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The University Edition of

SOCIAL

ORIGINS OF

EDUCATIONAL

SYSTEMS

Margaret S Archer

Pedagogiska Institutionen
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PREFACE

In abridging the *Social Origins of Educational Systems* I have tried to produce a text which will be useful to students. Doubtless when this version appears, reduced from 800 to 200 pages, some critics will ask why it could not have been a quarter of its size in the first place. Had it been, others would have undoubtedly criticized it for containing undocumented generalizations, unsubstantiated arguments and unjustified theoretical assertions. And the latter would have been right. The original book was not an instance of the proverbial Chinese apology for sending a long letter because one did not have the time to write a short one. The present text is no substitute for the original, hence the constant back-references for theoretical explication and empirical expansion. It is a readers' digest, produced for students working under time limits. Some, it is hoped, may later explore the unabridged version. Even if they do not, this text will have succeeded if it convinces them that the Sociology of Education remains fundamentally incomplete unless it addresses the *educational system* itself.

Margaret S. Archer
Deddington
September 1983

1 INTRODUCTION: THINKING AND THEORIZING ABOUT EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

The questions dealt with in this book are macroscopic ones: how do state educational systems develop and how do they change? The nature of these questions means that our approach to them must be both historical and comparative. If sociology is to supplement the work of the educational historian and the comparative educationalist it must develop theories which span their findings. This is what the present study attempts to do — to account for the characteristics and contours of national educational systems and their subsequent processes of change.

Thus, the first question here is, why does education have the particular structure, relations to society and internal properties which characterize it at any given time? The basic answer to it is held to be very simple: education has the characteristics it does have because of the goals pursued by those who control it. The second question asks, why do these characteristics change? The basic answer given here is equally simple: change occurs because new goals are pursued by those who have the power to modify education's previous structural form, definition of instruction and relationship to society. As we shall see, these answers are of a deceptive simplicity. They are insisted upon now, at the beginning, because however complex our final formulations turn out to be, education is fundamentally about what people have wanted of it and have been able to do to it.

The real answers are more complicated but they supplement rather than contradict the above: the theories developed to account for the emergence of educational systems and their subsequent change are theories about the educational activities of people. This very basic point is underlined for two reasons. First, because although fundamental, much of the literature in fact contradicts it and embodies implicit beliefs in hidden hands, evolutionary mechanisms, infrastructural determinism, and spontaneous adjustments to social change. There, education is still seen metaphysically, as adapting to social requirements

and responding to the demands of society not of individuals. Secondly, and for the present purposes just as important, our theories will be *about* the educational activities of people, even though they will not explain educational development strictly in terms of people alone.

The basic answers are too simple because they beg more questions than they solve. To say that education derives its characteristic features from the aims of those who control it, immediately raises problems concerning the identification of controlling groups, the bases and processes upon which control rests, the methods and channels through which it is exerted, the extensiveness of control, the reactions of others to this control, and their educational consequences. Similarly, where change is concerned, it is not explained until an account has been given of why educational goals change, who does the changing, and how they impose the changes they seek. To confront these problems is to recognize that their solution depends upon analyzing complex forms of social interaction, for the nature of education is rarely, if ever, the practical realization of an ideal form of instruction as envisaged by a particular group. Instead, most of the time most of the forms that education takes are the political products of power struggles. They bear the marks of concession to allies and compromise with opponents. Thus to understand the nature of education at any time we need to know not only who won the struggle for control, but also how: not merely who lost, but also how badly they lost out.

Again, the basic answers are deceptively simple because they convey the impression that education and educational change can be explained by reference to group goals and balances of power alone. It is a false impression because there are other factors which constrain both the goal formation and the goal attainment of even the most powerful group — that is, the group most free to impose its definition of instruction and to mould the structure of education to its purposes. The point is that no group, even for that matter the whole of society acting in accord, has a blank sheet of paper on which to design national education. At the very least, it is restricted by certain universal logical constraints — concepts of education are of necessity limited by the contemporary state of knowledge and their implementation by the existing availability of skills and resources.

Realistically, educational action is also affected by a variable set of cultural and structural factors which make up its environment. Educational systems, rarities before the eighteenth century, emerged within complex social structures and cultures and this context conditioned the conception and conduct of action of those seeking educational development. Among other things, the social distribution of resources and values and the patterning of vested interests in the existing form of education were crucially important factors. Once a given form of education exists it exerts an influence on future educational change. Alternative educational plans are, to some extent, reactions to it (they represent the desire to change inputs, transform processes, or alter the end products); attempts to change it are affected by the degree to which it monopolizes educational skills and resources; and change means dismantling, transforming, or in some way grappling with it.

These considerations introduce important refinements to the basic answers and at the same time indicate the theoretical problems to be solved in answering the original questions properly. A macro-sociology of education thus involves the examination of two things and the relations between them. On the one hand, complex kinds of social interaction the result of which is the emergence of particular forms of education, in this case the state system; on the other, complex types of social and educational structures which shape the context in which interaction and change occur. The sociologist's task is thus to conceptualize and theorize about the relationship between these two elements. The aim is therefore to provide an explanation of how social interaction produced specific kinds of state educational systems in different countries and how, from within these contexts, subsequent interaction succeeded in introducing further change.

It is a complicated task because it involves separating the factors which impinge upon education from the wider social structure and network of social relationships in which it is embedded. This means that we have to differentiate continuously between those things in society which influence education and those which may be ignored because they do not seriously affect it at any given time. It also follows that the factors which are included are themselves treated as unproblematic — for instance, in incorporating the educational consequences of economic organization we do not try to explain the nature of the economy, but treat it as given. This procedure

is unavoidable, for there is no such thing as an educational theory (which explains education by things educational), there are only sociological theories of educational development and change. Equally, there is no such thing as a unified sociological theory which can be applied to education, while simultaneously explaining the nature of and relationships between every other relevant element.

However, we are proposing to go about this task in a particular way and to develop a particular type of sociological theory to deal with the two major questions. It will be clear by now that both a pure action approach and a purely structural approach have been rejected in favour of a macro-sociological perspective which blends the two. Action theory is held to be incomplete because it has to take the social context of action for granted, and structural theories are considered equally inadequate if they make no reference to social interaction, but instead perpetuate an empty form of determinism. Nevertheless, rejection of these two types of theories does not involve abandoning all their core premises. Indeed, the notion that relations between education and other social institutions condition social interaction and in turn influence educational change is crucially important. But, equally essential to explaining the origins of educational systems and the processes of educational change is the independent contribution made by social interaction. In other words, it is argued that an adequate sociology of education must incorporate statements about the structural conditioning of educational interaction and about the influence of independent action on educational change. Weber's analysis, which gave equal emphasis to the limitations that social structures impose on interaction and to the opportunity for innovatory action presented by the instability of such structures, is the prototype of this theoretical approach.

The macro-sociological perspective¹

Any development of this Weberian tradition means confronting the major problem of sociological theory, namely how to link structure and agency. The path followed here is the broad swathe cut by macro-sociology: an eclectic category embracing neo-marxists, general functionalists, systems theorists and

proponents of exchange theory.² Their common denominator is the endorsement of methodological collectivism in contradistinction to both holism and methodological individualism.³ The generic method they employ for establishing the link between structure and agency can be divided into seven main stages.

(i) Connections between parts of the social structure are analyzed before proceeding to investigate inter-group relations — as opposed to the preliminary examination of the actors' perspectives and the subsequent study of social organization (the characteristic procedure of individualists, whatever their persuasion). This reflects the conviction that 'the properties of social structures and systems must be taken as given when analyzing the processes of action and interaction,'⁴ because of the conditional influence exerted by the former on the latter.

(ii) In analyzing the relationship between parts of society it is assumed that certain elements are more prone to change than others at any given time. It is where 'strains' develop in the social structure that the loci of potential change are pinpointed by macro-sociologists, though this mechanism is variously referred to as 'functional incompatibilities' in the Mertonian tradition or as 'structural contradictions' in neo-marxism. Strains themselves are emergent or relational properties. They are the unintended consequences of two sets of institutional operations, developed to meet different goal requirements, then turning out to be non-complementary. This is neither to argue that change will occur there (for contradictions are only conditional influences) nor to exclude the possibility of its appearance elsewhere (for conditioning is not determinism). Moreover, to hold that 'strains' influence the locus of change does not involve reification because these emergent factors have no effect unless mediated through the activities of people.

(iii) However, a basic mediatory mechanism is posited through which harmonious or conflicting institutional relationships are transmitted to actors by shaping the situations in which they find themselves. It consists of structural relations of contradiction or complementarity distributing frustrating or rewarding experiences to the situations which actors have to confront because of the institutional positions they hold. Where contradiction characterizes relations between social institutions, then strains are experienced as exigencies by groups associated with the impeded operations. In other words, operational

obstructions translate into practical problems which frustrate those upon whose day-to-day activities they impinge.

On the other hand, where operational complementarity prevails, this is transmitted to the relevant action situations as a series of rewarding experiences. It means that for the actors involved, the tasks they undertake by virtue of their positions will (*ceteris paribus*) be easy to accomplish: the contexts in which they work will be problem-free. For example, the complementarity which characterized the operations of the reformed public schools and the reformed civil service in the latter half of the nineteenth century meant that those responsible for the recruitment of administrators were dealing with the 'right kind' of applicant from the 'right kind' of background and possessing the 'right kind' of skills. (iv) In turn, it is argued that rewarding or frustrating experiences condition different action patterns; groups having experienced exigencies seeking to eradicate them (thus pursuing institutional change), those having experienced benefits seeking to retain them (thus defending institutional stability). The 'neutral' category, which has been left aside, specifies the likely non-participants in any struggle over the institutional relations in question. By this route, macro-sociologists view the points of strain within the social structure as representing the loci of demands for institutional change, whereas complementarity conditions maintenance pressures. Here the spectre of reification makes a brief reappearance. After all, it might be argued, frustration forces no one to do anything about it and rewards are not universally received with gratitude, yet is not the opposite assumed here? This is not the case as will be seen under point (v).

(v) Individuals' interpretations of their situations are important in macro-sociology: it is simply that there are things about these (disagreeable and rewarding) situations which encourage certain interpretations of them. Such 'predispositions' consist in the fact that opportunity costs are associated with different situational interpretations. These costs constitute the final link between the shaping of actors' situations and their subsequent action patterns. Groups opposing the source of rewarding experiences risk harming their own operations (damaging the operations through which their goals can be achieved); groups supporting the source of frustrating experiences invite further impediment to their own operations. There is, therefore, a structured distribution of costs and benefits for given


interpretations. It is wholly objective. These force no one, they simply set a price on acting against one's self-declared interests and a premium on following them. Some groups will sometimes be willing to pay this price — to assert the existence of a conditional influence is not to deny this, it is only to assume that much of the time most groups will not tolerate too great a disparity between their values and their self-declared interests. (Sometimes groups may not be fully aware of the relations between the two — in which case they pay the price uncomprehendingly.) Overall, however, this predispositional influence accounts for the coincidence between observable trends in group support or opposition and the complementarity or contradiction prevailing between institutional operations. To posit this involves nothing more sinister than the Weberian assumption that there is a rough congruence between interests and values. (vi) However, structural conditioning and the predispositions it generates are only one side of the equation: the other is made up of independent influences upon action.⁵ This recognition of the importance of action (uninfluenced by structural conditioning) is quite explicit in the analytical cycle employed by the macro-sociologists under discussion. Each of them distinguishes three broad analytic phases consisting of (a) a given structure (a complex set of relations between parts), which conditions but does not determine (b), social interaction. Here, (b) also arises in part from action orientations unconditioned by social organization, and in turn leads to (c), structural elaboration or modification — that is, to a change in the relations between parts. The cycle is then repeated.⁶ Transition from state (a) to (c) is not direct, precisely because structural conditioning is not the sole determinant of interaction patterns. Only holism conceptualizes a movement straight from (a) to (c), without mediation.

What methodological individualists claim is that action alone, (b), constitutes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanation of (c). To them (a) can be eradicated. Macro-sociologists do not deny that social interaction is the ultimate source of complex phenomena (which include both unintended and emergent consequences): they simply maintain that because at present we are unable to unravel this causal chain, we must acknowledge that we cannot deduce the latter from the former and thus must consider individual actions to be necessary but not sufficient conditions. Therefore, to account for the

occurrence of structural change (c), interactional analysis (b), is essential, but inadequate unless undertaken in conjunction with (a), the study of structural conditioning.

(vii) To work in terms of three-part cycles composed of (a) Structural Conditioning, (b) Social Interaction and (c) Structural Elaboration is to accord *time* a central place in sociological theory.⁷ Time is incorporated as a theoretical variable rather than simply as a medium in which events take place. For the occurrence of events, like the progressive structuring of an educational system, necessitates our theorizing about the temporal relations between structure and action. What is crucial is that the macro-sociological perspective maintains that structure and action operate over different time periods — an assertion which is based on two simple propositions: that structure logically predates the action(s) which transform it; and that structural elaboration logically post-dates those actions. These temporal interrelationships are represented in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
Temporal phases of the morphogenetic cycle



First, as far as (a), structural conditioning, is concerned, it is argued that the initial structural distribution of a property at T1 (i.e., the aggregate consequence of prior interaction) influences the time taken to eradicate it, for all structures manifest temporal resistance and do so generically through conditioning the context of action. Most often their conditional influence consists in dividing the population (not necessarily exhaustively) into social groups working for the maintenance versus the change of a given property, because the property itself (e.g., distribution of wealth, enfranchisement, educational control) distributes different objective vested interests to them


at T2. In other words, it takes time to change *any* structural property and, no matter how short, that period represents one of constraint for some groups, notably those whose goals lead them to attempt to change it.

Secondly, (b) social interaction, when initiated at T2, then takes place in a context which is not of its own making. Here it appears impossible to follow the methodological individualist⁸ and assert that any structural property influential *after* T2 is attributable to contemporary actors (not wanting or not knowing how to change it), because knowledge about it, attitudes towards it, vested interests in retaining it and objective capacities for changing it have already been distributed and determined by T2. On the other hand, between T2 and T3 human agency exerts two independent influences, one temporal, the other directional. It can speed up, delay or prevent the elimination of prior structural influences and also agents can affect the nature and substance of elaboration at T4. (Voluntarism has an important place in this perspective but it is ever trammelled by past structural and cultural constraints and by the current politics of the possible.)

Finally, if action is effective then the transformation produced at T4 is not merely the eradication of a prior structural property and its replacement by a new one, it is (c), the structural elaboration, of a host of new social possibilities. Some of these will have gradually come into play between T2 and T4 and this form of analysis can thus explain the timing of the new structures which emerge. Simultaneously, however, structural elaboration re-starts a new cycle, for it introduces a new set of conditional influences upon interaction which are constraining as well as facilitating. T4 is thus the new T1, and the next cycle must be approached afresh analytically, conceptually and theoretically.

Although in fact all three lines in Figure 1 are continuous, the analytical element consists in breaking up the flows into intervals determined by the problems in hand: given any problem and accompanying periodization, the projection of the three lines backwards and forwards would connect up with the anterior and posterior cycles. This represents the bedrock of an understanding of systemic properties, of *structuring* over time, which enables explanations of specific forms of structural elaboration to be advanced.

FIGURE 2
Summary diagram



Macro-sociology and educational systems

The organization of this study takes its shape from the theoretical approach adopted. Thus, the book is divided into two parts which deal with two consecutive sequences, two contiguous cycles in the history of educational change. Each part covers the three phases of the (a), (b), (c) sequence just outlined: structural conditioning, social interaction, structural elaboration. Hence, unlike general or unified sociological theory, this type of explanation relates to specific structures and is not atemporal. As the nature of the subject-matter — the structure of education — changes over time, so too must the theoretical framework which deals with it. In the comparative analysis which follows, it is not simple chronology which enforces shifts in the constitution of explanatory statements: it is new forms of educational development which require new kinds of explanations and these may occur at different dates in different countries.

The two parts of the book deal with different stages in the structuring of education. Part I is devoted to the emergence of state educational systems in England and France. Part II is concerned with their influence upon subsequent educational interaction and change. This division between the two parts reflects our conviction that the emergence of state systems represented a crucial break, because of the change in structural relations between education and other social institutions which accompanied it. The development of state education spelled its connection to the political centre and to a plurality of other institutions in terms of the services it provided. These two changes are universal (they characterize educational systems which may be strikingly different in other respects), and, it is argued, they profoundly affect the subsequent social processes which produce stability and change in education. Such processes become quite different from the types of interaction which brought about the key break and led to the emergence of state systems in the first place.

However, it should be noted that to accentuate this break in no way necessitates a belief that educational institutions are converging, either during or after the emergence of state systems. The importance of this break, for analytical purposes, lies in the changed processes involved, in their outcomes (whose convergence or divergence will depend *inter alia* on differences in the systems established and in other parts of the respective

social structures, which may themselves be either convergent or divergent).

The two parts are continuous since they represent two analytical cycles of (a) structural conditioning, (b) social interaction, and (c) structural elaboration. (Cycles are analytic in the sense that the historical sequence is in fact continuous.) In Part I, the complex forms of group interaction, partly conditioned by the fact that education is owned and monopolized by a restricted section of the population, are analyzed and their unintended consequences — the emergence of state educational systems — are examined. Part II opens with the elaborated structures, these new systems of education, which now represent the new conditional influences upon interaction. Modern educational change is thus interpreted as the joint consequence of such effects in conjunction with other and independent sources of social interaction.

Of course, there are historical cycles which preceded the one leading to the emergence of state systems, which constitutes our starting point. In other words, we open up with the results of *prior* interaction. Here, for the purposes of analysis, such phenomena have been treated as elemental — that is, no attempt is made to account for how the structure we take as our starting point has developed from previous interaction between groups and individuals in the context of antecedent structures even further back in history. The decision to do this was governed by the need to avoid ultimate regress to historically distant and sociologically complex inter-relationships. Quite simply, one has to break into the historical sequence at some point. Thus, we start by examining that cycle which is considered to have most bearing on the phenomenon that we seek to explain, but accept that its own origins figure as elements of 'givenness' in our theories.⁹

However, this means that the theory presented here is tied to the contextual features of that cycle (which it does not itself explain) and it *must not* be detached from them in any unwarranted attempt to increase the historical scope of explanation. There are two key properties of the cycle immediately preceding the interaction which generated state educational systems and our theorizing is therefore predicated on the existence of both. On the one hand, it assumes the presence of a differentiated institutional order at the systemic level (to which different groups were associated), and on the other hand,

an analagous situation at the level of social integration¹⁰ — the relative autonomy of differentiated interest groups. This means that the theory advanced here is not applicable to earlier social formations, such as historic empires or the ancient Eastern civilizations, which displayed relatively low levels of institutional differentiation (monolithic social structures) and of social autonomy (elite superimposition and mass subordination).¹¹

A final decision remains, namely about the most appropriate phase with which to begin each cycle. Here we have started with 'structure'. Part I opens with that structure which conditioned educational interaction immediately prior to the development of state systems, namely one where educational ownership was the basis of educational control. For there is obviously a need, in any study devoted to change, to describe the entity and relationships which undergo modification. Chapter 3 then moves on to examine the specific form of interaction which was conditioned by this state of affairs and which in turn became responsible for the introduction of large-scale change in education — that is, the process of competitive conflict. In Chapter 4, the emergence of state systems is then derived directly from this process of interaction: whether the new systems were centralized or decentralized in structure is held to result from the precise form taken by competitive conflict. This then completes the first cycle.

The start of the next cycle begins in Chapter 5 which discusses the ways in which these new state systems now condition subsequent interaction in a different way — leading to a universal transition from competitive conflict to negotiated change as the principal process of interaction. Chapters 6 and 7 then concentrate on variations on this type of interaction as engendered by centralized and decentralized systems respectively. Chapter 8 deals with the last phase of the modern cycle, where the new processes of interaction are linked to distinctive patterns of change in the two kinds of system. Once this has been accomplished it completes discussion of the second cycle and constitutes the end of the present study; but in reality, of course, it only signals the beginning of further changes and an indefinite number of succeeding cycles.

Figure 2 provides a summary diagram of the theoretical, comparative and historical ground covered throughout the book.

Caveats, case studies and challenges

It is important to be clear from the start about the scope of the explanation which follows. This study attempts to delineate the conditions necessary for the emergence of state educational systems. But it seeks to account for the autonomous emergence of this macroscopic change as the result of group interaction in countries where it cannot be attributed to external intervention, via conquest, colonization or territorial redistribution. This is not to argue that foreign influence, example or experience were unimportant, only that national education developed in response to internal pressures not external imposition. Foreign influence has to be assimilated by and mediated through national groups, but foreign intervention imposes a given form of education (like the extension of the Napoleonic system to other countries by military means and the experience undergone in most colonial territories). Obviously, this concern with the autonomous development of educational systems reduces the applicability of the theory to a particular group of countries and probably even to a minority of cases when world educational development is considered. Nevertheless, a theory which limits itself to endogenous processes of educational change is important, both in its own right, and also because it helps to account for the nature of instruction imposed abroad. The origins of the particular system which is exported must first be understood in order to account for educational change in conquered or colonized countries. In itself, our kind of theory will not fully account for educational development in such countries, but it is indispensable to a full account. The additional problems surrounding retention, rejection or adaptation of externally imposed educational systems warrant a study in their own right, but cannot be entered into here.

England and France are used as our case studies throughout the book, partly because they are both countries whose educational systems emerged autonomously and partly because of two major differences between them. On the one hand, it is generally agreed that their present systems of education are very different and that they have undergone dissimilar forms of historical development. On the other hand, even more indubitable is the diversity of their political, economic and cultural histories. Thus, the range of variation which the theory confronts is deliberately maximized.¹²

Perhaps it is worth anticipating the objection that this task

is wrongly conceived, because it does not compare like with like in either social or educational terms. For instance, it might be argued that some of the factors which are known to be important in educational change (e.g., mode or level of economic production, nature of social stratification, or type of political organization) differ greatly in the two countries to be examined. Because such factors are not controlled (they are not present or absent, or the same for both), the social contexts themselves are very different. It might then be objected that any educational changes observed later on simply reflect these initial variations. Such an argument would be unanswerable were the problem in hand the examination, for example, of economic influences upon educational development. It is not; on the contrary, the aim is precisely to see whether general sociological propositions about educational change can be advanced in the presence of such variations. The existence of socio-economic differences cannot therefore be used as a basis from which to prejudge the outcome of this theoretical undertaking. If it is possible to develop general theories about education, then they must be ones which embrace cross-cultural differences. There appear to be no grounds in the history of science for deciding in advance that particular phenomena are so intractable as to defy explanation.

PART I
THE
DEVELOPMENT OF
STATE EDUCATIONAL
SYSTEMS

2 STRUCTURE: EDUCATION AS PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

An explanation of the emergence of state educational systems involves the history of education, but not of its entire span, and it entails comparative education, but not an encyclopaedic coverage. The problem is large, but none the less delimited. If what is to be explained is this fundamental structural change in education, then although it was predated by a long sequence of developments, only one of these is of prime concern here, namely that type of formal education which gave way in each country to the state system.

Since the term 'educational system' has generally been used indiscriminately, referring to anything from primitive initiation rites onwards, to define it clearly serves three distinct purposes: identifying what is to be explained, dating when each nation acquired a system, and locating the time from which analysis must back-track in search of explanation. This sociological task, therefore, is not one of comparing like with like in substantive terms (the socio-economic differences between England and France, when each generated an educational system, were monumental). Nor is it one whose historical concern is with the same chronological period (almost a century separates the emergence of their respective systems). On the contrary, the aim is precisely to discover whether general sociological propositions about formal educational change can be advanced in the presence of such circumstantial variations.

The definition adopted is one which follows the everyday meanings of the words 'state educational system', and it should be stressed that very dissimilar types of education can conform to it. Hence a state educational system is considered to be a nation-wide and differentiated collection of institutions devoted to formal education, whose overall control and supervision is at least partly governmental, and whose component parts and processes are related to one another. Both the political and the systemic aspects are stressed in this definition which insists that they must be present together before education can

be deemed to constitute a state system, for the appearance of either characteristic alone is not uncommon. Many European courts controlled elitist or military academies without having any further involvement in the education of the nation: many European churches ran integrated networks, leading from catechization to ordination, quite independently of the political centre.

Having defined a state system helps to distinguish it from earlier forms of education but it does not fully identify the type of instruction which gave way to it. The problem is that the struggle for reform which ultimately generated state systems also lasted for varying periods of time in different countries, and during this time education often underwent gradual transformation. Hence, we cannot simply examine the form it took immediately preceding, or some fixed number of years before, the date at which the state system was consolidated. However, the origins of these struggles themselves provide a guide to those prior forms of education which eventually gave way to state systems. Thus the struggles of historical actors indicate what to examine (that which they sought to change) and when to investigate it (immediately before they began pursuing educational change).

For explanatory purposes it is necessary, therefore, to backtrack to the antecedent educational and socio-cultural contexts within which interaction for change first developed. Without this it is impossible to account for the interaction itself or for its consequences — since the very situations that people were trying to change would thus be omitted. Obviously, these contexts must be investigated independently, for the sociological task is not just to record how they were viewed by contemporary actors. It is also to conceptualize how this broader context structured the actual situation in which each group found itself vis-à-vis education, how it helped them to view it in a particular way, and led them to seek its change. The actors themselves, of course, may have been unaware of all the factors which moulded the situations in which they found themselves and of how these shaped their own action patterns.

The prior forms of education identified in this manner may be quite dissimilar. Nevertheless, these substantive differences, however great, do not preclude the existence of formal similarities between them: and it is possible to theorize about the latter despite variations in the former. Thus it is formal

similarities (in the relations between education and the social structure) which figure in the propositions put forward about common influences upon interaction patterns. Substantive variations are not dismissed as without influence upon action, it is merely that their effects co-exist with patterns conditioned by shared structural factors.

In the two countries examined, one common feature characterized the form of education preceding the development of state systems — a feature also found in such disparate cases as Romanov Russia, Pietist Denmark and Tokugawa Japan. In all of them, those who controlled education also owned it, in the sense of providing its physical facilities and supplying its teaching personnel. Education was private enterprise, and control derived directly from ownership. In turn, ownership was concentrated in a very restricted part of any population, but this educationally dominant group also came from different sections of different societies. Each had a virtual monopoly of the educational resources upon which its control rested and all were concerned to protect their position of domination in instruction.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to explain why education was owned by the various churches throughout Europe, prior to the emergence of state systems. The ideational pre-eminence of the religious institution in the neo-medieval period provides no straightforward answer, since in Japan it was the feudal political elite which occupied the position of domination. Equally, the question of why religious domination proved so enduring in Europe falls outside our purview since answers to both questions would require a detailed analysis of institutional activities and elite goals during earlier centuries and prior cycles of change. The fact of religious ownership has to be taken as given in these two cases, for it is not this itself but rather the consequences of education as private (religious) enterprise for subsequent educational change which are of concern.

Private ownership, mono-integration and subordination

Whenever educational control was rooted in private ownership this resulted in the same generic relationship between education and the rest of society. The fact that one particular group

virtually monopolized formal instruction meant that education was firmly linked only to a single part of the total social structure, namely that institution with which the dominant group was associated (in whose role structure they held positions as ordained clergymen or priests, with whose operations they were occupied, and whose goals they sought to attain). The link consisted of the flow of physical, human and financial resources from the ownership sphere to education and the counter-flow of educational services, appropriate to the dominating sector. Where churches constituted the ownership groups, these services consisted in religious socialization and a supply of ecclesiastical recruits. Such interdependence between two social institutions does not imply that it was equally advantageous to both, nor that their 'interchange' was freely determined, nor that it contributed to the persistence of the two parts concerned or that of the wider social system.

The term 'mono-integration' will be used to denote this common structural characteristic. It thus refers to one of the possible relationships which could be maintained between education and all other parts of society at a particular stage of institutional differentiation. Logically, education could be interdependent with all others, with some, or with none at all: mono-integration is used when it is related to only one. It is not, therefore, a property of any institution as such but of relations *between* institutions: it constitutes an emergent property which conditions subsequent processes of educational interaction and change. For when education is mono-integrated, two major implications follow — one for education itself and the other for the rest of society (with the exception of the lone institution to which it is linked through ownership).

(a) Effects on education

Interdependence between two social institutions is a relationship based on interchange. The biography of these exchanges is also the history of emerging power differentials between these institutional sectors, unless their mutual transactions remain reciprocal.¹ As Blau has argued, one party may be or become the subordinate of the other because of its dependence on it for the supply of resources or services.² When A receives resources from B, this represents some loss of autonomy for A, unless it is capable of full reciprocation — such being the price A 'pays'

for continued supplies from B. The more dependent A is on the supplies B provides, the greater the services A has to render to B in order to secure them, and the bigger the loss of A's autonomy to determine the nature of its internal activities and to pursue the goals arrived at in that sphere. Instead, A's institutional operations are defined externally by the party which constrains its services.

The sub-category of integrative relationships where these severe imbalances do occur will be termed 'subordination'. It is defined as the case in which **one social institution has low autonomy for the internal determination of its operations because of its dependence on the other**. Again, it should be noted that subordination is a property of the relations between institutions and not a characteristic of any one part of society. What is significant here, however, is that as a **mono-integrated institution, education was always the subordinate partner in the relationship because of its total dependence on the flow of resources from the other institution**. Education has high material and physical resource requirements for its operations and these make it vulnerable to the source of supply, which is unitary where education is mono-integrated. Historically, there appears to be a built-in, short-run asymmetry between the dependence of educational operations on resources and the reliance of those supplying them on educational services. Quite simply, the operations of another institution can do without new educational outputs longer than education can function without resources. This fundamental source of imbalance in the relationship between education and its suppliers was translated into differences in power and reflected in lack of educational autonomy. Thus, had those working within the educational field attempted to take any initiative (such as the autonomous redefinition of intakes, processes or outputs), they could swiftly have been checked by withdrawal of pay, closure of buildings or their own redeployment, as well as by a multiplicity of less tangible religious sanctions. Hence, it is not simply that the dominant group's ownership of educational resources gave them control over instruction, but that the dependence of education precluded it from ever threatening this non-reciprocal relationship, in the absence of alternative suppliers of resources.

The most important consequence to result from the subordinate status of education in the periods considered is that **educational change could not be initiated endogenously**. In

other words, the activities of teachers, pupils, academics and others engaged in instruction could not be an important source of educational innovation and change because of their stringent control by the dominant group. This is not to imply a lack of desire for change on the part of such groups — it is not necessary to assume this when arguing that constraints existed to prevent the realization of any such aims.

Change could not be initiated endogenously because subordination never involves lower autonomy than when it occurs in a relationship of mono-integration. Dependence on a single supplier of resources makes education extremely vulnerable and highly responsive to control by the ownership group. The latter, which invests in instruction only because it requires some particular kind of educational output which it perceives as essential to its (religious, political, etc.) operations, does all it can to get value for its money. The dominant group defines education in relation to its goals and monitors it closely to ensure that it serves these purposes. Close control means weak boundaries between education and the institution with which the dominant group is associated. It is reflected in a low level of differentiation between the two institutions.

Typically, this means that there is no distinctively educational role structure, but instead an overlapping of roles between both institutions. Those working in the educational field in no sense constituted a relatively autonomous professional body but instead could be manipulated by external sanctions, depending on the nature of the ownership group. Typically, too, there were no distinctively educational processes, for the content of instruction, the definition and the management of knowledge, as well as teaching methods, were conflated with the values and norms of the dominant group. Hence the inter-related 'Bun and Bu', the military and literary skills of Tokugawa Japan; hence the equation between theology and knowledge in much of Europe, and the use of catechization and disputation as methods of teaching and learning. Correspondingly, educated persons acquired a set of skills the limited relevance of which encouraged their employment in the dominant group's institutional sphere.

Taken together, these consequences of subordination and mono-integration — extremely low educational autonomy and little internal definition of goals — have further implications for the explanation of educational change. They mean that

such explanations will focus on social interaction outside the educational field and among groups of actors who are not employed or engaged in it. Unlike the present day, when any explanation of change would be incomplete if it neglected the independent contribution of professional groups of teachers and organized groups of students, large-scale educational transformation in this earlier period can be examined in terms of exogenous influences without loss of explanatory power.

(b) Effects on other social institutions

The consequences of mono-integration and subordination for other social institutions mean that all save one are not directly served by education. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the remaining institutional spheres find themselves in an identical situation vis-à-vis the education available. Instead, the nature of their own institutional operations mediates the impact of education upon them (as defined by the dominant group) and determines their degree of compatibility with it. Potentially, there are three major categories into which other institutions can fall in these respects, although each one need not be represented wherever and whenever education is found in a mono-integrated and subordinate relationship.

(i) *Neutral institutions*

First, then, there may be some institutional spheres which although not directly served by education are unimpeded by it. This is not to say that they would not have been more efficient, better adjusted, etc., were available educational outputs of relevance to them. It is simply that the existence of structurally induced strains or impediments is dependent upon the actual obstruction of operations, not ideal operative efficiency. Such an institution is neither helped nor hindered by the form of education that the dominant group provides. For example, it neither receives pre-trained, pre-socialized graduates nor does it miss them and find itself confronting a recruitment crisis in terms of lack of suitable people with appropriate skills and values.

Of course, it is not possible to determine analytically which social institutions are most likely to be represented in this

neutral category. This varies with the nature of the given institution at any time, and the compatibility of education (as designed by the dominant group) with its operations. Basically, this is how neutrality is identified — by comparing the objective goodness of fit between educational outputs and institutional operations in a particular period. (Only occasionally does one find supplementary evidence, like the townsmen and artisans of eighteenth-century Russia petitioning the tsar for a reprieve from scholarization because book learning was irrelevant to their activities: their only objection to the prevailing form of education was that they were forced to undergo it.)³ Nor is it possible to specify how large this category is cross-culturally, although it will be seen later that it shrinks over time. All that is being stressed at the moment is the *logical* possibility of educational neutrality towards a particular sphere.

The functionalist argument, that mutual normative support between social institutions is the prerequisite of societal integration, becomes a matter for empirical determination here. Cases in which such normative support is demonstrably present can be assimilated to the second category, outlined below, and cases where normative undermining clearly does occur (if, for instance, instruction disseminated egalitarianism while stratification was on hierarchical principles) then belong in category (iii).

In other words, the structural relations between these institutions and education are neither ones of strain nor of complementarity. Because of this, there are no structural factors which predispose these sectors to be loci of support for or of opposition to the prevailing form of education. This, however, clearly does not prevent actors associated with these institutions from participating in educational conflict, either in pursuit of change or in defence of the status quo. It is simply to argue that such interaction on their part is not structurally conditioned by the relationships discussed, which are ones of neutrality.

(ii) *Adventitious beneficiaries*

The second category of institutions consists of those which derive adventitious benefits from existing education. They do so exclusively because their own operations happen to be facilitated by the educational outputs offered, but determined elsewhere. Again it is impossible to decide analytically which sectors of society will fall into this category — for the receipt of

adventitious benefits usually depends upon an accidental compatibility between the definition of instruction and operational requirements, because no interchange has taken place to ensure that educational services are forthcoming. For example, legal systems based upon Roman law were quite well served by the classical education, conducted by the more important Catholic teaching orders in Europe.

Sometimes, though not necessarily, this coincidence is explained by interdependencies between the adventitious beneficiary (C) and the institution (B) with which education (A) is integrated, particularly if there are imbalances of exchange in favour of C in relation to B. Then C may negotiate with B for a certain type of educational service from A. Thus, for example, in eighteenth-century England, the erastian political elite (C), upon which the established church (B) was legally dependent, meant that the latter defined educational inputs, processes and outputs to provide some political services (socialization, legitimation and recruitment to the governmental bureaucracy).

Institutions in this category will tend to be loci of 'support' for the prevailing form of education and hence for its controllers. They will be areas from which support is forthcoming because they gain something desirable for nothing and seek to maintain the situation which gives them this 'bonus'. Again this is only a conditional influence and in any case such pressures are tenuous as complementarity can be reduced over time: since compatibility is generally fortuitous, this goodness of fit between the activities of two institutions can slip if either of their operations undergoes independent change. If this process occurs, there will be a tendency for the institution involved to move out of the category of adventitious beneficiaries — either to become neutral or to enter the third category.

(iii) *Obstructed institutions*

This third category consists of those institutions which are neither integrated with education nor served by it, but whose operations are clearly obstructed by educational outputs because they are incompatible with them. The precise nature of the obstruction can vary. It may be that those associated with a given institution require instruction but for some reason are denied access, that the values and skills disseminated are

irrelevant or harmful to their activities, or that the graduates who are produced are deficient in either quantitative or qualitative terms. Sometimes an institutional sphere will be impeded in several different ways simultaneously, as was the case with the expanding industrial economy in early nineteenth-century England. The entrepreneurial elite had limited access to secondary and higher education due to social and religious discrimination, the Test Acts erecting a barrier to graduation; the classical nature of secondary instruction was irrelevant to capitalist development while the catechistic nature of popular elementary instruction was an inadequate form of economic socialization for workers which did not teach sufficient respect for private property.⁴ In sum, those leaving elementary school did not have the right values, those leaving secondary school did not have the right skills and those leaving higher education had neither the right skills nor the right values.

There is no reason, of course, why there should be only a single institution in this category (or either of the preceding ones) at any given time. Indeed, historically it seems more common to find several different spheres simultaneously suffering from obstructions of varying degrees of severity. However, their members need not be allies but can have interests in complete opposition to one another as will be seen in the cases of both England and France. Also, different institutions are found occupying this category in different countries. In England, for example, it was the developing industrial economy and associated system of class stratification; in France the post-revolutionary polity and governmental bureaucracy. What these social institutions have in common is a structured predisposition to be loci of opposition to the respective forms of education available in those societies. However, before examining supportive and oppositional activities stemming from these different loci it is first necessary to examine the influence that mono-integration and subordination exert upon processes of educational change.

(c) Effects on processes of educational change

It is here that the subordinate status of education reveals its significance. In particular, it means that those in category (iii) who seek radical educational change, in proportion to the impediments they experience from current instruction, cannot

negotiate directly with the profession. Extremely low professional autonomy precludes any endogenous modifications to offset strains between education and the social structure. Thus, the effect of subordination for those seeking change is that **instead of direct transactions taking place with education, these have to be conducted indirectly with the party which has subordinated it.** Not only is the ownership group the real source of obstruction because it has moulded education to serve its operations alone, but only by interacting with it can the definition of instruction be altered, for the educational sphere is only responsive to its subordinator — in the context of mono-integration.

Moreover, these structural relations strongly influence the process responsible for large-scale educational transformation during this phase: in essence they discourage voluntary negotiation and instead condition a process of competitive conflict. There are three considerations which lead up to this proposition. To begin with, because ownership and control are exclusive to it, the dominant ownership group defines instruction to suit its own ends. Whatever impediments the relevant inputs, processes, and outputs constitute for other sections of society, they represent the form and content of education that its owners want. (This is not tantamount to saying that such education optimally meets their requirements; only that they *think* it serves them best.) If this is a serious impediment to others, it means that other groups require a very different kind of instruction. In other words those suffering the greatest obstruction therefore need the greatest changes in education in order to remove them.

Next, the magnitude of the changes required to relieve existing strains precludes their resolution by certain processes. Since the ownership group already has exactly the kind of education it considers indispensable, any radical shift in the definition of instruction would be contrary to its declared interests. That these interests are both conscious and extremely strong cannot be doubted, considering the resources that have voluntarily been laid out to meet them. Thus, major educational change would represent an equally major shift away from its ideal — a move which if fully accomplished would place the ownership group itself in category (iii)! Change of this magnitude is therefore the last thing that will be freely conceded; but if it does not occur, severe obstruction continues for other

institutions. The net result is that those concerned to introduce the most far-reaching educational changes are least able to do so by peaceful negotiation with the controlling ownership group.

Hence, negotiation is the preserve of those who do not require anything very different from education. Since transactions must be conducted with the ownership group in control, the latter will cease trading at the point where the benefits it receives would be bought at the price of damaging itself educationally. If the modifications in instruction which can be transacted before this point is reached are considered satisfactory, then small changes are clearly all that was wanted anyway. Thus, mutual compatibility between the educational requirements of the dominant group and those who can deal with it, sets stringent limits on the amount of change that can result from such a process. If greater modifications are sought, negotiation breaks down and the other party must seek change through a different process — and one which is not based on the assumption of continuity in control.

Finally, then, when negotiation is precluded, strains are only resolved by one party overcoming the other and thus removing the source of obstruction, which otherwise continues with all its negative consequences. Thus, large-scale change only occurs if the existing structural relations are destroyed and replaced by new ones. Any major changes in the form and content of instruction observed during this period are therefore expected to follow from equally fundamental changes in educational control — through the dominant ownership group being damaged or destroyed. For inputs, processes and outputs will only be modified to service the operations of other institutional spheres when the old relationships have been dismantled — via competitive conflict not peaceful negotiation.

(d) Structural relations conditioning educational interaction

Since it is an underlying assumption of this study that structural influences only exert their effects through people, a complete discussion of the importance attaching to mono-integration and subordination involves an examination of how such factors condition interaction. First, the fact that education is a mono-integrated institution creates a distinction between the ownership group and all others. Its implication is

that there is only one group in society which is *assured* of educational services, whereas all the rest are not. Since, as has been seen, this situation does not mean that no other groups actually receive such services, this distinction is based on differential capacity to control and not upon differential rates of benefit. The existence of mono-integration thus dichotomizes the population vis-à-vis education.

In conjunction with subordination it structures two quasi-groups in society. On the one hand there is a single educationally dominant group, consisting of all those associated with the ownership sphere, who collectively possess the capacity to determine the nature of educational outputs. Since this domination is based on the supply of resources to education, then their abundance, availability and distribution in society provide a key to the security of the ownership group's control over education. Maximum security coincides with monopolization of such resources, although this does not guarantee it since coercion can be brought to bear by dominated groups.

On the other hand, there remains the aggregate of all others who lack control because they are without property in educational terms. Obviously, however, some of these educationally dominated groups will themselves be dominant in other parts of society, because the ownership group only embraces the elite of one particular institution. Perhaps less obviously, some of the educationally dominated may constitute the overall socio-political elite, for during this period there is no theoretical or empirical reason whatsoever to suppose that the educational ownership group occupies or shares this position. In other words, it is unlikely that the dichotomy between educationally dominant and dominated corresponds to the more general social division between elites and masses.

However, there are powerful reasons which make it extremely unlikely that the two quasi-groups, defined by possession or lack of educational control, will 'convert' into opposing interest groups. That only one group has the capacity to control educational processes does not necessarily entail opposition between it and the rest of society. For this would be to assume that all groups at all times have an interest in, and see advantages deriving from, the control of education — and historically this has simply not been the case. Yet it would appear mistaken to assume that the relationships which develop between members of the two quasi-groups simply vary unsystematically with

empirical conditions. It was shown earlier that the relation between the kind of education supplied in a society and the type of operations conducted in different institutional spheres led to variations in the objective fit between them — thus producing strains as well as complementarities. It is suggested that these are directly associated with systematic variations in patterns of interaction. However, such objective relationships only exert an influence on interaction because of the ways in which they structure action situations for different groups.

Incompatibilities and complementarities are transmitted to different social roles in different parts of the social structure. For those occupying such positions they will be experienced as frustrating or rewarding situations. Although rewards do not compel support nor does frustration dictate antagonism to its source (for structural factors do not force anyone to do anything), they do render certain actions and interpretations distinctly advantageous, and others correspondingly disadvantageous. This is because of a structured distribution of different opportunity costs and benefits for different courses of action to those having different objective relations with education.

(i) In the 'neutral' category are those whose activities are neither impeded nor reinforced by the existing definition of instruction. Thus, the groups associated with them are not structurally predisposed either to support or to oppose the dominant educational group — since the roles they occupy and the tasks they have to accomplish in them are unaffected by the prevailing form of education. If such influences were deterministic and if all institutions fell into this category, then the educationally dominant group would remain totally unopposed (and unsupported, too), as groups associated with other spheres would remain educationally inactive. However, their members may none the less engage in educational action, but if they do so it will be for reasons independent of educational conditioning. It is groups associated with institutions in the other two categories which are expected to play the most important part in educational interaction.

(ii) Where institutions derive adventitious benefits from education, structural influences predispose groups associated with them to support the prevailing type of education and thus to buttress the position of those dominating it. Actors engaged in different aspects of institutional operations receive a variety

of rewards. Although the nature of these may vary considerably (from diffuse legitimation to direct instrumentality) most adventitious beneficiaries will, for instance, find the tasks of recruitment and replacement to be problem-free. Recruitment is facilitated by the availability of suitable candidates with appropriate values and training is shortened by the prior acquisition of relevant skills.

Nevertheless, the values endorsed by such a group, or simply their ignorance, can lead either to an underestimation of the objective advantages derived from this type of education, or to a repudiation of them despite their contribution being correctly perceived. However, groups associated with these institutions are in a different situation from those in the neutral category, for here endorsement of educational values opposed to those of the dominant group carries opportunity costs. Oppositional activities risk harming the operations of the institutions with which these groups are associated by depriving them of the current 'cost-free' service received. Thus, even if the advantageous character of available education has passed unperceived, it may well become evident at precisely the point when the dominant group is most threatened and other operations begin to suffer through attrition of adventitious benefits. Thus, for example, the English Tory Party's rather half-hearted support of Anglican educational domination in the first part of the nineteenth century (until the 1860s), increased throughout the remainder of the century — the benefits of religious instruction for social integration and popular quietism were fully acknowledged just as educational control gradually began to pass out of the hands of the traditional religious ownership group. The general proposition that adventitious beneficiaries have a high probability of playing a supportive role in educational interaction involves only the assumption that most of the time most groups display some congruence between their interests and their values — that the majority of their members does not bite the hand that feeds it.

(iii) From the point of view of structural influences, groups associated with institutions whose operations are hindered by the education available find themselves in situations which are the reverse of those just discussed. Although it is quite possible for some of their members to be convinced by the legitimacy arguments advanced by the dominant group (and the very form taken by education may induce mental limitations

about the services thought to be available from any kind of instruction), such attitudes are maintained at a price and it is this cost which places these groups in a completely different position from those already discussed. Members of obstructed institutions suffer inconvenience and frustration in their role situations: to support the dominant group is to incur the penalty of continuing hindrance. If the obstruction is severe, such support automatically threatens operational goal attainment. Sometimes this can be circumvented by the development, for instance, of in-service training, but only at the expense of additional time, effort and money. On other occasions this is quite impossible, especially where personnel and resources are inadequate, or where these alone are insufficient to remove the frustrations undergone by group members. The English entrepreneurs could develop factory-based training and informal systems of recruitment but they could not remove the stigma attached to 'trade' (reinforced by dominant educational values) nor the embargo it placed on certain life chances and styles for the middle classes themselves.

It is argued that groups in this category will be prone to engage in oppositional activities because of the structured opportunity costs involved in *not* doing so. As in the previous discussion of supportive groups, the only psychological assumption made here is that, on the whole, groups do not tolerate large discrepancies between their declared interests and the values they endorse. This assumption is not predicated on 'universal enlightenment': in making it and drawing conclusions from it, one is not implying that every group member unerringly detects the source of his frustrations, that every actor is, in other words, a good sociologist. (Of course, in many cases the correct diagnosis is difficult to avoid, e.g., why do new recruits not have the appropriate skills? Where did they learn inappropriate values?) However, initially at least, the oppositional group is likely to be much smaller than the total institutional membership and it may well remain so. But for assertion to develop it is not necessary for all members in the same obstructed position to perceive the reasons for it and actively to combat it — any more than class conflict requires the active support and participation of all class members. Instead it is merely being argued that some members will identify and seek to overcome the source of the frustrations and contradictions they experience. In turn this will lead to a different patterning

of educational activities among this group compared with that displayed by members of other groups whose operations are unobstructed. To maintain otherwise would involve a much more dubious psychological assumption: namely, that the existence of objective obstructions makes no difference to people's actions and that the objective costs attaching to certain interpretations have no effect upon people's attitudes.

(e) Determinants of educational interaction

What has been discussed so far is not simply group conflict or antagonism, for the groups involved are representatives of different institutions. However, in examining the conditioning of supportive and oppositional pressures, the structural relations of education have been artificially isolated from the wider social structure and culture in which they occur. Yet the latter will critically influence interaction to the extent that people hold roles in more than one or two institutions and share values that are not narrowly educational. Here the crucial element is the extent to which such factors reinforce or counteract the structural influences conditioning the formation of the supportive or oppositional groups just discussed.

In structural terms the extra-institutional involvements on the part of both oppositional and supportive groups may modify their commitment to educational change (or stasis) as well as the resources they can mobilize to these ends. Here we are on Dahrendorf's⁵ familiar ground, where cross-cutting ties minimize conflict and overlapping ones reinforce it — without, however, endorsing his implicit assumption that the former prevail over the latter. The degree of system integration, the superimposition or segregation of elites, the extent of vertical stratification and horizontal differentiation — all affect the nature of social ties and their impact upon educational interaction. Precisely the same is true of the cultural dimension, for the social distribution of values plays a vital role in the emergence of oppositional or supportive activities. In exact parallel it is the degree of vertical and horizontal overlap in the cultural domain which fosters or neutralizes educational conflict. What is of ultimate importance, of course, for educational interaction is the conjunction between the distribution of values and of resources in society.

Finally, a full account of the conflict surrounding education


must incorporate the contribution of independent factors, for it has constantly been stressed that structural factors only condition action, they do not determine it. Analysis of interaction must thus make full allowance for the (unconditioned) choice of particular goals; the avoidance of, or affinity for, given allies, the development and appeal of new ideas, etc. Factors like group antagonism, as opposed to structured opposition, can sometimes be as important as the conditioning influences. Because of this, the educational change which results must be viewed as the joint product of both these sources of interaction. Figure 3 thus summarizes the combination of influences on educational interaction which have been discussed in this chapter and which give it a distinctive character in the period prior to the emergence of state systems of education.

The macro-sociology of education and general theories of society

Figure 3 highlights how this analysis of educational change involves a particular angle of vision. It focuses on educational institutions and seeks to conceptualize how other parts of society impinge upon them. Education is thus moved to the centre of the stage and other aspects of structure, culture, and interaction are only considered in relation to it. They are incorporated as variables which help to account for educational change but are not themselves examined or explained. In other words, a theory about education in society is being advanced, not a general social theory. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two should perhaps be spelt out in concluding this chapter.

By analogy, our exercise has much in common with turning a globe until one is looking at a particular country, for optically it has the same implications — distortion of the size or relative importance of the focal point, blurring off of surrounding areas and, above all, neglect of things hidden from view. Thus it remains quite possible that a broader web of social relations, spun in other parts of the social structure, in fact envelops educational interaction. Hence the patterns of educational conflict examined here may map on to wider patterns of social conflict; the uniformities detected here may reflect regularities in the larger social structure; and the explanations advanced here may

FIGURE 3
The structural conditioning of educational interaction



be subsumed under more general laws. As a specialist theory which is strictly about educational change it may thus be consistent with one or more general social theories.

However, Figure 3 indicates that the approach adopted is an open one; if group interaction is heavily structured in other parts of society, then this enters our analysis (though is not explained by it) at the point where it intersects the educational field. This approach allows any such factor freely to filter in, but is neutral in the sense that it excludes none in advance, nor does it give preferential treatment to any particular type of factor. Therefore, while it is compatible in principle with larger scale theories of society, it remains to be seen whether in practice any of these theories *are* capable of subsuming the educational propositions advanced here. Indeed, one way of viewing this type of specialized analysis is as a testing ground for theories which lay claim to a higher level of generality. Macro-sociological work does not itself presuppose a total system of sociological theory,⁶ hence the onus is on those who feel that they do command such a theory to demonstrate that it holds the key which can unlock these subsidiary educational problems, as part of its general explanatory power.⁷

3 INTERACTION: COMPETITION FOR EDUCATIONAL CONTROL

The previous chapter concentrated upon structural relationships, and how these condition which groups will be involved in educational interaction and which processes of interaction will lead to large-scale changes in education. However, to understand interaction itself means grasping how structural factors like institutional contradictions and complementarities actually shape the situations which actors confront and why people respond to them in particular ways. Explaining educational change thus entails theorizing about its joint determinants — structure and agency — at their point of intersection.

This chapter presents a theory dealing with the struggle for educational control before the development of state systems. The preoccupation with struggle, rather than with peaceable forms of negotiation, does not mean that competitive conflict is held to be the universal motor of educational change. On the contrary, the justification for examining this phase of educational interaction in terms of conflict-analysis is itself a structural one: that there are good reasons for thinking it to be the most important mechanism of change in the period when the ownership and control of education were synonymous. Once these factors themselves change, so do the processes of change, and so must our theories about change.

Domination

When education is a mono-integrated and subordinate institution we have seen that its control and the power to define instruction rests in the hands of its owners, who are termed the educationally dominant group.¹ This was chosen as a neutral concept to designate the educational powers once enjoyed by a particular social group, which differentiated it from all other members of that society. 'Domination', following Max Weber,

is defined as the opportunity to have a command concerning education obeyed by a given group of persons.² As such, it may be quite distinct from other forms of social dominance: those with educational control may or may not be the ruling class, the political elite, or the most wealthy group in society. When compared cross-culturally, dominant groups can be very dissimilar and may originate from different parts of their respective social structures.

It was argued in the last chapter that prolonged educational stability (which refers to the structural relations between education and other social institutions remaining unchanged and the definition of instruction showing a high degree of continuity), corresponds to the lasting domination of a particular group. This stability may endure either because the dominant group remains unchallenged or because it successfully overcomes threats to its control. Such challenges have been called 'assertion' and defined as the sum of efforts made by another group(s), which does not have the opportunity to issue educational commands, to overthrow the existing form of domination.

It is therefore by investigating the main prerequisites of successful domination and assertion that one can account for educational stability and change at the macro-sociological level. This involves specifying two sets of characteristics, those necessary for a group to be able to subordinate education (through rendering its operations dependent on the resources supplied), and those necessary for another group to be able to change this structural relationship.

Domination ultimately rests on a group owning and supplying those resources which are indispensable for instruction, namely plant and personnel (plus associated costs: upkeep of school buildings, preparation of texts, payment of teachers and provision of auxiliary services like administration and training). However, because domination has been achieved by a particular group which owned and mobilized these supplies at some earlier point in history, this by no means implies that its control is secure and can be maintained over time. For other social groups may possess surplus resources which could be diverted towards the foundation of schools and converted into a trained teaching body. Indeed, the dominant group may have gained control initially, simply because no other party was interested in investing in education at that time — as appears to have been the case with the church in medieval Europe. Where this is so,

enduring domination and lack of large-scale change merely reflect the absence of opposition. The prerequisites of educational domination become more complex once one is concerned with the maintenance of control and the continuity of a given definition of instruction in the face of opposition.

For the dominant group to retain its position of exclusive control it must continue to be the only supplier of the resources upon which educational operations depend. Yet, since it is impossible for any one group fully to monopolize the resources itself (if only because of the human component), the dominant group has to preserve its *monopoly* of supplying educational resources by preventing others from converting financial and human assets into schools and teachers. On the one hand, an *ideology* legitimating this monopoly can be used by the dominant group to defend the exclusivity of its control by convincing others that they lack the right, the ability or the experience to engage in educational activities, or that the type of instruction already provided is the best, the proper, or the only form possible. On the other hand, a series of *constraints* can be employed to prevent alternative groups from supplying the facilities for imparting instruction. These may vary from the symbolic to the coercive, depending largely upon the nature of the dominant group itself. Use of either is conditional on members of the dominant group wishing to maintain control and the structural relations on which it is based. It is not necessary to assume that this desire is universal when seeking to specify the conditions for the maintenance of domination, for without it the prerequisites simply will not be developed.

All three factors — monopolization of educational facilities, protective constraints and legitimacy ideology — are together considered to represent the necessary but not the sufficient conditions for maintenance of domination. Without constraints the monopoly is vulnerable, without an ideology recruiting positive support rather than enforced compliance, it is even more so. However, neither may develop until monopoly ownership is challenged, but at that point it is best buttressed if the three elements are mutually reinforcing.

Turning to the countries considered, both dominant groups were concerned to defend their control of instruction but showed varying degrees of success in developing the three prerequisites for its maintenance. In France, the Catholic Church and its multiplicity of teaching Orders early acquired a monopoly of

educational facilities, for the Reformation served to underline that religious orthodoxy must be taught not assumed.³ In the following two centuries a patchy but country-wide network of confessional schools developed. Ownership was ecclesiastical: either religious Orders opened schools or local priests held classes on church premises. Teaching was closely controlled by the church and was generally undertaken by the clergy or by a Catholic lay teacher certified by the regional bishop. Post-elementary education was the preserve of the religious Orders and various types of *collèges* were owned, operated and staffed by Jesuits, Barnabites, Doctrinarians, Oratorians, etc., although the scholastic Jesuit model prevailed there, as in the universities. Instruction was 'characterized by a concentration on Catholic doctrine and literary classicism; the former led to religious conformity, the latter to the intellectual homogeneity of the ruling elite'.⁴

This substantial monopoly was reinforced by an ideology based on traditional legitimation. Appeal was made to the supreme moral authority of the apostolic church, whose priests had the exclusive right to pronounce on ethical matters. Since every academic subject and issue was held to have moral implications, the clergy was presented as the only body which could properly teach. Thus the educational ideology was fundamentally religious, but included strong elements of social elitism and political conservatism, which broadened its appeal beyond the strictly theological.⁵ Symbolic constraints were also available within the church, which did not restrict itself to the use of the pulpit for disseminating its ideology. Religious sanctions were imposed on parents to ensure the catechization of children, on pupils in the boarding-schools to induce doctrinal orthodoxy, and on recalcitrant communities harbouring schismatics who might be tempted to enter the educational market to perpetuate heresies. Thus the strong monopoly was protected by the use of religious constraints originating within the controlling group, along with those deriving from education itself, i.e., discrimination and exclusion of potential critics from instruction, promotion of potential supporters through giving privileged educational access, and the use of tuition for spreading supportive values — devices generally employed by every dominant group.

In England at the end of the eighteenth century, the security of Anglican domination was much more the product of lack of

threat or opposition. The majority of facilities was owned by the church, but at elementary level it represented only a thin network of parish and charity schools.⁶ Since Brougham's Royal Commission of 1820 branded England as the worst educated country in Europe, the Anglican monopoly was clearly not extensive.⁷ It depended on the absence of organized opposition: a competing network of Dissenting establishments had yet to be consolidated, while the individual dame-schools plugged the gaps without constituting any concerted threat.

Anglican control of secondary and higher education was more firmly based. Not only were many of the endowed schools religious foundations, but also the clergy enjoyed a complete monopoly of educational personnel. It supplied the vast majority of staff and controlled the profession as a whole, since an ecclesiastical licence was needed to become a teacher. The classical curricula of public and endowed schools, reflecting the state of knowledge at their foundation, were definitions of instruction upheld by the church because of their relevance to ordination. The same was true of the universities where an entirely Anglican teaching and student body meant that higher education was permeated with religious orthodoxy⁸ and largely geared to reproducing the Anglican oligarchy over time — between 1800 and 1850 nearly half of those matriculating at Oxford were subsequently ordained.⁹ The governing elite provided supportive legal constraints, the most important being the Test Acts, limiting university graduation to Anglicans alone, and the judicial upholding of the statutes pertaining to endowed foundations which served to protect the Church's definition of instruction. In England a defensive ideology was not properly elaborated until Anglican domination came under attack.¹⁰

(a) The effects of domination on other parts of the social structure

The nature of the dominant group's definition of instruction gave rise to specific kinds of educational outputs which could be either a help or a hindrance to contemporaneous operations taking place in other parts of society. It is to these that we must now turn in order to investigate what supportive pressures the dominant group's activities in the educational field generated from other sectors of society, and where they met with the

greatest opposition. Although this only represents a preliminary and conditional structuring of parties whose interests lay in the maintenance of domination and those whose interests lay in its overthrow, it bears an important though imperfect relationship to subsequent patterns of educational interaction. This, we will seek to demonstrate, is not simply a matter of correlation but a structural influence on group interaction, which in turn is modified or reinforced by other influences. If this is the case, then the fact that the distribution of adventitious benefits and obstructions was very different in the countries concerned is of corresponding importance for understanding the educational conflict which took place.

Because of their supreme control over education, the dominant groups in both England and France were able to design the form of learning which best served their purposes, with almost complete disregard for the requirements of others. It is not surprising, then, that in each case the narrowness of instruction and the homogeneity of its outputs¹¹ obstructed more activities than those which it accidentally aided. (A broader, more differentiated education would have produced more adventitious beneficiaries, each of whom would have gained something from different parts of instruction.) However, it is not the number of parties who were obstructed or aided which is crucial, but rather qualitative characteristics of groups of people in these categories — who they were, what resources they had at their disposal and how willing they were to engage in support of, or opposition to, the dominant group.

In France, Catholic domination sponsored a tradition of scholastic classicism which served its own purposes but increasingly meant that 'a gap widened between it and society'. To Diderot it was only useful to the most useless of occupations — the priesthood and the professoriat.¹² Similarly, in the mid eighteenth century, Rolland stressed its incompatibility with public administration and went on to underline its disservice to military and commercial activities, 'are public schools destined only to produce clergymen, judges, physicians and men of letters? Are soldiers, sailors, tradesmen and artists unworthy?'¹³

Even the *ancien régime* monarchy was not a clear-cut beneficiary. Certainly the Catholic definition of instruction which hindered social mobility, confirmed social privilege and stressed duties associated with station in life, served to reinforce

the stratificational system upon which absolutism rested. But, on the other hand, Jesuit ultramontanism was antithetic to the monarchy's Gallican policy in religious matters, and its scholasticism was decreasingly useful to government service. It was only with the expulsion of the Jesuits and their replacement by the more modernistic Oratorians as the leading teaching Order, that the monarchy eventually became an unambiguous adventitious beneficiary, and the sole one at that.

In England, the developing capitalist economy was seriously impeded by the Anglican definition of instruction and the values it embodied. This taught deference to squire and clergy but not to entrepreneur and merchant, it defended hereditary privilege but not newly acquired property, it preached catechism and constitution but not industrial skills and the spirit of capitalism, it taught classics and pure mathematics but not accountancy and applied science.¹⁴ Equally, it penalized other religious organizations since the constraints which prevented Dissenters from attending many endowed schools, from university graduation, and from entering the teaching profession, hindered a range of denominational operations.

On the other hand, the Anglican dominant group had a clear adventitious beneficiary in the political elite. Increasing working-class unrest in the early nineteenth century made the contribution of religious instruction to social quietism proportionately valuable. Equally complementary with the goals of both political parties was the social exclusivity of Anglican secondary and higher education — for the status characteristics which were confirmed through education were the same as those employed by the governing elite when making ascriptive political appointments. The production of churchmen was in no way incompatible with the production of statesmen.

(b) Support for the dominant group

Adventitious beneficiaries do not convert directly into supportive groups. Indeed, they may not move in this direction at all since other factors can neutralize or counteract the structural predisposition towards their becoming loci of support. To recap, those receiving rewards must be aware of it, and must not have social ties, values, or any other source of allegiance which militates against solidarity with and defence of the dominant group. In neither England nor France did such factors nullify

the influence of educational relations on the formation of alliances for the maintenance of domination.

On the contrary, in France, conditional influences originating from *other* social relationships reinforced the educational predisposition for an alliance between clergy and nobility. As enlightened thought simultaneously became more secular and more radical, the nobility was not slow to recognize the rewards it received from clerical instruction. Furthermore, the clergy and the nobility constituted the two privileged Estates — they were united by social ties and similar vested social interests in the retention of privilege — a link which went far beyond their educational relations.¹⁵ Once the Jesuits had been expelled in 1762 and the Oratorian Order, with its Gallican outlook and more modern curriculum, had stepped into the gap, then social, religious, political and educational factors encouraged the nobility to act in a supportive capacity.

In England, too, the education alliance between Anglican Church and political elite was cemented by other factors, although complicated by party politics. By the early nineteenth century, tories and whigs alike acknowledged the services of the church to social control and to legitimating elitist government: both supported the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church. Social ties of family and class linked Anglican leaders to members of both political parties. Nevertheless, the traditional 'Church and King'¹⁶ outlook was more prominent among tories than in the Whig Party, which increasingly received the Dissenting vote after 1832. Thus, while whigs remained consistent in their support of *religious* instruction, it was the tories who finally emerged as strong allies of *Anglican* education.

Assertion

Educational conflict need not prove damaging to the dominant group or lead to any change in its definition of instruction if the constraints and ideological pressures it develops succeed in containing or eliminating opposition. Furthermore, the support that dominant groups receive from other parts of the social structure may be sufficient to protect their control. Having discussed the preconditions for the endurance of domination and analyzed the specific types of support accorded to it in both

countries, a parallel specification is now required of the conditions under which an assertive group *can* seriously challenge domination.

Only the necessary conditions for successful assertion are outlined, and these consist of the factors required to overcome domination — to evade its constraints, to reject its ideology, and to damage its monopoly. Without them there will not be far-reaching changes, but conflict may be resolved in favour of existing domination, for this depends on the outcome of interaction itself. What is being specified, then, are only those factors without which latent opposition cannot be transformed into assertion and an assertive group cannot overcome the dominant group.

First, opposition must acquire bargaining power, i.e., sufficient numerical support and organizational strength to challenge domination. Both involve a desire for concerted action to transform educational control which over-rides social ties with the dominant group and any conviction that its legitimacy ideology may have carried. In other words, diffuse discontent must be consolidated into organized assertion if constraints are to be subverted. To this end, a counter ideology is required, partly to inform the movement of its goals, to recruit participants from the obstructed institution(s) as well as support from a wider audience, and ultimately to justify using the bargaining power at its disposal. But, above all, the ideology of the dominant group has to be challenged and negated by a separate philosophy which legitimates the goals and activities of the assertive group and specifies its new definition of instruction. Finally, the assertive group must successfully engage in activities which are instrumental in devaluing the dominant group's monopoly.

Instrumental activities can take two different forms — substitution or restriction. (These, incidentally, correspond to two of the ways Blau outlines through which power can be undermined.)¹⁷ *Substitution* consists in replacing the supply of educational facilities, which the dominant group had monopolized, by new ones. In practice, this means devaluing its monopoly by building and maintaining new schools and recruiting, training and paying new teachers to staff them. Here domination is challenged by competition on the educational market — the aim of the assertive group being to price the dominant party out of it or to relegate it to a small corner of the

market. In either case, a transfer of control takes place and macroscopic changes are introduced. *Restriction*, on the other hand, consists of removing some of the facilities owned by the dominant group, or preventing it from supplying these resources to the educational sphere. Thus, the monopoly is devalued coercively; buildings may be appropriated, educational funds confiscated, or personnel excluded from teaching and administration. Here domination is challenged, not by market competition but by coercive power — the aim being the forcible transfer of educational control.

The nature and timing of confrontation between domination and assertion depends upon the balance of factors present on the two sides. There are two limiting cases: unchallenged domination, when no group has acquired any of the factors necessary for assertion (which corresponds to institutional stability), and, on the other hand, a situation where the prerequisites of domination are matched by the preconditions of assertion (which corresponds to overt institutional conflict). The three components of assertion may be developed simultaneously or over a period of time, but for analytical purposes they will be examined sequentially for the two countries.

(a) The consolidation of bargaining power

Bargaining power is essentially a matter of numbers and organization; it can obviously vary in strength and plays an important part in determining the relative success of different assertive groups. Several elements jointly contribute to influencing the bargaining power acquired. These can be classified as factors which restrain the development of a large and committed assertive group versus those which further its actualization. When the obstructions stemming from the prevailing definition of instruction all focus upon the same social group, a higher proportion of its members are likely to be active in the pursuit of educational change. Equally, if frustrations are experienced by different social groups which are nevertheless closely linked by other kinds of social ties, their alliance increases overall bargaining power. Both of these represent a particular type of mobilization, where a single assertive group develops with a large number of potential activists. Here there will be a polarization of conflict between domination and assertion. On the other hand, if frustrations are diffused among a

number of different social groups which are not linked to one another, pluralistic assertion is more likely and each group will have a more limited pool of potential participants. Because each will have greater difficulties in acquiring strong bargaining power, educational conflict will be complex and protracted.

Other factors can operate in a cross-cutting or reinforcing fashion as was discussed in Chapter 2. Strong links, on grounds other than educational, with the dominant group or its supporters, can reduce the number of those actively opposing it. Similarly, the existence of social antagonism between the assertive group and other sections of society reduces the probability of recruiting allies and thus fulfils a similar restraining function. Bargaining power will then be stronger the greater the independence of the obstructed group from the dominant group and the greater its links with other parts of society, especially if these in turn are ill-disposed towards the dominant group on other grounds.

France provides a striking example of a country where the polarization of educational conflict was not restrained by other social ties or allegiances and the consolidation of bargaining power by the assertive group was correspondingly easy. Most important here was the fact that obstructed operations gave rise to frustrations which were experienced cumulatively in one group — the bourgeoisie. Not only was Catholic education irrelevant to its activities in commerce and finance but school enrolment and graduation placed it in an anomic position when its members could not gain appointments commensurate with their qualifications. 'Each year instructed, ambitious and intelligent young men graduated . . . but their legitimate ambition came up against unscalable obstacles, money, titles . . . The Army, high positions in the Church, judicial offices were all the prerogatives of rich and noble families.'¹⁸ These multiple grievances led to the recruitment of activists from all sections of the bourgeoisie committed to educational change.

On the other hand, there were few links between the bourgeoisie and the privileged Estates to restrain participation in assertive activities. On the contrary, social, economic and political factors conditioned opposition to privilege itself — that is, to the First and Second Estates, the dominant group and its noble supporters. Simultaneously, the bourgeoisie could recruit allies from among the people, given that the latter were subject to indoctrination by clergy, repression by

nobility and financial exploitation by the state.

Thus, predispositions towards educational assertion were superimposed on further sources of social division and political opposition.¹⁹ Far from participation in educational conflict being restrained by other social ties it was encouraged by them, and assertive bargaining power was augmented proportionately. Educational conflict thus harnessed itself to social conflict structured by legal privilege.

By contrast, the factors influencing the formation of educational opposition in England were complex and cross-cutting, eventually resulting in the emergence of two distinct assertive groups. Initially, it seemed that middle-class assertion would not experience great difficulties in generating bargaining power since two of the major operations impeded by Anglican instruction — the development of the capitalist economy and the progress of Dissenting denominations — affected many of the same people. The entrepreneurial and Dissenting groups were not perfectly superimposed, but there was a large overlapping sector where frustrations were doubled — where fathers were compelled to become self-taught industrialists and their children were debarred from a polite education by religious affiliation and trade connections. At the same time, educational activism was tempered by the significant percentage of the middle class which remained committed Anglicans and by the high proportion of factory owners afraid to lose child labour.²⁰

Nevertheless, during the first decades of the nineteenth century it appeared that alliance with the working class would considerably augment bargaining power. Shared opposition to the church as the educationally dominant group, and to its supporter, the political elite as the ruling class, promoted joint action. However, the non-enfranchisement of the working class in 1832 accentuated the divergent political interests of industrial workers and entrepreneurs. In turn, this signalled the emergence of independent educational assertion on the part of labour. Consequently, the consolidation of bargaining power became more difficult for both forms of assertion since they had to recruit participants to oppose the dominant group *and* the other assertive party. Unlike France, political alignments in England fragmented educational alliances rather than cementing them, and this partly accounts for educational conflict being much more protracted in England.

(b) The elaboration of ideology

The possession of an ideology performs three vital functions for an assertive group. **Ideology is a central factor in challenging domination, since the legitimization of educational control must be negated by unmasking the interests served, thus reducing support for the prevailing definition of instruction. Secondly, it is crucial in legitimating assertion itself and is thus related to the consolidation of bargaining power. Finally, it is vital for the specification of an alternative definition of instruction, the blueprint which will be implemented in schools if the assertive group is successful.** The elaboration of assertive ideologies can, as we have seen, be facilitated or hindered by cultural factors and the distribution of social values in a given country.

The analysis of educational ideologies is important for two reasons. On the one hand, ideological factors exert an independent influence upon educational interaction. As Weber argued, struggle in the realm of ideas parallels rather than reflects group conflict and, although related to the structured interests of participants, contributes something of its own to determining the outcome between them. Here we will see that educational ideologies played an important role in the recruitment of support and formation of assertive alliances — sometimes over-riding differences of interest, sometimes introducing cleavage within an interest group. On the other hand, educational ideologies are vital to the understanding of educational change. The precise definition of instruction advocated by a group cannot be derived directly from its interests. These interests do not dictate the content of the ideology adopted (for more than one educational philosophy may be compatible with them), nor within it the exact nature of the blueprint advance (for more than one specific curriculum, type of school, etc., may serve group interests and contribute to the attainment of group goals). Thus, to account for the aims pursued in assertion and the changes introduced if successful, the ideological source of the new definition of instruction must be examined.

In France, educational values encouraged polarization between domination and assertion and buttressed the alliance against the Catholic Church. Initially restricting themselves to anti-clericalism, rather than anti-Catholicism, the bourgeois assertive group appealed to French enlightened thought and especially to the educational philosophy of Diderot.²¹ His stress

upon utilitarianism, nationalism and meritocracy captured their aims perfectly, specifying precisely the type of education desired and negating the Catholic definition of instruction so successfully that even the monarchy supported the expulsion of the Jesuit Order. This particular strand of thought was, however, too explicitly elitist (though on meritocratic not traditional grounds) to recruit popular support, which the bourgeoisie needed in the educational struggle as in political conflict. To gain it involved papering over the divisions which threatened the unity of the Third Estate by legitimating educational assertion to the people as an inextricable part of their battle for political rights. The thought of Condorcet²² and Sieyès²³ contributed much to legitimating assertion on a wide social basis, by relating the political attack on the nobility to the educational assault on the clergy, and blending the two into a single challenge to privilege itself — whose abolition could only be achieved by the united action of the Third Estate.

In England, on the other hand, cultural and ideological influences complicated alliances and prevented the clear-cut polarization of educational conflict. The existence of Dissent was initially helpful in crystallizing opposition to Anglicanism, for it represented pluralism in religious values. Almost immediately, however, strong denominational commitment reduced unity within the embryonic assertive group because it clashed with the secular utilitarian element. This strain was apparent during the early years of the British and Foreign School Society where schism developed between the secular and Quaker elements, which eventually left the society in Dissenting hands.

However, the victory of Dissent²⁴ (which became more pronounced when working-class unrest cast doubts on the restraining power of classical economics and secular ethics²⁵ and thus revalued religion for popular control), had a serious backlash. Effectively, it alienated the working-class leadership to whom secularism had strongly appealed, because it harmonized with the intellectual traditions most influential in popular educational thought — the secular rationalism of the French Revolution and early English anarchism. Ideologically, the working classes were as tenacious in their adhesion to secularism as was Dissent in its defence of denominationalism. It took other factors to precipitate the final break-away in the early 1830s — but secular socialist values then played a major

role in the crystallization of an independent popular assertive group and in the corresponding reduction of middle-class bargaining power.²⁶

(c) The development of instrumental activities

Use of either a restrictive or a substitutive strategy to devalue the monopoly of the dominant group is conditioned by the social distribution of resources. Thus, few assertive groups have free choice between the alternative kinds of instrumental activities.

For a group to begin assertion by means of a restrictive policy, it needs some degree of access to the national legislative machinery. The social distribution of political power, therefore, structures the availability of restrictive strategies to different assertive groups associated with various institutions. However, the fact that legislative influence is essential does not imply that any group initiating a restrictive strategy is synonymous with the political elite itself or possesses extensive political power, especially if the economic distribution is such that the adoption of a substitutive strategy is precluded. However, in such cases the use of restriction to damage the dominant group's monopoly is dependent on a concordance of goals between the assertive group and the political elite. This unanimity need not be present at the start but may be generated in the course of assertion. The support of governing elites can be won by convincing them that existing educational control is politically undesirable and by specifying an alternative definition of instruction which is more conducive to their aims. However, unless the political elite can be recruited as a strenuous ally, then only a substantial shift in the societal distribution of power to the advantage of the assertive group gives it any chance of executing a restrictive strategy.

It is because such political changes can occur in the course of interaction that the initial degree of access to governmental machinery does not determine the success or failure of assertive groups. However, ultimately, it is only when the assertive group is very closely allied to, or in fact co-terminous with, the political elite that restrictive strategies can be successful and engender macroscopic educational change.

For a group to begin its assertive activities by employing a strategy of substitution it needs access to some degree of economic surplus which can be directed to devaluing the

existing monopoly of educational facilities. Although the economic distribution conditions the differential availability of this strategy to various assertive groups, once again it does not determine the outcome of assertion. First, the crucial factor in developing this kind of instrumental activity is not the absolute amount of wealth at a group's disposal, but the proportion of it which can be mobilized for educational purposes (thus relative bargaining power is significant here). Secondly, if the assertive ideology legitimates opposition among a wider audience of potential supporters, the resources made available to this end are increased. Thirdly, while the provision of alternative physical facilities in education is capital intensive, considerable progress can be made through concentrating on competition in the field of human resources (which is why so many assertive groups have made use of the Lancastrian method;²⁷ grossly deficient as a means of instruction, but strategically ideal in yielding maximum educational encroachment for minimum investment).

Thus, it can be seen that the economic distribution exerts an influence on the selection and development of substitutive strategies which exactly parallels that exerted by the power distribution on restrictive strategies. In both cases the initial adoption of a strategy is influenced by the original resource distribution, but the outcome cannot be predicted from it. However, in substitution, as in restriction, if the policy is to succeed, resources must be accumulated in the course of interaction. This has the further implication that just as the political elite was considered to be the type of assertive group most likely to succeed in restriction, so the economic elite is best placed to carry through substitution. Indeed, the assertive groups which have the greatest probability of failing to develop either kind of instrumental activity are those which occupy the lowest position on both the wealth and power dimensions simultaneously. These in fact are usually the only groups which can be said to have a free choice between the two strategies — though progress with either is difficult, but not impossible.

In France we have seen that a variety of factors helped to structure a single assertive alliance and here the distribution of resources encouraged the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie to follow a restrictive strategy. As a predominantly professional-commercial group rather than an industrial middle class, it was not poor but was far from being in an economic position to

compete with the resources of the Catholic Church — and it is financial relativities which are crucial in substitution. Furthermore, the assertive alliance with the popular section of the Third Estate was not one which substantially added to the financial resources of opposition. On the political dimension, however, the bourgeoisie had influence only in the provincial parliaments which were consultative rather than decision-making bodies. Nevertheless, these could be employed as platforms for the expression of bourgeois views and the success of certain presidents (especially Rolland and La Chalotais) in initiating the expulsion of the Jesuits, confirmed the adoption of a restrictive strategy against the church. It encouraged the search for allies and the attempt to unite the Third Estate in order to strengthen bargaining power and exert greater political pressure, for in France political power would have to be augmented during educational interaction if assertion was to succeed.

The English case presents a complete contrast, for the middle-class alliance of entrepreneurs and Dissenters represented a group whose respective economic and political positions clearly favoured the adoption of a substitutive strategy. In terms of financial surplus they were, as their economists never failed to underline, the group making the greatest contribution to national wealth. However, despite having largely taken over from the landed interest as the economic elite, their political participation was minimal before large-scale enfranchisement in 1832: after it, parliamentary representation and cabinet influence still remained small for several subsequent decades. It is not surprising, then, that in the first half of the nineteenth century this group concentrated on devaluing the Anglican monopoly by substituting new establishments at all levels, either on a proprietary basis or through voluntary subscription.

On the other hand, working-class assertion came from a group which had neither political influence nor economic surplus and thus lacked the factors predisposing towards selection of either strategy. Indeed, the tactical debate about whether to engage in educational substitution as a basis for subsequent political change or whether to seek franchise reform first as a means for obtaining educational change later on, was to divide the Chartist movement.²⁸ Nevertheless, it was the substitutive strategy which was adopted immediately after and largely

because of political disappointment in 1832. The chance of being in a position to manipulate legislative machinery for educational reform then appeared remote; substitution could be immediate, and the argument of Lovett that an instructed class had better chance of enfranchisement was influential. Relative to working-class resources, the sums mobilized for substitution of elementary schools, halls of science, and mechanics' institutes were impressive — but more as an index of class commitment to educational change than as a serious threat to the dominant group or the growing network of institutions founded by the assertive section of the middle class.

Educational conflict

Organized conflict rather than unco-ordinated opposition occurs when the three prerequisites of domination are matched by those of assertion, as was the case in both countries examined. The nature, length and intensity of educational conflict is influenced by a variety of factors, many of them non-educational, and these have been incorporated into the discussion but obviously cannot themselves be explained within the present analysis. They are taken as given in our theoretical approach, which is more concerned with their consequences for educational interaction. Hence, the points at which they impinge upon educational groups have been indicated and it now remains to examine the combined impact of all the factors discussed on the course of educational conflict. It will be possible to do this only in the briefest terms: only the most salient features will be accentuated and most attention will be given to the final state of play between dominant and assertive groups at the point when macroscopic change begins to take place in education. Discussion of the changes themselves is reserved for the next chapter.

France is a clear-cut case where an assertive group succeeded in devaluing the monopoly of the dominant group and gained educational control on the basis of a restrictive strategy. As such, it illustrates the important fact that possession of political power alone does not confer the ability to define instruction, although control of the legislative machinery is a necessary condition for restricting others and preventing them from doing so. For on the basis of this kind of strategy there are two stages

involved in attaining educational control — one negative, the other positive.

The first is *restriction* itself which is essentially a destructive phase comprising the closure of schools, proscription of teachers, and dismantling of the previous apparatus for educational administration. It is not synonymous with educational control (although it is a precondition of it), precisely because it is negative and may merely destroy the functioning of education altogether for a time. The second stage, where control is attained and a new definition of instruction is imposed, involves the *replacement* of new educational facilities. For this to occur not only requires access to legislative machinery but also the political capacity to mobilize sufficient resources.

In France the Revolution in itself only gave the Third Estate legislative control through which to devalue the dominant group's monopoly, but did not enable them to proceed with replacement. The bourgeoisie was now politically powerful but still dependent on the support of the people in education as in politics and this severely constrained replacement. Not only did it invoke the problem of defining a common denominator of reform, acceptable to all sections of the Third Estate, which none of the three revolutionary assemblies succeeded in producing;²⁹ the more serious constraint consisted in the fact that popular support was incompatible with the high levels of taxation which successful replacement implied. A revolution which had been waged against the tax burden could not risk imposing new levies as one of the earliest actions of government.

The shift from assembly to consular and finally to imperial government meant that military coercion replaced popular support as the basis of political stability. With the return to strong government came educational *étatisme*: the immediate resurgence of the bourgeois ideology of the parliamentarians with its nationalism, vocationalism and Gallicanism as the definition of instruction endorsed by the imperial political elite. On a coercive basis, progress could finally be made towards replacement — of a kind which embodied these values.

The case of England is very different, for pluralistic assertive groups working on a substitutive basis led to the development of separate and alternative educational networks, outside the control of the dominant group. Middle-class substitution had begun early in the nineteenth century. Its immediate effect was to stimulate Anglican efforts to retain control and the National

Society was the organization designed for this defence. The assertive group counter-attacked with the foundation of a parallel organization, the British and Foreign School Society, geared to undenominational instruction. A combination of factors reinforced this partitioning of the elementary field among the competing parties. Distrust of state intervention on the part of Anglicans and Dissenters alike, coupled with tory unwillingness to employ it and whig commitment to educational expansion, represented a parallelogram of forces whose outcome was the voluntary system — where schools were financed through the two rival societies. In effect, control of the elementary level was left (and this was itself a product of substitutive conflict) to be determined by competition on the educational market. The factors which had produced the voluntary system (and the religious difficulty was only partly responsible), ultimately had the effect of entrenching it. The wealth of the middle class allowed it to make considerable progress in founding schools and recruiting teachers, though greater damage would have been inflicted on the Anglicans had the iron-masters been less concerned to retain profits from child labour and had the working class not been deflected to found its own network. Simultaneously, Anglican appeals enabled the church to increase its educational resources. Thus, strong, differentiated and autonomous networks of elementary schools continued to develop in parallel. The same was true at secondary level and again in higher education where the foundation of University College, as a product of middle-class assertion, was matched by the establishment of King's College and Durham University, as Anglican institutions.

Correspondingly, educational conflict did not result in a clear-cut transfer of control to the assertive alliance as occurred in France. Instead, deadlock developed between the parties involved. The dominant group was threatened but not eliminated: the assertive alliance evaded constraints and entered the educational market but could not monopolize it. Competition was fierce but since neither party could fatally injure the other, their respective educational networks continued to develop in parallel.

Response to this deadlock was identical for the various parties concerned. The established church increasingly turned towards the state for political intervention in defence of Anglican control and to further its influence over the sectarian

forces of dissent.³⁰ Partly because denominationalists feared the consequences of this, and partly due to their increased political influence, the middle-class alliance was also drawn into the political struggle in order to overcome market stalemate. Since working-class assertion with its limited resources had recognized the impossibility of educational reform without political change during the second stage of the Chartist movement, all the parties engaged in conflict now looked to political action for its resolution. The quest for politico-educational alliances which would exert pressure on political parties in Parliament developed in the 1860s. But it occurred when none of these groups had the exclusive prerogative of political influence and it took place in the context of two well developed networks of national education. What all parties sought from the state was defence and expansion of what they had already achieved, and the extent to which they got it depended upon a lengthy and complex process of political interaction. Resolution of the educational conflict therefore depended on resolution of the political conflict, and until the end of the century political deadlock was to parallel the earlier educational stalemate. Meanwhile, the separate educational networks retained their autonomy and continued to expand slowly.

4 STRUCTURAL ELABORATION: THE EMERGENCE OF STATE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

This chapter is concerned with the final phase of the cycle, which is also, of course, the first phase of the next cycle. It deals with educational changes resulting from the social interaction just discussed, which will, in their turn, condition future interaction and further educational change. The aim here is to link a specific mechanism of change (the interaction of educationally dominant and assertive groups) with its effects on the structure of education and the relations between education and society.

These links can be summarized in two propositions, which are held to be universal for nations whose educational systems developed autonomously.

- (i) Competitive conflict transforms the structural relations between education and society by inducing the emergence of state educational systems which are integrated with a plurality of other social institutions.
- (ii) Simultaneously, this process of interaction introduces an internal restructuring of education itself, through the development of four new emergent properties: 'unification', 'systematization', 'differentiation' and 'specialization'.¹

Universal characteristics of structural elaboration: multiple integration and state systems

This section concentrates on proposition (i) concerning the integration of education to the political centre and also to a plurality of social institutions as products of the interaction between dominant and assertive groups. In other words,

the competitive conflict responsible for education losing its mono-integrated status also accounts for linking instruction to the central decision-making agency of a society and to other parts of the social structure.

Although both changes are the universal products of a competitive process of interaction, this does not mean that they follow from a uniform sequence of events. Instead, their development varies according to which of the strategies — restrictive or substitutive — was pursued to challenge the monopoly of the educational ownership group in any given country.

(a) From restrictive strategies

We have seen that successful restrictive strategies are two-stage affairs involving the destruction of private ownership and the subsequent reintegration of education with other parts of society. Failure to move from the destructive phase of restriction to the constructive stage of replacement simply annihilates existing educational provisions.

It is in this need to replace as well as to restrict, if a new group is to accede to educational control, that the mechanism is found which accounts for the emergence of state educational systems. The mechanism itself entails nothing superordinate to the actors involved, it is simply the result of an assertive group continuing to seek educational control and is contingent upon the consistent pursuit of this goal. Were an assertive group to falter in the face of difficulties with replacement, and to renounce its desire to define instruction, the predicted consequences would not follow. As in any sociological theory which focuses upon goal-orientated behaviour, it must be recognized that actors and groups of actors can change the goals they seek to attain, for to reject determinism is to admit that ultimately circumstances force no one to do anything. Nevertheless, for a theory of this kind to have explanatory power there must be good reasons why a particular goal is highly likely to be sustained by a group and thus lead to the predicted consequences.

Now here the assertive group initially sought educational control because the institutional operations with which it was associated were being seriously obstructed, and it thus wished to have the power to redefine educational services. Its activities continue to be impeded in the absence of educational provisions

(for if its operations could dispense with such services, this group would originally have fallen in the neutral category) and may again be obstructed by the resurgence of the old dominant group if replacement does not occur. Thus, continuity in conditioning, represented by the endurance of obstructions, accounts for the assertive group's pertinacity in seeking educational control. It is the reason why groups which have accomplished the negative restrictive phase will struggle to achieve educational replacement.

To imply that replacement is a difficult task derives from the reasons which led an assertive group to employ a restrictive strategy in the first place, namely that it did not have financial resources commensurate with its political power. Thus, in France, economic wealth was concentrated outside the assertive group — in the hands of the landed aristocracy not the Third Estate, and the significance of this *negative* predisposition towards restriction does not stop there. Because of it, an assertive group which had waged a successful policy of restriction was then completely unable to replace educational facilities from its own resources.

However, when the assertive group and the political elite are co-terminous, the lack of resources does not preclude replacement. For the advantage such an assertive group possesses over any other is that it can use the central legal machinery to organize public educational financing rather than having to provide such facilities itself. To do this is not an easy or automatic procedure, if only because it is an innovatory one which involves withdrawing central resources from existing priorities and/or increasing the fiscal burden on the public. It is one, however, that presents the treble irresistible attraction of allowing the assertive group to control educational output in conformity with its goals, to do so at national level and at public expense.

However, what takes place in this situation is not merely the integration of education to the polity, but the emergence of national state education. The assertive group does not simply replace the old dominant group, for it cannot subordinate education by making it dependent on resources it owns and supplies. These are public resources, and with their mobilization for purposes of instruction, educational ownership and educational control become separated for the first time. There was never any question of the assertive political elite being able to appropriate public funds and thus to constitute itself as an ownership

group, for such wealth was not even centrally located. The amount which could be diverted from the national budget was totally inadequate to the task of replacement, whose completion involved supplementing central funding by the political mobilization of local resources.²

The budget of the Imperial University gives the clearest picture of the importance of central mobilization compared with direct central financing.³ By 1811 the municipalities were charged with the upkeep of the *faculté*, *lycée* and *collège* buildings and the principal communes were compelled to create grants for secondary school pupils or pay a contribution into the treasury which was earmarked for this purpose. In sum, the elementary schools, *lycées* and some *facultés* were made self-supporting, and the university treasury had only to maintain in full the central educational administration.

Thus, the assertive group succeeds in bringing about replacement not through the supplies it provides itself but by use of its political authority to mobilize the necessary resources. It has gained educational control, not on the old basis of monopoly ownership of facilities but by virtue of its legislative power. Control ceases to be entrepreneurial and becomes managerial, for although education remains subordinate, it is dependent upon resources owned and supplied by the state, not by a dominant group. The capacity to define instruction becomes firmly linked to political position and, what is completely novel, can be lost with the declining political fortunes of a group. Thus, the emergence of national state education is the result of a group attempting to complete a restrictive strategy, but the control it gains over it is of a different and weaker kind than that previously enjoyed by dominant ownership groups.

So far it has been the development of the integration between education and the state which has been accentuated as the end result of the replacement phase. However, the same two factors — the assertive group's desire to gain educational control and its use of public resources to do so — also account for the simultaneous emergence of multiple integration. First, an assertive political elite faces considerable problems in arranging the public financing of education for the first time, especially when the emergence of a state system predates industrialization. The assertive group thus has to seek political support for large-scale public spending on education — support within the governing elite for giving it a high priority, and outside it for

supplementing central educational expenditure. In turn, the latter groups make their support conditional upon their own educational demands being met by government.

The assertive group is now in a difficult position for it cannot gain control (by completing replacement) without support, yet support is conditional upon a diversification of educational outputs beyond the goals designated by the polity. This is one of the two sources of multiple integration and it is as important for authoritarian regimes as for those based on democracy. It is, however, an unintended consequence, for the diversification of educational outputs in order to service a multiplicity of operations is the price the assertive group pays for the mobilization of resources. It is the cost of control without ownership.

In addition, however, some of the new structural relations which develop between education and other social institutions are intended ones and stem from the assertive group itself, for by definition all political elites have a plurality of aims which impinge upon the operations of various institutional spheres. Specific changes in educational outputs will help in their attainment. Since no political elite is truly monolithic, sub-groups like the military may want educational outputs rather different from those sought, for example, by heads of civil administration — and demand them at the point when replacement becomes a practical reality. Problems of elite cohesion are solved by concessions which intensify multiple integration.

Ideally the assertive group would like to establish interdependence imperatively between education and those operations designated in its original blueprint; in practice this is modified because of the need for support from sectional interests within the elite and for public support outside it. Thus, the two sources of multiple integration, the intended and the unintended, intermingle and determine the exact nature of the structural relations which emerge.

The replacement phase in France (1805-33) gave steady priority to developing those forms of instruction from which political elites would gain most, while making shifting concessions to such sections of society whose support was needed. Given strong government but limited funds, initial replacement catered to the civil and military requirements of Napoleon's empire. For him — 'to instruct is secondary, the main thing is to train and to do so according to the pattern which suits the

State'.⁴ Resources were concentrated at the top, founding a national network of *lycées* whose *baccalauréat* gave direct entry to state employment or to *grandes écoles*,⁵ retailored to meet *etatist* requirements — St Cyr supplied army officers, *Polytechnique* furnished numerate civil servants and *Ecole Normale* stocked the highest reaches of the teaching profession.⁶ Thus, ability was harnessed to state service and a diploma elite was created among the professional bourgeoisie, giving it vested interests in educational maintenance.

Although the individual had no right to instruction if the state had no need of it, the wish 'to use the masses for manual labour and above all . . . to obey and to die beneath the flag'⁷ required a political socialization which would cost money. To provide this at state expense would have subtracted from secondary and higher provisions, but to concede to Catholic pressures for readmission to the educational field had the double advantage of securing church support for the new system while passing it the bill for elementary instruction. Thus, the forms of multiple integration developed under the empire linked post-elementary outputs as closely as possible to the military, bureaucratic and political operations of state, while the traditional interdependence between the church and elementary schooling remained basically undisturbed.

However, Catholic support proved nominal and despite stringent state controls⁸ the church persistently exceeded its brief and pursued autonomous religious aims: 'the main goal of primary instruction was as before to instruct people in the Catholic religion.'⁹ Given that the church increasingly used its position to contest rather than buttress the state system, the new bourgeois government of the July Monarchy replaced this support base by one which Napoleon had completely neglected — the economic elite. The establishment of vocational schools (*primaires supérieures*), in 1833, provided the skills now sought in commerce, industry and business administration, thus rupturing the previous integration between religion and elementary education and replacing it with a new structural relationship with the economy.¹⁰ And this occurred without disturbing the connections previously established between higher levels of instruction and the state, which were simply too advantageous for subsequent political elites to dispense with — there Napoleon had rightly forecast that 'public education is the future and the duration of my work after me'.

(b) From substitutive strategies

Here the integration of education to the polity is an indirect and unintended consequence of interaction: those embarking on substitution aim to assume the position of the dominant group and to alter the part of society which education serves. Instead, the immediate effect of this type of assertion is to introduce a rudimentary form of multiple integration, while the ultimate result is the emergence of a state system — thus reversing the order in which these two features appear, compared with systems originating from restriction.

The immediate effect is produced because no assertive group enters market competition unless it seeks a very different kind of instruction from that provided by the dominant group. Consequently, the output from assertive schools is designed to serve institutional operations previously obstructed by the only form of education available. Furthermore, since there is no reason to suppose that the dominant definition of instruction will only prove a hindrance in one quarter, or that the leading assertive group can contain or accommodate all other educational grievances, there is nothing to prevent the mobilization of other assertive groups. If operational exigencies lead those from different social institutions to contemplate substitution on their own behalf, nothing but their own limited resources can stop them. But any new group engaging in market competition only does so because it is profoundly dissatisfied with the two definitions of instruction now in existence, and what it provides is something different again. Thus the mechanics' institutes and halls of science¹¹ of the English working class, developed a non-vocational definition of instruction, geared to popular enlightenment, and serving the political advancement of a group which both Anglican and entrepreneurial schooling repudiated or repressed.

This form of multiple integration is rudimentary because although 'education' as a whole now services a plurality of social institutions for the first time, the various independent networks of establishments are completely separate from one another. There is in fact no 'education as a whole' except in the sense of it being the sum of these various parts, owned by different groups, serving diverse institutional operations, and operating in isolation from one another. The networks are totally segregated in terms of roles, personnel, administration, financing, intake, examination and, above all, definition of instruction.

Moreover, all the networks tend to grow in strength, for the crucial thing about substitutive strategies is that they are incapable of forcing the old dominant group out of the educational market however successful and attractive the new provisions prove. Competition cannot ultimately exclude the dominant group for it cannot be deprived of the facilities it owns or the right to keep on supplying them. Here the factors originally predisposing towards adoption of a substitutive strategy have further implications. This course of action was followed by groups whose economic surplus outweighed their political influence and who generally lacked any access to the central legislative machinery (necessary for successful restriction). Such being the case, and no major redistribution of political power having occurred, the assertive group lacks the legal constraints to eliminate the dominant group entirely or to prevent others from entering the market and complicating competition.

However, the origins of multiple integration proper are found in these vigorous independent networks, each one embodying a different definition of instruction. Basically, this comes about through a process of incorporation as these segregated networks become connected together to form a system. This is not a simple additive process: the type of national education which emerges is not just the sum of these various sets of establishments. It is the product of negotiation, conciliation, concession and coercion, all of which result in modifying the original networks — accentuating some, altering others and partially suppressing certain institutions. Nevertheless, diversity in the emergent system stems from the incorporated networks retaining much of their early distinctiveness and continuing to supply many of the services for which they were originally established. Once again the mechanism which produces both universal changes is nothing other than the consistent pursuit of their educational goals by the conflicting parties. To trace the emergence of change from interaction is to focus on what competition does to the groups involved and to their prospects of attaining educational control.

The initial effect of competitive interaction is considerable educational expansion as the various groups seek to move forward against each other. The final result is that deadlock arises between them. The resources which can be mobilized by any group for educational purposes are not limitless and as conflict becomes protracted, each party is trying to run faster in order

to stay put. No group makes headway against the others.

The situation in mid nineteenth-century England was typical — rivalry 'did not produce a surplus of schools and cheap education, as some educational "free-traders" expected, but tended to paralyse the activities of all parties, so that schools were built that could not be maintained and children were taught for such short periods that they could benefit very little from the instruction given'.¹² Increasingly, then, the independent networks were locked in conflict, and prospects of retaining or attaining educational control through further market efforts diminished accordingly.

From this situation of stalemate, pressures develop which culminate in the integration of education to the state. Each of the competitive parties seeks to break out of the deadlock and this can only be done in one of two ways — by obtaining considerable new resources or by acquiring legal constraints to use against competitors. It is obvious that the central government is the only source of the latter, but less self-evident perhaps that it is also the greatest untapped supply of wealth for educational purposes.

It matters little who makes the first move towards state intervention, although the competing group with the closest link to the political elite is usually the earliest to hope for legal protection (like the Anglican Church turning to its old adventitious beneficiary, the Tory Party and receiving backing, for the voluntary system undoubtedly worked in the Anglicans' favour). Education is irresistibly dragged into the political arena, for all competing groups are threatened if one alone makes headway with central government. Thus, profound educational conflict produces a strain towards state intervention as a means to advance or to protect the various networks. The development of a state educational system does not originate from the goals of either dominant or assertive groups. It is the eventual and unintended product of all of them seeking state intervention for their own ends simultaneously.

Because all competing groups do this simultaneously, the conflicting parties in education have to accommodate themselves to the structure of political conflict. Unless they can insert their aims prominently in the programme of an influential political grouping they have little chance of extracting governmental support and recognition. Hence a period of alliance formation follows in which political opposition

(organized in parties in the case of England) meets educational competition (the independent ownership groups). Thus, the Educational League was formed after the liberal majority in 1868 to 'make the government go faster'¹³ and dismantle the voluntary system, still favouring the Anglican Church.¹⁴ It was an alliance of Nonconformists, radicals and entrepreneurs, together with the TUC in pursuit of national unsectarian education maintained from local rates. The counterpart of the league was the defensive National Educational Union through which the established church, sponsored by the Tory Party, sought to consolidate its position by 'judiciously supplementing the present denominational system of national instruction'.¹⁵

The alliances formed may vary in the strength of their political sponsorship, through the two-way accommodation involved. On the one hand, several educational groups might have to work through a single political party, one doing so through elective affinity, another perhaps through lack of alternative: the price of putting effective pressure on Parliament by working via the league, through the Liberal Party, was a dilution of goals for both the Nonconformists and the working class which had to abandon their denominational and socialist definitions of instruction respectively. On the other hand, the parties may differ in the strength of their solidarity with the educational pressure groups: the Anglican Union gained clear-cut support from the Tory Party, without substantial dilution of its educational goals, while the league was merely a pressure group within liberal politics whose effectiveness was muted by other party considerations.

These alliances transmit educational conflict from the market-place to the centre of the political arena. However, political struggles over education take place in the context of established market positions — of flourishing and functioning networks, for which their political allies seek central financial support and legal recognition.

Political conflict itself, then, has the effect of preserving the networks, sometimes through successive parties giving financial aid and legal backing when in government to different ownership groups (thus positively strengthening them), sometimes through opposition preventing government from undermining a network through financial or legal sanctions (thus defending them negatively), and ultimately through the compact they thrash out on the educational question.¹⁶

The settlement of 1870 reflected the balance of power between the two coalitions. It established the 'dual system': rate-aided school boards could be elected where the Education Department was satisfied that a shortage existed (a major advance for assertion); voluntary denominational schools were to continue receiving government grants but not to gain rate-aid (a continuing recognition of the Anglican Church which remained the largest proprietor). The liberal cabinet had steered a course between conciliating the forty MPs affiliated to the league and not alienating its Anglican members by depriving the church of the right to control what it owned. Non-decision-making was of paramount significance, for the party political defence of vested interests had militated against the introduction of a single national system of education.¹⁷

However, through this political process of concession, compromise and compact the independent networks do become increasingly public — they receive public funding and in return have to yield some autonomy to accountability — they gain legal recognition but have to cede some independence to incorporation. Central agencies are developed by government to control the public financing of instruction and to ensure adherence to the rules concerning legal recognition, with the national educational system emerging as the end-product.

How this works and who it benefits reflects the balance of power between the parties. The last third of the century was dominated by conservative rule. The 1870 liberal settlement proved a formula favouring the assertive alliance: after 1875 the Anglicans complained constantly of falling subscriptions, rising costs and competition from the school boards and succeeded in activating tory support for their cause. By a series of legal and administrative steps utilizing the new instruments of central control — auditing of school expenditure and intensified use of the code of instruction — the unseen grip of the Treasury tightened *differentially* on the networks.¹⁸ Henceforth, conservative efforts were devoted to defending the established rights of the church at elementary level (still enrolling 64 per cent in the late 1880s), by pressing for rate-aid, and to protecting Anglican entrenchment at the secondary level, by seeking to dismantle the higher grade schools.¹⁹

Despite considerable opposition from the liberals, the labour movement and the Free Churches, these were the major components of the tory Act passed in 1902 which created a single

central authority for English education and linked the networks together for the first time to form a national system. Thus, the types of interaction which link education to the polity are quite different from those which characterize systems with restrictive origins. There a political elite sought financial support to develop national education — here, educational entrepreneurs seek political support to consolidate their control. There educational systems developed centrifugally, by governmental initiative spreading outwards — here they emerge centripetally, from peripheric innovations which converge on government. In the former, a powerful elite founds a national educational system in order to serve its various goals: in the latter, educational networks already serving different goals become incorporated to form a national educational system. Systems with substitutive origins are then bred out of the private competitive networks by institutionalized political conflict; their final form being shaped by the interplay between government and opposition.

Since the two are rarely perfectly balanced, an interest group allied to a strong governing party will tend to see its network prominently placed in the educational system and will not have to make great concessions over its outputs and the parts of society these serve; one which has to work through a weaker form of opposition will tend to see its network relegated, subject to governmental modification, and loss of distinctiveness. Undoubtedly, the working-class definition of instruction lost out most, given minimal political sponsorship. It was virtually eliminated from national education since its main foothold had been in the higher grade schools which were now suppressed. In becoming part of a national system, elementary education had lost some of its earlier diversity although the various religious denominations succeeded in becoming incorporated without substantial loss of managerial autonomy.

Compared with the ferocity of elementary school politics, incorporation at higher levels was not overshadowed by a class threat and was settled by give and take among the party elites — feasible because the respective networks concentrated upon different types of tuition. Thus, the old Anglican strongholds retained their traditional definition of instruction in the public schools and ancient universities;²⁰ middle-class institutions were well accommodated, with technical education²¹ coming under the aegis of the local authorities in 1902 and the

university extension colleges²² receiving grants and charters which upgraded them without entailing loss of autonomy or change in the services provided for business or commerce; denominational secondary schools²³ were inserted without diminution of their special kinds of outputs. Although the endowed grammar schools increasingly served the growing bureaucratic requirements of government, other parts of post-elementary education could preserve their distinctive definitions of instruction.

(c) Structural elaboration within educational systems

To turn now to the internal changes taking place in national education is partly to engage in an exercise of analytic convenience, in the sense that the transformations to be examined are not separate from those already discussed. Indeed, they result indirectly from the same processes of interaction and thus take place almost simultaneously. There appear to be four types of internal change which are universally related to the emergence of educational systems: unification, systematization, differentiation and specialization. The first pair are associated with the attachment of national education to the state and the second pair with its multiple integration to different social institutions.

Unification

The first universal characteristic of state systems refers to the scope and nature of educational administration. Unification involves the incorporation or development of diverse establishments, activities and personnel under a central, national and specifically educational framework of administration. In turn, this results in certain uniform controls emanating from the centre, and the standardization of certain educational inputs, processes and outputs on a nation-wide basis. Such unification may be partial, as some kinds of educational institutions, some forms of instruction and some types of teachers may remain outside the central administrative framework. However, as we shall see later, the degree of unification is not simply a function of the size of the free or private sector in education. Unification varies both in extensiveness and also in the intensity of administrative control.

Not every aspect of unification mentioned in the definition has its origins in the advent of state systems: both the French Catholics and English Anglicans could perhaps claim to have administered a national educational network, but their administrative agencies were neither linked to the political centre, nor were they specifically educational in character. Thus, the significance of state systems for this type of internal change is that only with them are all aspects of unification found in conjunction.

As the definition makes clear, unification is equally characteristic of systems with substitutive origins, which emerge through incorporation and of systems with restrictive roots, which develop through replacement. In the former, the development of a central authority for education is a slow and cumulative process which is not completed until incorporation has taken place. The administrative framework is gradually elaborated and dissociated from other bodies (Charity Commission, the church, Poor Law agencies, etc.) as a direct product of the networks seeking public finance and legal recognition. When systems have restrictive origins, unification is generally quicker and more dramatic. Once the restrictive phase has been accomplished, replacement immediately takes a unified form — it is centrally directed, national in scope and controlled and orchestrated by specialized administrative agencies, which are often (as in France) new organs designed for the purpose.

Unification is not synonymous with the centralization of education, although the former is clearly a precondition of the latter. The concept of centralization denotes specific relations between the unified parts. 'A centralized system is one in which one element or sub-system plays a major or dominant role in the operation of the system. We may call this the *leading-part*, or say that the system is *centred* around this part. A small change in the leading-part will then be reflected throughout the system, causing considerable change.'²⁴ A centralized system is thus a special type of unified system, but not all unified systems are centralized; to argue otherwise is to assume that in all forms of state education the largest educational changes follow from the smallest initiatives of the political elite. On this point one can fully concur with Cohen that it is simply not the case that state institutions always influence others more than the state is influenced by them.²⁵ The existence of a central administrative framework does not automatically make it the

leading part. Centralization is thus regarded as a variable elaborative characteristic, whereas unification is a change which is universal upon the emergence of state systems.

Systematization

Accompanying unification, through which new educational boundaries are defined, are further internal changes which represent a transition from summativity to wholeness as the new systems become consolidated. Instead of national education being the sum of disparate and unrelated sets of establishments or independent networks, it now refers to a series of interconnected elements within the unified whole. Systematization consists in the 'strengthening of pre-existing relations among the parts, the development of relations among parts previously unrelated, the gradual addition of parts and relations to a system, or some combination of these changes'.²⁶ Two other aspects of systematization may be gradually refined in the decades following the emergence of the state system: first, a series of national examinations (or ones whose validity is nation-wide), corresponding to the boundaries delineated by the administrative framework and graded in relation to the various levels; second, regular forms of teacher recruitment, training and certification, valid throughout the system and appropriate to the various levels. This progressive systematization is analytically distinct from unification, since the latter is equally compatible with summativity. Empirically, however, these two changes go hand in hand, for both appear to be universal upon the emergence of state systems.

One of the most important aspects of this change is the development of hierarchical organization, i.e. the gradual articulation of the different educational levels which may previously have been unrelated, controlled by different ownership groups, and completely unco-ordinated. Hierarchical organization develops because educational goals, even if focused intently on a given level of instruction, are hampered by a lack of complementarity with inputs, processes and outputs at other levels. The impetus towards this form of change is not provided by some abstract 'strain towards efficiency', but reflects the increased co-ordination required if a multiplicity of educational goals are to be attained and the pressure exerted by their advocates to see that they are met.

To avoid confusion, it should be stressed that the concept of hierarchical organization does not imply the existence of an educational ladder. While the former is a precondition of the latter, it does not constitute the sufficient conditions for its development. The co-ordination of inputs, processes and outputs at different levels of instruction does not necessarily imply that pupils can or do pass from the lowest to the highest level. Indeed, with reference to certain goals, it involves organizing processes at the lowest level in such a way that its pupils *cannot* enter the next level and do not have the qualifications to do so. Hierarchical organization can thus operate positively to encourage movement between levels, by dovetailing inputs, processes and outputs, or negatively to discourage them by placing barriers between the parts. Both the positive and negative aspects will be found in most systems, but the particular levels at which they operate depend on the goals pursued and the outcomes of political interaction.

Differentiation

In the antecedent period, one consequence of ownership was a relatively low degree of differentiation between education and the institution whose elite subordinated it — low in terms of the definition of instruction itself (usually confounded with the operations of the subordinator, education, for example, being considered as the formation of the Christian); in terms of the educational role structure (often completely overlapping that of its subordinator and illustrated most clearly by the religious teaching Orders); and finally, of course, in terms of its administrative framework. Multiple integration, on the other hand, is associated with the development of a specialized educational collectivity, occupying a distinctively educational role structure, and transmitting definitions of instruction which are not co-terminous with the knowledge or beliefs of any single social institution.

For the pursuit of diverse educational goals and the effective pressure of a plurality of groups, together prevent the new educational system from being organized at the same low level of differentiation. Quite simply, a form of education which remained confounded with, for example, religious practices and personnel, would hardly satisfy military or civil training requirements. If education is to service several operations

simultaneously, it can only do so if it stands somewhat apart from all — for proximity to one will be prejudicial to the others.

Where restriction is concerned, the very plurality of political goals vis-à-vis education is itself a reason for educational differentiation, for these preclude the uniform and unifunctional type of education which is associated with a dominant ownership group. Certainly, there may be sections of the elite which preferred a low level of differentiation, with an intermingling of political and educational roles and activities, such that trained teachers represented loyal cadres and political ideology dictated the definition of instruction. However, the multiplicity of services sought from education by the various sections of society meant that the pressures they exerted did engender and sustain a higher overall degree of differentiation than was the case in the antecedent period.

The same factors are responsible in systems with substitutive origins, although they operate in a very different way. The political negotiations surrounding the incorporation of the independent networks fundamentally preclude a low differentiation of education. Since each assertive group works through its political alliance to defend the distinctiveness of its network while gaining state support, their interaction necessarily has the effect of opposing a tight relationship between education and one institution alone. Indeed, incorporation could not be negotiated were this the case, for all networks but one would have everything to lose and nothing to gain. Instead, the terms negotiated are essentially ones which deny any assertive group exclusive powers to define instruction, supply its personnel or control administration.²⁷ Thereafter, the conjunction of these different interests means that each acts as a watchdog to prevent the re-establishment of exclusive links between education and another party.

Specialization

So far we have seen how a change towards hierarchical organization helps to avoid the various educational goals from being mutually exclusive. However, the co-ordination of parts and levels only helps in the negative sense of removing obstacles to multiple goal attainment. In itself it does nothing to ensure that education *does* serve a variety of demands and service a plurality of institutional operations. Indeed, logically, a

hierarchically organized system could be a unifunctional one; it could mean co-ordination of parts and levels for a single purpose.

The concept of specialization refers to a range of internal changes rather to any single one. To serve a particular demand may involve the development of new types of establishments or the pursuit of new activities in existing ones; the delineation of new roles, forms of recruitment and training; the increased complexity of intake policies and the development of branching paths of pupil allocation, within or between levels and types of establishment; additional variety in curricula, examinations and qualifications throughout the educational system; the development of special facilities, teaching materials and equipment. These are further effects of multiple integration where specialization in intake, processes and outputs develop to meet demands whose diversity is incompatible with unitary procedures.

In systems with restrictive origins we have already seen that some diversification of educational services is the price of elite cohesion and public support. Where substitution is concerned, specialization is transmitted to the new system through incorporation of the independent networks, and the more they were incorporated intact, the greater the initial specialization of the educational system. In both cases it is the possession of power that determines the demands which are given most specialized attention in the new system.

These four changes take place within the same system, they may occur simultaneously or sequentially, and are forms of growth which can go on indefinitely. Since each aspect of this internal elaboration derives from social interaction, the specific changes which result are not necessarily complementary. They are not synonymous with a better adaptation of the educational system to its environment or with an optimal arrangement of activities for giving maximum services to a variety of social groups. Therefore, no assumption can be made that they constitute a trend towards systemic integration — structural contradiction and social conflict do not necessarily diminish.

Structural elaboration: variable characteristics

If our theoretical approach can account not only for general types of elaboration, but also for *variations* in these changes,

then it should be possible to advance further propositions. These would deal with the relationship between the four main internal changes in different systems and would give greater theoretical purchase on their specific problems of structural integration and further educational conflict.

It appears that variations in the elaborated characteristics are closely related to the way in which the educational systems developed — by incorporation or replacement. In particular these different social origins produce differences in the strength of the two pairs of characteristics (unification/systematization and differentiation/specialization) relative to one another. This in turn influences the relationships between these pairs and the problems of integration experienced within new educational systems.

(a) From restrictive origins

Unification and systematization are the pair of characteristics to emerge first and are inextricably bound together, for there is no intervening period in which a gradual transition is made from summativity to wholeness. Once restriction is completed and replacement begins the political elite seeks to institutionalize a new definition of instruction which is highly compatible with its requirements. Yet, if it is to ensure that the new establishments and personnel provide the services needed, then it must control them closely. Hence, one of the first innovations made during the replacement phase is the development of an administrative structure tailored to this task. This must simultaneously guarantee the responsiveness of educational institutions to the directions of the political elite and seek to eliminate countervailing or disruptive tendencies.

In founding the Imperial University (the name given to the new system as a whole), Napoleon could not have been more explicit that he was creating an instrument of government: 'schools should be state establishments and not establishments in the state. They depend on the state and have no resort but it; they exist by it and for it. They hold their right to exist and their very substance from it; they ought to receive from it their task and their rule.'²⁸ In other words, if the aims of the political elite are to be satisfied, unification must be intense and extensive. What is significant about such systems is that this

group is in a position to design the unified administrative framework in accordance with its goals.

The central administrative agencies formed have a strong, hierarchical distribution of authority in which each lower administrative level is subject to a higher one and ultimate control is exercised at the apex by a political officer. In turn, this means a very low degree of autonomy of decision-making in the various regions or in individual schools. It is not uncommon for every decision concerning expenditure, appointments, examination, curriculum and recruitment to be referred to a higher authority. Similarly, the autonomy of educational personnel is not great and it is common in such systems to find that teachers are civil servants and thus subject to more limiting legal statutes than other professions.

This intensive unification is exemplified in the decree of 1808 creating the framework of the Imperial University. To ensure central control, a perfect administrative pyramid was erected which subordinated regional *académies* to the authority of a *grand-maître* who in turn was directly responsible to the head of state, the Emperor himself. This legislation proclaimed uniformity in instruction throughout the country and the government's right to enforce it.²⁹ In consequence, all schools at the same level were to impart identical instruction, to each corresponded a single form of organization and every qualification (*baccalauréat*, *license*, *doctorat*) became a national one. This is the origin, more than half a century later, of the remark made by the legendary minister of the Second Empire that 'à cette heure, dans telle classe, tous les élèves de l'empire explique telle page de Virgile'.³⁰ Central controls also reached out to enmesh the teaching profession as civil servants and to ally them to the state by more than statutory bonds. To Napoleon, 'il n'y aura pas d'état politique fixe, s'il n'y a pas un corps enseignant avec des principes fixe . . . Mon but principal dans l'établissement d'un corps enseignant est d'avoir un moyen de diriger les opinions politiques et morales'.³¹ The loyalty of the teaching profession, modelled jointly on the Jesuit corporation and the military hierarchy, was to be ensured by a judicious mixture of training, incentives and surveillance.

Equally important is the fact that unification is very extensive. Thus, the decree creating the Imperial University also attempted to give the state educational system an absolute

monopoly over all instruction. State controls over private education were elaborated and reinforced in 1811, thus greatly increasing the extensiveness of unification. The most important restrictions, which virtually made these establishments part of the public system, included governmental authorization before any school could be opened, subordination to *université* regulations and inability to confer their own diplomas. In addition, to prevent competition with public education, private schools were weakened financially by a per capita contribution to the *université* paid on each pupil, and academically by a requirement that all private pupils entering for the *baccalauréat* had to present a *certificat d'études* attesting that their last two years of study had been in a public *lycée* or *collège*. Fearing above all resurgence of the Catholic Church, their schools were limited to one per *département* and prohibited altogether in towns where *lycées* existed. Initially, at elementary level, the religious orders were allowed to continue teaching but as part of a dual policy to control the church in the state and the people in society.

However, the boundaries of the state system did not, in fact, become co-terminous with those of national education. Private confessional schools lost only about half their pupils after the stringent legislation of 1811 which sought to establish a state monopoly.³² Indeed, the old dominant group continued to demand freedom of instruction and independent status for its own establishments. Nevertheless, even if these demands met with some success — as, for example, in France after the loi Falloux in the 1850s — the private sector does not achieve much independence as it cannot escape from the controls and common practices imposed by the unified framework. What to the state had been a partial failure in its policy for monopolizing public instruction, was a continuous and crushing blow to the autonomy of private education.

For instance, the existence of a single series of state-organized examinations limits the definitions of instruction which can be pursued within the private sector. Because of these factors unification is more marked in systems with restrictive origins, and the private sector is less able to create exigencies for the public sector because it is more closely controlled. Quite simply it is less problematic because it is less different. At the same time, however, the fact that the private sector is unified also prevents it from functioning as a shock absorber for

the state system by serving unsatisfied demands and thus channelling a potential source of conflict away from public instruction.

From the start, systematization is equally pronounced for it develops in tandem with strong unification. Because restrictive strategies, unlike substitutive ones, present the opportunity for beginning largely from scratch, any successful political elite will avoid internal bottle-necks, contradictions and inconsistencies by dovetailing inputs, processes and outputs in its own interests. At first, such systematization will involve only those parts and levels to which the political elite has given priority in its replacement policy, although others are added later. Nevertheless, the principles guiding co-ordination are the operational requirements of the political elite.

Pressures towards further specialization and differentiation arise as has been seen from multiple integration, which is an unavoidable consequence of the quest for resources and support during the replacement phase. Ideally, the political elite would like to construct a tightly controlled educational system with just that degree and kind of specialization needed to meet the various *étatist* goals. Instead, realistically it seeks the maximum contribution and support from other parts of society in return for conceding the minimum amount of diversification.

In France, this aim was achieved by confining to the primary level those forms of specialization which were of little interest to the state. (An instance where systematization followed the negative principle of hierarchical organization — the educational ladder was quite deliberately lacking.) Thus, because demands for increased diversity were minimized and modified by the political elite, the concessions made to them did not reduce the high level of systematization or detract from the streamlined structure of the resulting system. Because they were introduced by government, the new specialized institutions did not escape central administrative control and thus lower the high degree of unification. In other words, systematization and unification remained the predominant pair of characteristics as specialization and differentiation were accommodated to them.

Such systems may properly be termed centralized — they have a distinct leading part in their respective administrative frameworks and small changes initiated through them have ramifications for all the other component parts of education. Since changes in the various elements are carefully monitored

by the centre, their reciprocal influence is not of equivalent strength.

(b) From substitutive origins

The crucial point about substitutive systems is that **unification and systematization are superimposed on the networks which are already specialized and differentiated**. What this means in practical terms, is that the degree of unification brought about over the whole range of educational establishments is relatively low. In the same way, systematization is imperfect and various discontinuities in inputs, processes and outputs between different parts and levels witness to its incompleteness. The weakness of these two characteristics is a direct product of the interaction which leads to incorporation. It arises from defence of the independent networks in which specialization and differentiation are already entrenched.

As far as unification is concerned, each assertive group has a vested interest in retaining managerial autonomy over its network, since this alone guarantees the continued flow of those services for which the network was founded in the first place. Ultimately, pressures stemming from the assertive groups combine to ensure that unification will not be intense or extensive. The conditions under which a high degree of central administrative control could be introduced, would involve the dispossession of the assertive groups and nationalization of the networks. The political balance of power prevents this as each party sponsor protects educational property rights, as first the voluntary system and then the 1870 settlement in England illustrate. The role of the state was still principally that of central paymaster and the next quarter of a century did not fundamentally strengthen unification.³³

By the mid 1890s a complex administrative picture had developed from the conflict between the political sponsors. Some reduction in autonomy had been the price of state aid and recognition, but not strong, rationalized administration. A patchwork of statutory instruments, financial regulations and a chaotic array of agencies made up the central machinery for educational control. The main authority for secondary education, in so far as one existed, remained the Charity Commission which had survived the Taunton attempt at organizational rationalization and represented an organ unresponsive

to government.³⁴ (As Forster later reported, 'I found no Ministerial power there... my vote went for no more than those of anyone else'.)³⁵ Then the Science and Art Department, originally merely intended to encourage study of subjects neglected by traditional curricula, invaded both technical schools and board schools in the course of awarding its grants, an intrusion resented by both. Finally, the Education Department, supposedly concerned with the allocation of payments to elementary schools, also overlapped with administration of the higher grade level and the training colleges.

What is even more important as incorporation advances, is that political action continues to repulse the emergence of a strong central authority with extensive powers. This is largely an effect of the politico-educational alliances themselves. To a significant degree party hands are tied. However much a strengthened form of central educational administration might make political good sense, there is the support of the educational interest groups to consider. The latter, as highly organized bodies for exerting party influence, constantly use it to minimize such tendencies. The crucial point here is that such pressures are being put on both or all parties simultaneously. In sum then, forceful political initiatives in favour of a strongly unified system are lacking in such countries.

Thus, even the Bryce Commission (1895), which represented a liberal attempt at administrative rationalization, underlined that this was not synonymous with making 'secondary education purely a matter of state concern':³⁶ it accepted the existence of a large private sector which would not be highly controlled. It did not propose certification of teachers, only the keeping of a central register; it did not advocate central examination, merely the regulation and co-ordination of those held by the differing examining bodies already at work. Its careful insistence on guidance, not control and on co-ordination rather than nationalization indicates the low degree of unification the liberals thought politically feasible. Yet it was to be an even lower degree which was introduced by the Tories in the next seven years. This situation simply bears no comparison with the total commitment of political elites to central unified control in systems with restrictive origins.

The 1899 Act, instituting the Board of Education, represented the weakest form of unification, since it simply brought together the Education Department, the Science and

Art Department and the Charity Commission, while guaranteeing that there would be a separate organizational method for dealing with secondary education. It was so weak that it was virtually unopposed: 'a phenomenon that might legitimately, if uncharitably, be ascribed to the fact that the Bill was agreeably innocuous. It afforded such benefits as might be derived from association with a Department of State, without their being obliged to surrender any fundamental liberties they enjoyed'.³⁷ It was unopposed precisely because it was, in the words of the chairman of the London School Board, nothing but 'a miserable little piece of Departmental machinery'.³⁸ Nevertheless, for the first time 'the existence of the central authority implied that the administration of all public instruction was essentially a unity'.³⁹ However, when compared with countries of restrictive origins, there is no denying that 'the rise of a central authority for English education had been a slow, tortuous, makeshift, muddled, unplanned, disjointed and ignoble process'.⁴⁰

Furthermore, unification is not fully extensive, for important parts remain substantially outside the central administrative framework. Certain potential participants in state education simply withdraw, retaining their private status if it appears to them that their position in the unified system would be disadvantageous, and, if they have the resources to stay independent. This had been the strategy of the Headmasters' Conference from 1869 onwards: to ensure that the public schools 'should be free from any form of external guidance or control'.⁴¹ The private sector in education develops from such cases (they are rather like companies whose directors find the terms of a proposed merger unacceptable). However, it is not the existence of a private sector per se which is the peculiar characteristic of systems with substitutive origins. It is the conjunction between incomplete and weak unification which is significant here. For it gives rise to a private sector which is the most independent in the world.

Turning to systematization, here again attempts to preserve the autonomy of the networks limited the extent to which it could develop, just as they had reduced the degree of unification which could take place. The two issues, of course, are closely related, for without strong unification it is unlikely that a high level of systematization can be maintained, and, in addition, the defence of specialist activities means repulsing

intrusive central control. Again (in exact parallel to the argument about unification), if prominence of individual parts is the political concern of all, then a rational relationship between them is the political concern of none.

Directly reflecting this, the degree of systematization achieved by the English 1902 Act was the lowest possible, for it said nothing about the relations between secondary education and elementary schooling. In practice, the various institutions operating at these two levels showed the greatest discontinuities between one another: they were not dovetailed in terms of pupils' ages, their curricula or their examinations, but overlapped and contradicted each other at every point. This situation had arisen because the two major political sponsors had consistently pursued incompatible principles of hierarchical organization; the Tory Party advocating the negative principle and the Liberal Party the positive one. Neither of the political antagonists struggled for a rational relationship between *all* current types of institutions — their aim was to suppress, limit or transform their opponents' institutions and then to systematize relations between the remaining parts. It was precisely because neither party was fully successful in the preliminary ground-clearing operation that systematization could not be far-reaching. Thus, the Act of 1902 was not able to adjudicate between the two principles of systematization. Oppositional pressures had forced the inclusion of clauses making it obligatory for the LEA's to promote post-elementary education in relation to the needs of their areas. The Tory government had only managed to leave the relations between the two levels vague, not to impose its principle of complete separation. When the liberals finally returned to office in 1905, all they could accomplish was the introduction of 25 per cent of free places in secondary schools, so linking the two levels by competitive scholarships. Thus, all they could do was partially to impose their principle of hierarchical organization on their opponents' institutions.

At the secondary level itself, less was eliminated and (therefore) even less was co-ordinated. The middle-class technical schools and extension colleges survived, they remained linked together, but unco-ordinated with their opposite numbers, the public schools and older universities. Hence, the English system entered the twentieth century characterized by overall organizational discontinuity — with occasional links