986, 'The forms of capital' Bourdieu, in Richardson, J. (ed.), 1986, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, Westport: Greenwood.

Bourdieu, P., 1988, *Homo Academicus*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P., 2005, *The Social Structures of the Economy*, Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P., and M. Saint Martin, 1978, 'Le patronat', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 20(1), pp. 3–82.

Bourdieu, P., J. Chamboredon and J. Passeron, [1968] 1991, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries*, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Bühlmann, F., T. David, and A. Mach, 2012, 'The Swiss business elite (1980–2000): How the changing composition of the elite explains the decline of the Swiss company network', *Economy and Society* 41(2), pp. 199–226.

Bühlmann, F., T. David, A. Mach, 2013, 'Cosmopolitan Capital and the internationalization of the field of business elites: Evidence from the Swiss case', *Cultural Sociology* 7(2), pp. 211-229.

Chandler, A., 1977, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Industry*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Davis, G., and C. Marquis, 2005, 'Prospects for organization theory in the early twenty-first century: Institutional fields and mechanisms', *Organization Science* 16(4), pp. 332-343.

De Goey, F., and B. Wubs, 2006, 'US multinationals in the Netherlands in the 20th century: The open gate to Europe', Helsinki Congress of the International Economic History Association.

Dronkers, J., 1983, 'Mythen over elites. De rol van het onderwijs bij de recrutering van directeuren van grote bedrijven', *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 9, pp. 606-646.

Dronkers, J., and S. Hillege, 1997, 'Studentenverenigingen en de toegang tot de Nederlandse elites tussen 1960 en 1980', *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 24, pp. 253-276.

Economist (the), 2014, 'Inequality in the Netherlands: A capital issue', June 28, 2014.

Ellersgaard, C., A. Larsen, and M. Munk, 2013, 'A very economic elite: The case of the Danish top CEOs', *Sociology* 47(6), pp. 1051–1071.

Escofier, B., and J. Pagès, 2008, *Analyse Factorielles Simples et Multiples*, 4th edition, Paris: Dunod.

Fennema, M., and H. Schijf, 1979, 'Analysing interlocking directorates: theory and methods', *Social Networks* 1(4), pp. 297–332.

Fligstein, N., 1990, *The Transformation of Corporate Control*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fligstein, N., 1996, 'Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to markets, *American Sociological Review* 61, pp. 656–673.

Fligstein, N., 2001, *The Architecture of Markets*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

François, P. and C. Lemercier, 2014, 'The interplay between the social space of firmsand that of directors in French capitalism', paper presented at the workshop understanding the transformation of economic elites in Europe, Lausanne, 18–20 June 2014.

Granovetter, M., 1985, 'Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddednes', *American Journal of Sociology* 91(3), pp. 481–510.

Hall, P., and D. Soskice, 2001, *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hartmann, M., 2007, *Eliten und Macht in Europa – Ein Internationaler Vergleich*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.

Hartmann, M., 2010, 'Achievement or origin: Social background and ascent to top management, *Talent Development & Excellence* 2(1), pp. 105–117.

Heemskerk, E., 2007, *The Decline of the Corporate Community*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam.

Helmers, M., R. Mokken, R. Plijter and F. Stokman, 1975, *Graven naar Macht: Op Zoek naar de Kern van de Nederlandse Economie*, Amsterdam: Van Gennep.

Heilbron, J., and S. Quak, 2012, 'The Decrease and Polarisation of Corporate Social Responsibility', in Van der Veen, R., M. Yerkes and P. Achterberg (eds.), 2011, *The Transformation of Solidarity: Changing Risks and the Future of the Welfare State*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Hill, S., 1995, 'The social organization of boards of directors', *British Journal of Sociology* 46(2), pp. 245–278.

Hjellbrekke, J., B. Le Roux, O. Korsnes, F. Lebaron, L. Rosenlund, and H. Rouanet, 2007, 'The Norwegian field of power anno 2000', *European Societies* 9(2), pp. 245–273.

Husson, F., S. Lé and J. Pages, 2009, *Analyse des Données avec R*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Katzenstein, P., 1985, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Larsen, A., C. Ellersgaard and S. Andrade, 2014, 'soc.ca: Specific Correspondence Analysis for the Social Sciences', Cran-R.

Lê, S., J. Josse and F. Husson, 2008, 'FactoMineR: An R Package for Multivariate Analysis', Cran-R.

Le Roux, B., 2014, *Analyse Géometrique des Données Multidimensionelles*, Paris: Dunod.

Le Roux, B., and H. Rouanet, 2004, *Geometric Data Analysis – From Correspondence Analysis to Structured Data Analysis*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic publishers.

Le Roux, B., and H. Rouanet, 2010, *Multiple Correspondence Analysis*, Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Lebaron, F., and P. Bonnet, 2014, 'Classifications, social classes and cultural practices: A GDA approach through Bourdieu's sociology of culture', in Grenfell, M., and F. Lebaron (eds.), 2014, *Bourdieu and Data Analysis – Methodological Principles and Practice*, Bern: Peter Lang.

Lijphart, A., 1968, *The Politics of Accommodation*, Berkley: University of California Press.

Mach, A., T. David and F. Bühlmann 2011, 'La fragilité des liens nationaux : La reconfiguration de l'élite du pouvoir en Suisse, 1980–2010', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 190, pp. 78–107.

Maclean, M., C. Harvey, and R. Chia, 2010, 'Dominant corporate agents and the power elite in France and Britain', *Organization Studies* 31(3), pp. 327–348.

Mizruchi, M., 2013, *The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nenadic, O., and M. Greenacre, 2007, 'Correspondence Analysis in R, with Two- and Three-dimensional Graphics: The ca Package', Cran-R.

Palan, R., R. Murphy and C. Chavagneux, 2010, *Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Quak, S., 2012, *Transnational Firms and Their Corporate Labor Policy: Case Studies in Philips and ING in the Netherlands and the United States, 1980–2010*, PhD Thesis, Rotterdam.

Sluyterman, K., 2003, *Kerende Kansen: het Nederlandse Bedrijfsleven in de Twintigste Eeuw*, Amsterdam: Boom.

Sluyterman, K., and B. Wubs, 2009, *Over Grenzen: Multinationals en de Nederlandse Markteconomie*, Amsterdam: Boom.

Steier, L., and R. Morck, 2005, 'The global history of corporate governance: an introduction', *NBER Working Paper* 11062.

Stokman, F., F. Wasseur and D. Elsas, 1985, 'The Dutch network: Types of interlocks and network structure', in Stokman, F., R. Ziegler and J. Scott (eds.), 1985, *Networks of Corporate Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Morgan, G., 2007, 'National business systems research: Progress and prospects', *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 23(2), pp. 127–145.

Van Bottenburg, M., H. Israëls, J. Mooij, and J. Gerritsen, 1995, *Aan den arbeid! In de wandelgangen van de Stichting van de Arbeid 1945–1995*, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.

Van Zanden. J.L., 1997, *Een Klein land in de Twintigste Eeuw: Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland 1914–1995*, Utrecht: Spectrum.

Van Zanden, J.L., and R. Griffiths, 1989, *Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw*, Utrecht: Spectrum.

Westerhuis, G., 2008, *Conquering the American Market: ABN AMRO, Rabobank and Nationale-Nederlanden Working in a Different Business Environment 1965 – 2005*, Amsterdam: Boom.

Whitley, R., 1999, *Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whittington, R., and M. Mayer, 2000, *The European Corporation: Strategy, Structure, and Social Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilkins, M., 2005, 'Dutch multinational enterprises in the United States: A historical summary', *Business History Review* 79(2), pp. 193–273.

Windolf, P., 2002, *Corporate networks in Europe and the United States*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wubs, B., 2012, 'A Dutch multinational's miracle in post-war Germany', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte/ Economic History Yearbook* 53(1), pp. 15–41.

Zukin, S., and P. DiMaggio, 1990, 'Introduction', in Zukin, S. and P. DiMaggio (eds.), 1990, *Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

International dimensions of political position-takings among Swedish upper secondary students. Education, social class and place.[149]

YLVA BERGSTRÖM, SEC, Uppsala University

INTRODUCTION

> **Q**: Is there any political issue that you find important today?
>
> **A**: We must speak up when it comes to human rights, when human rights are violated. We, and then I mean Swedish authorities, become very cautious when it comes to trade agreements with China for one example. The Olympics in China is a good illustration; human rights, sports ethics, the Olympic money-industry was debated quite a lot and criticized, and I mean China is a world champion when it comes to violating human rights, people are executed for opposing opinions. So before the Olympic Games there was a huge debate. It is not possible not to have or, I mean like, give up business relations with China but we must consider human rights in our trade agreement. I'm a member of Amnesty and I've learned a lot about trade agreements and its ethical dimensions. One of the main projects that we are involved in is to put pressure on the US government to close Guantanamo. At school we've also discussed the deportation of El Zari and Agiza and it's a story that is agonizing. Swedish international relations are important, and Swedish authorities should do better, I mean, I do mean it's disappointing to learn about the critique that has been directed against Sweden from the 'international community'; for the deportation and the way the deportation was carried out, the way these men were treated and so forth. (Male upper secondary student, science program)

*

> **Q**: Is there any political issue that you find important today?
>
> **A**: I'm not interested in politics and I am actually totally uninvolved. I wouldn't want to join and participate in a political party or anything like that. You get upset about a lot of things… things that make me angry. But that's not the same as getting involved…" (Female upper secondary student, child care program).
>
> **Q**: What upsets you?
>
> **A**: Violence and things like that, destructiveness, affect me a lot…no one seems to do anything about it. Of course I see the environmental issues, which are always a topic of discussion. Of course it's important, but what can you do? I just don't know what to do about it. Some people say we need to change our lifestyles, but I for one can't

[149] This paper is a revision of three previously published articles: Bergström & Dalberg 2013 and 2014, Bergström 2013. The aim here has been to pay specific attention to the internationally oriented clusters of position-takings.

> save the climate: maybe if I had more knowledge, if I was better informed. (Female student, upper secondary school, child care program).

The above questions were asked in interviews with third-year upper secondary students as part of a survey on political opinions conducted in the university town of Uppsala and the rural mining district of Bergslagen in 2008-2009.[150] The quoted responses illustrate a wide difference in regards to the probability of declaring an interest in politics and speaking out politically – that is, of having an opinion about politics. The quotations not only, or primarily, reveal a difference in which an interest in politics is opposed to a lack of interest or indifference but commitment is also opposed to non-commitment. While the quotations illustrate a difference when it comes to verbosity and language skills, the related statements also reveal a difference in the trust or confidence the respondents' have in their own ability to imagine the political and deal with political issues: to speak and judge politically. In the second quotation, political issues seem out of reach in one way or another. While the first quotation indicates, from the very first sentence, that politics are of great concern to the respondent. The respondent speaks as though he not only has a good grasp of politics but that he knows and understands political issues. He is speaking as someone who is not only confident in his own ability, but also as someone who can allow himself to evaluate Swedish foreign policy or international relations: "Swedish international relations are important, and Swedish authorities should do better, I mean, I do mean it's disappointing to learn about the critique that has been directed against Sweden from the 'international community'".

Not least, the quotations may be considered the expressions of political approaches from different educational positions. The first quotation was expressed by a male student in a university-preparatory science program, and the second by a female student in a vocational program, both in Swedish upper secondary schools. How can such differences be understood? To whom does politics seem to be of concern and to whom is it simply pointless to engage and participate in (any kind of) political activity? The quotations illustrate a gap in political orientation with regard to internationally oriented political issues. This gap is the central concern of this paper where special attention is given to the international dimension of political position-takings, interests and practices.

A POINT OF DEPARTURE

It has become commonplace to argue that 'post-materialist' values have taken on greater importance in contemporary societies. A body of work in political science and sociology reveals how, first and foremost, younger generations in advanced industrial societies act in pursuit of

[150] The interviews complement a survey conducted among Swedish upper secondary students in the academic town of Uppsala and four small towns in the mining district of Bergslagen: Grängesberg, Ludvika, Smedjebacken (VBU), and Fagersta (NVU). The survey consisted of 30 interviews and a questionnaire with 1,499 respondents (1,097 in Uppsala and 402 in Bergslagen). This article focuses on political practices and is based on previous analysis of the space of position-takings.

goals that no longer have any direct relationship to economic security or prosperity, relating instead to the importance of affinity as well as aesthetic and intellectual needs (Inglehart 1971: 991-992, 1990: 66). The rising interest in human rights, animal rights, environmental and LGBT matters meet new demands that relate less to economic class conflicts than to socio-cultural identity and knowledge-related conflicts (Inglehart 1971, 1997, 2000: 221). While political conflicts are considered to be more concerned with the cultural sphere, socialization and issues other than economic scarcity/security, the relationship between social class, political attitudes and voting behavior has become blurred (Flanagan 1987, Lipset & Clark 1991: 397, 403, Lipset et al 1994, Habermas 1987: 391-396, 1997: 366-379). While some argue that social class has diminished as an explanatory factor of political orientation over the latter part of 20th century (Clark et al, 1993), others suggest that social class is still of vital concern for understanding the formation of individual political party orientations and voting behavior in contemporary society. From a historical perspective Swedish political parties and left-right ideology in general have been rooted in the social divisions of society (Hout et al. 1993, Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004: 141-162, Oscarsson 2005: 87, Svallfors 2006). A few recent studies from a Bourdieusian approach have also revealed the correspondence between the social positions of individuals and their political opinions and attitudes (Harrits et al, 2010; Enelo 2010, 2013, Flemmen 2013).

In previous articles (Bergström & Dalberg 2013, 2014) we have sought to locate individuals in a space of political attitudes, interests, and opinions and analyze how different interests, opinions, and attitudes relate to one another. While the analysis revealed that socio-geographical conditions play a part in shaping political position-takings, the results also show that the space of position-takings displays a homology with the social space – here indicated as social origin and educational position. By comparing the results of a survey on political opinions in the university town of Uppsala with a similar study in the rural mining district of Bergslagen, we can shed some light on the social conditions for political formations embedded in local contexts with a kind of detailed analysis that is often given short shrift in international cross-country analyses of value.

Political position-takings as a social space

Our point of departure, inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's (1979) classical sociology, has been to examine the underpinning of a multidimensional political space.[151] The question being, how do different political opinions, attitudes and values relate to one another as distinct and coexisting positions? How close or distant are so-called old traditional political issues on the redistribution of wealth related to environmental issues and questions concerning international relations? Is it possible to discern proximity between LGBT-, internationally oriented human rights- and environmental issues? And to what other political issues are they possibly juxtaposed? How are issues on income taxes related to privatization of welfare institutions and questions concerning the European Union? Rather than seeing attitudes as the private views of respondents, with a

[151] Bourdieu, Pierre (1984): *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. Harvard: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

set of given social attributes, the point is to assess how far attitudes are opposed and similar to others through being located in different places in a political space.

DATA AND METHOD

The data used here originates from a survey conducted among third-year pupils in upper secondary schools in Uppsala and Bergslagen in 2008. In total, there were 1097 respondents from Uppsala and 402 respondents from Bergslagen. A substantial part of the survey consisted of items concerning political attitudes, opinions, and practices from which a selection forms the basis for the construction of the space of position-takings. The survey also consisted of 30 interviews with students from Uppsala and 20 interviews with students from Bergslagen.

Out of a total of 93 questions measuring political attitudes, opinions, and interests, 24 questions were selected based on their content and contribution to the constructed political space. These 24 questions are categorized in five thematic subgroups covering the main topics of contemporary political debate in Sweden (see the table below). These questions also reflect some of the dimensions that have been identified or analyzed in the previous works on politics cited in this article (Ingelhart 1997, 2000, Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004). Clearly these questions do not reflect value priorities, such as materialistic or post-materialistic, but are instead more focused on political matters. Moreover, the results of the analysis of these questions are not directly comparable with Ingelhart's studies, although they should provide some scope for a comparative discussion. The same questions are used to analyze both the Uppsala and the Bergslagen cohort. However, the selected questions are not related to particular local issues, rather to general questions discussed in contemporary public debate as well as issues which reoccur in national surveys (Bergström & Dalberg 2013, 2014).

Table 1. Questions used as active variables.

Topic	*Q: What is your opinion on…?*	*Q: How interested are you in…?*
Liberal economy	Lowering the income tax Avoiding privatizing hospitals. Decreasing income inequality.	National economy Household economy
Cultural pluralism / Ethnocentrism	Accepting fewer refugees; Increasing economic support of cultural practices of immigrants Increasing support of native language development among	Foreign labor rights
Environmental issues	Increasing fuel taxes to improve the environment Banning the private use of cars in cities Preserving nuclear power after 2010	Environmental issues Animal rights
Supra-nationality	Whether Sweden should join the EMU Whether Sweden should withdraw from the EU Whether the EU should be developed into a United States of Whether Sweden should apply for NATO membership	Questions related to the EU
	Q: How much do you trust the work of the:	
Trust/confidence in established society and institutions	Government. Parliament. City Council. EU Parliament. Political parties.	

The political space of upper secondary students in Uppsala is mainly structured in three dimensions of which the first two will be studied in detail below. The first dimension is constituted by differing opinions on several issues, the second by trust vs. distrust in established political institutions and attitudes towards Swedish EU-membership and EU-policy, and the third dimension is one of interest vs. disinterest in different political issues.

A rough analysis of the point contribution of each theme to the first three axes in the space of Uppsala position-takings shows that the first axis is mainly related to economic, ethnocentric, and environmental issues (see Table 2, below). Environmental issues contribute the most, with 32 percent, followed by ethnocentrism and liberal economy, with 28 and 25 percent respectively. Issues of trust in established institutions, 43 percent, and supra-nationality, 29 percent, contribute the most to the second axis. On the third axis, issues of liberal economy contribute the most, 45 percent, followed by supra-nationality, 21 percent. One may also notice that the axes relate to different kinds of questions and their format. On the first axis, questions where the respondent was asked to give his or her opinion (agree/disagree) on different issues make the largest contribution, 87 percent. Questions where respondents were asked to take a position on political issues were also the most common question format in the present analysis. On the second axis, questions relating to the degree of trust the respondents placed into different established institutions contributes the most, 43 percent, followed by questions in the opinion format, 38 percent. Questions relating to the degree of interest respondents had in different issues made the largest contribution to the third axis, 72 percent.

Table 2. Space of position-takings, the Uppsala cohort. Contributions to the first three axes by theme and type of question.

Theme	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Type of question	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Liberal economy	**24.90**	7.20	44.74	Interests	11.27	19.37	**71.52**
Cultural pluralism--ethnocentrism	**27.80**	10.83	11.53	Opinions	**87.49**	**37.92**	**18.65**
Environmental issues	**31.93**	10.53	12.78	Trust	1.23	**42.71**	9.83
Supra-nationality	14.14	**28.74**	**21.11**				
Trust in established institutions	1.23	**42.71**	9.83				
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**Total**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

As for the Uppsala cohort, a rough analysis of the contribution by the points to each of the first three axes in the space of position-takings in the cohort of students in Bergslagen shows that the first axis is largely about issues related to cultural pluralism/ethnocentrism and environmental issues. The second axis is dominated by questions on supra-nationality and trust in established institutions, and the third axis is dominated by questions on supra-nationality but also shows just above the expected contributions from all other themes except trust in established institutions. The axes could also be analyzed by the types of questions with the highest contributions. Position-takings on opinion questions dominate all three axes whereas position-takings on political interest questions contribute above the average to axis 1 and 3 and position-takings on trust questions contribute above the average on axis 2.

Table 3. Space of position-takings, the Bergslagen cohort. Initial analysis of the first three axes of the CA.

Theme	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Type of question	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Liberal economy	10.66	17.74	*22.18*	Interests	**34.72**	4.66	**40.56**
Cultural pluralism--ethnocentrism	**33.25**	1.16	*23.24*	Opinions	**53.72**	**59.49**	**58.29**
Environmental issues	**36.98**	6.65	*22.95*	Trust	11.57	**35.85**	1.15
Supra-nationality	7.54	**38.60**	**30.49**				
Trust in established institutions	11.57	**35.85**	1.15				
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**Total**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

This space of position-takings, by virtue of its empirical object, is obviously a particular case. However, by treating it as a *particular case* of *possible* position-takings among young Swedish citizens using a comparative method: particular places at a particular time, under particular social conditions, and using a particular survey with a particular set of questions, the singularity of the object does not preclude drawing from some general propositions. It can be argued that the opinions, attitudes, and interests presented in the political space are in fact indicators of what kind of issues are relevant in contemporary Swedish political discourse. It could even be argued that this constructed space is a phenomenological construction of the space of political position-takings as it appears to those entering this space. Whether or not there has been a some shift in general public opinion or in lines of political conflict, as has been the focus in previous studies by Inglehart and the body of work referred to as the World Values Survey, the constructed political space reveals a pattern of political opinions and interests that is structured


by both old traditional and new political dimensions (cf Harrits et al 2010: 10-12, Bergström & Dalberg 2013). Regardless of any shifts, the space constructed is still a space of different conflict lines and positions relative to one another as perceived by those who are in the space.


The language used to describe the constructed space of position-takings, which employs words of a probabilistic nature rather than an absolute one, derives from the possibility that this space is not just a representation of different position-takings but a representation of different dispositions in Bourdieu's sense of the term. It is perhaps more accurate to speak of positions in any part of the space as dispositions towards position-takings more related to those positions, than to simply speak of different position-takings. And as dispositions are related to positions in the social space, the next section will analyze the relation between political dispositions and the social and educational positions of the students. This will be done with the use of hierarchical clustering within the geometrically constructed space.

In order to interpret the set of distinct and coexisting political position-takings and their correspondence to social and educational assets, Ascending Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) was performed on the first three axes for each of the two cohorts. We have chosen to interpret a partition into four clusters for each cohort, for which our sociological interpretation has the greatest viability.[152] These four clusters can be said to represent four (broad) sets of dispositions regarding political position-takings. This illustrates the multidimensional character of the space in that the multidimensional structure is present both in the space as a whole and in each cluster. Based on their respective orientations, the clusters may be labeled as follows:

The Uppsala cohort:
- Left-wing (1).
- Trust and internationally oriented (2).
- Right-wing (3).
- Conservative (or radical) right-wing (4).

The Bergslagen cohort:
- Radical right (A).
- Left-wing (C).
- EU orientation (E).
- General interest (F).





[152] The partition into four clusters accounts for 54.1 (Uppsala cohort) and 55 (Bergslagen cohort) percent of the variance of the cloud (Uppsala), which is just above the rule of thumb which states that "the between-variance should be greater than the within-variance" (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004, p. 114-115).

These four clusters, respectively, not only represent different orientations in each space of position-takings, but also reflect different social positions.[153]

Since the relationship, distances and proximities between these clusters has been discussed elsewhere, of central concern for this article is the character and social dimensions of the internationally oriented clusters in Uppsala, marked by a broader international orientation, and in Bergslagen, marked by its orientation towards the European Union.[154] Holders of the internationally oriented cluster of positions in the Uppsala cohort are also trustful of the Swedish parliament and political parties, as well as the EU parliament. Among the cohort of Uppsala students we find an interest in domestic economy, in foreign labor rights and EU-policy, and those who are reluctant to exit the EU.

The EU-oriented cluster (E), in the Bergslagen cohort of students, is characterized by a marked resistance towards increased connectedness among the European states, and a lack of interest in foreign labor rights. This cluster also includes positions affirming the for-profit provision of social and health services, and the ambivalent trust in national and international political institutions coupled with distrust in the local city council. The cluster of position-takings marked by a general interest in politics (F) shares a positive position towards the EU with position-takings clustered around an orientation towards the EU, though against EMU membership. Otherwise, this cluster is more characterized by the proximity between a position of general interest in politics and a tendency to lean towards a left-wing orientation.

In the Uppsala cohort, students from natural science programs are overrepresented in the internationally oriented cluster. The natural science program is an exclusive educational position marked by a high level of social recruitment and gender balance, as well as a relatively even spread between economic and cultural class fractions. Here we find holders of a great overall volume of capital, sons and daughters of employers, CEOs, and university professors. The internationally oriented cluster in the Uppsala cohort is characterized by an overrepresentation of daughters with professional upper class and cultural upper middle class origin. If we consider the overall capital volume, the internationally oriented cluster is opposed to a cluster with those who are most deprived. Sons and daughters of unskilled workers are overrepresented in cluster 4 in the lower level of figure 2, and gathered around a conservative-right political position-taking. If we instead consider the inherited cultural and economic assets, sons and daughter to university professors tend to be opposed to sons and daughters of employers and CEOs. Students with a cultural upper middle class origin are somewhat overrepresented in the internationally oriented cluster as opposed to students with an economic

[153] Se appendix, Table 8 Uppsala's space of position-takings. Characterizing modalities for clusters in partition 3, 7a &b Distribution of gender, educational position and social origin in four clusters (partition 3). Appendix, Table 10 Bergslagen's space of position-takings. Characterizing modalities for clusters in partition 3, Appendix, Table 9a&b Distribution of gender, educational position and social origin in four clusters (partition 3).

[154] Especially in the Uppsala cohort the internationally oriented cluster mainly gathers those who avoid strong positions on issues related to redistribution of wealth and equality; that is, they are neither left-wing nor right-wing oriented.

upper middle class origin being overrepresented in the right wing cluster, where students with a cultural upper middle class origin are in a much more concealed position.

The internationally oriented cluster of position-takings might also be interpreted in its relation to the left-wing and right-wing cluster of position-takings in the sense that holders of opinions gathered in each of these clusters are what one can call opinionated. The internationally oriented cluster is characterized by issues related to interests and trust rather than opinions. Although those gathered in the internationally oriented cluster indicate a left-wing slant, the opinion-like issues that characterize the internationally oriented clusters are issues regarding transnational relationships, such as EMU and NATO-membership, and rather the avoidance of strong positions on issues related to redistribution and equality. This tendency is reflected in the distribution of political practices. Internationally oriented position holders are less keen to participate in demonstrations or political activism. Rather, they resemble the vast group of students who prefer to engage in boy- or buycotting. Before turning our attention to political practices we should mention some similarities and differences in the international orientation among students in the Bergslagen cohort.

As mentioned above, the EU-oriented cluster in the Bergslagen cohort is characterized by a marked resistance towards increased connectedness among the European states, and a lack of interest in foreign labour rights. This cluster of position-takings resembles those where sons of industrial workers and sons of cultural middle class origin are overrepresented, though neither preparatory nor vocational programs are overrepresented. However, position-takings marked by a general interest in politics, sharing a positive position towards the EU, and at the same time holding a position against EMU membership we recognize an overrepresentation of women, students in preparatory study programs, and economic and cultural middle class origin.


In grouping different social origins, a distinction was made between the relatively large group of industrial workers and other working class professions such as construction workers, transportation workers, etc. This distinction does not only stem from the composition of our population. It also reflects differences in organizations where, on the one hand, we have industrial workers in large industrial companies where employees currently, and historically, are organized in unions and, on the other hand, individuals known to be organized through self-employment, like small businesses, and what one might call entrepreneurial organizations. This distinction relates to different dispositions in the space of possible political position-takings, such as the overrepresentation of sons of construction and transportation workers in the radical right cluster, which is characterized by antipathy towards immigrants, resistance towards the redistribution of common goods, income equality, and support for lower taxes on high income.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND THE CONSUMPTION OF NEWS AND "VIEWS"

Just as being willing and capable of responding to a questionnaire on politics, the propensity to join a political party or a political interest group, participating in a public demonstration, signing a petition, contacting an elected official, or reading a newspaper, and especially particular

sections of a newspaper, reveals social disparities and differences between students in different educational positions. However, political acts are also intertwined with the structure of political orientations. In the following, we have projected "supplementary variables" – indicating political activities – onto a space of political position-taking among students in upper secondary school in Uppsala (Bergström & Dalberg 2013). The aim here is to enrich the interpretation of the correspondence analysis of political orientations among young students. This supplementary analysis not only sheds light on the probability of being politically active among students in upper secondary school, more to the point, it reveals the differences that can be discerned between holders of differing political positions and thus students in different educational positions and of different social origins.

Figure 1. Political practices projected in the political space of Uppsala



□ Political activities, ● Association Membership, △ Newspaper pages, ○ Educational program

Figure 1 presents the distribution of political activities, membership in various kinds of associations, and newspaper consumption added as supplementary variables in the constructed space of position-takings, in this case the plane of axis 1 and 2 (the first two dimensions). The horizontal axis 1 is structured by opposing opinions on redistribution, cultural pluralism, and environmental issues where a left-wing orientation on the left-hand side is juxtaposed with a liberal right-wing orientation on the right-hand side. The vertical axis 2 is constructed by different positions towards trust in established political institutions and attitudes towards Swedish membership in the EU and EU policy, where the established trustful positions in the upper part of the figure are opposed to the distrustful positions in the lower part of Figure 1, juxtaposing those who favor Swedish EU membership and are interested in EU-policy from position-takings against Swedish EU membership and indifference or lack of interest in EU policy.

At first glance, we find an overrepresentation of members in politically related associations and political activities in the upper level of Figure 1, especially on the left-hand side. It is also in this area, the upper left part of the figure, that we find an overrepresentation of those who read the newspapers' opinion, editorial, and foreign news pages along with the arts pages. On the right hand side of the graph we find an overrepresentation of readers of the financial section. Consumers of the financial pages reside among those who hold liberal-right political positions,

whereas consumers of arts pages are juxtaposed to liberal-left position-takings and positions that favor cultural pluralism, environmental protection, etc.

The distribution of political practices and newspaper consumption corresponds with the structure of political position-takings in two striking ways. First, we find those who are members in multiple activities among those who are inclined to position themselves. Members of associations and organizations, as well as participants in various activities are mainly concentrated among the position holders along horizontal axis 1, among students who respond to questions and position themselves in relation to issues of redistribution, environmental protection, and cultural pluralism. Secondly, differences in memberships, activities, and newspaper readership correspond to the structure of opposing opinions along the first horizontal axis 1. For instance, we find an overrepresentation of those who responded that they participated in public demonstrations several times on the left-hand side of horizontal axis 1, closely related to left-wing political position-takings, such as interests in environmental issues, and egalitarian attitudes towards immigrants. In this area of the graph we also find an overrepresentation of those organized in international human rights, human aid and environmental organizations (cf. table 1 appendix). In the opposite area of the graph where the liberal-right wing position-takings are situated we find an overrepresentation of those that responded with more reluctant attitudes towards public demonstrations ("no response" to question about public demonstrations). Though, public demonstrations are not solely associated with the labor movement. Feminist, environmental, and LGBT movements have become successively associated with public acts and demonstrations in the advent of relatively new forms of political action: political activism, political consumerism, and discursive political actions (Micheletti, Follesdal & Stolle 2003, Micheletti & Stolle 2004, Amnå 2013).[155]

[155] Public demonstrations have successively been associated with new political interest groups: feminism, the environmental movement, the LGBT movement, etc. In the early 1980s, employees in the business sector took to the streets to demonstrate their disappointment with wage-earner funds (4th of October 1983). At the turn of the century, there was a wave of transnational social protest and global activism in which associated groups previously considered to be in contradiction to each other acted in together against privatization, unemployment, for environment protection, etc. (Seattle 1999, followed by the European cities of Brussels, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Gothenburg, etc.) See Wennerhag (2006).

Table 4. Participation ("once" *or* "several times") in political activities, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	N	Party work	Participate action group	Contact elected officials	Public demonstration	Protest political activism	Editorial letter	Boycott	Buycott	Political chat	Clothing as political consumerism	Culturejamming
Science	***172***	3.5	6.4	20.6	11.4	2.3	8.9	38.9	43.6	18.6	16.80	4.6
Technology	***68***	0	1.5	17.7	4.4	2.9	1.5	25.0	29.5	26.5	8.80	4.4
Social Science-language-cult	***129***	4.4	17.0	23.9	27.4	6.0	15.5	42.7	42.7	20.2	19.40	10.9
Social science-economics	***210***	10.0	10.5	20.9	17..6	5.1	9.5	26.2	26.2	20.2	12.90	8.5
Arts-media	***210***	3.4	5.2	14.2	16.6	9.7	11.5	30.4	30.4	16.2	14.30	10.9
Care-Health-service	***134***	2.3	5.2	5.4	7.5	3.7	2.1	15.6	15.6	8.2	8.20	6.7
Construction-vehicle-elct.	***174***	2.9	4.6	3.0	5.3	5.7	2.3	10.3	10.3	12.7	6.90	5.8
Total	***1097***	3.8	7.2	15.1	12.1	5.1	7.3	27.0	28.3	23.5	12.47	7.4

It is noteworthy that these "new forms" of political activity are scattered among differing political orientations in the space of position-takings. Buycotts and boycotts are especially closely related to left-wing political position-takings and are overrepresented among students in social science programs oriented towards language and culture, while political activism – such as protests – appears to be more closely related to students in arts and media programs. It is in the upper level of the graph, along vertical axis 2 – structured by trust versus distrust in established political institutions and transnationalism – that we find an overrepresentation of non-responses to political "action groups" and "protest activity". This means that internationally oriented position holders gravitate to a reluctant disposition towards political activism. It is also in this area we find an overrepresentation of those who joined a political youth organization; 8.6 percent of the students in economic oriented social science programs are organized in a political youth party, 7 percent of the science students and 6.8 percent of the students in language and culture oriented social science programs. In comparison with students in vocational programs, these figures do not reach above 2 percent. Thus, it is in the area of Figure 1 marked by trust in established political institutions that we find an emerging cautious approach toward protest and preferred adherence instead to the traditional, established political system. Accordingly, students are more likely to respond that they several times "contacted elected official", joined a political party and participated in party work (in particular students at the economics stream of the social sciences program).[156]

Political consumerism has been emphasized as an emerging political virtue of young citizens and the statistical analysis reveals, in line with contemporary research that political

[156] Students in science programs are less likely to participate in protest activities and are also overrepresented among position holders in favor of Swedish membership in NATO and the EU, also representing a trustful posture towards established political institutions (Bergström & Dalberg 2013).

consumerism – boy- and/or buycotting – is quite a widespread action among the (young) upper secondary students, although the same pattern of political consumerism tends to be more frequent among students at preparatory programs, especially science and social science students with a language and cultural orientation (Micheletti, Follesdal & Stolle 2003, Micheletti & Stolle 2004, Amnå 2013). The interviews did however unveil a variety of dispositions to political practice and participation, none the least concerning political consumerism. To some extent this is illustrated in the following quotations, where students bring up their interest in political consumerism. In the first quote the male student talks about the (fair trade) network of "clean clothes" campaigns, and in the second quote another student talks about the importance of local markets.

> **A**: Yes, well it's an organization or network, which is established, in not only in Sweden, it operates on international basis. It's focused on workers' rights and working conditions, simply trying to improve the conditions for those in the production line, sewing clothes, the clothes and shoes that we shop. It's about justice across borders, globally. Campaigning for workers conditions far from where we are, whose products, or as the saying goes, sweat, we consume here. By spreading information about textile workers working conditions, the sweatshops, in other countries, the aim is to create a public opinion and influence the biggest companies on the market. It's these multinationals companies that must take responsibility for the production, the working conditions of those who work in production.
>
> […]
>
> **Q:** So what's your role, how are you involved?
>
> **A**: I've participated in so called flash appeals, eh ... sending e-mails, and all kinds of messages to companies about the working conditions of the workers that they hire in the industry producing their stuff. In connection to some big occasions, some global events, like some sports events, it becomes even more important and it's many international organizations seeking to manifest the working conditions of people who sews and makes Adidas, Asics, Lotto , and Umbro .. you know designers stuff. It also is about making a sort of anti-advertising, culture jamming, jamming logos, distorting the image, text, and so, you mess up the message with an opposite type. The effect is so obvious. We have these famous brands and with a tiny, tiny, tiny twist of words, or a stripe, swoosh, something like it, the image "advertisement" is suddenly it opposite, just not advertising but more a subtext makes it apparent how it functions [the market forces]. It is to information and create a messages unveiling doubts connected to a specific company, brand, or the way we make our own living, how we consume, how our way of living is based on other people's extremely bad working conditions (Male student, social science programs, international orientation , Uppsala)
>
> *
>
> **A:** We shop things that are produced in the local area, it's environmentally friendly more convenient, in all cases. You see, buying locally produced means that we then support the local market, people's local work, that which is produced by people around here. There are a lot of labels like Fair Trade in products such as coffee, and beans and stuff like that. It's a whole jungle of brands if you want to keep track of it ... But I do not believe one bit of it, it's somebody is lurking, robbing the pennies for his own profit. Check the coffee for instance, that fair trade stuff, they are selling at outrageous prices, it's added through middlemen's hands, and by the salesmen, and that is at nobody's damn notice. But buying locally produced is politics, we have to survive here in small towns. (Male student, electricity program, Bergslagen).

These quotations reveal quite different understandings of how political consumerism constitutes a political act. One respondent refers to rather concrete issues and another who refers to more abstract and universal questions, verbalized in a language that is closer to the formal political discourse. Overall, the international orientation is more abstract and universally oriented along the principles of justice rather than the everyday, concrete and particulate

matters. Just like quotes from previous interviews have shown, these discussions on political practices disclose major differences in eloquence and verbosity as well as how familiar with contemporary political issues and informed and knowledgeable the students I talked to were in relation to the political issues they discussed. There is also a striking difference between the students from Uppsala and the students from Bergslagen. The difference relates to how place-oriented students in the industrial and mining districts were during the interviews. The local orientation coupled with global awareness was as striking as the interest in international issues were conspicuously absent in the interviews with these students. International interest was reflected upon in many of the interviews in Uppsala, especially in the interviews with students in the science program and the social science program with an international orientation or specialization in languages, journalism and the like.

*

A newspaper offers information that is not solely political. Its purpose is a rather diverse offering of, to varying extents, international and national politics, news, arts and culture, and sports. In an attempt to examine the relationship between educational position and social origin and political orientation, it is tempting to analyse students' choice of newspaper and the distribution of the choice of newspaper pages.[157] In a similar vein to students' civic engagement, memberships in associations, and participation in various political activities, newspaper readers tend to scatter in the upper level of the graph. Readers of the newspapers' opinion, editorial, foreign news, and arts pages are overrepresented on the left-hand side of the chart whereas sports pages and financial pages are overrepresented on right-hand side in Figure 3 (cf. table 6). Close to 20% of students in science programs (19.8%) and students in language and culture-oriented social science programs (18.6%) responded that they regularly read at least one national daily newspaper. However, the local paper is the most common choice of newspaper even among those groups of students where it is least common to read a newspaper. Nearly 50% of students in language and culture-oriented social science programs responded that they regularly read the local paper (cf. Table 2).

The evening papers are a more common choice among students in arts and media programs (20%) and a relatively common choice among students in male-dominated and female-dominated vocational programs (approx. 10%). Relatively few, less than 5%, of students in science programs reported that they regularly read the evening paper. Additionally, the free newspapers seem to be an alternative shunned by science students (cf. Table 5).

[157] In comparison, available statistics report a decreasing trend in newspaper readership: In the 15-29 age group, total readership of daily newspapers has decreased to less than 50%. In the early 1990s, 64% read one of the dailies on an "average day," a number that had increased to 70% in 1998. Since then, readership has steadily declined, reaching 51% in 2008 and 46% in 2009. As of 2008, approximately 22% read one of the evening papers every day (Svensk dagspress 2010, SCB, [Swedish daily press 2010, Statistics Sweden]).

Table 5. Reading a newspaper, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	N	National Daily	Local paper	Evening paper	Free news paper	Read no paper	Total %
Science	172	19.80	36.00	4.70	0.60	39.00	100
Technology	68	10.30	44.10	8.80	1.50	35.30	100
Social Science-language-culture	129	18.60	48.10	5.40	1.60	26.40	100
Social science-economy	210	11.90	33.80	14.80	1.90	37.60	100
Arts-media	210	6.70	26.70	20.00	6.20	40.50	100
Health-care-service	134	3.00	23.10	11.90	6.00	56.00	100
Construction-vehicle-electricity	174	0.00	25.90	10.90	4.60	58.60	100
Total and mean %	1097	8.40	31.50	14.70	2.70	42.70	100

In the lower part of the graph we find an overrepresentation of members of “local action groups” and “non-response” to “contacts with elected officials” juxtaposed to distrust in established political institutions. In the lower right-hand corner there is an overrepresentation of members in motor clubs among students in male-dominated vocational programs (construction, automotive, electricity). Far away in the opposite corner we find the very few members of feminist organizations. When comparing reported newspaper reading habits, it is noteworthy that the editorial pages, foreign news, and arts pages tend to have greater appeal in particular to science students and students in language and culture-oriented social science programs than students in any other program (cf Table 6).

The majority of students in automotive, construction, and electricity programs do not regularly read a newspaper (60% replied they did not read any paper), and none reported that they regularly read any of the national dailies. Among newspaper readers in these vocational programs, the local pages seem to attract the majority of students. As such, distinctions in newspaper readership correspond with the distinctions between an internationally oriented and conservative right-wing orientation in the space of political position-takings and these distinctions also correspond with social class structure. The probability of reading a national daily newspaper rises with educational resources (students in university-preparatory programs and with culturally upper middle class social origin) whereas the probability of reading an evening paper varies in the opposite direction. Students in vocational programs with a working class origin are relatively more likely to read an evening paper than any of the national dailies. The distance between the positions characterized by trust in the political system, egalitarian attitudes towards immigrants, and interest in international political issues and opposing positions characterized by reluctance towards cultural pluralism and immigrant support, lack of interest in international political issues, and lack of trust in established political institutions seems to reflect the difference between those who are more likely to read not only a local daily paper but also a national daily and furthermore, even more likely to read the sections of the

paper that offer information about national and international political discourses and those least likely to read any of national dailies or any of the editorial, debate, or financial pages.

Table 6. The distribution of readers of different news pages, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	N	Editorial pages	Opinion pages	Foreign pages	Domestic pages	Local pages	Arts pages	Financial affairs	Sports pages	Comic strips
Science	**172**	21.5	30.2	51.7	50.6	44.8	40.1	12.2	34.3	48.3
Technology	**68**	17.6	29.4	38.2	47.1	51.5	32.4	11.8	38.2	52.9
Social Science-language-culture	**129**	24.8	41.9	66.7	59.7	46.5	59.7	2.3	17.8	53.5
Social science-economy	**210**	16.7	23.8	46.7	51.4	51.0	27.1	17.1	40.5	37.6
Arts-media	**210**	16.7	20.5	35.2	41.0	41.4	45.7	4.8	22.4	48.6
Care- health-service	**134**	10.4	12.7	25.4	37.3	50.0	27.6	6.0	26.1	7.2
Construction-vehicle-electricity	**174**	9.2	9.8	16.7	30.5	40.8	12.1	8.0	37.4	43.1
Total N/mean %	**1097**	**16.4**	**23.1**	**39.7**	**44.9**	**45.9**	**34.5**	**9.1**	**30.9**	**44.9**

For example, among those students who reported they were very interested in issues of international peace and conflict, 26.7 percent responded that they regularly read one of the dailies, whereas 5.9% only regularly read one of the evening papers. Exceedingly few (1.3%) of those who responded that they were not at all interested in international peace and conflict reported they regularly read any of the dailies.

Local papers and local pages emerge as the widely read papers and pages among the general population, reducing the differences in readership between students in differing educational positions, and in different position-takings. For instance, the local pages attract slight more than 40% of those most interested in international peace and conflict, 33.5% of those who are least interested, and 23.9% of those who reported that they were not at all interested in these issues. Students in vocational programs tend to be more likely to read the 'wide-audience' pages: comic strips, local news, and sports pages, pages that are more or less acceptable or appealing to people of all tastes and value orientations.

INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION AND LOCALLY BASED GLOBAL AWARENESS – CONCLUDING REMARKS

From a sociological point of view there is an interesting difference between the international orientation in cluster 2 and the conservative right-wing orientation in cluster 4 which can be traced back to the character of issues at hand. EU-policy, EMU-membership and foreign labor

rights issues are more abstract both in language as well as in character, without direct reference to the experience of everyday life, than issues such as gas taxes. The more specifically political or politically scientific the question is formulated, the larger the difference in propensity to answer between those with least and most inherited educational assets, between students in vocational programs and preparatory programs. It is among individuals with high grades, whose parents invested a considerable amount of time in higher education that we find those who produce an opinion on the more abstract issues. Conversely, individuals with less educational assets, from families with little to no academic experience who attend vocational programs produce less opinions the more abstract the issue becomes. These differences disappear the more concrete the issue concerns everyday life, such as gas taxes or the right to a free abortion. The probability to respond and produce an opinion relates to what can be called a theoretical point of view, in Bourdieu's terminology a "*vision scolastique*" (scholastic view)[158], qualities that especially those programs that prepare for higher education also train for – in other words both to the qualities of the question and of the individual. Bourdieu unravelled the correspondence between social and cultural position and the preparedness to produce a political opinion, and how the scholastic point of view is the very condition of that which we usually call political (Bourdieu, 1984, pp 459-463; 1998, pp. 127-140, 2000, pp 9-32, 49-60, 65-84).

Political skills – not only the ability but the willingness to take a stand – are intimately associated with qualities that academic programs prepare for and especially the students at the prestigious science program seem to value – what we, with reference to Bourdieu, call a scholastic view. It also corresponds, however, with a kind of class ethos or a class habitus. We witness here a *readiness* to provide an answer to political questions.

The vast distance between the international orientation and the conservative right-wing orientation ultimately relates to social class, not only in the sense of a class ethos, but more as a feeling of a class' social conditions. The egalitarian attitude towards immigrants and interest in international issues is shared by those whose existential security in the knowledge society is secured by an educational position, keeping the doors for future educational investments open. The distance between those who trust the political system and those who do not follows the large gap between those who are in positions with a high volume of overall capita and those deprived thereof. In a similar vein it is mainly students on natural science programs and students in the language and cultural oriented social science programs that have adopted novel post-material political values. Thus, concluding these findings, one can detect a homology between social structures, the field of education, and the political space.

In the space of political position-takings as it was constructed on the basis of the Uppsala cohort of students, we were able to identify a cluster of opinions united by a high trust in political institutions, an interest in international politics and positive stance on the EU, characterized, as already noted, by particularly resourceful students in the science program. As

[158] In the English translation: Bourdieu, P (1998): *Practical Reason. On The Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p 127; Bourdieu, P (2000): *Pascalian Meditations.* Stanford: Stanford University Press ,p 9-32, 49-60, 65-84, Bourdieu, P (1984), p 401-407.

a group they are neither positioning themselves close to the right-wing dispositions nor left-wing dispositions which should be understood as points of views among students with high social origin, both economically and culturally. Certainly there are left-wing and right-wing students even in these programs but they do not contribute to any specific position of opinion, none that could count as overrepresented. In addition, it is more common among these students not to be particularly prone to manifest a personal standpoint. Rather, they harbour a general political interest. As we move upwards in social hierarchy the more distinguished these students are in terms of restraining themselves from manifesting personal opinions.

One of the male students in the science program at one of the prestigious schools in Uppsala described something along these lines in one of the interviews. When asked whether his interest in politics meant that he had participated actively in any way, he replied that the most important thing was to learn to scrutinize critically:

> A: Everything is globalized and most importantly in the flow of information is to learn how scrutinize politicians, lobby groups, businesses, and so critical. Politics is globalized, the issues are, but we there is no democratic forum at a global level where one can address these issues. To critically examine, that's what's left to do and rely on. Many people have a lot of opinions and all that … they may well have it, but it often becomes so personal and so unreasonable. (Male student, science program, Katedralskolan Uppsala).

Finally in Bergslagen, an historically industrial area, there is quite a strong awareness, for instance, of the impact of the global economy on local industries, but it is more an awareness shared among young people in Bergslagen than an issue that divides social groups of young people. Bergslagen differs from Uppsala in the sense that Uppsala is characterized by a higher degree of social differentiation than Bergslagen. Social groups with a relatively high amount of cultural capital and those with a relatively high amount of economic capital are more or less absent in Bergslagen.[159] The dominating distribution of difference in Bergslagen is revealed in relation to issues on cultural pluralism, dispositions towards refugees and immigrant groups with a corresponding gender division, separating students in preparatory educational programs from students in vocational educational programs and students with a working class origin from students with a cultural middle class social origin. Taking the changing structure of the political landscape into account, it is interesting to note that it is along new political dimensions, identity politics and socio-cultural issues that we discern a proletarianization of the radical right-wing orientation (Oskarsson & Demker, 2012, p 185-187; Rydgren & Ruth, 2011, 202-224).

A sizeable proportion of the young people in Bergslagen have a positive attitude towards the EU, simultaneously harbouring antipathy towards more extensive collaboration among EU member states. Bergslagen might differ from Uppsala in the sense that EU policy and related issues have more tangible everyday political consequences and are possibly also more apparent in local policy in Bergslagen than in Uppsala. Since the late 1980s the rural communities in Bergslagen have been challenged by structural transformation as the economic crises forced the steel and forestry industries to institute substantial efficiency measures. This transformation of Bergslagen has been and remains heavily dependent on 'structural funds,' financed initially by

[159] These groups were overrepresented in opposing positions on redistribution issues in Uppsala. (Bergström & Dalberg 2014, s 237-241).

the Swedish state and subsequently by the EU.[160] Young students' orientation towards the EU is reasonably related to local experience and the sense of dependence on government and EU funding.

It is striking how an egalitarian attitude towards the cultural practices of immigrants, multiculturalism, interest in international political issues and a sense of belonging to Europe is shared by those whose existential security in the "*knowledge society"* is secured in an upper secondary position, opening the doors for future educational investment in this same knowledge society. And, it is not just an elite formation that discerns a joint collectivity in Europe, especially at a cultural and political level. Here we find an overrepresentation of students in the science program and students in the language-oriented social science programs. It is possible that several of the students with a pronounced internationally oriented stance on political issues and their open attitude to multiculturalism are still limited to some form of Eurocentrism. A reasonable understanding of the headstrong distrust of multiculturalism that is overrepresented by students at vocational programs with working class origin is that it expresses a subjective experience of an objectively existing distance. The social distance between the school elite in Uppsala and the dispossessed vocational students in Uppsala and Bergslagen is expressed in an aversion to, or at least a distrust of, multiculturalism.

It is also interesting to note that the more culturally affluent elite in Uppsala gravitate slightly more than the economically affluent elite to international politics, foreign policy and cultural openness. The vertical distance in opinion-takings between the internationally oriented students and those who have no interest in international affairs and who are more inclined to turn their backs towards EU affairs and foreign policy, between those with high social origin in the preparatory science programs and those students in vocational program with working-class origins, is considerable. This distance, and the various dimensions it hides, complicates, or rather; nuances, contemporary (political and educational) debate about cultural recognition, cultural diversity, global citizenship, et cetera, and about the art of living together in a world of differences.

References

Amnå, E. & J. Ekman. 2013. Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology. Human Affairs, 22: 283-300.

Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Distinction. A social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul [1979].

Bourdieu, P. 1998. *Practical Reason. On The Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Polity Press [1979].

Bourdieu, P. 2000. *Pascalian Meditation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[160] EU structural funds and the first 'Bergslagen Mission' aimed at business innovation and entrepreneurship (30%), education (8.6%), communications (7%), and cultural projects (4%). (The Västerbergslagen package was primary intended for educational interventions and cultural projects)

Bergström, Y .2012. Educational and social Dimensions of Political Participation: Producing a Political Opinion. *Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk tidskrift for kultur og samfundsvidenskab*.(6) 4, p 23-34.

Bergström, Y & T. Dalberg. 2012. Political Position-takings. The Case of Young Citizens in a Swedish Rural Mining District. *Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk tidskrift for kultur og samfundsvidenskab*.(6) 4, p 7-22.

Bergström, Y & T. Dalberg. 2014. Education, Social Class and Education. The Political Space of Swedish Youth in Uppsala. In *Bourdieu and Data Analysis: Methodological Principles and Practice*, ed. M Grenfell & F. Lebaron. Oxford: Peter Lang Publishing. p 227-251.

Broady, D. & M. Börjesson 2008. En social karta över gymnasieskolan. In *Individ - samhälle - lärande. Åtta exempel på utbildningsvetenskaplig forskning*, ed. U. P. Lundgren, 24-35. Stockholm, Swedish Research Council report series.

Clark, T. N., S. M. Lipset & M. Rempel 1993. The Declining Political Significance of Social Class. *International Sociology*. (8)3: 293-316.

Enelo, J-M. 2013. *Klass, åsikt och partisympati. Det svenska konsumtionsfältet för politiska åsikter*. Örebro, Örebro University.

Evans, J 2005: The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support. *Comparative European Politics*. (3)1: 76-101.

Flanagan, S. C. 1987. Value Change in Industrial Societies. American Political Science Review, (81):1303-1319.

Flemmen, M .2013. The Politics of the Service Class. *European Societies*. Pp 2-27.

Habermas, J. 1987. *Theory of Communicative Action, volume two. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Boston: Beacon Press [1981].

Habermas, J. 1997. *Between Facts and Norms*. Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press [1992].

Harrits, G. S., A. Prieur, J. Skjott-Larsen, & L. Rosenlund 2010. Class and politics in Denmark. Are both old and new politics structured by class? *Scandinavian Political Studies*, (33)1: 1-27.

Holmberg, S. & H. Oskarsson 2004. Väljare. Svenskt väljarbeteende under 50år. Stockholm: Norstedts.

Hout, M C. Brooks & J. Manza 1993. The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies. *International Sociology*, (8)3: 259-277.

Inglehart, R. 1971. The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. *The American Political Science Review*, (65) 4: 991-1017.

Inglehart, R. 1997. *Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R 1990: *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University.

Inglehart, R. 2000. Globalization and Postmodern Values. *The Washington Quarterly*, 23:1, 215-228.

Invarsflaten, E. 2005. The vulnerable Populist Right Parties: No Economic Re-alignment Fueling Their Electoral Success. *European Journal of Political Research*, (44) 3: 465-492.

Le Roux, B. & H. Rouanet. 2004. *Geometric Data Analysis. From Correspondence Analysis to Structured Data Analysis*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Le Roux, B. & P. Perrineau. 2011. Les différents types d'électeurs au regard des différents types de confiance. *Le cahiers du CEVIPOF. La confiance dans tous ses états: les dimensions politique, économique, institutionnelle, sociétale et individuelle de la confiance*. 54: 5-29.

Lipset, S. M. & T. N. Clark. 1991. Are Social Classes Dying. *International Sociology* 6: 397-410.

Lipset, S. M. et al. 1994.The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited. American Sociology Review, (59) 1:1-22.

Micheletti, M; A. Follesdal & D. Stolle 2003. *Politics, Products and Markets. Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present.* Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Micheletti, M & D. Stolle 2004. Politiska konsumenter: *Marknaden som arena för politiska val*. Sören Holmberg and Lennart Weibull, eds: Ju mer vi är tillsammans, pp 103-116. Göteborg: SOM Institute, 34.

Oskarson, M. 2005. Social Structure and Party Choice. *The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies.* J. Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Oskarson, M. & M. Demker. 2012. Another kind of class voting. Working-class sympathy for Sweden Democrats. In *Class Politics and the Radical Right,* J. Rydgren, ed. 173-189. London: Routledge.

Rydgren, J & P. Ruth. 2011. Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition? *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 3/34: 202-224.

Svallfors, S. 2006. *The Moral Economy of Class. Class and Attitude in Comparative Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

APPENDIX

Table 7a. Overrepresented modalities in cluster 1 and 2, the Uppsala cohort of students.

	C1			C2		
Variable	**Modality**	% of category in group	% of category % in set	**Modality**	% of category in group	% of category % in set
Income equality	++	52.5	31.6	+	35.1	28.4
Interest in domestic economics	-	24.0	16.5	+	49.4	27.0
Interest in national economics	-	30.4	25.7	+	32.5	16.4
Lower high income tax	-	57.6	36.1	+	24.7	19.2
Ban private hospital profit	++	50.2	29.0	+	29.9	21.4
Cultural support to immigrants	+	36.4	21.4	+-	46.8	30.5
Interest in foreign labor rights	+-	35.9	30.1	+	39.0	16.0
Allow less refugees	-	55.3	32.3	-	44.2	32.3
Support to immigrants' native language education	++	22.1	13.4	+	41.6	27.5
Increase taxes on gasoline	++	32.3	19.3	+	48.1	24.5
Interest in animal rights	++	17.1	10.6	+-	44.2	29.2
Interest in environmental issues	++	35.5	24.2	++	40.3	24.2
Preserve nuclear power	-	38.7	20.8	+	26.0	16.5
Stop private motoring in cities	++	24.4	14.3	+	39.0	26.2
EMU membership	-	61.8	42.2	++	27.3	10.2
Interest in EU issues	+	17.5	15.8	+	32.5	15.8
Make EU into a United States	-	64.5	48.1	+-	24.7	17.1
NATO membership	-	56.2	35.1	+	16.9	9.1
Sweden should exit EU	+	19.8	13.0	-	71.4	41.5
Trust in communal council	+-	56.7	48.9	+	61.0	21.9
Trust in EU parliament	-	28.6	16.5	+	53.3	21.6
Trust in political parties	-	24.4	18.6	+	50.7	21.6
Trust in Swedish government	+-	49.3	37.7	+	62.3	27.7
Trust in Swedish parliament	+-	52.1	38.5	+	62.3	32.0

Table 7b. Overrepresented modalities in cluster 3 and 4, the Uppsala cohort of students.

Cluster:	3			4		
Variable	**Modality**	% of category in group	% of category in group	**Modality**	% of category in group	% of category in group
Income equality	+-	37.6	21.8	-	20.0	11.5
Interest in domestic economics	++	27.5	16.2	--	21.5	11.5
Interest in national economics	+-	40.4	28.1	--	41.5	21.8
Lower high income tax	++	41.3	19.3	++	27.4	19.3
Ban private hospital profit	-	30.3	14.7	+-	27.4	18.6
Cultural support to immigrants	-	50.5	31.6	-	63.0	31.6
Interest in foreign labor rights	+-	41.3	30.1	--	48.9	19.7
Allow less refugees	+	32.1	21.8	++	43.0	19.5
Support to immigrants' native language education	-	29.4	19.3	-	42.2	19.3
Increase taxes on gasoline	-	44.0	30.7	-	68.2	30.7
Interest in animal rights	+-	38.5	29.2	--	37.0	17.5
Interest in environmental issues	+-	39.5	25.7	--	27.4	7.6
Preserve nuclear power	++	43.1	28.3	--	28.9	20.5
Stop private motoring in cities	+-	35.8	26.6	-	39.3	20.8
EMU membership	+	24.8	9.3	-	52.6	42.2
Interest in EU issues	+-	47.7	32.5	--	45.2	18.6
Make EU into a United States	++	16.5	6.3	--	27.4	19.7
NATO membership	++	16.5	7.1	--	34.1	30.1
Sweden should exit EU	-	64.2	41.5	++	19.3	14.9
Trust in communal council	+-	60.6	48.9	--	20.0	8.0
Trust in EU parliament	+	34.0	21.6	--	22.2	9.7
Trust in political parties	+-	60.6	47.8	--	23.7	8.0
Trust in Swedish government	+	39.5	27.7	--	21.5	8.7
Trust in Swedish parliament	+	50.5	32.0	--	22.2	8.2

Table 8. Uppsala's space of political position-takings. Distribution of gender, educational program and social origin in four clusters (partition 3).

		Subpopulation selected for CA					Total population	
Characteristic categories	N	% of category in set	c1	c2	c3	c4	N	%
Gender								
Women	279	51.9	**65.9**	**54.5**	36.7	40.0	583	53.1
Men	251	46.7	31.8	45.5	**61.5**	**59.3**	490	44.7
Gender-n/a	8	1.5	2.3	0.0	1.8	0.7	24	2.2
Total	538	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1097	100.0
Educational program								
Natural Science	111	20.6	22.1	**32.5**	23.9	8.9	172	15.7
Technology Program	42	7.8	3.7	9.1	**11.0**	**11.1**	68	6.2
Social science - languages and culture	76	14.1	**25.3**	19.5	2.8	2.2	129	11.8
Social science - economic; International Baccalaureate	116	21.6	14.3	22.1	**36.7**	20.7	210	19.1
Aesthetics; Media; Commerce	89	16.5	**24.9**	9.1	8.3	14.1	210	19.1
Health Care; Handicraft; Food; Hotel and Restaurant Programs	44	8.2	6.0	3.9	7.3	**14.8**	134	12.2
Construction Program; Vehicle Program; Electricity Programs	60	11.2	3.7	3.9	10.1	**28.1**	174	15.9
Total	538	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1097	100.0
Social origin (Class+fraction)								
Professions	58	10.8	11.5	**18.2**	10.1	5.9	92	8.4
Economic upper middle class	35	6.5	6.5	7.8	**9.2**	3.7	55	5.0
Cultural upper middle class	31	5.8	7.8	**9.1**	2.8	3.0	47	4.3
Economic middle class	96	17.8	13.8	19.5	**27.5**	15.6	203	18.5
Cultural middle class	115	21.4	**26.3**	16.9	22.9	14.8	203	18.5
Working class	157	29.2	27.2	19.5	22.0	**43.7**	355	32.4
Unemployed, no answer	46	8.6	6.9	9.1	5.5	**13.3**	142	12.9
Total	538	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1097	100.0

Table 9a. Overrepresented modalities in cluster A and C, the Bergslagen cohort of students.

Cluster:	A			C		
Variables	Modality	% of category in group	% of category % in set	Modality	% of category in group	% of category % in set
Income equality	--	16,22	8,9	++	73,33	32,98
Interest in domestic economics	--	18,92	8,38	+-	46,67	36,65
Interest in national economics	--	43,24	21,99	+-	50	36,13
Lower high income tax	+	32,43	20,94	-	86,67	35,08
Ban private hospital profit	--	27,03	20,94	++	36,67	19,9
Cultural support to immigrants	-	81,08	35,08	+	40	18,32
Interest in foreign labor rights	--	62,16	29,84	++	26,67	8,38
Allow less refugees	++	64,86	25,65	-	50	23,56
Support to immigrants' native language education	-	43,24	15,71	--	16,67	10,47
Increase taxes on gasoline	-	83,78	43,98	+	30	14,14
Interest in animal rights	--	37,84	16,75	++	30	13,09
Interest in environmental issues	--	43,24	10,47	++	43,33	21,99
Preserve nuclear power	++	37,84	24,61	-	66,67	28,27
Stop private motoring in cities	--	29,73	18,32	++	30	15,18
EMU membership	-	48,65	34,56	-	70	34,56
Interest in EU issues	--	67,57	23,56	-	36,67	32,46
Make EU into a United States	-	56,76	38,22	-	70	38,22
NATO membership	--	43,24	34,56	-	60	30,37
Sweden should exit EU	++	29,73	15,18	+	26,67	9,42
Trust in communal council	--	37,84	12,04	+-	53,33	48,69
Trust in EU parliament	--	35,14	12,04	-	30	13,61
Trust in political parties	--	35,14	9,95	-	26,67	17,8
Trust in Swedish government	--	51,35	16,75	-	30	16,75
Trust in Swedish parliament	--	48,65	14,66	-	33,33	15,18

Table 9b. Overrepresented modalities in cluster E and F, the Bergslagen cohort of students.

Cluster:	E			F		
Variables	Modality	% of category in group	% of category in set	Modality	% of category in group	% of category in set
Reduce income differences	+-	31,37	21,47	+	32,88	29,32
Interest in personal saving	-	19,61	15,18	+	35,62	30,37
Interest in the national economy	-	35,29	27,23	+	20,55	10,99
Reduce taxes on high income	+-	29,41	24,61	+-	30,14	24,61
Stop profit-run hospitals	--	29,41	20,94	+	28,77	20,94
Support to immigrants' cultural activities	-	37,25	35,08	+-	41,1	29,84
Interest in wage labourers in other countries	--	43,14	29,84	+-	45,21	30,89
Reception of immigrants	+	29,41	23,04	+	27,4	23,04
Support to mother tongue education for immigrants	+-	35,29	27,23	+	41,1	30,89
Increase tax on petrol	-	52,94	43,98	+	20,55	14,14
Interest for animals' rights	-	31,37	20,42	+	36,99	25,65
Interest for environmental issues	+-	35,29	22,51	+	45,21	27,75
Keep nuclear energy sources	--	33,33	23,56	-	34,25	28,27
Stop private cars in cities	-	25,49	16,23	+	30,14	24,61
EMU membership	+-	29,41	18,85	--	32,88	29,32
Interest for issues related to the EU	-	45,1	32,46	+-	49,32	34,56
Transform the EU to a common federal state	--	39,22	29,84	+	13,7	9,95
NATO membership	+-	21,57	16,75	+-	20,55	16,75
Sweden should leave the EU	-	76,47	44,5	-	47,95	44,5
Trust in the municipality council	-	25,49	15,18	+	34,25	19,37
Trust in the EU parliament	+-	54,9	43,98	+	35,62	25,13
Trust in political parties	+-	70,59	53,93	+	23,29	15,71
Trust in the government	+-	49,02	35,6	+	42,47	25,65
Trust in the Swedish parliament	+-	47,06	37,17	+	42,47	27,75

Table 10. Distribution of gender, educational program and social origin in four clusters (partition 3).

		Clusters (%)				
Category	N	A	C	E	F	Total
Gender						
Women	95	27,0	**63,3**	40,0	**61,6**	49,5
Men	96	**73,0**	36,7	**60,0**	38,4	50,5
Total	190[161]	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Educational program						
Preparatory program	127	29,7	**76,7**	68,6	**79,5**	66,5
Vocational program	64	**70,3**	23,3	31,4	20,5	33,5
Total	191	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Social origin						
Industrial workers	51	29,7	26,7	**33,3**	20,5	26,7
Other working class occupations	54	**35,1**	**30,0**	23,5	27,4	28,3
Economic middle class	37	16,2	16,7	15,7	**24,7**	19,4
Cultural middle class	34	8,1	**20,0**	**19,6**	**20,5**	17,8
Unemployed	15	**10,8**	6,7	7,8	6,8	7,9
Total	191	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

[161] One respondent did not state gender.

L'internationalisation de la formation des élites, le cas des grandes écoles d'ingénieurs françaises[162]

ADRIEN DELESPIERRE, Université de Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne

L'internationalisation est un processus récent dans l'histoire des grandes écoles d'ingénieurs ; la circulation internationale d'élèves-ingénieurs, qui est certes au moins aussi ancienne que le système des grandes écoles mis en place au cours de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle, n'a concerné pendant longtemps qu'un nombre très restreint d'individus, tandis que la présence d'auditeurs étrangers ne constituait pas pour les écoles un enjeu de concurrence particulier[163]. D'une manière générale, durant les trois décennies qui ont suivi la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les politiques d'internationalisation étaient le fait d'établissements peu consacrés nationalement, à commencer par les MBA, qui commençaient à s'importer depuis les Etats-Unis et occupaient des positions marginales au sein du champ de l'enseignement supérieur[164].

Le processus d'internationalisation des écoles françaises d'ingénieurs a réellement commencé plus tard, au cours des années 1980 et 1990 ; c'est depuis cette période qu'ont été constituées en enjeu de concurrence, dans l'ensemble du champ des grandes écoles, l'intensification des partenariats académiques à travers le monde, la circulation internationale des étudiants, l'extension des activités des établissements à l'étranger (ouvertures d'écoles satellites, de bureaux de recrutement ou d'instances de représentation), ainsi que l'importation de disciplines et de techniques pédagogiques associées à l'international, qui s'écartent de la définition scolaire de l'excellence historiquement liée au modèle des grandes écoles. Ces nouvelles modalités de la concurrence culturelle entre grandes écoles correspondent à la montée dans l'échelle des valeurs symboliques d'un capital particulier, le capital international, qui se combine au capital scolaire tout en le subvertissant[165].

HOMOLOGIE DU CHAMP DU POUVOIR ET DU CHAMP DES GRANDES ECOLES

Le fait que les écoles d'ingénieurs aient commencé à s'internationaliser plus tard que les écoles de commerce tient à l'histoire spécifique de ce champ : on sait en effet que le monopole étatique

[162] Le texte présent a été écrit pour servir de support de l'intervention au colloque.

[163] A. Karvar, « Les élèves étrangers. Analyse d'une politique », in. B. Belhoste, A. Dahan Dalmedico, A. Picon (dir.), *La formation polytechnicienne, 1794-1994*, Paris, Dunod, 1994.

[164] P. Bourdieu, *La Noblesse d'Etat*, Paris, Minuit, 1989.

[165] G. Lazuech, « Le processus d'internationalisation des grandes écoles françaises », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, n°121-122, 1998.

de la violence symbolique légitime s'est traduit, au sein du champ éducatif, par l'hégémonie d'une définition spécifique de l'excellence, la définition scolaire, qui s'est instituée dans le système des classes préparatoires, des concours, des classements, ainsi que sur un enseignement à vocation très généraliste, fortement axé sur la théorie et, corrélativement, sur la dévaluation des apprentissages pratiques, des enseignements plus empiriques, plus tournés vers l'application concrète.

Les analyses de Bourdieu développées dans *La Noblesse d'Etat* établissent ainsi que les écoles dominantes, qui sont celles qui sont le plus liées à l'Etat-nation et au champ bureaucratique, sont également les plus sélectives scolairement, les plus distantes vis-à-vis des pratiques et des connaissances inductives qui sont associées au champ économique.

L'internationalisation de ces grandes écoles publiques a réellement commencé après la période des années 1960-1970, analysée par Bourdieu ; pour comprendre cette évolution il faut porter une attention particulière à la reconfiguration du champ du pouvoir qui a eu lieu depuis les années 1980-1990, marquées par la fin du capitalisme d'Etat. Une étude de Dudouet et Grémont, parue en 2010[166], montre ainsi la façon dont les élites d'Etat, les hauts fonctionnaires sortis de Polytechnique et de l'ENA et passés par les grands corps, se sont désinvestis de la sphère publique en conduisant depuis les années 1980 la privatisation des secteurs-clés de l'économie : les grandes industries et les institutions de crédit. On assiste donc, au sein du champ du pouvoir, à un affaiblissement du pôle administratif et étatique, au profit du pôle économique privé.

Ce processus de retrait de l'Etat, cet affaiblissement de ses prérogatives économiques et symboliques, est à l'œuvre dans le champ des grandes écoles qui va l'intégrer dans sa logique propre à travers la contestation de la définition scolaire de l'excellence, et les luttes symboliques autour de la définition du modèle des grandes écoles.

Il s'agit ainsi, à la suite des travaux de G. Lazuech[167], de se déprendre des discours présentant la « mondialisation » comme un processus uniforme et inéluctable qui aplanirait les différences nationales pour montrer, d'une part, que l'internationalisation ne bouleverse pas les structures mêmes du champ de reproduction des élites, et que les stratégies d'internationalisation des écoles sont conditionnées par la position qu'elles occupent dans l'espace national – ces prises de positions varient notamment, pour chaque établissement, en fonction de son ancienneté, de sa plus ou moins grande proximité à l'Etat, et de son degré de légitimité scolaire.

Nous illustrerons notre propos en nous appuyant sur les cas de l'Ecole polytechnique et de l'Ecole centrale qui symbolisent, parmi les écoles d'ingénieurs les plus prestigieuses, l'opposition entre le pôle étatique et le pôle économique privé au sein du champ de la formation des élites.

---

[166] F-X. Dudouet, E. Grémont, *Les grands patrons en France : du capitalisme d'Etat à la financiarisation*, Paris, Éditions Lignes de repères, 2010.

[167] G. Lazuech, *L'Exception française : la modèle des grandes écoles à l'épreuve de la mondialisation*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1999.

L'École Polytechnique, en premier lieu, présente plusieurs caractéristiques qui lui confèrent une position très spécifique dans le champ des grandes écoles : c'est d'abord l'une des plus anciennes grandes écoles françaises, fondée à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, en 1794, pour fournir à l'Etat des ingénieurs compétents et dévoués, destinés à l'armée et à l'administration[168]. Elle n'a pas tout de suite été une école militaire ; elle l'est devenue sous le Premier Empire, en 1804, dix ans après sa fondation. Elle a d'ailleurs perdu ce statut à deux reprises, sous la Restauration d'abord, sous l'Occupation ensuite ; c'est aujourd'hui l'une des rares écoles d'ingénieurs à être sous la tutelle du ministère de la Défense. Ses élèves français ont un statut de fonctionnaire, reçoivent un traitement et sont supposés devoir plusieurs années de service à l'Etat bien que, dans les faits, la plupart d'entre eux rejoignent aujourd'hui directement le secteur privé à la fin de leurs études.

Le fort degré de consécration scolaire constitue une autre propriété spécifique de Polytechnique, qui est réputée être l'école d'ingénieurs la plus sélective. Sa position dominante est entérinée par le système des écoles d'applications qui, mis progressivement en place au cours des premières années d'existence de l'X, est encore en vigueur aujourd'hui et lui confère un double avantage : sa formation de l'Ecole polytechnique la place en effet plus haut dans la hiérarchie des valeurs académiques, puisque la partie la plus abstraite, théorique et encyclopédique de l'enseignement lui est réservée, l'apprentissage des applications empiriques particulières qui peuvent être faites de ces connaissances étant délégué aux établissements d'application. Polytechnique offre en outre à ses élèves le meilleur accès à la haute administration : selon leur rang dans le classement de sortie, les jeunes polytechniciens peuvent intégrer différents corps d'Etat, dont les prestigieux corps des Mines et corps des Ponts auxquels ne peuvent prétendre, sauf quelques cas isolés, les élèves des autres écoles.

La position particulière de Polytechnique explique en partie le fait qu'elle se soit engagée dans les politiques d'internationalisation plusieurs années après la plupart des autres écoles d'ingénieurs, et *a fortiori* après les écoles de commerce. Plus proche de ces dernières, l'École Centrale est la première, parmi les écoles d'ingénieurs les plus prestigieuses, à s'engager au milieu des années 1980 dans des stratégies d'internationalisation. Par contraste, l'internationalisation de Polytechnique a réellement commencé une dizaine d'années plus tard, dans la seconde moitié des années 1990. Ce décalage doit être mis en regard avec les histoires respectives de ces deux écoles.

Comme on l'a vu, Polytechnique est historiquement liée au secteur public et à la haute administration, elle est initialement vouée à la formation d'une élite de serviteurs de l'Etat. Centrale, de son côté, est plus proche historiquement du patronat privé. Elle a été fondée en 1829 par la bourgeoisie industrielle, et conçue justement comme un contre-modèle de Polytechnique (les quelques polytechniciens qui rejoignaient l'industrie privée étaient en effet réputés trop théoriciens, et peu aptes à résoudre les problèmes pratiques de l'industrie) ; les

[168] Cf. notamment T. Shinn, *Savoir scientifique et pouvoir social : l'Ecole Polytechnique, 1794-1914*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1980.

fondateurs de Centrale prenaient modèle sur les ingénieurs civils anglais, spécialistes en développement industriel[169].

Initialement privée, Centrale est devenue publique en 1857. N'ayant jamais eu vocation à former des fonctionnaires, son histoire n'est pas liée à celle de la haute administration ; elle est d'ailleurs la seule école d'ingénieurs prestigieuse ne figurant pas sur la liste des écoles d'application de Polytechnique.

Ainsi, en raison de ses liens historiques avec l'industrie privée, et d'une distance plus marquée vis-à-vis de l'Etat et de la sphère administrative, l'École Centrale occupe une position très particulière, marginale par certains aspects, parmi les écoles d'ingénieurs les plus réputées et les plus sélectives scolairement. C'est pourquoi elle est exposée à une concurrence plus forte que celle que connaît Polytechnique, qui jouit en effet d'un statut avantageux garantissant à ses diplômés des possibilités de carrières favorables dans les grands corps ; les centraliens, destinés dans leur grande majorité aux fonctions d'encadrement dans le secteur privé, sont quant à eux soumis à une concurrence plus intense de la part des diplômés d'autres écoles d'ingénieurs ou de commerce.

De par sa position, l'école Centrale est donc plus proche des valeurs et des attentes des entreprises privées, plus portée également vers l'adoption de techniques pédagogiques nouvelles, à la manière de celles des écoles de commerce. Polytechnique, à l'inverse, est dans une situation plus favorable, qui la préserve mieux de la concurrence, et qui favorise par-là une certaine stabilité, ou inertie, institutionnelle.

L'INTERNATIONALISATION DU CAPITAL SOCIAL

De fait, dans les années 1990, l'internationalisation de Polytechnique coïncide avec l'affaiblissement de ses marchés protégés ; la situation de Polytechnique est en train de changer, en premier lieu parce que la privatisation des grandes entreprises publiques a augmenté massivement le nombre de polytechniciens travaillant dans le secteur privé. Durant cette décennie les rapports du comité d'administration anticipent avec appréhension la réduction du recrutement dans le secteur public, et le fait qu'à l'avenir le principal employeur des polytechniciens ne serait plus l'Etat. Le conseil d'administration prévoit aussi une intensification de la concurrence à laquelle Polytechnique sera confrontée, non seulement en France, mais aussi à un niveau international. Polytechnique va donc mettre en œuvre différentes réformes pour maintenir sa position dominante en France, pour gagner en reconnaissance internationale et pour capter une partie de la demande émergeante des étudiants étrangers.

[169] A. Grelon, « Du bon usage du modèle étranger : la mise en place de l'École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures », in. *La formation des ingénieurs en perspective, XVIII^e^-XX^e^ siècles*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004. On pourra également consulter l'ouvrage collectif : *L'École Centrale, Origines et destinée de l'École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures de Paris*, Paris, Éditions Bédécom, 1981.

Les deux principales réformes sont mises en œuvre dans la seconde moitié des années 1990. On assiste d'abord, en 1996, à l'ouverture d'une voie spécifique de recrutement sur concours à destination des étudiants étrangers. Cette première réforme est bientôt suivie d'une seconde, entrée en vigueur en 2000, qui modifie le cursus des élèves ingénieurs de Polytechnique afin de s'inscrire dans les standards internationaux, et allonge la durée de la formation afin de favoriser les départs en double diplôme à l'étranger. Dans la continuité de cette politique l'École polytechnique ouvrira quelques années plus tard, dans la seconde moitié des années 2000, plusieurs programmes de master au sein d'une « *graduate school* » nouvellement fondée.

L'Ecole Centrale, plus fortement exposée à la concurrence des écoles de commerce qui montent en puissance au sein du champ, prend modèle sur ses rivales et amorce au milieu des années 1980 une politique de développement des partenariats internationaux : elle participe ainsi à la fondation, au milieu des années 1980, d'un réseau européen de double-diplômes, baptisé TIME pour *Top Industrial Managers for Europe*[170]. Les membres de ce réseau, initialement européen mais comptant désormais des représentants au Brésil, en Chine et au Japon, figurent tous parmi les institutions les plus consacrées de leurs champs nationaux respectifs.

Cette stratégie d'accumulation de capital de reconnaissance internationale, par la légitimation croisée entre établissements prestigieux, sera reprise par les autres grandes écoles d'ingénieurs, qui développeront leurs propres liens de partenariat et intégreront, pour certaines, le réseau TIME. Ce processus, loin de bouleverser les hiérarchies nationales, contribue au contraire à renforcer la relégation des établissements de rang moyen en les excluant de fait des réseaux d'échanges les plus valorisés : les étudiants les plus dotés en capitaux scolaires ne circulent de ce fait qu'entre les établissements les plus renommés dans leurs espaces nationaux respectifs. C'est ainsi que, par un paradoxe apparent, les établissements les plus engagés dans les politiques d'internationalisation, qui intensifient les cours de langues et comptent dans leurs effectifs les pourcentages les plus élevés d'étudiants étrangers, sont relégués à des positions de second rang dans la hiérarchie interne du champ national et se trouvent ainsi exclus de la concurrence pour le recrutement des meilleurs étudiants des universités internationales les plus cotées.

TRADITION NATIONALE ET MODE DE RECRUTEMENT

Les modalités de recrutement des élèves étrangers sont elles-mêmes largement conditionnées par la position de chaque école dans le champ national de la formation des élites. Par opposition à Sciences-Po et aux écoles de commerce, les écoles d'ingénieurs sont, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, plus sélectives scolairement (du moins selon les critères académiques français), les candidats étant, d'une manière générale, sélectionnés uniquement selon leurs résultats dans les disciplines scientifiques les plus consacrées, à commencer par les mathématiques et la physique,

[170] D. Gourisse, *Le grand tournant (1968-2003) ou comment se préparer au marché global de la connaissance*, Paris, Association des centraliens, 2008.

considérées comme plus universelles, et par-là plus internationales, que les domaines particuliers qui en sont dérivés, tels que la mécanique, la chimie ou l'informatique. De même, les lettres de motivation et de recommandation que doivent fournir les candidats valent surtout comme certificats de leur adhésion aux valeurs scolaires et ne peuvent être identifiées aux procédures de sélection ayant cours dans les écoles de commerce, visant à évaluer la personnalité même des recrues potentielles.

L'attachement à la tradition scolaire dans le processus de sélection des candidats étrangers est d'autant plus affirmé que les écoles sont plus haut placées dans la hiérarchie interne, et plus anciennement liées au mode national de consécration des élites. Ainsi, à l'inverse des autres établissements, qui dispensent de concours les candidats étrangers et les sélectionnent sur examen du dossier scolaire et sur entretien, Polytechnique impose à ses candidats étrangers un concours spécifique, portant exclusivement sur des disciplines situées au sommet de la hiérarchie académique (le concours est constitué de trois épreuves, l'une en mathématiques, l'autre en physique, la dernière en « connaissances scientifiques générales »).

Ces procédures drastiques de recrutement mises en œuvre par les écoles d'ingénieurs les plus consacrées, précisément celles qui sont en mesure de mobiliser un réseau de partenaires académiques prestigieux, leur garantissent des élèves étrangers fortement dotés en capital scolaire, tels ceux de Polytechnique parmi lesquels on trouve plusieurs lauréats de prix internationaux de mathématiques. Ce mode de sélection, portant uniquement sur les connaissances scientifiques des étudiants, a pour contrepartie la faiblesse des exigences quant à la maîtrise du français et de l'anglais ; ainsi, une partie non négligeable des étudiants étrangers admis dans les écoles les plus prestigieuses ne disposent pas, au moment de leur arrivée, des connaissances linguistiques suffisantes pour suivre les cours ni pour s'intégrer parmi les élèves français.

INTERDEPENDANCE ET DOMINATION ENTRE SYSTEMES EDUCATIFS

Les chiffres de la circulation internationale des élèves français et étrangers des grandes écoles constituent un bon indice des rapports de force et d'interdépendance entre les différents systèmes éducatifs. On constate en premier lieu que les pays d'origine des étudiants étrangers séjournant dans les grandes écoles ne correspondent pas aux destinations privilégiées des élèves français.

D'après les chiffres de l'enquête réalisée sur l'année 2009-2010 par la CGE auprès d'un large panel d'écoles d'ingénieurs et de management[171], les 27 456 étudiants étrangers inscrits en formation diplômante dans une grande écoles française étaient majoritairement issus de l'Asie-Pacifique (28%) et du Maghreb (25%), et secondairement d'Europe de l'Ouest (15%), d'Afrique Sub-Saharienne (10%) et d'Amérique Latine (9%) ; les plus faibles pourcentages

[171] Cf. le rapport de la CGE : « Les grandes écoles sur la scène internationale », réalisé en 2011 par B. Porée. Détail des modalités de l'enquête p. 39 et p. 83.

sont ceux d'Europe Centrale et Orientale (6%), du Moyen-Orient (6%) et d'Amérique du Nord (3%)[172].

Les données sont très différentes pour les flux en sens inverse : parmi les 6 176 élèves français partis en 2009-2010 en formation diplômante, 50,8% séjournaient dans un établissement d'Europe de l'Ouest, 35,2% en Amérique du Nord, et 8,2% en Asie-Pacifique ; on compte enfin des effectifs résiduels d'élèves en Amérique Latine (3%), en Europe Centrale et Orientale (1,5%), en Afrique Sub-Saharienne (0,6%), au Maghreb (0,2%) et au Moyen-Orient (2%).

Les destinations des 12 780 élèves français partis au cours de la même année en séjour non-diplômant à l'étranger sont relativement proches : la majeure partie de cette population est partie en Europe de l'Ouest (54%), en Asie-Pacifique (16%) et en Amérique du Nord (15%), le reste se répartissant entre l'Amérique Latine (7,9%), l'Europe Centrale et Orientale (6%), le Maghreb (0,4%) et l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne (0,3%).

On ne peut évidemment prétendre donner ici une explication exhaustive de ces flux géographiques. On voit néanmoins se dessiner une partition entre différentes zones géographiques vis-à-vis desquelles le système français des grandes écoles entretient autant de rapports spécifiques.

On peut d'abord évoquer les espaces géographiques relégués à la périphérie des échanges, telles que l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne, le Maghreb et le Moyen-Orient : les élites de ces régions ont fréquemment recours aux systèmes de formation occidentaux pour asseoir leur domination locale, comme c'est le cas en Tunisie, au Maroc et au Liban, qui constituent des viviers traditionnels de recrutement des grandes écoles françaises. Corrélativement, les systèmes éducatifs locaux ne disposent pas d'un capital symbolique suffisamment important pour constituer un pôle attractif sur le plan international.

Le cas des pays dits « émergents », à commencer par la Chine et le Brésil, est tout différent : ceux-ci appuient leur développement industriel sur l'envoi massif d'élèves ingénieurs à l'étranger, dont les contingents constituent, avec les étudiants issus du Maghreb, les communautés internationales les plus nombreuses au sein des grandes écoles françaises. Les liens des institutions éducatives de ces pays avec celles des pays occidentaux sont toutefois récents et, si les effectifs d'étudiants Chinois et Sud-Américains sont en nette augmentation au cours des années 2000, les élèves français sont peu nombreux à séjourner dans ces pays pour y obtenir un diplôme.

Les universités d'Europe de l'Ouest entretiennent des liens plus anciens, et plus équilibrés, avec les grandes écoles françaises : les rapports de force entre les institutions les plus prestigieuses de ces pays sont assez équilibrées, ce qui se traduit par des échanges d'élèves dans les deux sens, dans des proportions approximativement équivalentes. Les premiers réseaux de partenariats académiques des écoles d'ingénieurs se sont d'ailleurs constitués, au cours des

[172] L'enquête dénombre également 8733 étudiants en formation non diplômante (type ERASMUS), dont 34% sont issus d'Europe de l'Ouest, 20% de la zone Asie-Pacifique, 18% d'Amérique du Nord, 13% d'Amérique latine, 9% d'Europe centrale et orientale, et respectivement 2% pour le Maghreb, le Moyen-Orient et l'Afrique Sub-saharienne.

années 1980 et 1990, essentiellement entre institutions européennes, et ne se sont étendues que par la suite, durant les années 2000, aux autres continents. Même si ces liens de légitimation mutuelle avec les universités prestigieuses d'Allemagne, de Suisse, de Suède ou de Hollande sont mis en avant dans la présentation de soi des grandes écoles, les échanges d'étudiants concernent que des effectifs très restreints, et portent essentiellement sur les cursus de master et de doctorat, plutôt que sur les cursus classiques d'ingénieur.

Les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni constituent des cas à part parmi les pays occidentaux. Les universités anglo-saxonnes dominent les échanges internationaux d'étudiants : elles n'ont pas besoin de s'insérer dans des réseaux de partenariats formalisés pour attirer à elles des étudiants fortement dotés en capitaux scolaire et économique, issus de toutes les régions du monde. Leurs étudiants sont en revanche peu enclins à venir étudier en Europe, hors séjours de courte durée sur le modèle des *summer schools*[173].

Le cas de Polytechnique donne une illustration concrète du lien entre la position interne au champ national et la position dans les rapports de force académiques internationaux.

Le recrutement d'élèves étrangers dans le cycle ingénieur de Polytechnique s'effectue selon deux modalités distinctes : la première correspond au concours classique, après deux ou trois ans de classes préparatoires, voie par laquelle sont recrutés chaque année une trentaine d'élèves étrangers francophones, issus essentiellement du Maghreb, du Liban ou du Vietnam. Le second moyen de recrutement est celui du concours spécifique, évoqué un peu plus haut, au moyen duquel sont recrutés chaque année environ 75 élèves étrangers non francophones (plus de la moitié d'entre eux sont originaires de la Chine et du Brésil, l'autre moitié se répartit entre différents pays d'Amérique latine et d'Europe). Les élèves passés par cette seconde voie de recrutement viennent des meilleures universités de leurs pays d'origine.

En revanche, les destinations privilégiées des polytechniciens français en double diplôme ne correspondent pas aux foyers de recrutement de l'École. Au cours de ces dernières années, chaque promotion de l'X compte entre 120 et 150 élèves (essentiellement français ou étrangers francophones passés par les classes prépa) à effectuer un double diplôme à l'étranger au cours de leur 4e année de formation.

La majorité d'entre eux (entre 70 et 80, soit un peu plus de la moitié des effectifs) part chaque année aux États-Unis ; une soixantaine séjourne dans une université d'Europe de l'ouest, et quelques individus isolés se rendent en Asie (Chine ou Japon). Les destinations se concentrent sur une douzaine d'universités de la *Ivy League*, ainsi que sur une quinzaine d'universités européennes parmi les plus réputées, en Angleterre d'abord, puis en Suisse et en Suède, ainsi qu'en Allemagne, aux Pays-Bas, en Italie et en Espagne.

[173] Différentes raisons, pêle-mêle : 1) pas d'harmonisation des cursus entre universités US (formation en 4 ans) et grandes écoles (formation en 3 ans) ; 2) les étudiants étrangers de filières *engineering* de ces universités sont d'autant moins enclins à faire des séjours diplômants en Europe qu'ils ont dû acquitter des droits d'inscription très élevés ; 3) place de second rang des filières *engineering* dans l'échelle US du prestige académique : les meilleurs étudiants américains se destinent aux études juridiques ou économiques ; les meilleurs étudiants des filières ingénieurs sont étrangers, les élèves ingénieurs américains n'ont probablement pas un niveau académique suffisant pour être acceptés dans une grande école ou une université européenne prestigieuse. Ils sont de toute manière peu nombreux à envisager d'effectuer une partie de leur formation hors des Etats-Unis.

Les décalages avec les tendances générales qui se dégagent des chiffres de la CGE donnent une idée de la position dominante des polytechniciens en termes d'accès aux diplômes internationaux les plus prestigieux :

- la proportion de départs aux Etats-Unis est nettement plus élevée chez les polytechniciens qu'au sein de l'ensemble de la population des élèves ingénieurs français
- les polytechniciens sont largement surreprésentés parmi les élèves ingénieurs en double diplôme aux Etats-Unis : ils représentent à eux seuls près du tiers de la population des élèves ingénieurs français en double diplôme dans une université d'Amérique du Nord (ils étaient 240 en 2007-2008, selon la CGE).

Cet aperçu un peu rapide soulève plusieurs questions à explorer dans la suite de mes recherches ; quelques pistes de réflexion à titre conclusif :

a) il faut distinguer, parmi les modalités d'internationalisation du parcours des élèves, entre les double diplômes, les simples séjours d'études et les stages en entreprises ou associatifs ; le fait que, parmi les différentes formes d'expériences internationales, l'obtention d'un diplôme étranger soit systématiquement mis en avant dans les stratégies de présentation de soi[174] des anciens élèves des écoles d'ingénieurs conforte l'hypothèse que c'est encore sous la forme d'un certificat académique (et ce d'autant plus qu'il est délivré par une institution prestigieuse ou, à tout le moins, implantée dans un pays occidental dominant), que le séjour à l'étranger offre son meilleur rendement sur la marché du travail ou, plus généralement, sur le marché symbolique national.

À l'inverse, on peut émettre l'idée (que semblent confirmer certains entretiens avec des élèves de grandes écoles parisiennes) que les séjours académiques de type Erasmus, permettant la validation par équivalence du diplôme de l'école d'origine sans donner lieu à l'obtention de celui de l'institution d'accueil, puissent être parfois dépréciés, au moins dans la mesure où pèse un soupçon de passe-droit (si l'on suppose, à tort ou à raison, qu'il est plus facile d'obtenir de meilleures notes dans telle université étrangère que dans sa propre école) et de relâchement scolaire excessif.

Les stages en entreprises, quant à eux, offrent une bonne garantie d' « employabilité » mais limitée à un secteur particulier ; il semble que leur rendement symbolique, nettement plus réduit que celui des diplômes prestigieux, tende ainsi à se cantonner à un champ d'activité strictement déterminé.

b) Le capital international, sous ses différentes formes (diplôme, séjour d'étude, stages en entreprise, ou encore compétences spécifiques telles que la maîtrise d'une langue étrangère), n'obtient son meilleur rendement que combiné avec des capitaux locaux ou nationaux ; cas-

[174] Telles qu'elles se manifestent dans les entretiens, les notices d'annuaires ou les CV en ligne.

limite d'un chercheur d'emploi uniquement doté de titres étrangers, même prestigieux : le rendement de ce capital dans un pays comme la France serait hasardeux et, au mieux, limité à des segments très spécifiques du marché du travail. Les diplômes étrangers ne sont susceptibles d'offrir un rendement élevé que lorsqu'ils sont combinés à des titres nationaux.

C'est qu'il n'existe pas aujourd'hui de normes ou de standards internationaux qui puissent prétendre à une légitimité symbolique comparable à celle que les Etats exercent sur les territoires nationaux ; les instances internationales de consécration existantes, loin des situations de monopole des Etats, se trouvent placées en concurrence les unes avec les autres et sont souvent contestées par les institutions qu'elles évaluent (on peut notamment évoquer les nombreuses critiques dont le classement de l'université de Shanghai a fait l'objet). > Argument contre les thèses qui prétendent qu'il existe désormais un véritable « champ international » de la formation, au moins au sens où les barrières nationales seraient vouées à disparaître dans un futur proche : rien ne permet pour l'instant de l'affirmer, ni de dire quand cela se produira.

On peut plutôt faire l'hypothèse que l'internationalisation de l'enseignement supérieur ne mène pas, dans l'état actuel des choses, à la disparition ni même à l'affaiblissement des frontières nationales des différents champs éducatifs ; elle correspondrait plutôt à l'introduction d'une nouvelle forme de capital culturel constitué en enjeu stratégique majeur de la concurrence entre les grandes écoles françaises. Cette évolution correspond bien à une modification des hiérarchies nationales, avec la fragilisation (relative) de la position des écoles d'Etat comme Polytechnique ou l'ENA par rapport à celle des écoles de commerce qui se constituent en rivales de plus en plus sérieuses ; mais elle ne bouleverse pas pour autant les clivages fondamentaux du champ, à commencer par ceux qui séparent les écoles de la « grande porte » et celles de la « petite porte », ou encore les écoles d'État des écoles privées.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Bourdieu, P., *La Noblesse d'Etat*, Paris, Minuit, 1989.

Collectif, *L'Ecole Centrale, Origines et destinée de l'Ecole Centrale des Arts et manufactures de Paris*, Editions Bédécom, Paris 1981.

Dudouet, F-X. & E. Grémont, *Les grands patrons en France*, Paris, Editions Lignes de repères, 2010.

Gourisse, D., *Le grand tournant (1968-2003), ou comment se préparer au marché global de la connaissance*, Paris, Association des centraliens, 2008.

Grelon, A., « Du bon usage du modèle étranger : la mise en place de l'Ecole Centrale des Arts et Manufactures », in. *La formation des ingénieurs en perspective, XVIIIe-XXe siècles*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004.

Karvar, A., « Les élèves étrangers. Analyse d'une politique », in. B. Belhoste, A. Dahan Dalmedico, A. Picon (dir.), *La formation polytechnicienne, 1794-1994*, Paris, Dunod, 1994.

Lazuech, G. , « Le processus d'internationalisation des grandes écoles françaises », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, n°121-122, 1998.

Lazuech, G., *L'Exception française : le modèle des grandes écoles à l'épreuve de la mondialisation*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1999.

Shinn, T., *Savoir scientifique et pouvoir social. L'Ecole Polytechnique, 1794-1914*, Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1980.

Wagner, A-C., « Les écoles de gestion et la gestion d'une culture internationale », in M. de Saint-Martin, M. D. Gheorghiu (dir.), *Actes du colloque « Les écoles de gestion et la formation des élites »*, Paris, EHESS, 1996.

Transnational capital and transformation of the elites. La revue *Algérie Littérature/ Action*: fragilité d'un capital transnational entre l'Algérie et la France pendant la « décennie noire ».

TRISTIAN LEPERLIER, EHESS - CESSP

La revue/maison d'édition *Algérie Littérature/Action* (*ALA*)[175] se trouve dans une position complexe entre la France et l'Algérie. S'intéressant essentiellement à la littérature algérienne, elle est créée à Paris à partir de 1996, avant de s'implanter également à Alger en 1999. Fondée par un Algérien et une Française, Aïssa Khelladi et Marie Virolle, elle est soutenue par un comité prestigieux d'intellectuels des deux pays basé à Paris, dans le but premier d'offrir un espace d'expression aux écrivains algériens, dans un contexte de guerre civile qui avait mis à mal la majeure partie du monde littéraire algérien.

Nous essaierons de montrer la fragilité de la constitution d'un capital transnational pour cette revue, entre la France et l'Algérie. Selon la définition que nous utiliserons ici, le capital transnational se caractérise par la valeur supplémentaire attachée à un capital (économique, culturel, spécifique…) grâce au transfert d'un bien d'un pays à un autre. Ce transfert reste sensible par une présence symbolique, un marquage (la littérature *venue* d'Algérie, un roman algérien *publié en* France). Cette constitution (ou augmentation) de capital est plus ou moins forte suivant la direction du transfert, suivant l'histoire des hiérarchies symboliques entre les pays et les espaces sociaux concernés. Or la domination symbolique (et en réalité multiforme) de la France, et surtout de Paris, sur la littérature mondiale et francophone en particulier, liée quoiqu'irréductible à la seule histoire coloniale, entraîne des transferts tout à fait inégaux avec l'Algérie[176]. La marque algérienne est moins rentable dans le champ littéraire français que la marque française ne l'est dans le champ littéraire algérien, la première étant généralement présentée comme un stigmate de relégation, au mieux comme un capital « d'exotisme

[175] ALA est une revue publiée par les éditions « Marsa », SARL de presse, et reste la principale publication de cette maison d'édition. Dans la mesure où la revue publie jusqu'en 2002 un long inédit (roman, théâtre, recueil…) en première partie (on parle de « revue-collection » ou de « livrazine »), la confusion est habituellement faite chez les enquêtés entre la revue et l'éditeur. En Algérie à l'inverse, « Marsa Editions », qui est une SARL d'édition, publie davantage de textes en plus de la revue. Les relations se font entre les deux maisons d'édition sœur : Marsa (dite Marsa Paris) et Marsa Editions (dite Marsa Alger).

[176] Voir notamment Pascale Casanova, *La République mondiale des Lettres*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1999, ou encore pour le cas des échanges de traduction Gisèle Sapiro, Translatio *: Le marché de la traduction en France à l'heure de la mondialisation*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2011.

postcolonial[177] » en phase avec les exigences du marché d'accueil, la seconde comme une proximité à « l'international ».

Le capital transnational, soit la présence valorisée de la marque symbolique d'un transfert dans un bien, ne saurait donc être pensé de manière homogène suivant que l'« international » en question est « central » (la France) ou « périphérique[178] » (l'Algérie). Par ailleurs, les circonstances peuvent valoriser ou dévaluer un capital transnational en modifiant les hiérarchies symboliques transnationales, ou en rehaussant le prestige d'une région périphérique. C'est là le facteur principal de fragilité du capital transnational pour le cas qui nous intéresse. Née des circonstances de la guerre civile et des mouvements de solidarité français à l'égard de l'Algérie, la revue devient centrale dans le champ littéraire algérien du fait de l'accumulation de capitaux parisiens, mais ne parvient pas à conserver sa position quand la conjoncture change. C'est qu'elle n'est pas parvenue à s'implanter *réellement* dans l'espace[179] littéraire algérien, mais seulement *symboliquement* : les capitaux français sont difficilement reconvertibles en Algérie, second facteur de fragilité ici du capital transnational.

Cette étude porte essentiellement sur la période 1996-2002 et s'appuie sur une lecture systématique des numéros de la revue jusqu'en 1999 ; un travail sur ses archives qu'il nous a été permis de classer et consulter[180] ; et des entretiens avec les fondateurs et un certain nombre de collaborateurs de la revue.

LES VALEURS DIFFERENCIEES DE L'INTERNATIONALITE

Revue de littérature algérienne située en France, *ALA* n'a pas les mêmes succès dans les espaces symboliques algériens et français. Dans un entretien à la revue *Encres Vagabondes* le 5 décembre 1996, Marie Virolle déclare : « On est dans la marge la plus incroyable, avec pourtant comme objectif d'être dans la centralité la plus grande. » Elle reste toutefois ambiguë sur l'espace pour lequel ils ambitionnent d'être centraux : quoi qu'il en soit, cette ambition est rapidement oubliée pour la part française (si elle a jamais existé), alors qu'elle est couronnée de succès pour la part algérienne.

Marginalité française

La revue-maison d'édition reste effectivement marginale en France. La réalité de ses financements indique dans quels espaces la revue s'inscrit, par delà l'ambition affichée. Le

[177] Graham Huggan, *The Postcolonial Exotic, Marketing the Margins*, London, Routledge, 2001.

[178] Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2004.

[179] Nous utilisons « espace littéraire » pour désigner l'ensemble des institutions et des acteurs composant le monde des lettres, et réservons « champ littéraire » à l'espace de concurrence entre écrivains. Pour cette raison, on parlera souvent dans ce travail sur la revue *ALA* de « champ littéraire algérien », car la faiblesse des autres institutions littéraires algériennes lui confère un rôle central dans le positionnement relatif des écrivains ; on parlera à l'inverse souvent d'« espace littéraire français » dans la mesure où *ALA* ne joue aucun rôle dans le champ littéraire français, mais est positionnée au sein des champs de revue et d'édition.

[180] Ces archives sont situées dans le local de la revue, rue de Rochechouart à Paris.

financement de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (MSH) montre une inscription dans l'espace des revues universitaires portant sur des aires culturelles (comme *Awal*, soutenue également par la MSH), où elle a acquis une bonne réputation : Marie Virolle est elle-même chercheuse au CNRS, et un grand nombre des collaborateurs de la revue sont universitaires, souvent réputés. Le FAS (Fonds d'Action Sociale[181]) est devenu avec le temps le plus important bailleur de fonds, passant d'un tiers à la moitié des subventions totales reçues entre 1997 et 2002. Ce financement souligne, contrairement à l'ambition proclamée de ne pas en faire une « revue d'exil**[182] », sa proximité avec les revues communautaires ou portant sur les questions de multiculturalité et d'immigration, avec lesquelles les échanges de publicité sont les plus nombreux (comme *Hommes et Migrations* ou *Ecarts d'identité*). *ALA* fait ainsi partie d'une association de revues, l'« Association des Revues Plurielles », qui partagent ces types de questions. Mais en tant que revue littéraire interculturelle, ou revue à tendance universitaire « francophoniste », elle se trouve marginale au sein du champ des revues françaises « non-marquées[183] », comme le prouve l'absence presque entière de citation ou autre soutien symbolique parmi celles-ci.

En tant qu'éditeur (puisque à chaque numéro, elle publie un long inédit, souvent un roman), *ALA* finit par assumer pleinement sa position marginale. Marie Virolle reconnait dans plusieurs entretiens qu'il ne s'agissait pas de concurrencer Gallimard. Bien plus, elle affirme avoir conseillé à Salim Bachi, dont le manuscrit était prometteur, d'aller se présenter chez de grands éditeurs : il sera finalement publié chez Gallimard, et accordera son premier entretien à *ALA*. Mettant en avant sa position de petite maison, elle dit « prend[re] des risques » à publier des auteurs inconnus. Comme l'indique pendant deux ans la quatrième de couverture,

> La revue soutient cette littérature [algérienne] en lui ouvrant un lieu autonome, loin des pressions économiques et idéologiques, un espace où sa diversité peut s'exprimer avec pour seul critère la force des textes. L'ambition d'*Algérie Littérature / Action* est également de susciter des dynamiques, d'encourager les nouveaux auteurs, d'ouvrir des espaces de rencontre et de réflexion. La revue prend le risque, renouant en cela avec une vieille tradition, de publier des œuvres inédites intégrales, même longues (romans, récits, théâtre), et de les immerger dans une actualité littéraire déjà reconnue.

Cherchant à objectiver sa position en se référant en filigrane aux travaux de Bourdieu, les fondateurs de la revue mettent en relation la taille de leur maison avec l'« autonomie » qu'ils

[181] Le FAS, fondé en 1958 « pour les travailleurs musulmans d'Algérie en métropole et pour leur famille », a ensuite étendu son public (le Fastif : Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leur famille), d'abord aux immigrés de toutes nationalités, puis à toute personne souffrant de discrimination, et diversifié ses activités.

[182] Tout au long de cet article, l'astérisque* renvoie à un entretien personnel fait avec Marie Virolle à Paris le 31 octobre 2012, la double astérisque** à un entretien personnel avec Aïssa Khelladi, à Alger le 23 avril 2014.

[183] C'est-à-dire portant sur la littérature française centrale, donc « européenne » et « blanche ». C'est le propre des littératures centrales de se concevoir et d'être pensées comme non-marquées. Sur le caractère racialisé de la « littérature française », voir Tristan Leperlier, « Les Français et la Francophonie, perspective postcoloniale sur la représentation de la littérature francophone en France. », Minho (Portugal), Universidade do Minho, 2011.

revendiquent par rapport aux logiques économiques184. De fait, elle fait « de nécessité vertu ». Les auteurs, vivant en Algérie ou en France, qui envoient leurs manuscrits à ALA ont généralement été refusés par de plus grandes maisons d'éditions, ou ont anticipé des refus : ALA à l'inverse insistait sur son ouverture aux Algériens les moins reconnus. Une telle position lui permet de se faire « découvreur de talent* ». Refusé par Le Seuil, le premier roman de Maïssa Bey Au com*mencement était la mer* publié par *ALA* sera un succès de librairie, en particulier après sa cession de droits aux éditions de L'Aube. L'image du « tremplin* » que Marie Virolle utilise pour décrire son rôle d'éditeur reflète bien la réalité de sa position.

Centralité algérienne

Cette capacité à sortir ses écrivains de la marginalité en donnant accès à la publication parisienne n'est pas pour rien dans le succès d'*ALA* dans le champ littéraire algérien.

Cette centralité se lit dans les lettres reçues à la revue. Dans une lettre d'octobre 1996[185], un lecteur algérien immigré en France, très enthousiaste à la parution de la revue, y voyait un moyen de lutter contre l'isolement : « Beaucoup trop d'intelligences dispersées, esseulées, et donc déprimées. » Il y voyait également un lieu d'échanges dans un pays (la France) qui met les « Arabes sur la touche », voire une nouvelle république des lettres algériennes, un centre accessible à tous : « Enfin une chose qui ne sera pas autre chose que ce que nous en ferons ». Cette centralité dans le champ littéraire algérien est liée au prestige qu'elle a su acquérir. Dans une lettre de décembre 1999[186], une écrivaine éconduite, qui aura quelques temps plus tard un rôle important dans l'animation culturelle algérienne en France, s'avoue déçue de ne pas être publiée par « revue aussi prestigieuse que Algérie Littérature/Action ».

Bien plus, cette centralité se mesure au nombre et à la qualité de ses contributeurs. Un quart des écrivains algériens actifs à cette période a publié au moins une fois dans la revue entre 1996 et 1999, et le taux monte à près de 40% quand on ne prend en compte que les francophones (et bilingues)[187]. De fait, elle remplit en la matière un vide absolu dans l'espace littéraire algérien des deux rives, surtout pour sa part francophone (plusieurs revues existent pour la littérature algérienne d'expression arabe).

Comme dans d'autres collectifs, les contributeurs écrivains d'*ALA* (toutes contributions confondues) sont majoritairement très marginaux dans l'espace d'accueil : « marqués » par leur origine[188], ils sont en outre souvent nouvellement arrivés en France. Bien plus, ils le sont dans

184 Cette manière d'assumer politiquement la réalité de cette marginalité économique se retrouve chez les éditeurs indépendants dont parle Sophie Noël, *L'Edition indépendante critique : engagements politiques et intellectuels*, Lyon, ENSSIB, 2012.

185 Archives d'ALA, Boite « courrier 1996 ».

186 Archives d'ALA. Boite « courrier 1999 ».

187 Selon notre base de données prosopographique, portant sur les écrivains algériens en activité entre 1988 et 2003.

188 Sur la domination symbolique des écrivains « francophones » (c'est-à-dire francophones non-français) dans le champ littéraire français, voir notamment Claire Ducournau, *Écrire, lire, élire l'Afrique: les mécanismes de réception et de consécration d'écrivains contemporains originaires de pays francophones d'Afrique*

le monde littéraire francophone en Algérie : journalistes (Aïssa Khelladi, Hassan Bouabdellah…) ou universitaires (Zineb Ali Labidi, Soumya Ammar-Khodja …), ce sont de nouveaux entrants dans le champ littéraire, qui n'habitent parfois pas à Alger (El-Mahdi Acherchour…). On constate par ailleurs une surreprésentation des femmes[189]. Pourtant ces contributeurs écrivains étaient généralement reconnus dans les espaces professionnels qu'ils ont parfois dû quitter (dès lors en situation de déclassement professionnel, au moins provisoire, du fait de leur émigration en France). Les rares écrivains arabophones publiés dans la revue (Waciny Laredj, Merzak Bagtache, Abdelhamid Benhaddouga, Mohamed Sari), sont même tout à fait centraux dans l'espace littéraire algérien de langue arabe.

La revue réussit pourtant à attirer dans ses pages des écrivains algériens reconnus, même si ils sont rares à y publier régulièrement. Ils publient en effet généralement déjà dans des maisons d'édition françaises, dès avant la guerre civile ou depuis son embrasement. Sur les 26 premiers numéros, aucun écrivain reconnu n'a publié plus de trois textes (fiction, entretien, ou autre), en dehors de Jamel-Eddine Bencheikh, plus connu pour ses travaux de traduction, et Waciny Laredj. En revanche, un nombre non négligeable d'écrivains importants dans le champ littéraire algérien accorde des textes courts ou des entretiens à la revue : Abdelkader Djemaï, Jean Pélégri et Leïla Sebbar donnent trois textes, Malika Mokeddem et Habib Tengour deux, Mohammed Dib et Assia Djebar un. La fréquence des contributions est donc inversement proportionnelle à la notoriété des écrivains, et s'apparente donc parfois à un acte de parrainage. *ALA* parvient ainsi à prendre une position centrale dans le champ littéraire algérien, recevant le soutien des plus reconnus, et amenant à elle des nouveaux venus non complètement marginaux, attirés par la perspective de l'entrée dans l'espace littéraire français.

On voit qu'il est difficile de parler pour ce cas précis d'un capital transnational homogène : les valeurs de l'internationalité varient suivant les hiérarchies symboliques internationales et les contextes spécifiques à chaque champ considéré. Marginale car marquée comme non-centrale dans un espace littéraire français par ailleurs saturé, la revue est en revanche marquée positivement, dans un espace algérien déstructuré, pour sa proximité et surtout l'accès qu'elle donne à l'« international » français. Cet ajustement, mais également l'importance des capitaux français que la revue a su accumuler, sont à l'origine de sa centralité algérienne.

LE TRANSFERT DE CAPITAUX FRANÇAIS

On peut dire qu'*ALA* a accumulé un capital transnational dans la mesure où sa centralité dans le champ littéraire algérien vient en bonne partie de ce que, quoique algérienne dans sa marque, elle a pu profiter dans un contexte politique particulier de capitaux économiques et symboliques français.

subsaharienne, Thèse de doctorat, École doctorale de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, 2012, 736 p.

[189] L'ensemble des contributeurs (à la fois écrivains et critiques) femme jusque fin 1998 représente 40% du total, quand, à titre de comparaison, elles ne représentent que 20 à 25% des écrivains de la période selon notre base de données prosopographique.

Des capitaux économiques français affirmés

Le capital économique accumulé par la revue pour exister est en effet entièrement français. Comme on l'a déjà évoqué, ses subventions viennent d'institutions françaises : Centre National du Livre (CNL), Centres Culturels Français d'Algérie (donc du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères), Fond d'Action Social (FAS), Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (MSH). Contractuellement, la mention de ces aides figure sur les ouvrages qui en ont bénéficié. Mais sporadiquement, l'origine uniquement française de ces fonds est rappelée, comme gage de l'autonomie de la revue par rapport aux possibles pressions politiques algériennes : opposant par avance à l'argument nationaliste de la « traîtrise » celui d'une autonomie intellectuelle dénationalisée[190]. C'est le cas par exemple dans une lettre adressée à la direction de *Télérama* en février 1999 après que l'un de ses journalistes a accusé Aïssa Khelladi d'être lié aux services secrets algériens. Plus tard à l'inverse, à la suite du semi-échec de l'expérience de Marsa Alger (voir plus bas), Aïssa Khelladi déplore n'avoir jamais reçu d'argent de la part du gouvernement algérien :

> […] la revue, *Algérie Littérature/Action*, a eu beaucoup plus de lecteurs en France qu'ici. Ici, j'arrivais pas à avoir un abonnement, j'arrivais pas à faire un terrain, j'arrivais pas à vendre. […] pour l'acheter, il n'y avait personne, pour aider personne, l'ambassade de France m'a aidé un peu au début pour deux, trois numéros, mais après ben ils pouvaient pas aider non plus tout le temps. Le Ministère de la culture n'a jamais donné de deniers publics pour la revue, ils n'ont jamais donné.[**]

Le début de cet extrait évoque un autre aspect du capital économique de la revue, celui des abonnements. Dans une publicité datée de mai 1997, diffusée à l'occasion du premier anniversaire de la revue, la rédaction déclare avoir plus de 400 abonnés dont une trentaine de grandes bibliothèques. Or là encore la part algérienne n'est pas dominante ni même majoritaire. A la lecture du « fichier client » créé en octobre 1997 (qui rassemble l'ensemble des commandes et des abonnements à cette date, ce qui correspond à 450 noms environ), on constate que les noms des lecteurs réguliers de la revue se partagent assez également entre noms à consonance « française » et « algérienne »[191]. Et même quand elle a été diffusée en Algérie à partir de 1999, la quasi-totalité des abonnés habitaient en France, ou dans d'autres pays du « nord » (pays francophones du nord, Etats-Unis, Allemagne…), selon Aïssa Khelladi. Avec l'indication de la trentaine de « grandes bibliothèques », on voit que ce capital économique est tout autant un capital d'ordre symbolique.

[190] Pour autant les subventions françaises n'ont pas été neutres dans l'évolution de la revue, notamment sur son recentrement partiel sur les littératures « beurs ».

[191] Le critère grossier de la « consonance », qui recoupe l'opposition entre noms chrétiens et musulmans, ne permet pas bien sûr de déterminer le lieu de naissance ni la nationalité des personnes. Charles Soulié et Brice Le Gall ont adopté une méthodologie équivalente et s'en expliquent dans « Voyage en terre d'asile académique. Éléments pour une histoire sociale des étudiants étrangers de Paris VIII et d'ailleurs », *in* Charles Soulié (dir.), *Un mythe à détruire? Origines et destin du Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes*, *Vincennes*, Presses universitaires de *Vincennes*, 2012.

Des capitaux symboliques français euphémisés

Sa situation parisienne, on l'a vu, est décisive pour comprendre l'attrait dont *ALA* a fait l'objet. Dans les entretiens ou les publicités, la direction ne manque pas de rappeler l'ensemble des capitaux symboliques qui ont convergé vers elle, quoiqu'avec une tendance cette fois à l'euphémisation de leur dimension proprement française.

C'est le cas dans cette publicité déjà citée, où il est indiqué que de « nombreux articles de presse, des émissions de radio et de télévision » ont été consacrés à la revue. Leur dossier de presse est en effet très important. Outre de nombreux articles et entretiens dans la presse papier française (*Le Monde, Libération, Télérama, Le Nouvel Observateur*…) et algérienne francophone (*El Watan, La Tribune, La Nation*…), les animateurs ont été plusieurs fois invités dans les médias audiovisuels (France Culture, « Bouillon de culture », « Qu'est-ce qu'elle a dit Zazie ? »...), allant jusqu'à mettre en place un jeu-concours avec « Beur-FM » en décembre 1999 (mois de ramadan). Par ailleurs leurs écrivains sont invités dans un grand nombre de manifestations publiques, comme lorsque certains de ses numéros ont été sélectionnés par la « Quinzaine de la FNAC » au printemps 1999. Mais ce sont deux exemples français qui sont cités : ils rappellent la formule de Philippe Vallet à France Info, « véritable coup de tonnerre dans l'édition parisienne », et annoncent un grand article avec photo à paraitre dans le *Télérama* du 4 juin 1997. Sans mettre en avant le fait qu'ils sont français, cette publicité accrédite le prestige attaché à ces médias.

Il en va de même pour les « collaborateurs prestigieux » de la revue évoqués également dans cette publicité. En première page de chaque numéro, figurent les noms du comité de « collaborations et parrainages », les deux termes étant habilement mélangés alors qu'ils ne se recoupent pas (les plus prestigieux d'entre eux ne « collaborent » généralement pas, on l'a vu). Derrière la juxtaposition de noms classés par ordre alphabétique, on constate que la majeure partie possède un lien plus qu'étroit avec la France : il s'agit de prestigieux intellectuels algériens vivant en France (Mohammed Dib, Assia Djebar, Leïla Sebbar qui est d'origine algérienne mais de nationalité française…), ou encore proprement français (Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, Etienne Balibar…). Ce sont d'ailleurs ces derniers qui sont les plus cités en entretien par les rédacteurs ou les écrivains de la revue, comme Marie Virolle :

> […] les gens se sont abonnés magnifiquement sans avoir pratiquement rien en main, juste par confiance dans la qualité du travail qui serait fait, avec le soutien de Bourdieu, Derrida, Balibar, Jeanson et tout, tout le monde est venu parce que ces intellectuels-là nous ont vraiment permis de nous asseoir sur déjà, une petite notoriété symbolique... un petit capital symbolique comme dit Bourdieu, on avait le capital symbolique et le capital a suivi par les abonnements.*

Méconnu et donc reconnu, ce prestige symbolique français a par ailleurs la particularité de reposer originellement sur une dimension militante.

Un transfert politique de capitaux

L'intérêt que portent ces intellectuels symboliquement dominants à une petite revue algérienne ne laisse pas de dérouter en effet si l'on s'en tient aux hiérarchies symboliques internationales dans le monde des lettres. C'est que ces parrainages relèvent d'un acte politique conjoncturel, lié à la situation critique de l'Algérie. Cette solidarité avec les intellectuels algériens, à la suite notamment des mobilisations du CISIA[192] présidé par Pierre Bourdieu et dans lequel Marie Virolle a joué un rôle important, réactive par ailleurs les anciennes solidarités de gauche de l'époque de la guerre d'Algérie puis du tiers-mondisme. Universitaires, journalistes, ou appartenant aux milieux littéraires plus largement (écrivains, éditeurs, théâtre…), ces illustres parrains ont avec l'Algérie une histoire, qu'elle soit biographique ou militante. On peut donc distinguer trois groupes de parrains de la revue.

1) Les écrivains et universitaires algériens connus. Tous ont été socialisés dans un contexte intellectuel de forte politisation, marqué par la guerre de libération (Mohammed Dib, Assia Djebar, Christiane Chaulet-Achour), et par le socialisme pour les plus jeunes (Abdekader Djemaï, Arezki Metref). Certains ont milité au parti communiste algérien (le Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste) comme Naget Khadda ou Waciny Laredj, et ont été menacés en bonne partie pour cette raison.
2) Les intellectuels français ayant un lien biographique avec l'Algérie. Jacques Derrida est issu d'une famille juive d'Alger, et l'éditeur au Seuil Louis Gardel est né également à Alger. Sami Naïr, né en Algérie, est installé en tant qu'universitaire et engagé politiquement auprès de Jean-Pierre Chevènement.
3) Les intellectuels français militants anticoloniaux ou tiers-mondistes. On compte parmi eux des anciens de la lutte contre la guerre d'Algérie (Etienne Balibar, Pierre Vidal-Naquet) ; des coopérants de l'Algérie socialiste (Pierre Bourdieu, Charles Bonn). La revue des *Temps Modernes*, très active pendant ces deux périodes, est représentée par Marie-France Briselance, Danielle Sallenave puis Claire Etcherelli, qui sans avoir participé à la guerre d'Algérie ont été marquées par les idéologies du tiers-mondisme. Enfin Gabriel Garran, dont les parents juifs ont été déportés, est un militant de la francophonie, lui qui dirige le Théâtre International de la Langue Française (TILF).

Ce caractère politique est sensible dans la ligne éditoriale de la revue elle-même, qui utilise la rhétorique de l'engagement dès son titre : dans un contexte marqué par les violences affectant les intellectuels algériens, et par l'inquiétude de ces derniers, francophones en particulier, face à la pérennité de la culture en Algérie, « publier est un acte politique » (ALA n°3, p.121). Bien plus, la fonction politique de la littérature est pleinement assumée, car elle est perçue comme un médium de compréhension de la crise algérienne : « Cette parole littéraire de l'urgence est autrement plus complexe, plus nuancée, plus humaine que tous les discours politiques ou

[192] Comité International de Soutien aux Intellectuels Algériens, fondé en 1993 à la suite de l'assassinat de Tahar Djaout.

médiatiques. » (quatrième de couverture pendant deux ans). L'étiquette « littérature de l'urgence », directement liée aux enjeux politiques de la période, est même créée dans ses pages. Située à Paris, la revue algérienne réussit à accumuler, dans un contexte qui valorise la marque algérienne auprès d'un milieu intellectuel de gauche formé en partie à l'époque de la guerre d'Algérie, un capital français dont la valeur non seulement économique mais surtout symbolique est reconnue par tous dans un espace international hiérarchisé ; un capital transnational donc, mais qui n'en reste pas moins fragile.

FRAGILITE DU CAPITAL TRANSNATIONAL

Lié à la conjoncture politique, son capital transnational se dévalue en effet très vite en France, et il est par ailleurs difficilement reconvertible en Algérie à cause des contraintes concrètes de son marché.

Dépolitisation et dévaluation progressive de la revue en France

Il semble qu'au fur et à mesure que l'Algérie du terrorisme est sortie des médias français, la revue, son lectorat, et ses contributeurs se sont éloignés du militantisme qui les caractérisait au départ. La logique présidant à l'édition de la revue était en effet en bonne partie militante. Bénévoles, les collaborateurs d'*ALA* entendaient reconstruire un espace d'expression qui avait été entièrement détruit par la guerre. Marie Virolle en particulier, qui se dit Algérienne « de cœur » sans en avoir la nationalité, a été l'une des personnes à l'origine de la création du CISIA, et perçoit son activité au sein d'*ALA* dans la continuité de son engagement auprès des intellectuels algériens en péril. Pourtant, dès 1999, les demandes de subventions au CNL[193] insistent sur la volonté de routinisation de la pratique éditoriale :

> L'objectif de faire fonctionner progressivement la revue d'une façon « classique », moins militante, se concrétise doucement, sans que soit perdu de vue, bien au contraire, l'engagement motivé de cette publication au service de la littérature et de la culture algériennes, son caractère novateur et original.


Si l'on ne peut prendre pour argent comptant des déclarations en vue de l'obtention de financements, celles-ci recoupent toutefois un certain nombre de changements dans la pratique d'édition. Si Aïssa Khelladi, qui « a toujours eu les pieds sur terre* », s'est toujours attribué un salaire quand les finances de l'entreprise le permettaient, on constate cependant une certaine rationalisation des activités à partir de 1999, comme la création d'un local rue de Rochechouart à Paris centralisant les activités et les dépôts, l'emploi régulier d'un salarié et/ou de stagiaires, ou la comptabilisation par Marie Virolle des publications de la revue dans la liste de ses travaux pour le CNRS.

[193] Archives d'ALA.

Cette dépolitisation, sensible dans les pratiques, se retrouve dans la modification et la chute de son lectorat. A partir de 2000, les demandes de subventions au CNL ne mettent plus tant l'accent sur le nombre global d'abonnés (par ailleurs très surévalué) que sur le fait que de nombreuses universités internationales et départements spécialisés en littératures francophones sont abonnés. Mais plus largement, cette routinisation du lectorat ne parvient pas à compenser la chute de celui originellement fondé sur l'action militante. Le succès d'estime que reçoit la revue dans ses premières années s'essouffle avec le temps. Marie Virolle évoque ainsi la période faste des abonnements :

> Le début, les 4 ou 5 premières années quand c'était très très chaud autour de l'Algérie, parce que vous savez on est tributaires de l'actualité tout bêtement, donc quand on s'est montés les projecteurs étaient complètement braqués sur nous, après... bon y a eu après une petite remontée 2003 parce que c'était l'année de l'Algérie en France, et après ça a été carrément l'effondrement […]*

La chute du nombre d'abonnements semble avoir été très brusque. Si en 2002 on n'en compte plus qu'environ 150[194], il semble que le nombre ait été relativement stable depuis 2000. Plus largement, on peut suivre la désaffection progressive de la revue à partir des chiffres donnés aux impôts.



Graphique 1 : Evolution des revenus des éditions Marsa (Paris) entre 1997 et 1999, en francs constants (conversion pour l'année 2002).

Les courbes ici en dents de scie (subventions, et donc produits d'exploitation) doivent être quelque peu écrasées : les chiffres de fin d'exercice budgétaire sont tributaires de l'irrégularité de paiement des bailleurs de fond ; mais les subventions reçues restent à peu près stables à partir de 1998 (autour de 250 000FF). On constate une baisse du produit d'exploitation sur la période (perte de près de 40%), liée en majeure partie à la baisse de la vente de marchandise, en l'occurrence les ventes des numéros de la revue. La vente par abonnements, qui caractérise les années 1997-1998, s'effrite, et est compensée en partie en 2000-2001 par les ventes au numéro, grâce notamment à l'ouverture d'un local-librairie rue de Rochechouart. Si, à partir de 1999, *ALA* rejoint le lot commun des petites revues subsistant grâce aux subventions publiques, qui contribuent en moyenne pour moitié à son produit d'exploitation, ce sont à l'inverse les années 1997-1998 qui sont exceptionnelles, et donnent la mesure, au travers des abonnements, du soutien (sinon du succès)

[194] Selon un budget manuscrit sans date mais écrit en euros, dans la boite « courriers 2001-2002 », Archives d'ALA.

français à la revue dans un contexte de mobilisations intellectuelles en France en faveur d'une Algérie en proie aux massacres.

La stigmatisation de la « littérature d'urgence » ou encore la « littérature de témoignage » chez les nouvelles générations d'écrivains cherchant à se distinguer de leurs aînés, étiquettes en partie associées à la revue, ont contribué également à la perte de prestige de celle-ci. La revue a pourtant rapidement réagi au développement de la critique contre cette étiquette, notamment en coupant dès le numéro 17 de janvier 1998 la partie de la Quatrième de couverture consacrée à la question de la « littérature d'urgence ». Pourtant, à une question portant sur ces étiquettes, un jeune écrivain[195] qui y avait publié ses premiers textes avant d'entrer chez un éditeur prestigieux nous expliquait: « *Algérie Littérature/ Action* par exemple en a fait beaucoup hein sur ça, des romans comme ça : c'est pas resté. Les éditeurs à l'époque publiaient ça tu vois ». Manière de se distinguer d'un « mouvement » duquel il a pu être un temps rapproché, en l'homogénéisant comme une littérature d'actualité qui « ne reste pas ». Le fait qu'*ALA* puisse ainsi servir de bouc-émissaire, porte-étendard rétrospectif d'une littérature stigmatisée, montre a contrario la centralité qu'elle avait acquise dans ces années.

Prenant acte du changement global de conjoncture, Marie Virolle a donc réorienté Marsa Paris vers les littératures « beur » :

> […] on s'est retrouvés avec un problème financier, déjà, et on s'est retrouvés avec quand même une situation historique qui avait pas mal évolué, beaucoup des auteurs qui étaient en France soit étaient revenus au pays, soit poussés par nous parce qu'on a servi de tremplin, avaient trouvé des voies éditoriales plus prestigieuses on va dire, et donc on s'est posé la question : est-ce qu'on garde la même ligne ou est ce qu'on infléchit ? Et on a infléchi pour ce qui est de Marsa Paris, vers une ouverture plus grande aux écritures dites « beurs » […] Et aussi pour pouvoir bénéficier des subventions, voilà, de la région, de l'ACSE[196] qui commençait à enlever toute subvention à tout le monde...*

Perdant avec le temps le crédit symbolique qu'elle avait accumulé grâce à la conjoncture de violences en Algérie et de solidarité en France, *ALA* conserve toutefois une partie des subventions françaises grâce à sa routinisation et sa « francisation ». Cette dernière marque aussi l'échec, après tout de même six ans d'existence (1999-2005), d'une revue et de publications faites en parallèle de part et d'autres de la Méditerranée. C'est que les capitaux français se sont avérés paradoxalement difficiles à transférer en Algérie.

Les difficultés de transfert des capitaux français en Algérie

Refusant d'en faire une « revue d'exil », Aïssa Khelladi et Marie Virolle entreprennent dès 1998 de diffuser *ALA* en Algérie, et créent en 1999 une « société sœur » à Alger (Marsa Editions), cette fois SARL d'édition. Il s'agit de convertir la centralité symbolique acquise au sein du champ littéraire algérien en centralité réelle, en la donnant effectivement à lire aux

[195] Entretien personnel, mai 2014.

[196] L'Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances (ACSÉ) a remplacé en 2006 le FASILD, qui remplaçait depuis 2001 le FAS (cf : p.2).

Algériens. Portée par Aïssa Khelladi qui se réinstalle à Alger en 2000, l'ambition de Marsa Alger n'est pas militante, mais de devenir une maison d'édition centrale en Algérie, au moment où l'espace littéraire s'y reconstruit à peine. Comme il l'écrit dès avant la création de Marsa Alger dans une lettre datée du 12 septembre 1998[197], il s'agit de « doter l'Algérie de sa véritable maison d'édition littéraire, avec ses collections et sa revue d'avant-garde [198], *Algérie Littérature/Action*. »

Pourtant, loin de « prendre des risques » comme Marsa Paris, Marsa Alger reprend les titres publiés d'*ALA* qui ont eu le plus de succès, pour les proposer au public algérien au format poche et à bas prix (200 DA généralement). Il s'agit donc de convertir le capital symbolique accumulé dans la marginalité française en centralité algérienne. Bien plus, Marsa Alger diversifie rapidement ses titres en lançant un pôle de traduction, et en achetant des droits à des éditeurs français pour publier en Algérie, à raison de 7 livres publiés en poche par an (entre 2000 et 2002). Cette stratégie lui permet de devenir en 2001 (mais cette année seulement) la première maison d'édition littéraire francophone algérienne en nombre de titres publiés[199].

Cette constitution d'un capital symbolique à partir des ressources françaises n'est possible que par le transfert de capitaux économiques français : Marsa Alger est soutenue par le Bureau du Livre du MAE et le Ministère de la culture français. Tandis que Marsa Paris paye les droits d'auteur, les deux maisons mettent en place un échange de bons procédés économiques. A partir de 2000, l'impression des numéros d'*ALA* et des livres publiés à part se fait chez un éditeur algérien : en achetant les livres à Marsa Alger, Marsa Paris permet à la maison-sœur de dégager une marge importante, et réduit considérablement ses propres charges (dans un contexte, on l'a vu, de baisse de ses ventes).

Pourtant ces transferts butent sur la réalité du marché algérien. Celui-ci souffre au début des années 2000 d'un manque de professionnalisation : le militantisme qui caractérisait la rédaction parisienne n'est pas remplacé par un salariat solide en Algérie. Mais bien plus il souffre d'une grande étroitesse de lectorat et de grands problèmes de diffusion.

> C'était très très compliqué la diffusion en Algérie, c'est une catastrophe, nous on avait dû prendre un gars qui parcourait l'Algérie avec sa petite camionnette et qui distribuait, et alors quand on n'était pas payés par les libraires mon dieu mon dieu c'était très très *hard*... donc Marsa-Alger n'a pu vivre que grâce à Marsa-Paris pratiquement […]*

L'activité de Marsa Alger se fait donc à perte, et ne peut se poursuivre un temps que grâce au soutien de Marsa Paris. Les gains économiques mêmes que Marsa Paris réalisait en faisant imprimer ses numéros en Algérie sont perdus du fait des problèmes d'acheminement des livres. Comme le dit Marie Virolle,

[197] Archives d'ALA, « Courrier 1998 ».

[198] Le terme est très rarement utilisé dans la communication de la revue, privilégiant l'expression de « nouvelle littérature algérienne ».

[199] Selon notre base de données bibliographiques.

> On a constaté que notre collection en arabe ne marchait pas du tout, que les arabisants n'étaient pas du tout en recherche de littérature, donc on a quand même perdu un peu de sous sur cette affaire […] On en a tiré les leçons, on a arrêté la collection en arabe, mais de toute façon très rapidement on a été confrontés à ce problème d'import export où on perdait les livres aussi, tout ça été pénible, et du coup on a arrêté... alors après tout s'est arrêté, le pôle de traduction, et finalement la maison d'édition là-bas a périclité...*

Comme elle l'explique dans un autre entretien, Marsa Paris n'avait pas l'argent pour payer un transporteur suffisamment professionnel, et « n'avait pas les reins assez solides », pour perdre autant de livres. Elle cesse d'acheter ses livres à Marsa Alger, qui, privée de la majeure partie de ses revenus, arrête alors presque aussitôt ses activités (en 2005).

Pas assez solide, la double maison d'édition n'était paradoxalement pas non plus assez petite. Sa taille acquise pendant les quatre premières années parisiennes justifiait l'ambition d'en faire la maison d'édition centrale en Algérie, par l'importation de textes reconnus publiés d'abord en France. A l'inverse, la jeune maison d'édition littéraire Barzakh, misant sur de nouveaux écrivains locaux et dont la production est ajustée à sa clientèle algérienne, se développe (comme d'autres après elle) en harmonie avec les contraintes du marché algérien. Elle a par ailleurs axé sa politique éditoriale contre l'étiquette de « littérature de l'urgence » qui a en partie permis de stigmatiser Marsa.

Paradoxalement donc, le capital économique et symbolique accumulé à Paris n'a pas été reconvertible à Alger : Marsa Alger s'avère trop petite ou trop grande pour le marché algérien, pas assez ou trop française malgré sa marginalité parisienne.

Conclusion

Le cas d'*ALA* contribue à rompre avec une représentation parfois simplificatrice des transferts de capitaux à l'international. S'il ne fait pas de doute que les hiérarchies internationales dans un domaine particulier (la littérature en l'occurrence) entraînent dans un sous-espace dominé (le champ littéraire algérien) une valorisation de la marque internationale (être publié, voire reconnu à Paris), en revanche l'accumulation, et surtout la conservation d'un capital transnational pour une institution marquée par son caractère périphérique (revue algérienne en France) ne vont pas de soi. Ce sont les circonstances de la guerre civile qui ont valorisé en France la marque algérienne, permettant la création d'*ALA* à Paris, et attirant à elle des capitaux symboliques, mais aussi économiques. Ceux-ci n'ont certes pas été suffisants pour faire pénétrer la revue autrement que de manière marginale dans l'espace littéraire français, mais ils l'ont été pour la rendre symboliquement centrale dans le champ littéraire algérien. Son déclassement montre la fragilité du capital transnational acquis. Si le transfert de capitaux français à la revue algérienne a été possible grâce à la conjoncture, en revanche la reconversion de ceux-ci a été un échec. Le capital de lancement, d'origine militante, n'a pas pu être reconverti en capital à long terme : la perte de lectorat pouvait sembler inéluctable en France pour une revue « marquée », et qui survit grâce à sa conversion partielle mais tardive aux littératures

« beurs ». Mais elle n'est pas parvenue non plus à détacher son image de la dimension politique qui l'avait caractérisée à l'origine, et contre laquelle les nouvelles générations d'écrivains et d'éditeurs algériens se sont positionnées. Bien plus, elle n'est pas arrivée à convertir ce capital français en capital proprement algérien : Marsa Alger, trop grosse car trop française par ses capitaux, n'est pas parvenue à investir concrètement l'espace algérien, et a périclité aussitôt que ces derniers ont manqué. A l'origine de son succès, ce capital transnational est aussi à l'origine de son déclin.