

between pairs of institutions (witnessing to the partial success of their sponsors) but without any of the dovetailing devices such as a uniform teaching body or national curricula and examinations (testifying to the intransigence of their founders).

In other words, educational systems originating from substitution retain specialization and differentiation as their dominant pair of characteristics and these constantly create strains and problems which, as we shall see, are barely contained by simultaneous but weaker pressures towards unification and systematization. Such systems are frequently and properly referred to as decentralized — they indeed have no leading-part.

PART II EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS IN ACTION

5 STRUCTURE: STATE SYSTEMS AND NEW PROCESSES OF CHANGE

The preceding chapters sought to explain the emergence of state education systems: we now turn to their consequences for subsequent interaction and further educational change.

Once private ownership had given way to state systems and mono-integration to multiple integration, educational interaction was immediately conditioned in a completely different manner. The context in which people now found themselves educationally, the problems they experienced, and what they could do about them altered radically. They reacted and interacted differently and this gave rise to educational change through processes other than the competitive conflict of earlier times. **Ultimately this means that once state systems have developed, the domination and assertion approach ceases to be appropriate for the analysis of educational change, since the structural relations which made it so have now disappeared.**

Interaction between dominant and assertive groups had been the historical 'guidance mechanism'¹ which repatterned the relationship between education and society, but concurrently it had transformed itself by destroying the conditions engendering this distinctive form of interaction. Henceforth, as education began to serve a plurality of social institutions, its control largely ceased to rest on the private ownership and provision of physical and human resources; most of them became publicly provided and thus their command was now the issue. Correspondingly, control over education became less direct: instead, struggles over it concerned indirect rights to deploy public finance for particular educational ends.

To understand the transformation of conditional influences which stem from the new systems is vital for the explanation of educational conflict and change in the modern period. However, two kinds of influences are involved: the general consequences of the emergent state systems, which will be

examined first, and the variable effects of their different structures, which will be discussed afterwards. Because centralized and decentralized systems emerged respectively from restrictive or substitutive competition, their subsequent conditioning of educational interaction will not be identical. For different kinds of structural elaboration which developed in the past, in turn condition diverse forms of interaction in the present, and may then influence divergent patterns of change in the future.

(a) General effects on education

The first and most obvious consequence of the new linkages established between education and society is the loss of its previous mono-integrated status (associated with private ownership), many of whose educational implications also disappear. The fact that these systems are multiply integrated has the general effect of lifting education from its earlier position of total subordination. Now, four interrelated factors begin to inject a greater reciprocity into the relations between education and the institutions it serves. All of these stem from the fact that the resources used by education are no longer owned and monopolized by one party. Together they do not introduce balanced exchange, but although reciprocity remains imperfect, a significant amount of educational autonomy develops for the first time.

(i) To begin with, the fact that it is public resources rather than private means which now finance education does something to correct its supine dependency on a single supplier which can manipulate funding to call the tune and variations on it. The significance of this change is heightened because simultaneously education ceases to be a minority affair, for the competitive interaction giving rise to state systems also generated considerable expansion² — in both strategies this gradually meant that more and more children were being enrolled and an increasing proportion of people were practically involved, if only as parents.

From being completely without influence over formal education in the antecedent period, the position of the mass of the population has improved because of the pressures it can exert over public spending. Parental outcry and student protest are

political prices which elite groups, directly concerned with transmitting public funds to education, must take into account. Consequently, educational spending increases, but at first this does not begin to approximate to 'fair exchange', for though monopoly has been lost, financial hegemony remains in the hands of a minority elite.

(ii) However, the very plurality of the institutional orders with which education is now integrated in itself fosters greater reciprocity. Their operations are distinct, and the groups associated with them will not seek identical outputs from education however strong the alliance between them or the mutual interdependence of their operations.

Reciprocity is encouraged through fear of the harm which would result for their own activities were educational services to be defined and commandeered exclusively by one party. Each group involved has a vested interest in preventing instruction from again becoming supremely dependent upon one among them. Thus, counter pressures operate against the re-emergence of the old mono-integrated and subordinate pattern. In the context of state systems, mutual policing seeks to prevent any one group from making the flow of public funds to education conditional on instruction meeting its requirements alone.³ Since all integrated parties want different educational services and since all play the policing role towards each other, the overall effect is an increase in funds for education. This growth in reciprocity is the only possible compromise if no party is allowed to monopolize and all groups press simultaneously for their requirements to be met in full.

If the additional resources gained in this way result in any surplus over the costs involved in producing the agreed outputs, these may be devoted to the pursuit of internal goals. Thus, this net consequence of multiple integration for education is a potential increase in autonomy, defined as the capacity for internal determination of its operations. This may not be extensive in certain cases, but its existence to some degree in every state system is in complete contrast with the total lack of autonomy which characterized education under private ownership.

(iii) Obviously, this increased autonomy would be of little significance if educational personnel remained as tightly controlled and unable to articulate or implement their own demands as in the past. In fact, on the contrary, the changes just

discussed go hand in hand with a third — the transformation of the teaching role itself — and their importance is due to this simultaneity.

As we have already seen, when education begins to serve a plurality of operations because of multiple integration, the definition of instruction becomes more complex. Specialization is the method by which a diversity of educational processes are accommodated with one another. It has profound occupational ramifications. First, educational personnel become clearly differentiated from the professional role structure of other social institutions — the mixed roles of priest-teacher or warrior-teacher disappear. **This has the important effect of creating professional educational interest groups for the first time — that is, people whose vested interests lie in the improvement of their educational positions because of their exclusive full-time employment in them.**

Secondly, the specialized activities in which teachers now engage gradually enable them to claim unrivalled expertise in educational matters. Even though the definition of instruction is still largely formulated elsewhere, there is no longer a body — such as theologians — which is more authoritative about the knowledge transmitted than the academics. This facilitates the transformation of a loose collection of teachers into a self-conscious profession, which seeks to acquire the same rights as other professional associations. Although this may take time, their increase in autonomy together with the greater flexibility of resources available can already be used to introduce some of the changes the professional interest groups want for themselves. **For the first time, educational operations are not determined exclusively by groups from other social institutions.** (iv) However, professional organization has external as well as internal consequences. It is only after professionalization develops that direct transactions can be conducted between external interest groups and education itself. During the earlier period any such transaction was necessarily indirect: it was carried out perforce with the dominant group, by-passing education which did not enjoy the requisite autonomy for direct negotiation. Now professional interest groups may themselves initiate transactions with the exterior or be approached by outside parties.

Ideational influence comes into universal play, with external interest groups trying to convince the profession that certain

courses of action are in both their interests — arguing, perhaps, that starting a new applied course would also generate extra teaching posts, protect against redundancy and improve facilities. Here the external agency is seeking to benefit by getting the profession to use its new freedom of initiative and surplus resources in ways which are advantageous to it. Alternatively, the profession tries to gain outside support for its own policies and with full professionalization, collective action gives more force to these views.

Secondly, there is a stronger form of direct negotiation which actually involves the exchange of resources for services. In certain systems the degree of autonomy acquired by the profession enables it to accept resources, in terms of research grants, buildings, equipment, etc., from outside parties, in return for increased intake, for laying on new courses or making special forms of training available and for undertaking applied research projects. Again, this type of transaction may be initiated by either party and again it will not be concluded unless it is felt to be mutually advantageous. The net result is therefore a novel and important process of change which not only enables the profession to accomplish more of its goals directly, but also does the same for certain groups in the wider society.

In sum, an extremely significant implication of the emergent state systems is that much more endogenous change must be anticipated now that education gains more autonomy through multiple integration. Since the teaching profession will collectively formulate its goals and plays a greater part in negotiating educational change, its activities cannot be ignored as in the antecedent period. In other words the explanation of change in state educational systems must alter now that their personnel have ceased to be passively controlled and have started to be professionally active. Explanation must now include reference to changes which are initiated autonomously within the educational system, whether this is due to the internal cumulation of resources or to transactions with external groups.

(b) Effects on other social institutions

The educational changes which have taken place universally affect other institutions, in terms of the services their members receive and in terms of the control that their members can exert.

Change in services is largely due to the development of multiple integration, change in control derives mainly from the linkage of national education to the political centre. The new relationship between education and society, consequent upon the emergence of state systems, is one in which both the capacity to control education and the receipt of educational services shift away from the (near) zero-sum situation which prevailed in the past.

In the antecedent period, if a group was the dominant group, then it enjoyed the most extensive powers over education, if it was not, then it was powerless to institute anything other than the most minor changes in instruction. As a basis of educational control, monopoly ownership was necessarily of that zero-sum type: the shift from private ownership to public funding annulled this formula. Educational control increasingly resided in the capacity to influence public spending, and its possession by one party no longer implied that others lacked it — if the military elite exerted a strong influence on educational spending this did not mean that the economic elite was correspondingly uninfluential. (This example also illustrates that the spreading of educational control does not necessarily entail a more democratic distribution of it.)

Multiple integration obviously has a very similar effect on the services received from instruction. Their distribution never approximated quite so closely to the zero-sum position as was the case for educational control, since although outputs were designed to serve the requirements of one group alone, certain other parts of society could sometimes make use of them. However, with the emergence of the state system, the fact that various institutional spheres are served by education now ceases to be a matter of adventitious benefit. Instead, the more specialized outputs are *intended* to service different operational requirements simultaneously.

The more widespread distribution of educational services has the immediate effect of abolishing the tripartite division between other social institutions into adventitious beneficiaries, neutral or obstructed institutions, according to the goodness of fit between their operational requirements and the education available. With multiple integration these stark contrasts fade. Sharp differences in kind are partly transmuted into differences of degree. The blurring of the tripartite division has the important consequence that it can no longer be used as a simple guide

to identifying support for and opposition to the educational status quo. This becomes clear when we consider the new educational system in relation to our three previous categories.

(i) Compared with the old adventitious beneficiaries (which received something for nothing because of the harmony between their requirements and that dominant definition of instruction) **more parts of society now gain some of the services they seek upon the emergence of state educational systems.** Certainly, this is limited to those sectors which move into an integrative relationship with education during the interaction sequence generating the new system. Certainly, too, few of the new parties which do so, including the powerful political elites spearheading restrictive strategies, gain precisely what they want, and none gains what it does without concessions to other groups. But they do gain something and it comes with a bonus never enjoyed by adventitious beneficiaries — a measure of security. Because of this, they acquire a vested interest in the continuation of these services, even if they want to see their scale greatly extended or their relevance vastly increased. For the first time, a plurality of institutional spheres now have a lasting stake in the existing form of education.

(ii) The main change which takes place as far as the old category of neutral institutions is concerned is its drastic curtailment. **Compared with the antecedent period there are fewer and fewer parts of society whose operations are neither helped nor hindered by the prevailing definition of instruction.**

On the one hand, there is the push exerted by the expansion of instruction — inextricably related to the development of state systems — which now affects *all* social institutions. As school enrolment increased spectacularly, fewer parties could go their own way, inducting and initiating the next generation, independent of and indifferent to the prevailing type of instruction. For they were increasingly forced to recruit school-leavers and eventually could recruit nothing but them. In this situation, complete indifference to the skills and values they had acquired was impossible to sustain.

On the other hand, they were not simply pushed to seek interdependence because independence was no longer possible. There was also the pull exerted by the changed nature of their own operations. The salience of instruction grew with such broader social processes as bureaucratization, the application of science to production, the commercialization of agriculture, and the

development of world markets. Few institutional spheres remained immune from all those influences. Obviously, formal instruction had no monopoly over the transmission of skills and many successful forms of in-service training developed. However, as the new systems were funded by these groups, like all others, it is unsurprising that the majority began to want value for money — a form of education better adapted to its operations, without paying twice over for it.

(iii) In the previous era, considerable significance was attached to the class of institutions whose respective operations were obstructed by the prevailing nature of education, and this still remains the case. However, two new propositions can be advanced about this experience of hindrance once the state system has emerged. Both concern the 'who' question and highlight important contrasts with that antecedent period.

The first is simply that since the new forms of national instruction are state educational systems, then it follows that the governing elite will never appear in the obstructed category. It will not gain precisely the services required because, *inter alia*, of inefficient planning, unintended consequences, a backwash from the private sector, and the interference of other objectives pursued in the system. But the fact that it is always imperfectly served does not mean that it is ever severely obstructed. Its legitimate control of resources is proof against this. Thus a fundamental contrast with the antecedent period is that nowhere will the state appear as an obstructed party in any serious sense of the term.

The second is that total obstruction will now be experienced principally by non-elite groups — it becomes concentrated among the people. This can be explicated by referring back to which parties successfully imposed (some of) their service requirements on the emergent educational systems. As far as systems with restrictive origins are concerned, what is obvious is that the more closely groups were clustered around the governing elite, the more say they had in defining instruction. With some over-simplification, the receipt of educational services can be pictured as a series of gradients: first, the governmental bureaucracy at the centre received most of its service requirements; secondly, sub-sections of the political elite were in receipt of many of the outputs needed for the institutional operations with which they were identified; thirdly, there was a partial satisfaction of educational demands among

explicit supporters of government; and finally, a severe tailing-off of educational services to other uninfluential sections of the population.

Exactly the same occurred in systems with substitutive origins. Here the definition of instruction derived from the independent networks run by those who had been able to mobilize resources to found and operate them. During the consolidation of the system certain networks attained a prominent place, thus guaranteeing continuity of service to their sponsors while others were relegated, or even eliminated. Again, one can picture gradients in educational services received, with these tailing off for groups which had not been able to protect their definition of instruction from erosion during incorporation, and petering out altogether for parts of society which had never developed a competitive network. Thus, in these systems, too, the experience of total obstruction will be concentrated among non-elite groups, which lacked the resources to develop strong networks and the power to defend them.

Hence, in the new educational systems, maximal educational obstruction will, for the first time, show a strong tendency to be concentrated among the less privileged sections of the population. What has changed is that the experience of grave impediments is no longer shared with a number of important institutional elites, like the military, the economic or the political elite itself.

Thus, the inception of state systems alters the relationship between education and different parts of society. The loci of support for and opposition to the new definitions of instruction are still conditioned by benefits received from it and frustrations induced by it. However, the distribution of these rewarding and frustrating situations among different social institutions changes both quantitatively (in terms of the number of institutional spheres assured of services) and qualitatively (in terms of the degree of benefit or obstruction experienced and by whom). It remains to link these alterations in the social distribution of educational services and the parallel transformation of educational control to the question of interaction and change.

(c) Effects on the processes of educational change

Turning now to consider how change is brought about within the state educational system, this too is found to differ considerably

from the earlier period. In the past, competition introduced sweeping educational changes whereas negotiation only produced minor modifications acceptable to the dominant ownership groups. The importance of competitive conflict then was due to the structural relations linking education and society — to the fact that only by displacing the dominant ownership group could macroscopic change take place. The transformation of these structural relations, with the advent of state systems, means that this is no longer the case. Instead, the conditions for successful competition became vastly more stringent at exactly the same time that the changes obtainable through negotiation increase enormously in scope. These two factors will be considered in turn to account for the fact that negotiation is now the most important process of educational change.

(i) Direct competition loses most of its viability in the new state system, for the chances that any dissatisfied group could gain educational control by either of the old competitive strategies are drastically reduced. On the one hand, the resources upon which educational control now rests are no longer concentrated in the pockets of a single group. This implies that strategies based on substitution are extremely unlikely to succeed because of the volume of public resources now absorbed by education, which rises as a corollary of multiple integration (more resources are needed if different kinds of services are to be provided simultaneously, more and more are forthcoming for this to be done because of the conjunction of pressures exerted by powerful interested parties). Thus, the chance of private suppliers being able to compete with public ones becomes increasingly inconceivable over time.

Equally, a restrictive strategy launched by a dissatisfied group would be most unlikely to succeed. To do so, it would have to overcome the governing elite (which obviously now thinks that state education is in its own best interests) as well as undermining the other parties whose activities are being adequately (if not ideally) served. As has been seen, one of the main results of multiple integration is the development of a plurality of groups with vested interests in the prevailing form of education. Thus, because it would have to contend with a defence of the educational status quo which is now centrally directed and socially extensive, restrictive competition ceases to be a realistic remedy for those finding education grossly inadequate for their purposes.

In effect, there is now only one way in which competitive conflict can still succeed and, although it will happen, the necessary conditions are severe enough to make it a very rare occurrence. Quite simply, unless social disintegration is extremely far-reaching, large-scale educational change will not be brought about by competition. It is only likely to occur as part of a general social transformation in which the state itself is overthrown and educational grievances can merge with other, more important causes of revolution.

(ii) However, transformation of the process responsible for macroscopic educational change is not due simply to the impossibility of the old methods, but is co-determined by the new possibilities which open up with the spread of control over education. What is crucial here is not merely that many parties get something out of education, for it could still be argued that they have more to gain from change than to lose from the status quo. It is also that their newly acquired influence over decision-making now provides an alternative means for modifying the definition of instruction. The possession of resources, which in the past could only produce change through competitive substitution, can now be employed to *transact* modifications. Similarly, political influence, which then could only serve to spearhead restriction, can now be used to *negotiate* changes in the state system, through pressurizing the central government to which it is attached.

Processes of negotiation were irrelevant to large-scale changes while educational control was vested in private ownership, because transactions remained limited to those found acceptable by the group subordinating education. However, in state systems the spread of educational control means that no single party can impose its limitations on what may be negotiated. Just as the definition of instruction is no longer designed to serve one party alone, so too no single group can veto the introduction of far-reaching changes if these are sought by others. The only limits to what is negotiable are those imposed via the interaction of the influential parties themselves — the way in which they block one another, the compromises they mutually enforce, and their concern that changes should be compatible with the present services which they require.

However, there are no grounds for expecting that less change will occur after the emergence of state systems than in earlier times: all that alters is the process predominantly responsible

for bringing it about. On the one hand, radical change may be sought jointly by a group of parties which together are influential enough to transact it. General societal changes can alter the operational requirements of several sectors simultaneously (as in the aftermath of war) and lead their members to press for similar or compatible forms of educational change. On the other hand, smaller changes negotiated from month to month can accumulate until they represent a considerable departure from their starting point.

The checks, balances and compromises are no homeostatic mechanism guaranteeing the maintenance of the educational status quo. On the contrary, the pursuit of their own interests by all parties gives rise to transactions which alter the educational context: as each transaction is accomplished, groups realign according to how it has affected them, and further interaction produces new departures.

Thus, instead of negotiation being of limited importance, it becomes the process which accounts for most of the change most of the time in most countries. On the whole it is less dramatic: sweeping changes are introduced less precipitously, important modifications may be transacted without polemic, and innovations can be initiated unobtrusively. As a process it is also vastly more complex: with competitive conflict one set of relations was crucial for change (that between the dominant ownership group and others), whereas in negotiation several sets of relationships between education and society account for the changes taking place. Consequently, as the interaction leading to change becomes more complex, so, too, must the nature of the analysis which seeks to explain it.

(iii) The general process of negotiation can be broken down into three different kinds, all of which come into play with the development of state educational systems. As will be seen, the three kinds of negotiation are not equally accessible to all social groups, so that to examine them is to investigate three different sets of relations between education and society. The changes which are observed to take place will stem from the three in conjunction.

The first type of negotiation, *internal initiation*, has already been touched upon in the previous section. It was seen that their increased autonomy enables professional educators to play a part in determining the rate of exchange between resources received and services supplied. Surplus resources can then be

devoted to accomplishing professional goals within the educational system. In other words, this source of change is the school, the college and the university. It can be brought about on a small scale by independent initiative in a particular establishment, and on a much larger scale by collective professional action. The relations which are significant here are those taking place between professional educators on the one hand and the suppliers of resources on the other.

The second form of negotiation, *external transaction*, involves relations between internal and external interest groups. It is usually instigated from outside educational boundaries by groups seeking new or additional services. As before, the profession is one of the groups involved in these negotiations, but the other party opts into the transaction of its own accord: it is this which distinguishes external transactions from internal initiation. Groups which, in the past, could only pursue change indirectly by dealing with the dominant group, can now negotiate directly with education itself. Given the increased autonomy of the new educational system, the outside world can now approach it. It is not suggested that these direct transactions will predominate over indirect ones (conducted via the political centre), indeed in some countries they will be of very limited scope. In others, however, they make an extremely important contribution to educational change.

Thus, certain parties which do not receive all the educational services they require will try to rectify this situation by entering into negotiations with the profession, offering more resources in exchange for better services. Basically, then, the external agency will try to buy the educational change it wants (although the currency need not necessarily be monetary). For example, a particular local firm may offer equipment and facilities for a college to lay on a specialized form of training, the armed services may provide scholarships in return for the enrolment of their cadets, the police, farmers and various professional groups may sponsor or support specialized establishments and industry may negotiate applied research in return for grants, professorships, laboratories, etc. This list is illustrative, but the fact that it is vastly more extensive in reality does not mean that any outside party can negotiate everything it wants provided it has the necessary resources. There are two major obstacles to unlimited transactions.

On the one hand, the profession itself has the power of veto.

Like other groups it is motivated by vested interests and will refuse transactions which compromise these. If the services sought by outside agencies are held to be professionally degrading (e.g., involving 'training' rather than 'teaching', the presentation of pseudo-knowledge or the dissemination of unacceptable values), the terms will be rejected. If they imply a less attractive work-situation, worse conditions, longer hours, more pupils, lower standards, they will probably suffer the same fate. Similarly, terms which are advantageous in their own right will not be accepted if they are likely to damage other desirable negotiations or to prove disruptive. For example, a university may turn down an attractive military research contract to avoid student outcry. Thus, in seeking to advance and project itself professionally, the educators also filter external demands and conclude transactions only where these are held to be reputable, profitable, and compatible.

On the other hand, as the major supplier of resources, the governing elite also enjoys the power of veto in certain circumstances. It will try to prevent transactions taking place which are contrary to its current policies, at least as far as public education is concerned. However, not all external transactions will meet with political censure and some indeed will be welcomed — if services are provided in exchange for private resources they take the strain off the system both financially and in the sense of removing pressure from government. Furthermore, the composition of governments varies and what might once have been vetoed, may become acceptable, pass into established practice and survive future political change. Finally, the private sector of education, in certain countries, can enable external transactions to take place even if they have been politically vetoed for public instruction. Changes introduced in this manner may well have important repercussions for the state system itself.

It is probably clear from the foregoing that external transaction is a form of negotiation which is open only to those groups which have substantial resources at their disposal. Thus, both processes of change discussed so far involve relations between education and rather restricted parts of the social structure. The same is not true of the third kind of negotiation, *political manipulation*. On the contrary, this is the principal resort of those who have no other means of gaining satisfaction for their educational demands — despite the fact that they

may also be the least successful at manipulating the political machine. This form of negotiation arises because education now receives most of its funds from public sources. In turn, a whole series of groups (depending on the nature of the regime) acquires formal influence over the shaping of public educational policy. It is this, of course, which encourages popular groups of various kinds to use the political channel in the absence of alternatives. In the endless quest for support and party votes, it is this, too, which focuses much of the public dialogue about instruction on popular or democratic themes, though it does not imply a commensurate degree of political action on these lines.

However, this does highlight some important breaks with the past which accompany the development of state systems. First, educational influence is not tightly restricted to those parties which are already closely integrated with it: instead all groups can attempt to work through the polity, wielding whatever political influence they possess, to modify national educational policy in their favour. Secondly, while the distribution of educational control remained relatively static as long as the monopoly of vital resources was maintained by the dominant group, now that ownership and control have largely been dissociated, educational influence becomes much less stable over time since it varies with the balance of political power. Thus, the question of which groups receive educational services, and to what degree these coincide with operational requirements, may receive different answers as time passes and the composition of the governing elite alters. Thirdly, then, to understand educational changes stemming from governmental directives we need to analyze the political interaction through which various groups negotiated their introduction. Obviously, the groups which enjoy the greatest continuity of political power will receive a complementary and uninterrupted flow of educational services, and vice versa. Nevertheless, since this is not a zero-sum situation there will be a whole series of political pressures, alliances and concessions whose result is the continuous modification of the definition of instruction. The final contrast with the earlier period is that because the state everywhere plays a major role in the regulation of resources flowing to public education, it will always be a party to the process of structural elaboration in education, although political manipulation will not be the only process involved.

In sum, the three new forms of negotiation add up to a much more complicated process of change than the old style of competition. To analyze it involves examining group interaction at the levels of the school, the community, and the nation, and the inter-relations between them. For these different types of negotiation do not take place in isolation from one another. Political manipulation influences negotiations between government and the profession, thus affecting the amount and type of internal initiation which can occur. It also helps to determine the nature of external transactions, partly because of the power of veto and partly, too, because it helps define which groups engage in such negotiations, i.e., those whose demands are not well served by public policy. In turn, external transactions, conducted with the profession, increase the surplus resources of the latter and thus influence the scope and sometimes the character of changes brought about by internal initiation. Together, the changes introduced in these two ways modify the definition of instruction independently of the political centre. This alters the services available in ways which will be favourable to some groups and detrimental to others, thus affecting their policy orientations and the goals they subsequently pursue through political manipulation.

Thus, each form of negotiation and the changes to which it gives rise has repercussions on the others. This then is the complex network of interaction and change which must be unravelled in order to explain the transformation of educational systems. If our explanations are to do justice to this complexity, then the relative simplicity of the domination and assertion approach must be left behind, where it belongs, with the period antecedent to the emergence of educational systems.

(d) Structural relations conditioning educational interaction

Structural factors only influence interaction because they shape the action contexts in which people find themselves: what affects them is their own educational system and their place in it. Yet, as was seen in Chapter 4, there are differences in the structure of the new educational systems which co-exist with the universal changes in structural relations. In particular, restrictive competition shaped a centralized system, whereas

substitution fostered a decentralized one. Thus, the actual situations to which people react, and which predispose them to act in particular ways, are moulded by their national system: this system will reflect universal changes but it will present them to people as part and parcel of its own particular structure. Thus, to explain interaction we must leave the general discussion of universal changes behind and get down to the question of how these are mediated and modified by differences in the structure of particular educational systems.

In considering structural influences on interaction, the same two factors — the distribution of educational services and control — need examining in greater detail. The former course helps to determine which groups will be pursuing change actively while the latter helps to account for the ways in which they go about it. Here it will be shown that the emergent centralized and decentralized systems exert dissimilar influences upon interaction because of differences in their distributions of services and control.

In decentralized educational systems

Earlier it was seen that systems originating from substitution are much more loosely structured. Because specialization and differentiation were entrenched in the independent networks before the development of state education, they remained the predominant characteristics. The interaction surrounding incorporation defended much of the autonomy and integrity of the networks and thus limited the degree of unification and systematization taking place. Hence, such systems are decentralized, they have no leading part, and are raggedly integrated.

The predominance of differentiation and specialization leads to a distinctive set of strains which persists because unification and systematization remain too weak to provide the co-ordination which would prevent it. On the one hand, the system is sluggish and unresponsive to administrative control, its parts going their own way, often contradicting and obstructing central policy through their activities (as is most evident in the case of the strong private sector with its elitist practices). On the other hand, this same autonomy threatens the internal integration of the system leading to bottle-necks and barriers,⁴ which persist because each element defends its own specialized practices and none is strong enough to make order among them.

These strains represented by unresponsiveness to central control and internal disjuncture, are experienced by various groups as deficiencies in educational services. To some groups this means that they will have access to certain levels of instruction but are debarred from entering higher establishments or elite enclaves; to others, frustration may consist in certain studies not continuing beyond a given level (it may be impossible to gain a degree in technical or applied disciplines). Each of these will be experienced as personal frustrations by pupils (and their families), and as recruitment problems (in a broader sense than the occupational) by those concerned with other institutional operations. In addition, the latter often find that the types of specialization carried over from the competitive stage of educational conflict, run counter to those they now require.

These exigencies in turn condition pressures for change from the various groups involved. However, they do not experience the same problems as one another (those debarred from prestige institutions are not the same people, by and large, as those whose recruits lack the training required). Also, the exigencies differ in that some could be overcome without substantial change in the system (by modifying course composition or admissions quotas). In conjunction, these two points indicate that the distribution of services and dis-services in decentralized systems discourages the emergence of a single solidary oppositional group committed to far-reaching educational change.

This fissiparousness is encouraged by the variety of things the discontented can do about their grievances, for the spread of control in the decentralized system means that change can be initiated in a number of ways. What is of supreme importance here is the rough parity between the three forms of negotiation as sources of educational change. Not all of these are open to every discontented group: its position in the social structure largely determines which ones it can use successfully. But the fact that different groups can pursue change in different ways is a further reason for not expecting the development of a united oppositional movement. Instead, it is anticipated that fragmentary interest groups will initiate change through different forms of negotiation in the decentralized system.

(i) First, *internal initiation* is an extremely important process of change here. In decentralized systems the profession rapidly becomes an active participant in the formation of educational

policy. Because of its greater initial autonomy and its access to independent resources in terms of endowments, bequests, subscriptions, fees and earnings, the process of professionalization occurs early. It is not so subject to legal control nor so financially dependent on the polity as to preclude the formation of professional associations. These emerge first from the richer networks, whose very resources give them special interests to protect (like the Headmasters' Conference in late nineteenth-century England). It may take longer for them to develop in other parts of the system, but in none is control or dependency strong enough to prevent it.

Their consolidation means that the profession can begin to negotiate with the polity on an organized basis, and to affect policy formation in a variety of ways — gaining representation on advisory committees to government; independently initiating changes which are then used as 'evidence' or 'precedent' in subsequent political bargaining; refusing to implement central policies or subjecting them to considerable modification at the local level; as well as negotiating continuously for better pay and conditions. The relationship thus becomes a two-way one with education no longer passively receiving directives but with teachers collectively helping to frame legislation and mould practice.

Its independence enables the profession to make substantial internal innovations on the basis of its own experience, the teaching situation it faces, and the collective goals formulated by its associations. In decentralized systems the range of changes which can be introduced in this way is broad and often includes the capacity to alter curricula, texts, examinations, teaching methods and disciplinary processes, to accept or reject *in situ* the demands voiced by pupils and students, as well as to improve the professional work situation. In this type of system, internal initiation serves professional interests but also benefits other parts of society by rectifying locally perceived deficiencies. The increased resources earned in the process in turn reinforce autonomy and extend the future scope of internal initiation.

(ii) Secondly, *external transactions* represent a process whereby certain groups negotiate substantial changes in decentralized systems. Those parties which dispose of considerable resources and have aims acceptable to the teachers can often gain satisfaction from the public sector. Transactions are more numerous

with the more independent parts of the state system. In England, accordingly, it has been the technical schools, colleges and universities which have been involved in the majority of external transactions — their own evolution being shaped by this process.

When wealthy groups fail to obtain the changes they seek from public education because their demands are unacceptable to the profession, are too specialized or focus on levels which are virtually closed to external transactions, another possibility exists in the decentralized system. There, strong private sectors of education flourish with relatively little interference from the administrative framework and such groups can gain satisfaction by buying what they seek from existing institutions or by founding new ones. These transactions account for the development of pre-school education, of preparatory establishments, of experimental or specialized secondary schools devoted to music, the arts, sectarianism or minority cultures, and commercial and industrial training; of technical, theological and trade colleges; of business schools and even of an independent university. The variety is as great as the list of buyers, for there are few barriers to entering the private market in education, especially where the older age groups of pupils are concerned. Obviously, this openness means that a number of disreputable institutions (like the self-styled colleges selling degrees) will be found among them, but what is significant about the private sector in a decentralized system is that its parts are not condemned to be second-rate.

Because they are not compelled to enter pupils for state examinations or to follow standard curricula, they are not forced to ape the public sector and thus to dilute their own activities. Instead, they can develop clear and distinctive courses which establish their own prestige and/or award qualifications which are recognized for their relevance in appropriate areas. Success is not guaranteed but it can be attained equally by a short trade course, a secretarial college, an elite business school or a trade-union college. Hence, various groups can introduce the educational changes sought, without standards comparing unfavourably with those in the public sector. This form of external transaction is, however, restricted to groups with surplus resources at their disposal. In the decentralized system it is not difficult to buy educational change but neither is it cheap.

(iii) While government has certain powers of control over educational institutions, their greater autonomy prevents *political manipulation* from being the distinctive form of change in decentralized systems. Thus, the third form of negotiation tends to be most important (a), where external transactions are least possible, and (b), for those who are least able to engage in them. On the one hand (a), although unification is weak when national education has substitutive origins, certain parts and levels emerge with less autonomy from the political centre than others. Because interest groups cannot transact services directly, they have to work indirectly to influence governmental policy and to counteract the political pressures of other parties in order to shape these particular public institutions in conformity with their needs. Thus, political manipulation will be most intense, and most important in accounting for change, when alternative courses of action are most limited.

It will also be used most intensively, (b), by those whose demands have little chance of satisfaction through other methods and, in general, the majority of the population is not in a position to use the first two forms of negotiation. The lower classes, immigrant groups and ethnic minorities cannot engage in external transactions on a significant scale because they lack the resources. Generally, too, the nature of their sub-cultures does not harmonize spontaneously with prevailing academic values and they do not gain much advantage from internal initiation. Partly this discourages them from trying to influence the profession but also many of their practical demands (like opening playgrounds early, running holiday activities, incorporating foreign cultures or integrating handicapped children in the local school) would not improve the teachers' work situation or enhance professional status.

Thus, it is via political manipulation that non-elite groups seek to gain any kind of educational change. (It is significant that even the powerful trades union movement makes most use of this form of negotiation and only dabbles in external transactions to meet its own bureaucratic needs.) By continuously dragging class, ethnic and minority claims to the centre of the political arena, other groups are irresistibly drawn to debate in these terms when defending their own interests. For this reason, most of the central legislation passed will be found to concentrate on such issues. However, the public prominence accorded to the educational problems of the underprivileged

should not mislead us about the character of educational change in general: in the decentralized system other kinds of changes can be introduced unobtrusively through different forms of negotiation, without visible political struggle or social polarization.

Hence, it follows that the most outstanding feature of interaction in these systems with substitutive origins is its complexity. If change is to be explained satisfactorily, then all three kinds of interaction must be examined, together with the interrelations between them. Analysis will have to concentrate on the distribution of educational deficiencies, on the differential availability of the three sources of changes according to the position of the groups affected, and on the different forms of negotiation themselves.

In centralized educational systems

In the last chapter it was seen that systems with restrictive origins have a tightly integrated internal structure. Because their emergence was orchestrated by the political elite, the various parts were co-ordinated from the start to protect its own educational requirements from interference by other services which had to be provided simultaneously. Because such elites sought a system which would be uniquely responsive to their changing needs, the administrative frameworks were expressly designed as the leading part of each such system. Through them educational change could be filtered and monitored so that it never escaped the control of the governing elite.

In turn, the problems of integration found here are of a very different type from those common to systems with substitutive origins. Instead of the strains which develop representing a constant threat to the internal co-ordination of the system and a danger to governmental control, here the exigencies generated by a tightly articulated and centralized system create problems for groups in other institutions. Thus, in the centralized system tensions will manifest themselves between the system as a whole and other parts of society, because the dominant pair of characteristics limit the degree to which education can become diverse enough to meet its demands. Parents and pupils confront a system which provides them with relatively little choice. Other groups will find themselves compelled to develop various

forms of in-service training in the broadest sense of the term; they will experience recruitment problems because of the prestige attaching to mainstream education and its outlets into state service; they will suffer from the implicit or explicit denigration of their activities and values by the official definition of instruction.

These deficiencies which condition pressures for change clearly structure educational opposition very differently in the centralized system. To begin with, the uniformity of public education means that there are more groups which gain very little in terms of services from it. In turn, this means that there is less chance that each deficiency will be experienced discretely by isolated groups. Added to this, the severity of educational grievances provides more opportunity for various groups to discover common ground. Taken in conjunction, these factors imply that the development of a united opposition group or groups is less unlikely in systems with restrictive rather than substitutive origins. The final contrast with the decentralized system is that tighter central control makes it difficult to remove the pool of grievances gradually, by a series of direct transactions — different in kind and spread over time and space. (i) First, *internal initiation* will be less significant in centralized systems, both in terms of who can use it and what can be accomplished through it. The most outstanding difference is that, by and large, it is not a channel through which external or consumer demands can be filtered and satisfied. Instead, this process tends to be the exclusive prerogative of the profession itself, although the scope of changes which can be introduced internally is also more limited due to the lower degree of professional autonomy. Compared with its counterparts in decentralized systems, the professional body receives more directives from the centre and is able to initiate fewer in return.

Professionalization takes place with greater difficulty and over a longer period in the centralized system. The teaching body starts off with relatively little autonomy from the administrative framework which defines its training programme, supervisors certification and organizes placements. Usually, to ensure continued control, teachers are made civil servants and are subject to the same restrictive statutes which withhold the right to combine or engage in political action. Teachers' associations thus emerge late, after a hard battle for recognition of professional expertise and the eventual lifting

of the most repressive statutes. What results is not a uni-directional relationship, but one in which the profession is very far from being an equal party in negotiations with government.

Their relative lack of autonomy also means that teachers and academics cannot negotiate directly with external agencies or earn extra resources from them. They themselves are too closely controlled to be able to offer the kinds of modifications sought by various groups in the community. They cannot alter courses, curricula, assessment, examination or selection procedures, for these are established centrally and are not susceptible to local variation. Thus, the most important issues are removed from the negotiating table. Local groups cannot hope to influence the profession to make good the deficiencies that the former experience in educational services. They are well aware that the teachers' hands are tied and that their own efforts are better directed elsewhere. Thus, formal contact between the profession and external interest groups will not be great at local level. What is missing here is the hard, practical and productive dealing between them, characteristic of decentralized systems.

The internal changes which the profession can introduce (by using any surplus resources extracted from government) are usually limited to those which are acceptable to the political elite and compatible with the existing organization of the system. On the whole, these are modifications which are of concern to professional advancement but matters of indifference to government — intensification of intellectual specialization, accentuation of the pure over the applied and extension of research activities. Hence, the changes it can and does initiate internally are those which benefit itself alone: in the centralized systems the profession can only function as a vested-interest group.

(ii) *External transactions* are also of limited importance as a process by which major changes are negotiated in the centralized system. No part of the public sector is independent enough to introduce new services in exchange for resources. Because it cannot earn, its autonomy remains low and state education stays closed to transactions, however great the resources offered by the external groups and however acceptable their proposals might be to the teaching profession. It may seem to follow that negotiations with the private sector will therefore be a more important source of change in the centralized system,

precisely because of the closed nature of public education. The opposite is in fact the case.

Certainly, groups with adequate resources can found new establishments or negotiate changes with existing private institutions; however, the services acquired in this way are rarely adequate to meet their demands because the private sector is subject to heavy state interference and finds it difficult to offer a proper alternative to public instruction. First, the effect of strong unification is that private establishments are more closely controlled in terms of their inputs, processes and outputs. They are subject to state inspection, certification and often examination, and because of this such establishments are irresistibly drawn to imitate public education. For instance, if their pupils or students are to sit for national examinations, then they must follow public curricula, use the set texts and appoint teachers adept in the appropriate methods, otherwise their failure rate will exceed that of the public sector. Thus, schools set up for confessional purposes constantly find that religious instruction, far from dominating the timetable, is being squeezed out by examinable subjects. Here, the problem for these institutions is that their external sponsors and parental fee-payers are not going to invest in something which they can get free of charge anyway.

Alternatively, if the private sector attempted to award its own qualifications, these would have little chance of establishing their value on the educational market since this is far from a free one. Only state qualifications are recognized for a whole range of purposes which are of vital concern to those taking private diplomas — university entry, deferred military service, public appointments or possession of a degree. Private institutions are in a cleft stick, for they go it alone in the knowledge that what they have to offer cannot compete with the advantages and prestige attaching to public certificates. By following this alternative, they by and large condemn themselves to being second-rate and to giving a corresponding lack of satisfaction to those they serve: in the centralized system the private sector is not the elitist one.

Yet external interest groups seek neither the second-rate nor a carbon-copy of public instruction, they want a different kind of service from private education, but this difference is precisely what the remorseless pressure towards standardization, which emanates from the state, also militates against. The private

sector thus remains weak, for too many groups seeking substantial educational change know that they can only get a modicum of satisfaction from it. Among them may be the rich elites which could buy the services they require in a different kind of system. Here, since their demands are scarcely met by external transactions, they are forced to (re)present them through the last form of negotiation.

(iii) Thus *political manipulation* is by far the most important form of negotiation in centralized systems. Because education as a whole has so little autonomy from the government and because groups seeking change have few alternative means of obtaining it, most pressures converge on the political centre. The provisions which do exist for serving other parts of society are those which the political elite had to concede historically because of its need for support and resources. This remains the case for future changes in the definition of instruction — these stem predominantly from processes of political interaction. In other words, the parties seeking new services must accumulate their demands, form alliances and organize themselves to work through the political machinery.

This is the case for most groups, including the teachers and academics, for when their demands exceed the bounds of professional self-advancement and involve broader educational issues they cannot introduce these directly. Instead, they must go outside the system in order to influence it, by joining a national political organization or external pressure group. The same applies to the majority of affluent groups which cannot transact changes directly; it, too, must seek to transform public policy through political manipulation. This represents a major contrast with the decentralized system, for instead of political interaction being the resort of the underprivileged, it is the main channel through which all social groups work to bring about educational change. Consequently, a more restricted area of social conflict needs to be examined to account for a change in the centralized system, compared with the decentralized system. Analysis will have to concentrate on the distribution of educational deficiencies, the differential ability of groups to exert political influence, and the nature of political interaction itself.

(e) Determinants of educational interaction

As in the preceding period, due allowance has to be made for

the influence of other structural and cultural factors, which are non-educational in origin, upon the processes of interaction and the resulting patterns of change. The transition from the first to the second cycle is a historical process of quite lengthy duration and thus considerable social change will have been unfolding concurrently. In starting to discuss the second cycle we must now insert those alterations in the social context of educational interaction which distinguish it from the social environment of domination and assertion in the past.

The growing complexity of social structures, which develops as societies move towards full industrial status, involves the mobilization of broader sections of society, the differentiation of a larger number of corporate interests, and the interpenetration of diverse collectivities. The social environment of education enlarges correspondingly (practically no one remains disinterested in the definition of instruction), and becomes more complicated as the nature of educational demands undergoes a parallel diversification (matching the greater social differentiation of interests). In all new systems, this spells greater educational activity as do the concomitant cultural changes which have taken place. The increasingly international nature of value systems, consequent upon mass communication, mass literacy and mass mobility means that limited access to alternative legitimacy values no longer operates as a barrier to the organization of opposition, except perhaps in countries with very efficient forms of censorship. On the contrary, there is a growing fund of inter-continental ideologies, of schools of thought propagated by educationalists, ensuring that no ignorance of alternatives holds back the potential forces for change. However, this new environmental context has different consequences for the two types of systems.

The nature of the decentralized system is such that the greater social differentiation of interests and values, structured elsewhere in society, can find educational expression without difficulty. Given three different outlets for change, there is high probability that different interests and pluralistic values will be pursued through them. In other words, there is no longer the need to accumulate, articulate and then dilute demands, as in the old alliances of the past. Instead, particular social interests can and will attempt to negotiate their requirements in all their detailed specificity. Of course, this is not to deny that the more influential parties remain linked by kinship, class

or overlapping membership (e.g., businessmen in Parliament, politicians as churchgoers and shareholders, teachers as members of political parties), the more they will defend common interests at all three strategic points — the school, the community and the central political arena.

On the other hand, in the centralized system, the supreme importance of political manipulation still places a considerable premium on the ability of both government and opposition respectively, to hold together if they are to be successful in the maintenance of the status quo or the transaction of change. Thus, if the spread of control has increased the social and cultural diversity of the controllers, mutual accommodation is still needed for them to arrive at a common programme.

Equally significant, given the attachment of every new system to the political centre, are the differences in the national structuring of political power. Thus, the relative closure or accessibility of state power will have far-reaching consequences for educational interaction in every system. This is absolutely crucial in the centralized system, since political manipulation is the main process for negotiating change. It is still very important in the decentralized system, although the effects of political closure can be offset, to some extent, by the intensive use of the other two processes. Thus, in contrast to the antecedent period, there is now an interface between education and the polity in all countries where educational systems have emerged.

(f) Patterns of educational interaction

Taking the whole of the foregoing discussion together, the different patterns of interaction which are conditioned by the two different kinds of educational system can be summarized in the following basic diagrams. These stand in the same relation to the second cycle as did Figure 3 (Chapter 2) to the first cycle, when educational change was heavily conditioned by ownership, mono-integration and subordination. The fact that there are now two diagrams for the second cycle reflects the importance attached to the centralization and decentralization as conditional influences on subsequent interaction. Both diagrams have been deliberately simplified at this stage in order to accentuate the different patterns of educational interaction to which the two systems give rise

FIGURE 4
The structural conditioning of educational interaction in the centralized system




FIGURE 5
The structural conditioning of educational
interaction in the decentralized system




Figure 4 shows the typical convection currents of action conditioned by the centralized system, where demands originating in the school or community have to be aggregated, passed upwards to the central decision-making arena and negotiated there before being transmitted down to education in the form of polity-directed changes. In contrast, Figure 5 presents the more complex cross-currents of interaction conditioned by the decentralized system. Due to the fact that there are three different outlets for the negotiation of change, there is no necessity for demands to be cumulated or passed upwards, since changes can be introduced locally or internally. Hence the greater complexity of the typical action pattern.

These two basic diagrams involve considerable oversimplification.⁵ The gross interaction patterns for both kinds of system are like road maps which show nothing but the motorways: complex transactions between sub-groups, parties and organizations, have been eliminated to allow the figure to stand out from the ground (see Appendix 1 for expanded diagrams relating to the two kinds of systems). However, in the following two chapters, dealing with interaction in the new educational systems, it is necessary to go beyond these simplified pictures and to magnify the two basic diagrams until they bear a closer resemblance to models of empirical reality, rather than schematic representations of dominant traits.

6 INTERACTION: EDUCATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Three processes of transacting educational change

Three processes of educational negotiation have now been distinguished: political manipulation, internal initiation and external transactions. Each of these involves the exchange of resources or services (wealth, power or expertise) against one another by the interest groups involved. Educational change is the product of such transactions and its nature is therefore determined by which group succeeds in accomplishing which form of negotiation in the course of interaction. Success depends upon the negotiating strength of one party relative to the other in any transaction. For this concept is a bilateral or relational term, it is not a generalized capacity possessed by some groups but not by others, but pertains to interaction itself.

Since each of the three processes of negotiation involves the exchange of resources, an unslavish use of Exchange Theory¹ helps to conceptualize what gives one group greater negotiating strength in relation to another. Furthermore, since power and control are derived as the emergent consequences of exchange, then the outcome of negotiations accounts for the development of either dependence, reciprocity or domination of one group in relation to another and to education.

Let us begin this discussion of relative negotiating strengths by isolating three crucial elements of any given piece of educational interaction, viz: (a) the participants, (at least) two educational interest groups, X and Y; (b) the resources they respectively command, X^{r1} and Y^{r2} , which constitute their bargaining positions; (c) the exchange (or non-exchange) of $r1$ and $r2$, which expresses the relative negotiating strengths of X and Y. These elements determine the degree of change, if any, occurring in this particular case. They also decide who exercises educational control in this situation; it can be X, if Y finds $r1$ irresistible, or Y if X cannot do without $r2$, but control is not necessarily a zero-sum matter, for a reciprocal exchange of $r1$

and $r2$ gives X and Y shared control and joint responsibility for the changes introduced.

We can now begin to consider the nature of the relationship between these two groups and what will give one high negotiating strength vis-à-vis the other. It has been argued that an interest group has the best chance of concluding an educational transaction in its favour the more irresistible are the resources it supplies to the other party involved. In his discussion of exchange and power in social life, Blau has provided a useful classification of the situations in which such irresistibility arises.² X will have the highest degree of negotiating strength when it supplies resources to Y under four conditions: (a) when Y cannot reciprocate; (b) Y cannot get the needed resources from elsewhere; (c) Y cannot coerce X to supply them; and (d) Y cannot resign itself to doing without them.

From these can be derived the strategies required to attain or sustain educational control on the part of X in relation to Y. X must try to establish rates of exchanges which are highly favourable to itself; bar Y's access to alternative sources of supply through monopolizing the resource or legally controlling the processes of exchange; discourage any attempt at coercion on Y's part; and prevent Y from being indifferent to the benefits it offers. Equally, Y's defensive strategies, aimed at keeping up its own negotiating strength, can be deduced by corollary. It must do everything it can to avoid being reduced to complete dependence on X. This involves a constant effort to prevent the exchange rate from becoming too unfavourable, by increasing the desirability and exclusivity of its own resources or services to X. It must work at keeping alternative supply lines open and accumulating supplies, thus increasing independence from X; developing strong organizations to compel X to behave differently; and propagating counter-ideologies which undermine X's right to use resources in the way it does.

(a) Interest groups, exchange and the three processes of educational negotiation

So far, the exchanges which are the backbone of educational negotiations have been treated in abstract and skeletal form. They begin to be fleshed out when we relate them to the three processes responsible for introducing change into education.

Internal initiation

The principal resource commanded by the education profession is its expertise (i.e., the specialist knowledge possessed by teachers, their capacity to impart skills and to inculcate values). Basically, internal initiation involves the profession exchanging the expert services it can offer for other kinds of resources which it needs, namely the financial means and legal rights required to translate its own goals into reality. To do this it depends on getting a good rate of exchange for educational services against the financial resources supplied, in return, by external interest groups. But these transactions themselves may be subject to political veto so the profession also has to increase the value of its expertise to the political authorities in order to prevent their imposing such embargoes. The latter is merely one aspect of a broader negotiation with the polity in which expert services are exchanged against increments in autonomy (the legal rights to do x, y and z). Only if the profession succeeds in improving its wealth and autonomy in these ways will it be able to increase the amount of educational change produced by internal initiation and ensure that its direction coincides with professional interests. **Thus the main task, on whose accomplishment internal initiation depends, is the exchange of expertise for financial resources and legal rights on favourable terms.**

External transaction

The principal resource commanded by external interest groups is their wealth, or more strictly their liquid assets, which can be devoted to the quest for educational services of various kinds. External transactions fundamentally consist of the exchange of financial resources for educational expertise, e.g., a professional undertaking to receive certain pupils, provide a particular form of instruction or produce a specific kind of output in terms of the knowledge, skills or values of those completing the course of study. The financial resources offered against expert services have to be sufficiently attractive to the profession to overcome their inertia (unwillingness to add new teaching burdens, devise new curricula or invent novel methods of assessment), and any repugnance or reluctance felt towards performing and providing the services required (if, for example, they involve longer teaching hours, collaboration with

non-professionals, lower entry standards, or constraints on the knowledge transmitted). Simultaneously, the external interest group must be able to evade or overcome any political resistance to these transactions taking place; for only if it does both will it be able to instigate those educational changes needed to service its particular institutional operations. **Thus, the main task, on whose completion external transactions rely, is the successful exchange of financial resources for expert services.**

Political manipulation

The principal resource commanded by political authorities (both central and local) is their legal authority and capacity to impose negative sanctions. This includes their ability to pass laws and impose regulations, to withhold benefits and recognition, as well as to penalize irregular practices and offending parties. Political manipulation, therefore, consists of those groups which dominate the central or local decision-making arenas using their official powers to extract the educational services desired and to preclude undesirable outputs. At either level, it involves the exchange of politico-educational privileges (ranging from salary increases for teachers, through the institutionalization of professional advice, to the recognition and regularization of internal initiatives) in return for increased educo-political services. Alternatively, it can involve the application of political sanctions, in other words the withholding of certain rights or requirements in order to overcome professional resistance or to veto unwanted transactions. The services extracted or suppressed in this way are used to keep educational activities in line with political requirements. **Thus, the main task, on whose execution political manipulation rests, is the exchange of power resources for expert services.**

Obviously, the designation of these 'main tasks' involves considerable over-simplification. First, each of the groups concerned (be it professional, institutional or political) possesses more than one type of resource which comes into play in processes of negotiation — the financial powers of government are simply a clear example of this more general point. Secondly, it is indeed many of the same people who engage in the three kinds of transactions: some members of the population may only participate at the lowest level in one of them (e.g., by voting), a much smaller proportion will participate in all three

(e.g., by being an active member of a political party, a parent-teacher association and a chamber of commerce), while between these extremes there are varying degrees of educational activity and of overlap between participants. The existence of overlap means that actors themselves come to know that what happens via one process of negotiation then has an influence upon others, and that there is more than one way of getting what they want. Thirdly, the actual processes of negotiation have been entirely left aside by concentrating on the objectives of the 'main tasks' rather than the strategic action through which they may or may not be accomplished.

(b) Negotiating strategies

Each of the three processes of negotiation operates rather differently in the centralized and the decentralized system because of initial and enduring differences in the bargaining positions of the three main parties involved — the governing elite, professional educators and external interest groups. Nevertheless, the negotiating strategies are identical. Hence, formally, we are concerned with the same strategic interplay between the three main parties, with how each played the hands that the resource distribution dealt them, although the cards were stacked differently in the two kinds of system. For it is these negotiating strategies which in combination ultimately shaped educational change.

Political manipulation

Over time, the central authority seeks to maintain or strengthen its educational control in order to be able to attain its own goals and does so in the four following ways, all of which are hedged by the initial and subsequent distribution of resources among the three main parties to negotiation.

(i) The first strategy is to try to reduce the capacity of education to reciprocate for the resources supplied to it by the state. The aim here is to attain the educational equivalent of the state's position in a command economy, where it controls the rate of exchange, prices, production and distribution. Here the polity's leverage consists in its ability to confer benefits and this accounts for so many governments continuing to increase their investment in education, even when they have become the

majority suppliers. As a strategy, however, this can prove double-edged, for to invest generously may be to allow the internal accumulation of surpluses with which the profession can pad itself against political prods whose thrust derives from withholding resources. However, if strategy (ii) is successful, then dependence on the state can be coupled with a low rate of exchange.

(ii) The effectiveness of the first strategy is thus related to the second — barring access to *alternative suppliers* by imposing legal limitations on exchange processes. Here the polity will refuse legal recognition to certain diplomas, establishments, personnel or courses, thus reducing the attractiveness of the services that the profession could offer to external groups. This discourages external transactions by damaging the professional bargaining position, but it is only one branch of a two-pronged attack. The other involves the imposition of legal vetoes and the refusal to authorize certain negotiations at all. The crucial element in this connection is the degree to which the external interest group is itself politically influential (and can deflect projected embargoes) or is capable of marshalling legal defence (to repulse or lift such vetoes). Ironically, this means that the polity's strategy will be most effective against the weaker suppliers, which have least to offer the profession but which also present least threat to the educational ambitions of governing elites.

(iii) Since the main problem for the governing elite is resistance to its policies, the third strategy is to undermine the autonomy which makes this possible. Thus, legislation can reduce local and institutional autonomy, making the system more responsive to central directives, if the governing elite is strong enough to deploy the whole battery of central sanctions to this end. But two things may stand in its way: the political influence and positions already acquired by educational interests, and the hostility of opposition parties (which may indeed accept state intervention in principle, but fear the consequences of placing this instrument in the hands of its opponents).

(iv) Consequently, most political elites will strategically promote ideologies favouring political intervention, often justified on totally different grounds but sharing the self-righteous assumption that it would be justly used in their hands alone. The left usually seeks to identify state intervention with eliminating social discrimination; the right generally associates

it with guaranteeing value for taxpayers' money. Both strands can be met by ideological opposition from among their own supporters (interest groups defending educational autonomy because it advances their aims) and this itself may constitute a powerful normative contribution to the maintenance of the status quo.

However, the initial distribution of resources placed the governing elite in a very different strategic position upon the emergence of the decentralized and the centralized systems. The original distribution of resources was much less favourable to the political centre in decentralized systems and made its 'main task' of exchanging power resources for educational services considerably more complicated than where centralization prevailed. Other groups were also in strong bargaining positions and education was not exclusively dependent on the resources supplied (or withheld) by the central political elite. For example, the profession retained property and sectional autonomy, defended during incorporation; it maintained alternative suppliers and the relationship between internal and external interest groups was mutually supportive, protecting the 'free market in education'; organizations had formed to resist central encroachment on professional autonomy or the acquired rights of external interest groups and these continued to insert themselves at all levels of decision making so as to cushion the impact of political directives on education as well as generalizing values which mobilized opposition to political veto on educational matters. Consequently, any change in the decentralized system involves a broader set of transactions. Every legal change introduced from the centre entails negotiation with professional interest groups to ensure its implementation, and with external interest groups to prevent its vitiation or evasion.

Thus, in the decentralized system political manipulation involves a struggle, not only on the part of those wanting to influence governmental policy, but also in order to translate official policy into educational practice. Because of the initial distribution of resources, the polity is not in an unassailable bargaining position and, since the enduring aim of interested parties is to defend if not to improve their own positions of influence, this tends to keep it that way. In this context, parts of the system continually escape political control and introduce changes independently, thus creating new problems for government: while with equal pertinacity the polity struggles to

contain such developments and keep education in line with governmental policy.

On the contrary, in centralized systems, the governing elite has been from the start in a vastly stronger strategic position. In terms of our earlier notation, the polity X supplied resources to education under the four conditions which made the professional groups Y^1 completely dependent upon it, and unable to increase their autonomy through dealings with other interest groups Y^2 . The rates of exchange between X and Y^1 consistently favoured the former, the profession having neither the finance nor the freedom to alter its services and thus manipulate a more reciprocal rate; X's political veto on direct transactions between Y^1 and Y^2 prevented resources from being acquired elsewhere; while neither Y^1 nor Y^2 could resign themselves to the situation. The profession, both as a body morally committed to providing educational services for the community and as individuals with vested interests in job security, could not dispense with centrally provided resources. Moreover, in the modern period, we have already seen that few external interest groups can remain indifferent to the receipt of educational services. The only weak point in the polity's control was its capacity to contain counter-coercion on the part of Y^1 and Y^2 , precisely because the negotiating strength of X itself generated so much discontent and opposition. Hence, of course, the pattern of intermittent explosions directed against X, which represent a major source of change in the centralized system.

Consequently, in centralized systems it is possible to concentrate almost exclusively on interaction which culminated in the passing of legislation, decrees or regulations because both internal and external interest groups had little alternative but to accept these measures since the polity was continuously in an unassailable position. In contrast, because of the weaker strategic position of the political elite in decentralized systems, the following forms of negotiation will be of greater significance there.

External transactions

The 'main task' of translating financial resources into the expert services required involves direct negotiation with professional groups. The political aspects of such transactions have already been discussed, so here we will concentrate on the factors

determining the relative negotiating strengths of external and internal groups when they (can) face one another in interaction. Although wealth of resources is usually translated into a high level of negotiating strength, it will be rather rare for any external interest group to reduce education, or a particular part of it, to a position of total dependence. Instead, when transactions occur they are more likely to be of a reciprocal nature for several reasons.

The fact that a professional group has been approached for services means that it has something of value to offer and this it can play upon in negotiations. Also, if it is propositioned by several external groups simultaneously, then the teaching body can pick and choose, bidding up the rate among the alternative suppliers of resources and only settling on advantageous terms. Finally, and most important, no external interest group can force the profession to supply services it does not want to provide (on normative grounds) or does not think are worth providing (at the price offered). On the contrary, the onus is upon the external group to make its terms as attractive as possible to the educational institutions involved. Given this defensive position on the part of the profession, what the external interest group must try to do is to ensure that a transaction takes place at a price which is reasonable to it.

They will be most likely to succeed when four conditions hold, and these constitute their negotiating strategies:

- (i) When the external interest group proposes a generous exchange rate (leaving the profession a surplus over the actual cost of providing the services required), which implies that it has considerable resources at its disposal and/or devotes a high proportion of them to educational ends.
- (ii) When the offer it proposes compares favourably with those made by other interest groups. However, such deals are not concluded exclusively on financial grounds — if the profession promotes its own goals through transacting with a particular group, the cash element will play a smaller part: if it feels it is degrading itself or endangering state aid through inviting political veto, then the financial inducement will have to be much greater. Nevertheless, the two above conditions hold good because wealth always enables an interest group to transact with the private sector, even if it makes no headway with public education.
- (iii) When a group can 'square' a deal in advance with the polity,

through the governmental influence or favour it enjoys, the educators are more likely to get down to the negotiating table for fear of future political reprisals.

(iv) When a group is convinced ideologically that it cannot dispense with educational services, the more likely it is to obtain them — partly because it will devote a greater proportion of its available resources to getting them, and partly because it will strive to meet the above conditions if it did not do so in the first place.

If the final condition holds, yet the group in question fails to bring about a direct transaction, it can still pursue its educational goals through political manipulation: indeed, many groups will be engaging in both forms of negotiation simultaneously. However, it is important to note that repeated repulsion by the profession can lead some groups to resign themselves to doing without educational services altogether. These will be the poorer groups whose lack of resources had given them weak bargaining positions with the profession, and especially those whose political influence was equally low. For minority groups, in particular, their failure in one kind of negotiation may produce general discouragement and mean that the profession has played a part in organizing certain issues and problems out of educational politics. This is true of both kinds of system, but will be more pronounced in centralized ones because external transactions themselves are fewer and less far-reaching.

Internal initiation

Here, where the main task is the translation of educational expertise into other kinds of resources (which increase autonomy and internal self-determination), different sections of the profession find themselves in different bargaining positions. The initial distribution of resources, vertically among the various educational levels and horizontally among different kinds of institutions, gave certain groups of teachers and academics better starting points than others. This should be borne in mind when recalling the points made about professional negotiating strength in the discussion of the other two processes. Rather than repeating these, we can extract from the earlier analysis those conditions under which the educators are most likely to succeed in transactions, and express them in such a way that they can refer to the profession as a whole or to particular parts of it.

From the foregoing discussion it appears that professional groups will do best in negotiation, and in turn be able to introduce more of the internal innovations they desire, when they employ the following strategies:

- (i) Offer services which are attractive in terms of their inputs, processes and outputs. One of the most important aspects of this is professional upgrading through which a higher quality of service is made available. By raising expertise itself, a higher exchange rate can be asked, thus increasing the market value of professional skills.
- (ii) Control the certification of expertise, both in terms of the quantity and quality of those admitted to the profession, so as to create a *de facto* if not a *de jure* closed shop which bars alternative supplies of 'teachers' or 'lecturers', or so raises the prestige of the certificated professional that the latter are at best 'instructors' or 'trainers' and at worst 'crammers' or 'unqualified'.
- (iii) Participate in official processes of educational control and administration in order that they themselves play a part in moulding official policy rather than being reduced to modifying, resisting or sabotaging it at the stage of implementation.
- (iv) Reinforce and legitimate the above activities, as well as encouraging the need for expert services, through disseminating appropriate educational values. In this the profession alone can make direct use of the learning situation to spread its values, and also by its very nature it can make good use of public media.

(c) The bargaining positions of educational interest groups

So far we have analyzed negotiating strategies without reference to the vital question of who can use them. This is the point at which the distribution of resources in society connects up with the structural influences upon interaction exerted by different types of educational system. For the former defines the bargaining positions of the various social groups in relation to educational negotiations. Bluntly, the social structure determines *who* has the three kinds of assets, while the educational system is decisive for *what* they can do with them. Resource distributions obviously change largely in response to non-educational factors: they are thus inserted into the present analysis but cannot be explained by it.

In advancing a series of propositions about educational interaction, the intention is to remain neutral towards the general

sociological debate between those who emphasize a uni-dimensional social structure (with a superimposition of the class, status and power dimensions) versus those stressing divergence and multidimensionality.³ The relative merits of these views (for any given period) are left to manifest themselves through the analytical framework used here. For example, if class analysis alone is adequate to account for educational interaction, this will become apparent since the line-up for each process of negotiation would reflect little other than class divisions.

This deliberate neutrality (and the correspondingly guarded vocabulary of elites, groups and parties) is also prompted by the specificity of our problem which is to theorize about the intricacies of who really exercises and contests control, with what degree of success and under which conditions. Without this specification, class or any other concept of structured interaction remains at too high a level of generality to give purchase on the course of institutional stability or change. In other words, theories claiming greater universality themselves need to specify the precise interactional mechanisms through which their 'key group' penetrates the educational field. It is exactly this question of how the social structure and educational system interpenetrate that is the concern of the present theory.

In particular, it is maintained that since political manipulation is the most important process through which change is introduced in the centralized system, then it is the social distribution of power which is of prime concern in explaining the course of educational politics. Conversely, since the three processes of negotiation enjoy a rough parity of importance in the decentralized system, then it is the distribution of all three resources — wealth, power and expertise — which shapes the contours of educational politics there.

Thus, the social distribution of power⁴ in the centralized system and of power, wealth and expertise in the decentralized system constrain: the nature and number of people admitted to educational transactions; their initial bargaining positions and changes in them; and the volume and kinds of demands which can be negotiated at any time.

The concentration of power in relation to the decentralized system

Thus, in the centralized system one variable exerts a crucial

influence on the course of educational politics, namely the structure of political decision-making.⁵ Here the vital aspect of different political regimes is how broad or narrow, open or closed, accessible or inaccessible they are in structure. For this directly affects political manipulation since it helps to determine what kinds of changes are negotiable and who can engage in negotiations.

A simple formal classification in terms of degrees of governmental closure seems adequate here for differentiating between different political structures at different times. Closure is defined and identified by the accessibility of the main organs of government. Such organs are considered inaccessible if socially significant parties can make no use of them and are systematically turned down by them, if such organs give no hearing to issues held important by these groups, or if such organs operate coercively or manipulatively to exclude these parties, their issues or their interests. The main organs of national government are thus taken to delineate the central political arena and its degree of closure is the main structural characteristic to be accentuated: because our interest is centred on the manipulation of the former it is their manipulability which is stressed.

Consequently, a simple form of classification which is comparative, minimalistic, problem-oriented (and susceptible of later refinement), distinguishes three broad types of state frameworks:

- A. The impenetrable political centre;
- B. The semi-permeable political centre;
- C. The accessible political centre.

Obviously, the simple typology used here is a static device and any country is likely to change category with regard to closure over time. Reasons for these political transformations lie outside the scope of this study, which merely takes account of them by using the classificatory scheme as a template which is moved longitudinally through history. This enables a nation's past to be divided into periods when its political centre was of the A, B or C variety and then allows the comparison of patterns of educational interaction and change when different countries displayed similar degrees of closure at different times. It is anticipated that the greater the penetrability of the political structure, the larger the number of parties able to gain redress for their educational grievances and the broader the range

of changes introduced in centralized systems.⁶

From this we can advance three basic hypotheses:

Proposition 1: With an impenetrable political centre, only sub-sections of the governing elite will be able to negotiate educational demands by political manipulation.

Proposition 2: With a semi-permeable political centre, sub-sections of the governing elite, together with government supporters, will be able to negotiate educational demands by political manipulation.

Proposition 3: With an accessible political centre, governmental opponents, too, will be able to negotiate educational demands by political manipulation.

However, the effects of each type of political structure are themselves affected by the nature of elite relations within them, and the latter are logically and empirically distinct from the former.⁷

Relations among such elites are variable: at one extreme they may display unity, homogeneity and superimposition (sharing the same background, similar or compatible interests and consciousness of belonging and working together), at the other extreme they can be heterogeneous in origin, have cross-cutting affiliations and pursue disparate goals. Potentially, both kinds of elites can be found in conjunction with each type of political centre outlined above, which is precisely why the two should not be conflated.

Attention is given to governing elites for the simple reason that they always have the capacity to command political attention (they merely differ in the extent to which this is exclusive to them alone). Because of this, elite relations everywhere exert an influence on the kinds of educational changes which are introduced or blocked. Obviously, this influence is most crucial where the political centre is impenetrable, because then the governing elite alone constitutes the restricted circle of those with direct access to decision-making organs. Under these circumstances, the type and diversity of educational change sought (or the extent to which existing educational practice is defended) will be highly dependent on the relations between sub-elites, their relative independence from one another, and the extent of their unanimity about educational goals. It seems likely that the greater the homogeneity of the governing elite, the

more standardized and undifferentiated will be any educational reforms introduced. Lack of unity, homogeneity and superimposition between sub-elites, on the other hand, encourages a more diversified educational policy. However, it also seems to be the case that the effect of their divergent educational interests can often block change, especially where the different sections are evenly balanced. Finally, it must not be forgotten that governing elites which are divided on decision-making may be united on non-decision making. For example, military and civil service heads can seek very dissimilar types of curricula without any disagreement about which class of people should receive either kind of instruction. Empirically, one of the greatest problems of analyzing elite relations is thus to tease out and stress the quiet areas of educational accord as well as accentuating the blatant conflicts over policy.

The concentration of power, wealth and expertise in relation to the decentralized system

Whereas in the centralized system the bargaining positions of educational interest groups are determined by the relative concentration of political power, in the decentralized system it is the relative concentration of all three resource distributions which plays the corresponding role. The availability of all resources is conceptualized in a similar manner. Thus, wealth and expertise are also considered inaccessible in so far as significant social groups do not possess them, cannot make use of them, or to the degree that other groups can employ them to exclude further parties and their interests from either external transactions or internal initiation.

At all times, every educational interest group will have a place on the hierarchical distribution of each of the three resources considered. The general position of a group is made up of its placings on the hierarchies of wealth, power and expertise. However, it is methodologically impossible to express this overall position mathematically, because of the incommensurability between the three hierarchies, and the absence of a common denominator to which they could be reduced. In view of this, we are forced to work in rather gross terms, merely designating groups as having high or low access to each resource.

However, within these limitations, it is possible to advance

three propositions which link groups and resources to educational interaction. (These represent the broad equivalents of propositions 1, 2 and 3 about who can negotiate change, given different concentrations of political power, in the centralized system.)

Proposition 4: Groups with low access to all resources will be in the weakest bargaining position (Position 1)

Proposition 5: Groups with differential access to the various resources will be in a stronger bargaining position (Position 2)

Proposition 6: Groups with high access to all resources will be in the best bargaining position (Position 3)

By corollary, groups are likely to receive educational services in reverse order. Therefore, it is groups in the latter position which will tend to be responsible for the majority of changes, whereas those in the first position will probably not be able to introduce significant educational modifications. However, it must be recalled that it is the degree of concentration which is crucial, for the less concentrated the distribution of resources, the fewer the number of parties which will find themselves in position (1) above, and the greater the proportion of groups which will be capable of benefiting from educational transactions. The opposite is equally true, a very high concentration of resources places a very restricted section of society in position (3) above. Along the same lines, a differential concentration of the three resources maximizes the number of interest groups finding themselves in position (2) above.

However, in contrast with the centralized system there is a much lower premium on 'good relations' among the resource holders: for, in the decentralized system, where the three processes of negotiation operate simultaneously, superimposition and organization are not necessary for effective transactions and may even prove counter-productive. For example, local firms working quietly through external transactions may gain the exact services they seek from colleges in their vicinity much more readily than if an industrial confederation sought the transformation of further education en bloc. Indeed, united inaction (in repulsing the educational ambitions of the resourceless masses) is probably the most important form of concerted action, for where positive changes are sought, the sub-elites will tend to pursue their specific institutional

requirements independently. Finally, this does indeed imply that the less the unity among resource-holders, the greater the diversity of educational changes introduced. Unlike the centralized system where all protagonists cluster in and about the political arena, often blocking one another and producing overall immobility, the existence of three processes for negotiating changes reduces the extent to which groups cancel one another out and contribute to stasis.

These considerations lead to an important conclusion:

Proposition 7: The superimposition and organization of interest groups are only advantageous in decentralized systems to the extent that they increase collective resources.

The increase can be purely quantitative (e.g., wealthy groups getting together to found high quality private establishments) or may improve the variety of resources available to a collectivity (e.g., when a powerful group and a rich one collaborate). But unless this condition holds, collective action carries no automatic bonus for the negotiation of change.

However, where political manipulation is concerned, this condition nearly always does hold. The greater the intensity of organized pressure, whether at the level of voting in elections, shaping party policy or influencing decision-making, the stronger the impact — because numbers, commitment and organization are the stuff from which power is made. And this, of course, is why superimposition and organization were always advantageous to interest groups in centralized systems, for to them political manipulation was the only process of negotiation available. Another way of looking at this is that the centralized system is a special case where collective action always increases resources. However, it is only a particular case of a more general rule, whose full workings are displayed only in the decentralized system, with its three processes of negotiation, namely that combination promotes effective transactions only when it enhances the bargaining position of educational interest groups.

Interaction in the decentralized system⁸

Although we are dealing with the same generic process of negotiation when examining interaction in the two kinds of

system; although this is conditioned by the same fundamental relationship between the distribution of resources in society and the structure of educational interest groups; and although the same basic strategies are responsible for generating educational change — the decentralized and the centralized systems differ in the *complexity* of the interaction patterns they engender. In other words, although the same theoretical framework will be employed for both systems, the patternings of interaction which it has to encompass are extremely different. Once again, substantive variation provides a challenge to theoretical unification.

Because of the supreme importance of political manipulation in the centralized system, the majority of interaction is narrowly clustered at the interface between education and central government. In turn, this serves to simplify the task of both description and explanation. There it is possible to describe educational interaction as a continuous political story, with characters, plot and outcome; and to explain educational interaction in terms of its relationship with the political structure.

Both description and explanation differ considerably when dealing with the decentralized system. On the one hand, interaction cannot be described as a story, because three different kinds of negotiation proceed simultaneously and at three distinct levels (the school, community and nation) instead of being restricted to the last of these. Thus, there is no single historical epic but only a vast collection of short stories (like 'going comprehensive'), often varying in scope, sometimes involving different personae, but whose outcomes are frequently intertwined (for the consequences of each transaction introduce shifts in educational control and the definition of instruction which alter the context in which subsequent negotiations occur). Explanation, on the other hand, involves making sense of these myriad episodes by relating them to a set of more general relationships which account for their patterning.

We will begin with the more complicated case of the decentralized system where, because the three forms of negotiation are of roughly equal importance, an account of educational interaction must be broad enough to embrace those transactions conducted autonomously by the profession and those introduced directly by external interest groups, as well as those taking place in the political decision-making arena. The centralized system then emerges as a special case (in the

theoretical not the empirical sense) whose particular structure limits interaction to one part of a much wider range of negotiation, which is only displayed where decentralization prevails.

Since bargaining positions are intimately connected with the shifting distribution of resources in society, data on the latter are fed into the following discussion of England in the twentieth century. Four periods capture *major* shifts in the societal distributions of resources and corresponding alterations in the bargaining positions of different groups in society. Although alternative periodizations might be preferable for a more detailed analytical exercise, here they suffice for the disengagement of basic propositions concerning relations between resource distribution, negotiating strength and change in the decentralized system.

1902-18

In Table 1 it is clear that high degrees of concentration and superimposition are the outstanding characteristics of the

TABLE 1
Summary of the social distribution of resources: 1902-18⁹

Power

Highly concentrated: absence of universal suffrage; lack of an effective united party representing the masses until the end of the war; weak trade unionism enfeebled by legislative and judiciary constraints. Parliament dominated by the (mutually antagonistic) Liberal and Tory Parties of privilege: the nascent Labour Party forced to work as a liberal pressure group. A period of prelude to full parliamentary democracy.¹⁰

Wealth

Highly concentrated: capital holding restricted to the top few percentiles; large inter-class income differentials (mean deviations for male employment categories 67 percent, 1913-14), no serious improvement in real wages throughout the period; liberal reformism (pensions, National Insurance, super-tax, etc.) of little redistributive significance. Shrinking intra-class differentials did substitute a working class for the plural 'labouring' classes of the nineteenth century.¹¹

Expertise

Highly concentrated: among the small group of 2,000 graduate academics in universities. Expertise of elementary teachers very low, certificated teachers being immersed by uncertificated personnel. The NUT worked to weed out the untrained, promote registration, improve low pay, status, autonomy and influence and to weld the intensely sectional groupings of teachers into a single profession.¹²

distribution of resources in society. Thus, before the end of the First World War, the vast majority of the population were in the weakest possible bargaining position, none but a tiny band of academics had differential access to resources, and only the socio-economic elites were strongly positioned (see propositions 4 to 6) — a privilege they would never again enjoy in this completely unrivalled form.

External transactions

The 1902 settlement recognized a number of groups as suppliers of educational resources: the religious denominations at all levels, the entrepreneurs in technical instruction and the upper middle class in prestige private schooling. However, the fate of the three main attempts to extend external transactions clearly demonstrated the indispensability of wealth if new demands were to be accommodated through this process.

The simplest case was the rise of the 'New Education Movement'. The 'progressives' were a loose association of prominent and usually wealthy individuals whose methods accentuated 'freedom' and 'individualism' on broad Montessori lines, becoming a more organized interest group after the 1915 Conference on New Ideals in Education.¹³ Since they were prepared to maintain and staff experimental schools, the launching of the progressive movement required nothing from either polity or profession. It constituted no threat, it made no demands, and above all it confined itself to the private sector throughout its genesis — where external transactions are usually possible if funding is forthcoming.

The other pair of cases is instructive because two groups, one the most affluent, the other the least wealthy, both tried to negotiate directly with the same institutions — the universities. The success of industrialists and the failure of organized labour directly mirrored their respective negotiating strengths.

That of industry was exceedingly strong.¹⁴ It could pay lavishly by university standards (strategy i) and make offers which no other social groups could better (strategy ii). It had 'squared' the polity (strategy iii), for the foundation of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR, 1916) to act as a broker between manufacturers with problems and universities with expertise, indicated all-party support for such

transactions. Finally, the growth of the large firm convinced industrialists that the servicing of research and development requirements was imperative. In comparison, the negotiating strength of the academics was distinctly weaker, for in the absence of other bidders (state grants did not begin to cover overheads), they were in no position to pick and choose: even Cambridge was undergoing financial hardship and universities without the backing of big business were almost going under. Acquisition of new laboratories or libraries offset repugnance towards investigating the bio-chemistry of cheese-ripening, the composition of German detergents, etc., but implied that much teaching and research were determined outside the universities.

In sharp contrast the adult education movement, spearheaded by labour and TUC representatives (with the aim of improving their own leadership), proffered the begging-bowl not the wallet. Its negotiating strength was near zero and the significance of this profound imbalance became clear when developments in adult education affronted the dons and threatened to confront the government.¹⁵ The Oxford colleges patronized 'impartial' WEA classes but would not tolerate the independent socialist Ruskin College founded by American philanthropy. The famous Ruskin strike only demonstrated that an external interest group cannot coerce the profession. On the contrary, imbalanced exchange means the weaker party must submit if transactions are to continue at all: submission took place, Ruskin's socialist principal was removed. The genuine labour colleges which the 'Plebs League' founded in response met with equal resistance from the polity, since this partisan instruction was officially blamed (1917) for unrest in the Welsh minefields. Henceforth, polity and profession hustled adult education along 'harmless' WEA lines, giving legal recognition and financial support provided its classes worked under academic surveillance and without institutional autonomy. Thus, the weak negotiating strength of the working class meant that it had not been able to introduce a socialist definition of instruction through external transactions.

Internal initiation

The general effect of the resource distribution was to place the profession as a whole in such a weak bargaining position that internal initiation made little contribution to educational change

at this time. Instead, the majority of the teaching body was preoccupied with attaining the negotiating strength to participate later on — the conditions of which had figured in the NUT charter since 1870, but which only the academics achieved by 1918.

School-teachers made minimal headway on any of the four strategic fronts. Their upgrading was prevented while the Board of Education and the impoverished religious denominations shepherded an 'army of unqualified practitioners' into the classroom:¹⁶ none of the NUT's exertions could weed them out since the board refused to terminate its Acting Teachers' Examination. Self-regulation, pursued through the establishment of a Teachers' Registration Council (1912), had derisory effects, since it had no sanctions to compel registration or to penalize those unsuitable for it. Little progress was made with insertion, while sectional divisions (voluntary vs. council teachers; graduates vs. non-graduates; trained vs. untrained; men vs. women; heads vs. class teachers; the certificated vs. the non-certificated), precluded consensual professional values and meant that the polity could capitalize on disunity to enfeeble strategic action on the first three fronts.

In contrast, the academics already enjoyed high expertise: their problem was how to turn it into a convertible currency. This was attempted by offering more attractive services (strategy i). Not only did academics respond to business demands (examined under external transactions) but many reached out to create new industrial demand for different services (especially in economics and commerce) — though initially without great success. The breakthrough was the war itself,¹⁷ for the successful co-operation of scientists, firms and officials subsequently allowed academics to approach both of the richest institutions in society to offer what they would for what they could get.

By obtaining *two* wealthy suppliers the academics had achieved a prime condition for increasing the market value of professional skills. Successful *insertion* through the consolidation of the University Grants Committee (UGC) as an academic body, was important in protecting against central encroachment and providing a buffer against industrial intervention.¹⁸ It was also an official sign that *self-regulation* was formally recognized. This combination of high expertise, increased earnings and enhanced autonomy introduced a positive feedback loop

which fostered substantial internal initiation in the next period, while the school-teachers remained trapped much longer in their original bargaining position.

Political manipulation

The enduring concentration of political power meant that the rise of the Labour movement only succeeded in placing educational democratization on the parliamentary agenda. It could influence the topics of debate but not their outcome; for in the liberals' last great piece of educational legislation, the 1918 Act, the governing elites continued to perpetuate inegalitarianism in education.¹⁹

Prior to the war, political interaction demonstrated the yawning divide between labour's view of secondary education as a right and the liberal conception of it 'as an exceptional privilege to be strained through a sieve, and reserved, as far as the mass of people were concerned, for children of exceptional capacity'.²⁰ Essentially, the liberals were willing to abolish the half-time system by raising the school-leaving age but saw the subsequent instruction of the majority as taking place in part-time continuation classes, quite separate from the secondary schools for the selected few.

Nevertheless, by the end of the war the polity was geared for some reform to appease public and professional demand. Parties and pressure groups lined up now legislative change was in view, but since the Labour Party remained in the weakest parliamentary position, its chances of challenging liberal policy were small indeed. The new bill, drafted in 1917, showed the power elites closing ranks: its minor concessions to the left were coldly received because of the massive act of non-decision-making they concealed, namely the determination not to alter the basic structure of the educational system. Small as it was, the concession incited intense hostility from industrialists, especially the northern manufacturers, represented by the Federation of British Industry (FBI), who saw the end of the half-time system producing major industrial dislocation.

To get the bill through and propitiate industrial opposition, the introduction of continuation schools was postponed for seven years, though the subsequent economic depression prevented them from ever being realized. In reality, then, the Act had done nothing more than abolish the half-time system: it

represented the effect of collective inaction on the part of the socio-economic elites vis-à-vis structural change and the incapacity of labour representatives to make any impact through political manipulation, given the distribution of power in society.

Conclusions

The greater the concentration of resources in society, the fewer the social groups which can utilize any of the three processes through which educational change is negotiated in the decentralized system. The majority of the population is prohibited from participating by its weak bargaining position: instead, it concentrates on acquiring the strategic prerequisites for subsequent participation. Furthermore, the greater the superimposition among resource-holders, the more all three processes of negotiation benefit them alone and the more non-decision-making is to their advantage. Finally, the conjunction of an extremely high concentration of resources and superimposition among resource-holders means that initial bargaining positions largely determine negotiating strength. Strategic interaction has little free-play to affect the outcome of changes transacted in education.

The inter-war years

The changes in the social distributions of the main resources were of a divergent nature in this period, as summarized in Table 2. Power underwent redistribution, wealth showed an intensified concentration, while expertise displayed a growth which spelt increased diffusion. The main consequence of this for the three processes of negotiating educational change was that it placed a variety of important social groups in a differential bargaining position for the first time.

External transactions

Wealth alone contracted and intensified in concentration during this period: its consequences were to reduce the social groups participating in external transactions, to prohibit new interest groups from starting direct negotiations, and to worsen the bargaining position of those who were weakly placed before the

war. The latter is particularly clear where denominational, progressive and adult education were concerned, but their very different relationships with polity and profession mediated the impact of austerity upon them.

TABLE 2
Summary of the social distribution of resources
in the inter-war years ²¹

Power

Reduced concentration: Union support and liberal demise meant labour became the chief opposition party, assuming office in the 1920s, thus realigning politics on a class basis. Effects of redistribution were neutralized by: the General Strike, enfeebling the Unions (membership only recovered its 1918 density by 1944); the parliamentary weakening of labour after MacDonald's failure to push the party into a national government and the repudiation of his leadership; the resultant conservative landslide in the 1930s.²²

Wealth

Intensified concentration: economic crisis and depression increased financial disparities; unemployment disproportionate among manual workers and in double figures throughout period; widening income differentials (mean deviations for male employment categories rose from 67 percent 1913-14, to 75 percent 1922-24, and stood at 70 percent by 1935-36); manual earnings then registered an absolute, not a relative increase; collective assets of working-class organizations declined correspondingly in contrast to the growing resources of the FBI.²³

Expertise

Deconcentration and growth: by the 1930s graduates increased among elementary personnel and trained teachers among secondary staff: by 1944 the term 'elementary' teacher had disappeared. In between, the board terminated its Acting Teachers' Examination and relinquished responsibility for certification to a national committee with NUT representation; groups of training colleges were formed round the universities, thus academics (who had doubled numerically) acquired greater cultural hegemony over the entire profession.²⁴

The voluntary religious schools, facing straightened circumstances²⁵ as subscriptions fell away and church affiliation declined, were rescued by the fact that none of the three political parties was strong enough to alienate old supporters. As the liberals were traditionally committed to the free churches, the conservatives to protecting Anglicanism, while labour was under serious Catholic pressure, the National Government introduced a compromise measure whereby the LEAs made generous

grants towards building voluntary schools to meet Hadow reorganization. For strategy (i), the non-punitive pouring-in of funds, was the only one all parties could countenance. Denominational education was saved thanks to the differential bargaining position of the churches, whose political influence was disproportionate to their resources.

The salvation of the progressive movement came from the profession not the polity. The post-war spate of experimental establishments (including Summerhill, the Malting House School and Beacon Hill) was pared to the bone by the downturn of the economy. Only a few would have remained as isolated showpieces but for the fact that child-centred education was taken into protective custody by the teachers.²⁶ Professional values had been seeded with progressive ideas and their victory was subsequently accomplished through internal initiation.

By contrast, adult education went to the wall — its deteriorating financial position coinciding with the internal acrimony which weakened the Labour movement. Following this severe check, the Labour Party made no future attempt to introduce socialist instruction through external transactions.²⁷

Hence, the industrial elite proved the only group capable of extending direct negotiations, given its relative wealth plus strong official support for transactions which could help surmount the economic crisis. However, changes in the negotiating strength of the profession released the universities from supine dependence in their exchanges with industry. First, the war-time revaluation of their expertise allowed them to bid-up the exchange-rate and devote the surplus to their own ends (e.g., Manchester serviced numerous companies and simultaneously developed pure science under Rutherford, Bragg and Bohr).²⁸ Secondly, the existence of an alternative supplier in the state (providing one-third of university income by 1930) allowed academics to be more selective about their clients, as did the bipartite University Grants Committee which provided a buffer against crude business demands. Finally, a small but eminent group (Flexner, Laski, Bernal, Huxley) was becoming critical of offering anything, provided the price was right. Hence external transactions with industry proliferated steadily if much more selectively. They ensured continuing growth, despite economic depression but its direction was still markedly influenced from outside.²⁹

Internal initiation

The inter-war years witnessed a reduced gulf between the bargaining positions of school-teachers and academics, thus leaving both poised for really substantial internal initiation once an economic upturn allowed the transaction of surplus resources. The four strategies of the school-teachers proved mutually reinforcing. Qualifications rose and advances were made in self-regulation as the LEAs involved the NUT in school reorganization and elementary teachers entered the inspectorate (freeing them from classroom censure by those unfamiliar with their problems and antipathetic to their values). Insertion took a step forward since the attention attracted by the seven reports (including the Hadow ones) of the Consultative Committee culminated in the creation of the Central Advisory Council for England (1944), with the new right to investigate topics of its choice.³⁰

Underpinning all this was the development of a new set of educational values which had been hammered out in the private experimental schools. By the mid-1930s 'most of those who wrote books on education, spoke at conferences, produced official reports or sat on important committees, trained teachers, or contributed to the educational journals came to accept progressive views as a basis of their own thinking'.³¹

Together, these four improvements in negotiating strength allowed a quiet classroom revolution for freer child-centred methods to begin: it was held back by financial limitations on equipment and architectural adaptation, but the first serious piece of internal initiation by school-teachers was off the ground.

In the universities, continuing transactions with industry were offset by government spending cuts, thus precluding the egalitarian developments that the Association of University Teachers was advocating by 1942 — the creation of extra-mural departments and people's colleges. Professional values now exceeded the pursuit of vested interests — the pay scales had fallen from the AUT's eyes — but new innovations had to await more abundant resources. Generally in this period, internal initiation was limited, but not eliminated, by the overall shortage of funds.

Political manipulation

While the economic situation made the majority of the population exclusively dependent on political manipulation for

expressing its educational demands, internal strife meant that the Labour Party could never satisfy them by introducing 'Secondary Education for All'.³² What the working class received was largely on conservative terms. As the first decade of class politics, the 1920s set the scene with the Tories driving brutal economy measures through the political breach, stopping Hadow reorganization in mid-stream and thus retreating from reformism to blunt retrenchment.

With the beginning of economic recovery in the late 1930s the Consultative Committee published the Spens Report, which played-up agreement between right and left on the need for differentiation (by proposing grammar, technical and modern schools) and played down their division over the principle of hierarchical organization (by giving the three schools parity of status). Given their political strength, the conservatives simply shelved Spens and substituted the Norwood Report (elicited from the more traditionalistic Secondary Schools Examination Council). This neatly inverted the Spens notion of parity between secondary schools by ranking them vertically and became the basis of the tripartite policy.³³ This was endorsed by R. A. Butler when he circulated 'Education After the War' (1941) in the run-up to a major piece of legislation. But with Labour ministers now in the National Government, the Labour Party endorsing multilateral schooling³⁴ and the TUC, NUT and WEA banded together in Campaign for Educational Advance, there was substantial pressure for an Act providing equality of opportunity.

As drafted and passed the bill was a masterly piece of political manipulation, recognizing the significant difference between what the Campaign for Educational Advance desperately sought (raising the school-leaving age, gratuity, uniform amenities and universal secondary education) and commitment to a particular form of organization — the multilateral school. Accordingly, the 1944 Act gave secondary education to all: it made no mention of types of secondary school beyond stressing variety.³⁵ Since the bill had not prescribed tripartite reorganization nor legally proscribed the multilateral school, there was no formal barrier against supporting it. What it did do, however, was to create the necessary conditions for imposing tripartism or any other kind of organizational uniformity by creating a minister to 'control and direct' a 'national policy'.³⁶

TABLE 3
Summary of the social distribution of resources,
1945-64³⁷

Power

Substantial deconcentration: Although the conservatives had more time in office, they could not ignore the opposition as the parties were never more than a few percent apart in the five elections after 1945. Balance spelt further deconcentration, as both parties bid for the support of interest groups, and prompted consensus politics — 'Butskellism' with its bipartite endorsement of the managed economy, Welfare State and political corporatism.³⁸

Wealth

Substantial deconcentration: Initiated by the first majority Labour government (1945) and its redistributive measures (National Insurance, rent control, progressive taxation, etc.), but mainly due to the expansionist economy of the 1950s resulting in: low levels of unemployment, steady rises in real income, substantial increases in disposable income, shrinking income differentials (mean deviations for male employment categories dropped from 70 percent in 1935-36 to 48 percent in 1955-56). Although capital only spread-out within the top 20 percentiles, poverty was no longer co-terminous with class.³⁹

Expertise

Moderate deconcentration: Upgrading of school-teachers proceeded slowly — two-fifths of graduate teachers now worked outside the grammar schools, but the demographic 'bulge' brought in 35,000 staff under an emergency training scheme — regressive in relation to the ideal of a graduate profession but progressive in completely eliminating the unqualified. Academics emerged from the war with a greatly enhanced reputation and able to promote considerable university expansion and further intellectual specialization.⁴⁰

Conclusions

The broadening of any resource distribution increases the range of social groups which can participate in educational negotiations (as illustrated by both power and expertise): but participation itself does not guarantee a successful outcome (as reference to the power dimension demonstrates), for this depends on negotiating strength. Furthermore, when the three resource distributions are no longer isomorphic or superimposed (i.e., many groups are in a differential position), then initial bargaining positions no longer nakedly determine the outcome of transactions, for negotiating strategies become more influential in shaping educational change.

1945-64

In our terms, the dawn of the 'affluent society' represented a growing availability of all three resources to larger sections of the population than ever before. It remains to be seen whether this generalized improvement in bargaining positions enabled new groups to participate successfully in educational negotiations for new purposes.

External transactions

The post-war period of economic recovery was particularly rich in external transactions, for greater affluence brought them within the reach of an unprecedented portion of society. Their proliferation was due partly to private affluence, for personal investment in private schooling reached record levels in the 1950s,⁴¹ generating growth in public schools, a marked resurgence of experimental progressive schools, the proliferation of 'crammers' to ensure grammar school entry (thus institutionalizing the diffuse transactions developed by the lower middle class as their disposable income had allowed — the elocution teacher, maths coach and 'front-room' tutor), and the burgeoning of nursery schools as women workers filled a lacuna in public provisions.

Equally, corporate growth fostered the dramatic expansion of collective transactions.⁴² Industry and commerce entered into novel exchanges with further education and the partnership between the state and industry (the educational face of corporatism) legitimated this by giving employers strong representation on the governing bodies of the new advanced colleges of technology, founded after the Percy Report of 1945. Henceforth, employers became the effective mentors on further education and could negotiate a host of diverse training requirements and then monitor and modify them.⁴³

Where the universities were concerned, the bargaining position of the economic elites was better than ever before, but negotiating strength is a relational matter and it was precisely the relationship between buyer and seller that had changed. Industrialists were convinced of their need for research and manpower services (they were now the largest employer of graduates),⁴⁴ business was booming and could offer terms with

which none but the state could compete — and the latter itself endorsed expansion (conferring five new university charters) on the assumption that this would automatically strengthen the economy. But, for the first time, academics could now outmatch them: exceptionally, the exchange rate was to their advantage.

Academic expertise had never been more sought after and private finance flowing to the universities reached new peaks in the 1950s. The greedy absorption of all graduates⁴⁵ and the proliferation of research sponsors increased academic independence — this being unintentionally reinforced by increased state funding meant to enable the universities to respond more fully not more selectively. Though transacting more intensively than ever, the academics could finally afford the luxury of a conscience — foregoing particular transactions without threatening their own survival and giving priority to intellectual considerations in development decisions.

Internal initiation

School-teachers won sufficient autonomy for them to have virtual freedom to define instruction in any establishment up to the grammar school.⁴⁶ Given the balanced nature of party politics, attempts were made to woo the teachers, largely by conceding increments in self-government. Consequently, as the 'statutory limitations on what can be done in a school are very few indeed'⁴⁷ the contents and methods of instruction became the prerogatives of teachers. These then reflected their progressive values, which had swept through the primary level, now percolated up through the secondary moderns, and were only held back by the examination barrier from inundating higher levels.

For the first time, teachers too became able to participate in audacious structural reform, thanks to their insertion at local level. For the partnership which emerged between the profession and the local authorities was tantamount to an alliance *against* the centre. (Frequently the LEAs aligned with the NUT not the DES⁴⁸ and in turn the NUT opposed any administrative erosion of local government powers.) This alliance was vital, since the LEAs made all the running in structural innovation at this time, pioneering comprehensive reorganization in opposition to central policy, which would have been impossible without strong professional support.

By contrast, the increased impact of the academics was due to their strength in market terms. An unprecedented amount of state aid was now forthcoming, industrial benefactions doubled in the period 1952-63, and external funding of research represented the largest increase in any source of university income.⁴⁹ Yet the AUT calculated that, in 1957, less than half of the latter was actually devoted to industrial research — the majority of these earnings was therefore capital accumulated by the academic community and devoted to their own ends. Revelling in their new-found wealth, they developed the 'pure' rather than the 'applied', the social not the natural sciences, 'professional' not 'executive' training, and the PhD rather than the MSc. The financial scope for internal initiation had never been greater, but danger signs were present (the UGC was more intrusive, especially in steering research through ear-marked grants, and the government had quietly become the major supplier — it provided one-third of university income in 1938-39 but it furnished two-thirds by 1951-52).⁵⁰ Although this threat to autonomy did not materialize while the economic boom continued, the profession was becoming strategically vulnerable, for any collapse of industrial support (i.e., the natural equivalent of strategy (ii), the barring of alternative suppliers) would open the door to the central forces ready to undermine university autonomy (via strategy (iii)).

Political manipulation

The question of how to organize secondary education dominated political manipulation in the three decades following the 1944 Act, given that the lower classes could command continuous political attention while other social groups turned to make use of external transactions and internal initiation, since both had widened in terms of who could use them.

The interaction surrounding political manipulation fell into two phases. The first mirrored the political consensus of the period and witnessed Labour and Conservative governments successively employing their new central powers to introduce a higher degree of uniformity than ever before in English education — the tripartite system.⁵¹ Labour would only sanction limited innovations (when it quit office in 1951, only twelve comprehensive schools existed): the conservatives only countenanced 'judicious experiments' (like London and Coventry) or

made allowance for 'sparsely populated areas'. Yet from the mid-1950s onwards, conflict intensified 'between local authorities wishing to establish comprehensive schools, and the Ministry, wishing to prevent this development, except on its own terms'.⁵²

While the conservative response was to shore up tripartism, protecting the grammar schools by allowing advanced courses in the secondary moderns, the reaction of many areas was to dispose of it completely. Although plans for comprehensive reorganization continued to be rejected, the local authorities took over the running from government and ministry in a manner inconceivable in the centralized system. The Leicestershire experiment crept in under the official net by using nothing but existing buildings: fifty comprehensive schools were now functioning, attracting considerable attention from other LEAs, and making their own pragmatic contribution by concrete example; finally, the Crowther Report (1959), underlining the need for a more flexible structure of secondary schooling, encouraged the snowballing of anti-tripartism among the local authorities. Even Edward Boyle bowed to Bradford's abolition of the 11 plus, a sign that 'in the early 1960s there was apparent the beginnings of a movement to do away with the selective system at the secondary stage, one which represented a reversal of the position established in the late 1940s when the central authority lead firmly contained development on these lines. Now it was the central authority which retreated before local authorities, though still uttering some final vetos as it went'.⁵³

Conclusions

The greater the growth of all three resources and the deconcentration of their distributions, the more intensively are all three processes for negotiating educational change used, and the higher is the volume-cum-diversity of changes introduced. However, as the range of social groups which can participate in educational change expands, each group makes most use of that process in relation to which it has the best bargaining position. A major implication is that the lower classes turn to intensive political manipulation, the two alternative channels for introducing change being dominated by other social groups. Finally, the more intensive the employment of all three processes of

negotiation, the more important is the interplay between them and their outcomes.⁵⁴

TABLE 4
Summary of the social distribution of resources
1964-75⁵⁵

Power

Relocation and reconcentration: Under labour, the alliance between the state and the unions snapped with the proposed Industrial Relations Bill, removing the linchpin of consensual social democracy and the reason for conservative restraint. This rupture displaced power away from Westminster and towards the organized Leviathans, spelling an overall decline in effective representation for the majority, given simultaneous disorientation of the parties — without coherent philosophies, attracting support by sectional accretion, facing substantial electoral volatility and challenges to the two-party system itself.⁵⁶

Wealth

Relocation, reconcentration and recession: Growth of multinational companies and institutional investment led to a parallel concentration of capital resources away from the state, rendering them less amenable to government control. Correspondingly, as Britain's economic position deteriorated in the 1960s, successive governments tried to balance the books by altering the labour side of the equation through wage freezes and incomes policies, thus widening pay differentials. Simultaneously, intensification of recession and inflation also reduced the disposable income of the middle classes.⁵⁷

Expertise

Growth and deconcentration: Slow upgrading continued for school-teachers. The Robbins Report placed their training in the orbit of higher education and initiated the BEd. This did not create the all-graduate profession (only 10 percent stayed on for the degree in the 1960s) but meant that certification was no longer an end-stop, condemning teachers to semi-professionalism. For academics, Robbins brought huge expansion (the new universities, upgraded CATs, the CNAA) but also represented the climacteric of their growth, influence and valuation.⁵⁸

1964-75

The years of unremitting growth of the main resources (and their rather more limited redistribution) were ending. Replacing them was another phase during which changes in the resource distributions were unsymmetrical, again producing various groups with differential bargaining capacities. However, current negotiations, even in straightened circumstances, took place in the context of past gains and this prevented recession

and retrenchment from reducing the negotiating strength of any group to zero or from rendering any process of transaction nugatory.

External transactions

The start of this period was a prolongation of the last — there were continuities in the patterns of both personal and collective investment — but its finish saw a severe cut-back in external transactions, mirroring the deepening economic recession. Personal transactions with the private sector remained the preserve of middle-class groups (as they drifted further beyond the financial reach of working-class parents) but significant numbers made use of the 'voluntary aided' and especially the Catholic schools, regardless of religious affiliation, believing that these preserved standards and provided a protected environment. Given all-party agreement that church schools should not suffer from comprehensive reorganization (80 percent building and maintenance grants were made available to them),⁵⁹ the existence of this ready clientèle preserved the remains of the dual system.

The new post-Robbins universities represented a massive expansion which itself changed the market even before the economic downturn reduced the number of buyers, for it could no longer be assumed that the occupational structure would automatically absorb their products. Certainly some of the new universities (Essex, Lancaster and Warwick) rapidly entered intensive transactions with industry, but others remained completely disengaged, turning their autonomy more to their own account than to that of the national economy. Not only did this incur political opprobrium (an embargo on further universities) but industrial reactions revealed an ambivalence unknown in the antecedent period. Undoubtedly, some of the new developments in management sciences, industrial relations, business administration, data processing, etc., were distinctly advantageous to industry, commerce and bureaucracy,⁶⁰ but the foundation of an independent university was an indicator of growing dissatisfaction with the values communicated, if not with the training available in higher education.

If a feeling was spreading among their suppliers that the negotiating strength of the universities was excessive and leading to excess, then rectification was accomplished by recession which cut industrial transactions back hard.

Internal initiation

If the previous period was the high-water mark of academic influence, the present one was the best yet for the school-teachers since the scope of internal initiation widened enormously. The abandonment of the 11 plus relocated selective functions within the school, making teachers' assessments paramount for pupils' destinies, the Plowden Report (1965) witnessed the universalization of progressive pedagogy, all of this being crowned by the teachers winning control over the new Schools' Council. This was a signal piece of insertion, accomplished by the professional unions supported by local authority associations for, when first mooted (1964) the council was to be a 'commando-like unit', assisting the Secretary of State on matters of curriculum and examinations. When it emerged as an autonomous body, outside the department, it meant that the chief agency concerned with the definition of instruction was now commanded by teachers, thus officially reversing the respective roles of profession and polity as inherited from the nineteenth century.⁶¹

In contrast, after 1966 when the Robbins proposals took on flesh, the last vestiges of consensus politics dispersed, and the economic downturn established itself as here to stay, the academics had won everything they were going to achieve for a long time. Henceforth, they were engaged in a fort-holding operation which basically resulted from the universities' financial dependence on government. World recession and English inflation meant that alternative suppliers began to dry-up from the late 1960s onwards. For the first time academics were left alone with the state as the sole agency on which they depended for funding. Both parties had employed strategy (i), pouring in funds until all the universities had to offer was reliant on government resources. This now paid off and in turn allowed strategy (ii) to be activated — the strenuous use of political veto (always most effective in the absence of alternative suppliers). This was illustrated by the refusal to implement Robbins fully and by the imposition of the binary policy. Hence, once financial dependency was established, the exchange rate could be lowered, thus reducing surpluses available for internal initiation. The way was also open for the reduction of institutional autonomy (strategy iii), through the growing dirigisme of the UGC — which became more an agent of state than a neutral mediator between government and university.⁶²

Political manipulation

The end of the social democratic consensus issued in a more hostile period of party politics — fully reflected in educational policy and only modified by LEA resistance to any government in office. In a period when power was increasingly displaced on to the most strongly organized collectivities, it is not surprising that the local authorities benefited — they were always there to press their case(s), whichever party was in power, and were obvious candidates for the tactic adopted by both parties of appeasing sectional interests.

Hence, when labour returned to power in 1964 it effectively sponsored the more 'progressive' authorities. When Circular 10/65 requested all LEAs to submit proposals for comprehensive reorganization, not only did this eschew legislative coercion of the local authorities but also the 'central guidance' it claimed to give 'amounted to passing round to all authorities what the DES had found in its suggestion box in 1965'⁶³ i.e., the six main models already operating at local level. Comprehensive remained essentially local in character under the next Conservative government (1970-74), which stood to gain educationally from the intransigent authorities and politically from defending local rights. Their replacement circular of 10/70 condemned monolithic reform and committed itself to the defence of 'good schools' in the plural. Thus the conservatives decelerated and diluted comprehensive reorganization rather than stopping it, as many comprehensive plans were passed providing they left the grammar school intact. When labour resumed office in 1974, determined that reform should not be stranded 'halfway there', it still reined-in short of strong compulsion or standardization.

Why, then, did successive governments balk at the legal imposition of a coherent policy from the centre? Largely because the sequence of interaction, encouraged by both parties, giving local initiative its head or intransigence its way, had gradually structured vested interests in local definitions of the comprehensive school (middle school, upper school, sixth form college, etc.) and these then conditioned resistance to the legislation of 'the' uniform comprehensive school. Thus, thirty years after the 1944 Act, positions had again been reversed with the authorities becoming more influential than the ministry as the result of the interaction surrounding political manipulation over the three decades.

Conclusions

Reconcentration, recontraction or relocation of each resource does damage or affect the respective process of negotiation. However, this is a more attenuated influence than in the past. Present negotiating strength is no longer quite so sensitive to the contemporary fluctuation of resources. For once the main educational interest groups have acquired significant negotiating strength, they tend to retain many of their past gains and to remain active parties in the negotiation of educational change. Thus, over time negotiating strength slowly and partially distances itself from temporary variations in bargaining positions. Nevertheless, a major effect of reconcentration and recontraction is to prevent any new social groups from participating in educational transactions for the first time.

Interaction in the centralized system⁶⁴

The following discussion explores the nature of political manipulation, given that this is the most important process through which change is introduced in the centralized system. It remains so there because governing elites continuously wield the four strategies which ensure continual educational dependence on the state. The aim is now to move on to an analysis of its contours, course and consequences within such systems, for without this it is impossible to explain comparative and historical variations in political manipulation.

Particular patterns of interaction and different outcomes of political manipulation are held to derive from two factors: (i) the penetrability of the political centre and elite relations inside it; (ii) the superimposition and organization of supportive and oppositional interest groups in education. Obviously the formulation and testing of hypotheses about such combinations require an array of cases, covering all permutations of the key variables. As a single case study, France at least has the advantage of furnishing unequivocal illustrations of the three types of political centre with their different degrees of closure or accessibility:

- A. The impenetrable polity — the Second Empire (1852-69)
- B. The accessible polity — the Third and Fourth Republics (1875-1958)
- C. The semi-penetrable polity — the Fifth Republic (1958 to date)

TABLE 5
Interaction in the impenetrable polity⁶⁵

Framework of the state

Impenetrable political centre: Strong presidential government concentrating executive powers on Louis-Napoléon and away from the elected assembly which had no right to initiate legislation. An amalgam of plebiscitary and autocratic practices where presidential powers derived directly from the electorate without organized parliamentary bodies of right or left effectively representing public demands. Closure was so great that government and democracy were 'two separate poles, too far apart for the vital spark of democratic government to flash between them'.⁶⁶

Elite relations

Elite disunity: Deep cross-cutting fissures fragmented the assembly, weakening its tenuous constitutional grasp on policy-formation. At one extreme were ultra-conservative monarchists, divided into Bourbons or Orléanists, but united in Catholic orthodoxy; in the middle were counter-revolutionary liberals, Bonapartists and liberal Catholics, capable of alliance but divided upon the role of state in society and of church in state; at the other extreme were minority republicans, repudiating clericalism and strong government. Even the broad class interests common to deputies (as bourgeois professionals, bankers or landed gentry) were split by the rural-urban divide.

Structure of educational interest groups

Fragmentary interest groups: Social divisions produced a variety of sub-cultures with divergent educational interests, while political repression (limiting freedom of the press and of association) deterred interest-group formation. Together they meant that educational pressure groups emerged tardily and separately, were weak in numbers and organization and without impact on the general population. Typically they were loose gatherings associated with specialist journals — like *L'Univers* (orthodox Catholic), *L'Opinion Nationale* (anti-clerical), *Journal des Economistes* (progressive industrialists), and *L'Atelier/Bibliothèque Utile* (republican working class), none of which was superimposed or even allied with any other.

This allows for a fairly rigorous assessment of propositions about the influence of political structure upon educational interaction and change. Unfortunately, an equivalent range of variation in elite relations is not provided in French history, as high elite disunity prevailed until the last period. Thus, it will be necessary to supplement the theoretical discussion with side references to other countries. Much the same is true of the organization of educational interest groups, since fragmentation remained their dominant characteristic throughout in France. (See Appendix 2 for a summary diagram of the com-

plete permutations of relationships and their effects on the negotiation of change in education.)

The Second Empire, 1852-69

At the political centre

The nature of educational politics provides clear substantiation for Proposition 1, since they were dominated by the elites belonging to the charmed circle of the closed polity and directed by the changing balance of power between them. Hence, educational policy in the 1850s was shaped by the alliance between imperial government and the Catholic Church. Louis-Napoléon saw Catholicism in instruction as a counterweight to republican forces in society:⁶⁷ the church in turn made the seemingly innocent notion of 'liberty of instruction' a condition of their support for the president. But once this had been achieved (by the loi Falloux),⁶⁸ the liberal drapery clothing the freedom of instruction was stripped away to reveal the church revindicating educational control of the *université*, founding a competing network of confessional schools, and contesting control of the entire system. This, plus the Italian war of liberation in which Napoléon III received Papal denunciation as a traitor, finally ruptured the church-state alliance at the end of the 1850s.⁶⁹

Having repudiated its supporters on the right, the government sought to build them up on the left, but paid the price for the alienation of the latter in the previous decade. Teachers had become unco-operative under their double surveillance by church and state, the Saint-Simonian bankers and industrialists disgruntled at the failure to harness education to economic development, and the republicans disillusioned by the repudiation of universal primary instruction. Yet these discontented groups could neither ally in a common cause nor could a common denominator be found among their grievances. The *universitaires* clung to their academic traditionalism, their sole claim to social status, to be protected against spiritual or temporal despoilation: but this tenacious classicism was irrelevant to the industrial elite, which sought scientific instruction, and its associated elitism was unacceptable to republican leaders who wanted universal schooling. Given the dead weight of the conservative majority in Parliament, this was a formula for inaction.

Consequently, various attempts at liberalization and modernization lacked the political strength necessary for execution, and it was the lowest common denominator of entrenched political, social and educational interests which passed into legislation. The attempt to universalize elementary schooling ended in a modest bill (1867) giving municipal councils the discretion to abolish fees; mainstream secondary education bowed to academic conservatism and traditional classicism was left intact in the *lycées*; the demands of the new middle class for practical professional training were propitiated by the introduction of 'special education' inside existing *lycées* — deficient because of its expensiveness, lack of specialization and its social discrimination.

Thus, elite disunity had precluded the pursuit of a positive and coherent educational policy. It resulted either in sectional legislation favouring a particular elite alliance (as in the 1850s), but dissatisfying other elite groups which received too few of the educational services they required, or to collective inaction, because of mutual blocking (as in the 1860s). Under these circumstances, non-decision-making was the most significant product of political closure. In particular, popular interests were organized out of the central arena for policy formation — since the only dimension of political unity was the negative bourgeois consensus. Here a comparison with the USSR is instructive as it presented a similar degree of political impenetrability but accompanied by more united elite relations in the post-revolutionary period.⁷⁰ This combination, on the contrary, facilitated the smooth downward flow of polity-directed changes which represented packages serving the common interests of the governing elites.

Professional interest groups

Teachers and academics are generally closely controlled under the impenetrable polity, which prevents effective co-ordinated action and the development of any of the four strategies for professional advancement. While the church-state alliance lasted,⁷¹ this conjunction of authoritarian powers meant that centralized control grew at the expense of academic influence — detailed directives stemmed directly from the minister's Rue de Grenelle offices, via the inspectorate and prefecture to each classroom. Teachers had, for example, to keep notebooks on

topics taught and exercises given so that the authorities could verify that the new restricted programmes had been observed. The stringency of surveillance was indicated by the dismissal of over 800 *instituteurs* for their suspected socialist opinions. Upon the break with the church and the withdrawal of the reserve inspectorate of parish priests, attempts were made to replace coercion by compliance, to woo back the profession by a limited amount of consultation, which did not warrant the name of insertion, but involved the signal concession of recognizing professional expertise.

Yet, even minor concessions, meant to increase teacher co-operation, tended to be counter-productive. The small increment in autonomy was used to intensify obstructiveness in defence of academic traditionalism. As a marginal social group, promoted from the people but not yet assimilated into the bourgeoisie, they clung tenaciously to the *culture générale*, which marked them off from the masses and forced Minister Duruy to retreat from his policy of modernization. Even his attempt to minimize Greek merely prompted the formation (1867) of the Association for the Encouragement of Greek Studies, the first essay in corporate action on the part of the profession. That it was harnessed to academic traditionalism here was circumstantial: it indicates that in a centralized educational system with an impenetrable polity, in so far as the profession is not simply obstructive it is driven to act as a vested-interest group. Under stringent control it cannot respond to the demands of other social groups, so any small increment in freedom of action will be used for the advancement of its own interests.

External interest groups

Obviously, tight central control over public instruction repulsed external transactions: there was no question of squaring a deal with a polity which did not consider that state education was open to negotiation. Less obviously it deterred negotiations with the private sector for the 'liberty of instruction', won by the church and available to others,⁷² was not synonymous with the freedom to diversify education (because of the standardizing influence of state examinations).⁷³ Alternative suppliers could not extract alternative supplies which met the specialized requirements of external interest groups because of the low

TABLE 6
Interaction in the accessible polity⁷⁴

Framework of the state

Accessible political centre: The political centre of gravity moved downwards as power shifted away from president and senate to be vested in government by assembly. The Chamber of Deputies, elected on direct male suffrage, exercised detailed control over public policy. Constitutionally, every group had access to the decision-making arena: in practice each nuance of public opinion could gain parliamentary expression and, in the absence of strong party organization, all could work through the shifting coalitions to press their demands. Punctuated by the Vichy and Provisional governments, the Fourth Republic was effectively a continuation of its predecessor — a prime index of lasting openness being that 30 percent of legislation was sponsored by the opposition. However, the fact that Parliaments had more control than governments contributed to political instability — eighty ministries collapsed under the Third and twenty-two under the Fourth Republic.

Elite relations

Elite disunity: This was mirrored in the fragmentation of political parties, due to cross-cutting social cleavages (clericalism, monarchism, class and militarism) which survived the introduction of mass suffrage. At the turn of the century, the extreme right was isolated through its legitimism and Catholicism, while moderate conservatives were united only in anticlericalism and defence of business interests, the division of the bourgeoisie being completed by the Radical Party of the centre. Parallel divisions paralysed the twentieth-century left — permanently divided between Socialist and Communist parties, incapable of durable alliance. Party fragmentation spelt political 'centrism' as only combinations of the centre parties could form governments — the pendulum swung between the margins of centre-right and centre-left. In turn, political 'centrism' meant political 'immobilism' — legislation being restricted to the minimum programme which the governing coalition would endorse.

Structure of educational interest groups

Fragmentary interest groups: The weakness of political parties made them court every complementary interest. This encouraged the mobilization of many educational pressure groups: (i) *professional* associations: primary, secondary, technical — loosely united in the FEN by 1946; (ii) *sectional* groupings: Catholic organizations, industrial bodies, labour federations; (iii) *pressure* groups: of parents, students, reformers and educationalists. As their common target was national politics, they were all organized on a national basis since interest groups reflect the structure they seek to influence: local organizations are pointless if local negotiations are impossible. Interest groups proliferated but their aggregation was so difficult that they neutralized one another politically. Fragmentary political parties meant that the interest groups gave them guarded support for temporary pledges rather than a permanent unity of action developing for the political manipulation of educational change.

autonomy of private education. More importantly still, such groups lacked the organization necessary to engage in successful political manipulation and to introduce change through modifying public policy. This in turn highlights the fact that the impenetrable polity is never confronted by an organized and united source of opposition, regardless of whether it enjoys solidary elite relations or not. This absence could not be explained away by reference to class antagonism, since by the end of the Second Empire a common ideology of *laïcisme* was beginning to unite liberal industrialists and urban workers under the banner of secularism in education. Instead, the consolidation of opposition was deliberately prevented by limitations on the freedom of association — thus non-elite interests were organized out of the central decision-making arena imperatively.

The Third and Fourth Republics, 1875-1958

At the political centre

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the intensity of *laïcisme* provided enough political cement for the Republican Union to steer through substantial legislation. The introduction of free, compulsory and secular instruction by Jules Ferry⁷⁵ in the 1880s involved the strengthening of all four strategies for increasing education's dependence on government. Underpinned by the ideology of *laïcité*, public educational funding increased; institutional autonomy diminished as primary schools were reduced to agencies of state and secular curricula were imposed throughout the system; alternative suppliers were banished when religious personnel were prohibited from teaching in the public sector — a policy which culminated in the full separation of church and state in 1905, given the intensity of clerical resistance to this secularization of the *université*.

Thereafter, bold legislation came to an abrupt end, although the parliamentary expression of demands remained unproblematic. The question of why such a highly accessible political centre did not produce a commensurate proportion of the educational changes pursued by different groups can only be explained by the basic lack of political cohesion between them which now became salient. In the past, clericalism had successfully driven a wedge into the conservative opposition, thus allowing

republican legislation to get through. It had also been vital in postponing a split over educational modernization and especially democratization between the centre and the left: the only political combination capable of steering elements of these on to the statute books. However, once *laïcisme* had triumphed, it could no longer perform this role and the *école unique* issue (the demand for a single, democratic middle school which dominated educational politics thereafter) became the most long drawn out example of political manipulation which failed through lack of party unity.

The brief history of the Cartel des Gauches in the early 1920s wrote the scenario for the rest of the Third and Fourth Republics. In their electoral alliance the *école unique* had figured prominently in the minimum programme which both radicals and socialists could endorse. With support from the major labour union (CGT) the Cartel won, but useful as educational reform had been for covering party differences during electioneering, it became subordinate to destructive disputes over economic policy when in office.⁷⁶ Perpetual division on the left spelt a prolonged exercise in non-decision making: the battle of the projects continued,⁷⁷ those of Zay (1937), Langevin-Wallon (1947) and of Marie, Delbos, Depreux, Berthoin and Billières (under the Fifth Republic) being killed in the cross-fire over other issues or buried by the fall of ministries. Certainly, the openness of the political centre could not be blamed; entirely different effects will be found when accessibility, accompanied by a stable party system, is examined in England. Immobilism was the result of profound disunity among governing elites, preventing the consolidation of stable units for political manipulation (parties, alliances, coalitions) and generating the crippling instability that dogged both Republics. This precluded the steady downward flow of polity-directed changes. It was unsatisfactory to both government and opposition, and merely benefited conservative interests in society since protracted inaction was a welcome 'decision' to perpetuate educational privilege.

Professional interest groups

Under the Third Republic, teachers remained constrained by a battery of central regulations which prevented the *corps enseignant* from engaging in internal initiation. As the

instituteurs were freed from the local tutelage of *curés* and *notables* to become civil servants, the state immediately enmeshed the primary school too in its familiar net of prescribed duties and proscribed activities. Since change of any magnitude at any level (in curricula, timetables, courses, examinations, pupil intake, etc.) required parliamentary or administrative sanction, the profession was driven towards political manipulation if it was to have any voice in policy formation.

To be effective through it, the profession had first to organize, but the path towards legitimate association was long and rough, paved with organizational repression and personal dismissals, until the Cartel des Gauches (dubbed the 'republic of professors') gave legal recognition to the *Syndicat National des Instituteurs* (SNI) and the association of secondary school teachers in 1924. Significantly, then, the first precondition of successful political manipulation, had itself depended on political change — on a brief shift of power to the left.

Henceforth, the centralized structure of education predisposed towards the formation of large national associations to exert parliamentary pressure.⁷⁸ If these were to succeed in the political negotiation of change they needed strong party sponsorship and concerted professional action. Given the social origins of the *corps enseignant*, their obvious allies were left of centre. However, the inability of the *Fédération Générale de l'Enseignement* (FGE), in the 1930s, and of the larger *Fédération de l'Education Nationale* (FEN), in the 1940s, to unite with any of the (warring) labour federations or (divided) parties of the left⁷⁹ precluded the exertion of strenuous and continuous political pressure. But internal disarray was as important as external failure to coalesce with others in vitiating effective political manipulation. The FGE could place its weight behind the *école unique* movement while projects remained safely on paper, but the FEN found no mantle of unity to cover the divergent interests of primary and secondary teachers after Jean Zay's clutch of experimental *classes nouvelles* had become a reality. In turn, this paralysed the FEN's potential for shaping public policy on educational democratization and it crippled the *école unique* movement itself.

Thus, within the accessible polity the contribution of the profession to educational change is not limited to negative obstructiveness. Teachers and academics can influence policy through extra-parliamentary association in conjunction with political

sponsorship, but the condition for effective political manipulation is lasting unity of action between the three kinds of groups.

External interest groups

As before, stringent control of the *université* left the private sector as the only part of education open to external transactions, but the standardization of private schooling meant most interest groups abandoned negotiations with it and rapidly turned to political manipulation instead. The fact that secular private education steadily declined from the middle of the nineteenth century indicates that external interest groups could gain nothing from strategies (i) and (ii) (offering generous, competitive terms) and were driven to rely predominantly on the strategy (iii) — the attempt to 'square' a deal with the polity. Since the political structure of the two Republics encouraged interest group activity, squaring deals with a party sponsor was easy,⁸⁰ but the relative weakness of each party⁸¹ made its delivery of the goods just about non-existent.

Equally deleterious for effective manipulative action were divisions among the interest groups themselves, since the accessible polity places a premium on their coalescence. Instead, clericalism and communism dissolved the unity of labour (dividing it into three groupings) and disaggregated consumer grievances (separating defenders of privilege, like the organization of lycéean parents from equally privileged protectors of Catholic rights: or alienating respectable radicalism, like the *Ligue de l'Enseignement*, *Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle* or *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* from disreputable forms of *gauchisme*).

The two factors interacted. Socio-ideological cleavages coupled with the constant availability of political sponsorship meant that in the course of political manipulation, any rebuff produced regrouping, any setback generated schism and any serious failure induced a complete falling apart. Thus the divisive relations characterizing the political elites were paralleled by those of the interest groups,⁸² the two exacerbating one another and sacrificing the potential for negotiated change held out by the accessible polity — by reinforcing disaggregation of interests, organization and action.

TABLE 7
Interaction in the semi-penetrable polity⁸³

Framework of the state

Semi-penetrable political centre: The antidote to past instability was to confer greater constitutional powers on president and government, to contain an unruly assembly. Presidential powers enabled certain issues to be resolved imperatively, over-riding the warring factions, but since the constitution vested most executive powers in the government, a strong president required a majority in the National Assembly — hence the development of a disciplined Gaullist Party. Government itself was strengthened in order to limit the ability of Parliament to overthrow or obstruct it: now legislation which was not officially sponsored sank to less than 10 percent of the whole. However, since Parliament was still the bedrock of power, a premium was placed on a strong opposition. Deficiencies in this respect on the left reduced democracy at the political centre beyond the constitutional diminution of openness.

Elite relations

Asymmetrical elite relations: The Gaullist Party (UNR then UDR) signalled growing unity on the right and gave the president an advantage unique in republican history — a decade with a working majority in the National Assembly. This increasingly streamlined party transformed the Fifth Republic into one of stable government and unstable oppositions, compared with the opposite under the Fourth Republic. The fragmented parties of the left and centre were the greatest force for Gaullist domination over public policy. Political arithmetic made their coalition imperative, but two factors inhibited it: hopes for a centre revival, excluding the communists, bifurcated the opposition and its potential for challenging the UDR; antagonism between the Socialist and Communist Parties prevented a genuine union of the left. This asymmetry, with unity on the right and disarray on the left did not change until the 1980s.

Structure of educational interest groups

Fragmentary interest groups: Factionalism and particularism weakened employers' federations, professional associations and workers' unions: *groupuscules* spawned on the right and the left. Both counteracted the consolidation of united national organizations, necessary for confronting the centralized state. Political manipulation was thus limited to lightning opportunistic alliances on specific issues. Since interest groups require party sponsorship, the absence of a united left in the face of a united right made disunity more of a penalty for some pressure groups than others. It spelt an asymmetry of influence where right-wing interest groups had the ear of government while their left wing counterparts scarcely had a hearing in the National Assembly.

The Fifth Republic, 1958 to date

At the political centre

The focal points of interaction represented a return to the earlier preoccupations with secularization, modernization and democratization. But in each area the changes introduced and the processes involved bore the marks of increased political closure and the asymmetrical access of different groups to decision-making. Each measure reflected the augmented powers of government, especially its devices for by-passing Parliament.⁸⁴ Each was passed in the face of substantial opposition from the left, the teaching profession and external interest groups, thus creating a growing reservoir of discontent. Finally, each selectively rewarded political supporters of government and penalized critics of the regime, while calculatively taking into account manifest and dangerous sources of discontent.

Yet even the loi Debré, a straightforward recompense for the Catholic vote⁸⁵ (passed as a motion of confidence), made strong contracts of association the condition of aid to Catholic schools. Effectively this was a central charter for standardization since it eliminated the last stronghold of diversity in French education — by intensifying strategy (iii), the undermining of institutional autonomy. A similar defence of *étatist* control accompanied those improvements in vocational training with which the Fouchet reforms rewarded the industrial backers of government (including the development of long and short technical courses at secondary level and the creation of university institutes of technology, as a 'short' alternative to the full degree). This was evidenced by the inclusion of education in the national plans, for these were bureaucratic not democratic exercises, involving the official interpretation of group interests rather than interest groups negotiating their specific demands. The Berthoin reform (1959), imposed by decree, was intended to defuse and diffuse the discontent which had built up following the repeated failure of the *école unique* movement.⁸⁶ It was a compromise measure which merely created a two-year observation cycle taking place in existing establishments — with all their self-fulfilling consequences. The intention was to give a little to those who had wanted substantial democratization, yet not to subtract much from those with vested interests in the educational status quo.

In sum, educational negotiations and the educationally

negotiable altered now that the four political strategies for inducing educational dependence on the state operated with a renewed vengeance. As the new style of government asserted itself in educational politics, discontent grew but the concessions made were too modest to contain seething hostility. Hence the outburst of the 1968 May events. Initiated by students, joined by an unprecedented total of 8 million strikers (including professional as well as industrial workers), and enjoying considerable popular support,⁸⁷ this extra-parliamentary movement owed nothing to party or union organization. It was a crisis not only for the government but for the official left, too, as direct action was a direct condemnation of the left-wing parties' failure to deliver the goods through political manipulation.

Consequently, all parties were predisposed towards panic legislation — hence the unanimity with which the *Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur* came into being by November. This set a new pattern for the remaining Gaullist and the Giscardian periods: generous reformism in initial legislation was followed by administrative renegeing on the more radical clauses. Alienation and opposition henceforth characterized relations between government and the profession. Although the solidarity of May was not recaptured, de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing had earned themselves an intransigent if disunited opponent whose intermittent outbursts vitiated every central move for educational rationalization or modernization, and which was later to present the Socialist government (1981) with half a century's frustrated aspirations for secularism, democracy and, above all, autonomy in education.

Professional interest groups

From the start, relations with the Gaullist government were ones of frigid mistrust as many teachers had refused to support de Gaulle in the 1958 referendum, on good republican grounds of commitment to open government, distrust of right-wing militarism and total repugnance for Catholic conservatism. In reprisal the *université* was made to writhe under the intrusive control of Minister Fouchet, active in the Algerian campaign and bringing military discipline to the educational system.

The new ministerial style of direct control in instruction by very detailed decrees meant that the profession was subject to a great many policy directives which it had neither helped to

shape and which it was powerless to modify. Correspondingly, the profession's direct links with the central decision-making arena were reduced (appropriate commissions were often not even consulted) and its local and classroom activities became more circumscribed. Teachers and academics had little freedom to respond positively to external community demands or especially the internal demands of pupils (disoriented, for example, by the semi-annual changes in the *baccalauréat*) or students (bewildered by the changing course requirements attending the ministerial programme of modernization). Whatever their sympathies, they could not make a direct response through internal initiation nor could they play an indirect role by piloting change on to the statute books through political manipulation. The profession is in an intermediary position here in relation to the other two kinds of polities. Its corporate and consultative role is smaller than in the open polity, while its organization is greater than in the closed polity. It shares with the former the ability to form alliances with parties and interest groups outside the educational field but it shares with the latter the inability to play any other peaceful role than that of negative obstructiveness. These two aspects are intertwined in encouraging direct action when the negotiation of change fails.⁸⁸

External interest groups

Lack of diversity in instruction invited all discontented groups to address themselves to the source of their frustrations, the state educational system itself: when coupled with the internal inflexibility of the centralized system, it constrained them to do so in a particular way, through the process of political manipulation. However, two factors made external interest groups less than successful in using the latter to negotiate change.

On the one hand, the French social structure still favoured fission rather than fusion. Even the main industrial organization, the *Conseil National du Patronat Français* failed to represent the small firms and shopkeepers: in parallel, trade unions did not organize more than a quarter of the active population and traditional ideological cleavages precluded rapprochement between the four main unions, cancelling out the advantages of their national structure and preventing a link-up with

teachers' associations which still dared not put all their eggs in one basket. Instead, there was a plethora of pressure groups of all kinds, on the right as on the left (Meynaud lists over 300),⁸⁹ which reinforced particularism, factionalism and the narcissism of small differences. This proved especially damaging for those not figuring as government supporters.

A vicious circle developed — the powerlessness of the opposition fostering *groupuscules*, whose internecine conflict then damaged the unity of the left.⁹⁰ On the other hand, the government itself attempted to substitute consultation for negotiation with the interest groups. But the creation of 500 councils, 1,200 committees and 3,000 commissions at the national level, was a device for taming the power of political intermediaries rather than an extension of the negotiating table.⁹¹

In consequence, where interests failed to get a response from government, their reaction to rejection was almost identical — a resort to direct action, displayed first by the small agriculturalists, then by students, left-wing factions and finally by the trade unions which were dragged into the May events. But their internal divisions prevented them from forming other than temporary alliances, cemented by the euphoria of revolt, never holding together long enough to consolidate the educational gains sought.

The absence of a cohesive opposition movement intensifies the tendency for educational demands to be expressed through extra-parliamentary action since it leads to continuous failures in political manipulation, above and beyond the legislative and constitutional bias towards government interests.

7 STRUCTURAL ELABORATION: PATTERNS AND PRODUCTS OF CHANGE

The final stage has now been reached, where the processes of interaction which have been examined in the last two chapters remain to be linked to patterns and products of change, thus bringing the analysis up to date. However, the present task is not to describe these historical changes or to assess the performance of modern educational systems, but to provide a sociological account of macroscopic changes in education in terms of the structural and cultural factors which produce and sustain them.¹

Patterns of change

Different patterns of change are found in centralized and decentralized systems. In the centralized system, political manipulation, the process of interaction which accounts for the bulk of macroscopic changes, is also responsible for patterning them in a distinctive way. As we have seen, demands for change have to be accumulated, aggregated and articulated at the political centre, they have to be negotiated in the central political arena, and if they are successful, they are then transmitted downwards to educational institutions as polity-directed changes — evidenced and documented by laws, decrees and regulations. The crucial point is that these represent a definite and often dramatic punctuation of educational stasis, for education can change very little in the centralized system between such bouts of legislative intervention. Patterns of change, therefore, follow a jerky sequence in which periods of stability (i.e., changelessness) are intermittently interrupted by polity-directed measures. This has been termed the 'stop-go' pattern, and its precise derivation from educational interaction in the centralized system will occupy the next sub-section.

It is contrasted with the pattern of change common to decentralized systems. In the latter we have seen that three processes of negotiation are of roughly equal importance for introducing educational change; hence demands do not have to be passed upwards to the political centre, some can be negotiated autonomously within educational institutions, others can be transacted independently by external interest groups. Consequently, change is never-ending, it is constantly being initiated, imitated, modified, reversed and counteracted at the level of the school, the community and the nation. Equally, however, it is usually undramatic, frequently indefinite, and commonly specific and local in application. The three processes taking place simultaneously at the three levels, intertwine and influence one another, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively, to produce a seamless web of changes. This has been termed the 'incremental' pattern, signifying that macroscopic change is made up of small increments, of minor modifications introduced from different sources, whose sole significance may lie in their accretion. Once again, a separate sub-section will be devoted to the ways in which this pattern derives from interaction in the decentralized system.

In proceeding to make this connection between processes of interaction and patterns of change, it should perhaps be stressed for the last time that what is presented does not constitute a complete theory of educational change. What is being traced are the effects of structural conditioning on how social groups bring about educational changes and the imprint of this on the resulting patterns of change. Such a theory cannot itself explain the composition and characteristics of social groups at any time or their norms and values, for these require general theories about social structures and cultural systems.

(a) The centralized system and the stop-go pattern

As has already been seen, the centralized system in which unification and systematization are the predominant characteristics encourages the build-up of frustrated demands outside education and in the wider society. Instead of these demands being propitiated by direct negotiation at the local or institutional level, thus drawing off discontent on a day-to-day basis, dissatisfaction accumulates. To effect educational change all groups, including teachers, must move outside the educational

field to engage in political interaction at the national level. As far as the successful negotiation of demands is concerned, the nature of the political structure and of elite relations influence whose requirements are met but have much less effect on the form of change which is introduced. In fact, the polity-directed changes which are routinely negotiated through political manipulation are formally very alike in terms of their initiation, their legislation and their execution. By examining these in turn, and discussing the mechanics involved in each of them, we can jointly describe how it is and explain why it is that centralized systems generate the same kind of pattern.

(i) The initiation of change

Basically, changes are slow and cumbersome to bring about in the centralized system: and this is the case regardless of the type of political structure or elite relations which prevail. It is not simply the problem of marshalling consensus which is responsible, since this is equally problematic for political manipulation in decentralized systems. Rather it is the commitment of every political elite to retaining the supreme responsiveness of education to government (inherited as part and parcel of centralization), which means that each governing elite monitors educational development in relation to its own goals and changing circumstances. For various reasons it hesitates to introduce a major change until there is pressing evidence that current policies are not working or are not appropriate.

First, since the change will be national, it entails detailed planning (even if not in its modern form), such as teacher retraining, building programmes, production of teaching materials, etc. Secondly, since this is costly, the inevitable competition of other priorities for public spending means that it will not be embarked upon lightly. Finally, the elite will hold back as long as possible because what is involved is a leap in the dark — a restraining feature generic to the centralized system. For these systems do not contain within themselves any fund of experimentation, they lack the local, private or autonomous institutions which provide concrete models of new ideas in action and thus furnish a practical basis for argument and a firm precedent for action.

Certainly, there appears to be a growing tendency for

governing elites themselves to initiate experiments (in a restricted area, a particular type or level of school, and for a limited duration) and we find increasing examples of this in twentieth-century France. Nevertheless, state experimentation carries with it many of the disadvantages common to legislation itself. After all, the decision to undertake an experiment is a political decision: and by and large this means that it will have to be promising, acceptable, responsible, justifiable and any number of other things which will distinguish it from the fund of spontaneous experiments in decentralized systems, which are both more diverse and more daring. State experimentation functions largely as a negative feedback loop, minimizing gross deviations from the status quo, by exercising a preliminary exclusion of radical, but possibly workable, alternatives. Thus, leaps in the dark are resisted, until pushed by political supporters or force of circumstances, and when they are taken they will be unadventurous, unless produced by a new group assuming power.

Because the political centre thinks long and hard before it legislates and because the intervening changes brought about through other processes are minimal in comparison, then long periods of relative educational stasis are typical in the centralized system.²

(ii) The legislation of change

Legislation in the centralized system always involves concession, compromise and a dilution of the goals pursued by those who help to pass it. This is most obvious, because witnessed at its most extreme in the accessible polity with a weak government. For if it succeeds in legislating at all, it produces the most innocuous compromise measures and the greatest discrepancies between the change introduced and the goals of any of the groups which participated — as the introduction of a few experimental *classes nouvelles* instead of the universal *école unique* illustrated in the last decades of the Third Republic. However, the same is also the case in the semi-penetrable polity, in which concessions have to be made to government supporters (like the loi Debré rewarding Gaullist Catholics despite the hostility evoked in most other quarters) and compromises with dangerous opponents (like the décret Berthoin intended to pacify the left-wing proponents of educational democratization without

alienating the right-wing defenders of educational elitism). Equally, the closed polity, with strong elite disunity, publicly betrays the same tendencies — the attempt to find formulae which give something to everybody who counts and take away as little as possible from any of them. The wranglings over modern, technical and professional instruction during the Second Empire revealed the design of two successive compromise policies (of bifurcation and then of special education), in a deliberate attempt to mobilize adequate support for limited modernization.

Finally, these tendencies also characterize the closed polity with highly superimposed and integrated elites, though they may not be worked out in public to the same extent. The reason is simply that, however harmonious their relations, different sub-sections of the governing elite want different services from education, and if none wishes to reduce educational responsiveness to the polity by relaxing unification, then all have to work doubly hard at a compromise which dovetails their requirements with one another.³

In other words, concession and compromise are general characteristics of legislative change in the centralized system, whatever the political structure or elite relations which go with it. Above all, this means that no polity-directed change is ever precisely what anyone wanted. Even if a group successfully pilots its demands through into legislation, the actual change introduced will be tempered by the requirements of powerful others: sometimes the compromise will be so gross that nobody really wants it. In brief, legislative change often fails to satisfy and never satisfies fully in the centralized system. The most successful use of political manipulation still means that demands are met without precision, and this lack of precision is inherent to legislation which is national in scope and at best meets the highest common denominator of those educational interests enjoying political expression. Because of this, each polity-directed change does not significantly reduce the pool of discontent. Interest groups continue to exact more or better and remain ready to extract it if political circumstances permit: they stay armed for further political manipulation and give the educational system no respite from the pressure of their demands. Typically, legislation has tepid supporters and brutally hostile critics in the centralized system.

(iii) *The execution of change*

Educational legislation is national and uniform both in conception and application in the centralized system. This is the concomitant of maintaining strong central control, in the interests of educational responsiveness to the polity, and a high level of co-ordination, to avoid conflict between the different services education is to provide. Its main implication is that change will be confined to measures which do not challenge unification and which dovetail with the current form of systematization.

This means that the logic of central control perpetuates the illogic of educational uniformity. Instead of allowing for variations to meet local conditions or for adaptation in response to changing circumstances, each legislative change imposes a standardized formula on the relevant part of the educational system. Usually this involves too gross a response to the variety of initial social conditions and proves inflexible towards social change. The obvious corrective which consists in allowing sufficient local and institutional autonomy for self-regulation is precluded by the fear of its abuse, i.e., fear that the parts will escape control, pursue their own ends or prove more responsive to groups other than the polity.⁴ The alternative is polity-directed specialization, and this is what takes place, orchestrated from the centre and organized so as to fit in with other centrally approved goals for education. Unfortunately, it can swiftly be nullified by social action and social change — e.g., student failure rates or the decisions of pupils not to pursue their specialisms can wildly distort numerical targets, just as social, economic or technological changes can render them obsolete. These consequences are just as pronounced in imperative Soviet planning as in the indicative French plans, for they are not problems whose solution depends on the availability of sanctions.

In other words, the uniformity with which change is applied and the tight co-ordination of specialist developments mean that changes both fail to satisfy and frequently fail to work. Once again they leave behind them a pool of discontent, the proportions of which increase as the dysfunctional consequences of change amplify over time. This trend will continue as long as the polity refuses to cede some degree of unification and systematization, for the attempt to introduce more differentiation and specialization without weakening the predominance of

the first pair of characteristics can only lead to further maladjustments and undesired consequences. However, given commitment to the centralized structure, such problems merely prompt the movement from one national and uniform plan to another — legislative inadequacy is met by more legislation in those 'over-controlled' systems. In this lies another part of the mechanism which produces the 'stop-go' pattern of change.

It now remains to examine what happens if and when the political negotiation of educational demands proves impossible, for in Chapter 6 it was seen that every type of political structure was capable of frustrating a substantial volume of demands. In general, if demands are consistently refused, the strains which produce them continue and grievances grow and aggregate. However, they do so outside the 'normal' political channels, whatever these may be, for the legitimate procedures have already failed to satisfy them repeatedly. Whether this reservoir of discontent bursts depends partly on the political action taken and partly on the nature of the frustrated groups and the type of confrontation in which they are willing to engage.

That centralized systems can 'tolerate' considerable discontent there is no doubt, for they do so all the time, but the political centre can react in different ways if discontent reaches alarming proportions. Direct repression is most common in the closed polity. Here, a battery of threats, sanctions and punitive measures are used, the educational status quo is also buttressed by other social institutions (churches, youth organizations, the security forces) and widespread ideological indoctrination is disseminated through the media and education itself — all of these serve to keep the lid on by subtracting from the potential participants in disorderly outbursts. Indeed, when repression is supremely successful the collective character of discontent disappears, to be replaced (seemingly) by individual manifestations of 'dissidence' which can be dealt with on a personal basis. If these techniques work, discontent is contained, educational policy remains undisturbed from below, and the 'stop' phase continues — until the first hint of political instability.

Alternatively, and this is more typical of semi-penetrable and open polities, though it is not exclusive to them, concessions can be made when dissatisfaction appears to reach a dangerous level, the aim being to keep it within 'manageable' proportions

and also if possible to break up any solidary groupings of dissatisfied parties. However, the assessment of danger levels and the estimation of the size of concession needed are both delicate matters of political judgement and they can be wildly wrong. Whether the polity is made to pay for such errors depends upon the extent to which the disgruntled groups can work together and recruit support from other parts of society for extra-parliamentary action. If they can, then the result is an explosion (like the May events in France in 1968), which is bigger when educational grievances are augmented by others, as they were then.⁵ If dramatic, their participants may even envisage toppling the polity itself — for a month the Fifth Republic looked very insecure — and political change would then signal a new 'go' phase of educational reform.

The explosion of educational grievances may not reach this point, and obviously the governing elite will seek to put out the fire. In this context, panic legislation takes place to defuse the situation and restore order. Promises of unheard-of concessions are made, unprecedented shifts of principle take place, entrenched positions are yielded and a major reform is hurried on to the statute books. All of this is illustrated by the *loi d'orientation*, passed virtually unanimously in 1968, to solve the university crisis. If and when the *furor* dies down, and the government again feels secure, it may well try to renege on some of its more radical undertakings by administrative claw-back (as in this case)⁶ and the disillusionment caused leads to the re-accumulation of discontent. Whether a new explosion takes place depends on the degree of unity retained (or forged anew) among the proponents of educational change, the sensitivity of government to signs of unrest, and its flexibility in propitiating them before flashpoint is reached again.

Thus, whether educational changes are polity-directed through peaceful political manipulation or are the products of explosion followed by panic legislation, they constitute a distinctive 'stop-go' pattern. Periods of stasis are punctuated by legislative reforms and change advances by jerks rather than the slow accretion of modifications. In all cases, universal reforms fail to satisfy, they are followed by a period in which grievances build up and finally result in another universal reform, the cycle repeating itself indefinitely.

(b) The decentralized system and the incremental pattern

As was seen in Chapter 6, the presence and parity of the three different processes for negotiating change in the decentralized system means that although the educational status quo will give rise to a variety of unsatisfied demands at any given time, more of these can be fulfilled by direct transactions because greater changes can be implemented internally or independently and less of them depend upon central intervention.

As all three processes of negotiation operate simultaneously and successfully, educational change is ceaseless. There is no period of stasis between educational acts and no sense in which these represent the largest or most important changes, except that they are the most public — they are the most audible if not the most visible. (This, of course, is why some are tempted to assign a class character to educational interaction as a whole: political manipulation is class based and it does command more attention by definition because of the public character of parliamentary proceedings.) Nevertheless, the changes introduced by sectional transactions can be just as far-reaching.

In the decentralized system, change is thus a combination of small localized shifts, possibly concentrated on one level or one establishment in a given area, the effect of which is cumulative, and policy-directed changes, which are intended to be larger in scope but in fact also bring about further increments of change rather than root and branch reforms. It is by following through the way in which the small localized shifts can accumulate to produce a significant scale of change as well as the way in which central policy directives are systematically reduced in scope that the overall pattern of incremental change is understood. The 'incremental' pattern is the result of both action sequences, in conjunction with one another.

(i) The accumulation of small localized changes

Here we are concerned with the results of external transactions and internal initiation, that is with the contribution which these two processes of negotiation make to the overall pattern of change. Both show a strong tendency to introduce unit changes which fall far short of the macroscopic. Thus, external transactions usually involve localized changes negotiated between interest groups and educational institutions. These may be

extremely small in scale (like one firm negotiating a research contract with its local university) and thus depend upon replication and aggregation if they are to influence educational development. (Alternatively, an institutional interest group can engineer a series of transactions, in different localities, which produce a network of changes simultaneously.) Similarly, the innovations introduced by internal initiation normally involve small changes in teaching materials and methods which take place in particular schools or classrooms. Again, only by their repetition in a large number of establishments, whether by spontaneous imitation or orchestrated by a professional organization, can these add up to large-scale educational developments. The rest of the argument is thus taken up with demonstrating two propositions: first, that the accumulation of large-scale change from both processes is a frequent and important occurrence, and secondly, that the kinds of change introduced in these ways have distinctive characteristics which in turn affect the central governance of education.

Quintessentially, external transactions provide services (to the interest groups involved) which are marked by their *specificity*. For negotiations are only successful when the buyer gets what he wants from a seller who is willing to supply him; dissatisfaction on the part of the former or reluctance on the part of the latter mean a breakdown in negotiations.⁷ In turn, this specificity means that the new services which have been transacted represent a diversification of current educational practices.⁸ Often these cannot be accommodated within the existing institutional, disciplinary and curricula frameworks. Consequently, external transactions foster the progressive segmentation of institutions, differentiation of courses, and specialization of knowledge, whether for teaching or research. But for such direct negotiations a whole range of educational establishments and activities would not have come into being in England — the development of civic universities, for example, represented the aggregate effect of hundreds, if not thousands, of independent transactions on the part of industry which continued to pump successive waves of differentiation throughout the tertiary level.

Certainly, many external transactions remain localized and without sequel: indeed, one of their purposes is to bring educational services in line with unique requirements or special circumstances. Equally, others which bid fair to introduce

macroscopic change leave no lasting impression, like the repeated failure in England to make a form of *real* post-elementary instruction stick. However, the point here is not that all external transactions necessarily accumulate until they represent large-scale changes, only that they can produce macroscopic changes incrementally and that these increase the overall differentiation and specialization of the system.

Change introduced through internal initiation often involves nothing more than personal experiments on the part of individual teachers in the seclusion of their own classrooms — indeed this is its basic unit. However, these too can accumulate in a number of ways and result in macroscopic changes. First, concerted action orchestrated by a professional organization can co-ordinate changes which become national in scope. The transformation of English primary education along progressive lines was accomplished without legislative intervention and was solely due to an exceptionally high degree of pedagogical consensus among teachers at this level, encouraged and spread by the NUT. Second, there are various mechanisms of mutual influence within the profession. Often innovations are generalized through imitation — e.g. the copying of early prototypes of comprehensive schools by other LEAs. Similarly, the growing demand for a particular innovation can lead to the rapid diffusion of this service — like the spread of business education in English universities once this had attracted a market — through the creation of positive feedback loops.

Finally, a change which has prevailed at one level can acquire wider diffusion through the downward influence exerted by higher levels on lower ones, like the English universities increasingly reaching down to shape teacher training via the certification and BEd examinations. Furthermore, the conjunction between the two processes of direct negotiation will amplify some of these changes still further until they reach macroscopic proportions, as in university expansion.

The full range of changes which are brought about through internal initiation and external transactions is characterized by its untidiness. In institutional terms the changes are tacked on as unplanned extensions, they sprout out of the top of existing institutions, shoot up like a scaffolding against the mainstream schools, or sprawl out as new edifices built in their grounds. In terms of the definition of knowledge the changes are analogous; new disciplines are delineated, old ones are sub-divided,

existing distinctions are blurred, prevailing categories are recombined, the boundaries of educational knowledge are redrawn and status is redistributed. Thus, because both external transactions and internal initiation intensify systemic differentiation and specialization, they threaten overall systematization. In other words, the changes they introduce jointly and separately result in anarchic structural elaboration.

(ii) *The modification of polity-directed changes*

It is in their scope that polity-directed changes in the decentralized system are most sharply distinguished from those taking place in centralized systems. Here there are no grand reforms which radically transform national education and whose passage marks a complete change of direction or a large stride forwards or backwards. Both the conception and application of polity-directed measures are modified by local and institutional forces whose general effect is to prevent legislation from introducing changes which are either uniform or universal. Instead, such modifications mean that each polity-directed change is itself incremental in its effects. Its scope is reduced by resistance and its standardized provisions are distorted, redefined and adapted at ground level. In other words it has just been argued that there is no 'stop' phase in the decentralized system because internal initiation and external transactions maintain a ceaseless flow of small localized changes. Now it is being maintained that there is no distinctive 'go' phase, heralded by central legislation, because interaction at lower levels robs it of much of its impact.

(a) *Polity-directed changes are affected by existing developments.*

Any projected legislation must necessarily take into account what is there — a truism, whatever the structure of the educational system. However, at any given time the practices and provisions current in the decentralized system reflect the consequences of decentralization in the past. Their diversity and malintegration shape a practical context of considerable complexity which political intervention has always to confront. In other words, the decentralized structure constantly produces and reproduces an untidy patchwork of educational activities which condition what legislation can do with or to them. Moreover, these engender vested interests in their maintenance:

defence of independence, autonomy, acquired rights, continued services, established privileges and, most basically, of having a say, all constitute constraints on political intervention and fundamentally limit its scale. Thus, for example, the first two Labour governments were limited to extending free places in the grammar schools, to a slight democratization of what was there and was well defended, rather than being able to replace it by something altogether more egalitarian. In the same vein, R. A. Butler reflected that his 1944 Education Act had merely succeeded in 'recasting' the system, not transforming it.⁹

Equally, the ongoing practices and provisions have as much effect on polity-directed change as does legislative intervention on current educational activities. Such changes follow just as much as they lead in the decentralized system. On the one hand, legislation is often modelled on experiments which have been conducted autonomously and have given concrete evidence of their effectiveness, or at least provided a persuasive precedent. In many ways, the fund of experimentation, made up from private, local and professional innovations, constitutes the research and development agency of the education industry.

On the other hand the impetus for central legislation itself often comes from below. Because of their relative autonomy, the local authorities, the schools, colleges and universities can spearhead educational changes — which take shape at ground level by a roll-on effect — from experimentation via imitation and accumulation to substantial innovation. Often the centre has to run to keep up, its legislative acts merely recognizing, legitimating and extending what has already taken place. For example, the English moves to found new universities were well under way before the Robbins committee reported and the government accepted its recommendations: similarly, it was the LEAs which made the running with 'intermediate' instruction between the wars, which began to drop 11 plus selection, and to pioneer comprehensive reorganization. When polity direction finally came, it no longer had a clean page on which to draw a fresh design, but a set of burgeoning initiatives already in operation, a new set of existing practices to take into account and a new series of vested interests protecting them. Consequently, political action bent with the tide: it gave recognition and it gave legitimation and what it sought to achieve in addition was rationalization. Here both the Hadow proposals, as accepted by the government, and Circular 10/65 are very

revealing, for both based their six recommended schemes on ones which were already in being. What was to be universalized was not a centrally determined plan but progressive local practice. Consequently, neither Hadow reorganization nor comprehensive reorganization could conceive or impose a specific kind of change establishing a particular type of school: they merely pointed to bundles of acceptable practices which were nothing more than the prior initiatives taken by local authorities.

(b) Polity-directed changes are mediated locally and institutionally

This dimension of interaction is almost entirely lacking in the centralized system. Here, local and institutional autonomy enables action to be taken at various levels which results in the modification of central directives. Because legislation is mediated by such forces it does not have a uniform effect wherever it is applied, and consequently it does not give rise to standardized changes in the institutions or processes involved.

On the one hand, the area or institutional authorities can be laggardly in their implementation of legislation or in their response to central directives. Without downright defiance they can be slow (pleading local difficulties), thus reducing the tempo of educational change; they can make ritual obeisance to the letter of the law while traducing its spirit, thus affecting the texture of educational change. History shows that local authorities have often been laggardly with impunity: Hadow reorganization was barely half finished by the outbreak of war; many areas never developed the technical schools which were an intrinsic element of the tripartite policy; schemes for comprehensive reorganization were not forthcoming from 50 per cent of authorities when they fell due in 1966.

On the other hand, mediation also operates in the other direction, pushing and stretching legal provisions as far as they will go, and often much further than was ever intended. Again this involves reinterpretation, the maximum use of enabling clauses, the exploitation of precedents and the pleading of 'special cases'; ducking restrictions, circumventing regulations and capitalizing on any ambiguity or vagueness in the central directive. Thus, between the wars a number of LEAs fostered a new outgrowth of post-elementary instruction, again blurring the official distinction between elementary and secondary

schooling; after 1944 certain areas pleaded population dispersal or bomb damage in order to establish multilateral schools, against official policy; in 1958 Leicestershire initiated full comprehensivization without official bye or leave, through re-deploying its existing facilities.

The crucial fact to underline is that the two types of modifications — the positive and the negative, the amplifying and the minimizing, those pushing forward and those holding back — affect each polity-directed change simultaneously, for local and institutional autonomy will be put to both ends by different groups in different places. Thus mediation means that a single central directive leads to a plurality of practices, according to the interpretations placed on it; practices which may be so disparate that their common denominator is hard to detect. Furthermore, the balance of such modifications may represent a substantial shift away from central policy — like the predominantly bipartite organization of secondary schooling in a supposedly tripartite system after the 1944 Act. In sum, mediation prevents central policy directives from introducing clear and uniform changes in national education.

(c) Polity-directed changes are rejected by parts of the system. Any given polity-directed change can be resisted or rejected by different parts of the educational system, but mainly those which are most independent or those which determine to push their relative autonomy to its very limits. Examples include the recalcitrance of certain English LEAs vis-à-vis comprehensive reorganization and the refusal of the majority of public and direct grant schools to associate themselves with it. In other words, not only do central policy directives fail to produce uniform changes in education, they also fail to introduce universal changes.

Certainly the use of political sanctions can sometimes overcome resistance (and have already been used against the direct grant schools) but the central polity is frequently impotent in relation to the fully independent sector of education, whose strength in decentralized systems enables it not only to limit the scope of central policy but also to vitiate its workings — public schools undermined both the notion of meritocratic selection on which tripartism was based and the egalitarian principles underpinning comprehensive reorganization.

Logically, of course, further political sanctions could eliminate these sources of resistance and disruption. After all,

there is nothing inconceivable or unprecedented about the abolition of private schooling. In practice, however, we now come full circle back to the beginning of our discussion — to the ineluctable fact that polity-directed change in the decentralized system is limited by what is there and is well defended. Ultimately, the polity has to resign itself to proceeding incrementally rather than radically towards the changes that it would like to introduce immediately and universally. Hence, the results of political manipulation also contribute to the 'incremental pattern' of change, thus paralleling the effects of internal initiation and external transactions.

Products of change

(a) In centralized systems

So far, the importance of political manipulation in centralized systems has been examined exclusively in terms of the way in which it shapes the 'stop-go' pattern of change. Thus it remains to assess the cumulative result of changes introduced in this way over time. In general, the effects of political manipulation have been consistently centripetal in nature: the substantive changes brought about through it have maintained and strengthened unification and systematization over time. They have done so with extraordinary tenacity in the face of all kinds of counter-pressures from wider society and despite considerable political, social and economic change.

However, these formal continuities in educational control and co-ordination have consistently generated difficulties in the relationship between education and society. Thus, in the centralized system there is a continuous state of tension between education and its environment. Instead of educational inputs, processes and outputs being produced which corresponded to demands deemed politically acceptable, the strength of standardization and centripetalism militated against this harmony. In fact, the very tenacity with which the central authorities clung to unification and systematization, for purposes of control, produced an endless sequence of mis-matches with the environment. The inflexibility of such an educational system meant that any change of circumstances promptly threw it out of alignment and did so again and again, despite intermittent

overhauls. Thus, while problems of integration are experienced in the decentralized system as tensions between the central authorities and the centrifugalism of other parts of the system, with centralization the problem of integration arises between the system as a whole and its social environment. It is a periodic problem of external maladaptation rather than an imminent threat of internal anarchy.

Why then were unification and systematization maintained with such tenacity if their concomitant inflexibility generated major problems at regular intervals? One suspicion it is important to remove is that educational centralization is nothing more than a reflection of authoritarian politics. This might well arise, given that France has undergone extensive periods of political closure, whether these involved monarchism, imperialism or bonapartism. Nevertheless, it is crucial to stress that the maintenance of these two characteristics was no less pronounced during the intervening periods when more open political structures prevailed, whether these took the form of bourgeois monarchy, republicanism, government by assembly, or a parliamentary presidential system. The fact that France has tried out most kinds of regime twice over, gives ample evidence that these educational characteristics are not narrowly associated with a particular kind of government. Indeed, the protestations of republicans like Jules Ferry¹⁰ about the essential role of education in protecting the republican state and consolidating republican society, provide the key to this tenacious continuity. For any incoming regime or government the inheritance of a highly responsive educational system was extremely advantageous: and the more the new regime differed from the old in structure and ideology, the more welcome was centralization since education could immediately be harnessed to legitimating and reinforcing the new polity. Thus the basic structure of Napoleon's Université Impériale was passed unaltered from hand to hand through the whole spectrum of political organization, for each new regime hitched the educational system to the tasks of political socialization, political integration and political recruitment.

The course of change itself was moulded between the two factors just discussed: the intermittent need to re-establish harmony with the environment and the consistent defence of unification and systematization. But, necessarily, the first task had to be accomplished within the framework of the second,

otherwise a loss of control and of responsiveness would have been the result. It follows, therefore, that if the course of change was under-controlled in the decentralized system (being initiated from the periphery and barely rationalized or contained by the central authorities), it was over-controlled in the centralized system, where adjustments and adaptations were instrumented from the top down — once the need for such changes had been negotiated through political manipulation.

Thus, for example, the central authority in France continually acknowledged to the economic elite that a series of adjustments were needed to match the rapid changes in the industrial environment. But educational reforms always fell short of the moving target and did so because of their inflexible implementation and rigid co-ordination. Accepting the need for a shorter and more practical instruction, several formulae were tried out during the Second Empire (bifurcated secondary instruction, technical schools and finally special education), but only served to prove that the state's educational ideal could not be reconciled with vocational specialization. The Third Republic inherited the problem and made three different attempts at adaptive modernization. The policy of developing modern technical training failed largely because the centre would abandon no authority to local industrialists, enabling them to adjust it to their diverse requirements. The policy of updating secondary studies and diluting the hegemony of *culture générale* foundered because it was based on marrying special education to the *baccalauréat* in the *lycée* where modern education assumed an inferior status to classicism and special education lost its distinctive character.¹¹ Finally, the attempt to found real universities, as specialized centres of teaching and research, failed because all faculties were elevated in the same standardized fashion, spreading resources too thinly for specialization.

These examples serve to illustrate the basic fact that compatibility with the environment involves differentiation and specialization (since no aspect of it is ever uniform, it can only be matched by provisions which are adapted, or which can be adjusted, to local variations, special circumstances and unique configurations). Yet this kind of change has to be accommodated in an educational system whose unification and systematization are already strong and which the central authorities are determined not to relax. Thus in the course of change the two pairs of characteristics, unification/systematization and

differentiation/specialization have to develop conjointly, but the latter remains the weaker pair as it was upon the emergence of the system. It is this pair which has to do the accommodating, has to take second place and has to accept the precedence of the first pair.

None the less, in its own interests the central authority cannot afford to let education slip grossly out of alignment with its environment, as this threatens its own goal attainment. Consequently, it has to make periodic efforts to introduce the requisite degree of differentiation and specialization in order to produce the services required. (Namely, those sought by the elite itself or negotiated by others through political manipulation.) What follows, therefore, is that progressive systematization and progressive segmentation develop simultaneously in a process of guided change — that is, within a context of strong unification. In modern terms this would simply be called planning, but it was practised in education long before it was conceptualized in this way.

Progressive segregation, through which diversification is accomplished, entails a successive division into sub-systems which is accompanied by a differentiation of their functions and a specialization of their activities. Progressive systematization consists in the strengthening of pre-existing relations between parts, the linking of parts previously unrelated, and the gradual addition of new components and relations to a system. The two take place simultaneously under the guidance of the centre and develop by a series of jerks during each 'go' phase. To call these 'progressive' is only to reflect on the overall tendency of the system to become more complex in both respects over time. The term carries no evaluative connotation nor does it preclude periods of structural inertia or of regression to simpler forms of organization. The history of the French system witnesses to the conjoint development of segregation and systematization, but also demonstrates the predominance of the latter, whatever the nature of the regime — centralized systems have always been, and they remain, extremely neat in form compared with their decentralized counterparts.

The heritage of the Napoleonic structure was a system subdivided into two levels unlinked to one another (the negative principle of hierarchical organization). The Third Republic retained and reinforced the basic segregation of the primary from the secondary level, such that these two sub-systems developed

almost independently of one another — fulfilling totally different functions and enrolling very different social strata. However, within each sub-system, segregation and systematization both took a big step forward.

At the secondary level, the aim was to diversify, to introduce the degree of differentiation and specialization commensurate with modernization. Yet, as we have seen, the priority accorded to systematization meant that special education was the vehicle used for this and it soon lost its distinctiveness, disappearing altogether in 1902. Then a further assault was made on the same problem: a single secondary education now led to a *baccalauréat* with four specialized sections, intended to afford a greater variety of instruction. In other words, systematization and segmentation were to go hand in hand, but as usual there was no doubt which one led. Modern studies were confined to the fourth (inferior) option and lost their distinctive character between pressures to imitate the prestige branches and to prepare for university entry. In tackling the same problem yet again, an identical sequence was repeated in the twentieth century with the creation of the technical *baccalauréat* in 1946;¹² it again failed to attain parity and succumbed to academicism. Thus, these attempts to achieve a higher level of reintegration, which included differentiated courses of modern subjects, made some progress but always suffered from the fact that systematization acted as a strait-jacket which denied distinctiveness, diluted specialization and thus demoted diversification.

Exactly the same story was repeated at the primary level, with successive attempts to introduce more differentiated and specialized courses of vocational or pre-vocational instruction only really succeeding in rare cases when these institutions broke away from the Ministry of Education altogether. Otherwise, their practical orientation steadily gave way to general education the longer they remained part of the system — the fate not only of full-time institutions like the *écoles primaires supérieures*, but also of the part-time training courses for working youth, introduced immediately after the First World War.¹³

As the system entered the twentieth century, demands for more democratization bombarded the National Assembly, but produced grudging and tentative moves towards the fundamental structural change sought — the linking of the primary and secondary sub-systems. Slowly, progressive systematization

and segregation again went forward together, but as usual the former predominated throughout. Even by the start of the Fifth Republic, all that had been introduced was a 'harmonization' of programmes at the end of the first *degré* and at the beginning of the second, the orientation, at least in principle, of pupils to different types of further instruction on the basis of their performance, and the establishment of '*classes passerelles*' allowing for the transfer later on of those who had taken the wrong route. Thus there was no audacious structural change and the differentiation of no new self-standing institution to combat social discrimination.¹⁴

Continued pressures led to the eventual segregation of the *Collège d'Enseignement Secondaire* but this was accomplished by the regrouping of existing components (the final class of primary, the first cycle of secondary and of the old *collèges*). To a large extent these elements resisted reintegration and refused to collaborate in a purposeful manner.¹⁵ The introduction of the positive principle of hierarchical organization, the biggest rupture yet with the Napoleonic structure, needed to be articulated by a separate and forceful institution committed to overthrowing a century and a half of socio-educational discrimination,¹⁶ like the original conception of the *école unique*: instead, the task was entrusted to this weak amalgam — the CES.

The composition of the Fifth Republic government made it considerably more sympathetic and creative in relation to modernization at secondary and higher levels. The same device was used to introduce greater diversification in both — the differentiation of cycles of studies, giving more chance for vocational and academic specialization. Each cycle which was segregated in this way was also systematized with those below and above it, although distinctiveness was protected by each cycle awarding a separate diploma. Thus, secondary education was divided into two cycles, a short and a long, while the historical influence of the *baccalauréat* as a force for standardization was reduced by its division into numerous sub-sections, related to different occupational outlets and higher educational inlets. At the higher level the differentiation of the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie* replicated the segregation of short and long alternatives. University education was itself subdivided into three cycles, each with specialist options and a diploma at the end of it. Once again these changes betrayed

the super-ordinate insistence on systematization — the reforms were imposed uniformly and universally from the centre, their rigidity defying local or institutional adaptation.¹⁷ Only the outburst of the May events led to the concession of some university autonomy for differentiation and specialization to be defined *in situ* rather than at the centre — but even here the subordinate characteristics have not been grafted well on to the old tree.

(b) In decentralized systems

When the three processes for negotiating change are considered in relation to one another over time, certain long-term regularities become apparent in the types of changes which they have produced. In particular, external transactions and internal initiation have operated as forces for diversification, which have strengthened the *differentiation* and the *specialization* of the educational system over time. By contrast, political manipulation has represented a consistent force for standardization which has defended the *unification* and *systematization* of national education during the same period.

Thus, external transactions and internal initiation constituted *centrifugal* tendencies, whether considered alone or in conjunction with one another. The changes which stemmed from both processes constantly threatened to escape central governance and accountability and in turn often vitiated public policy by extending practices it sought to eliminate (e.g., private schooling) or developing ones hostile to it (e.g., the expansion of the social rather than the applied sciences in higher education). Basically, such changes damage central policy because they involve differentiation and specialization in directions which are incompatible with it. They undermine central control and stress the absence of a leading part as well as preventing its emergence.

Equally, direct transactions advance sectional interests but their particularism is often at variance with an integrated system. Thus, the transformation of the English primary school along progressive lines is held by some to have undermined integration between levels by not inculcating the skills or values needed later on, thus jeopardizing a high standard of secondary or vocational instruction.¹⁸ These changes disrupt the system by failing to dovetail with other parts or activities. They serve

to emphasize the fragility of co-ordination, as well as making this task more difficult.

In contradistinction, the changes introduced through political manipulation showed a strong tendency to reinforce unification and systematization over time, for the very determination to introduce centrally defined policies entailed their defence. In particular, the fact that the polity was increasingly preoccupied with the quest for educational democratization, especially after the Second World War, meant that it needed to defend a degree of unification sufficient to ensure the national implementation of a new form of systematization, based on the principle of the educational ladder. However, because the very introduction of *any* polity-directed change was predicated on buttressing the weaker pair of characteristics in the decentralized system, these were constantly reinforced by government in general, not just by the political representatives of labour. Consequently, polity-directed changes involved a consistent *centripetal* trend.

The basic effect of polity-directed change was thus to minimize developments which threatened to disrupt central policy. This involved the pruning and elimination of those institutions and activities which were not complementary, and a corresponding increase in standardization. In England there were three different phases in which such developments were pruned back hard to prevent their interference with a politically sponsored institution and to ensure the latter pride of place. Successively, the higher grade schools were cut down and replaced by the higher elementary schools at the incorporation stage; the outgrowth of a wide range of differentiated post-elementary institutions were weeded out in favour of the uniform Morant grammar school; and the senior, central and municipal schools proliferating between the wars were forced, root and branch, into the secondary modern format.

Training and containing are alternatives to pruning and eliminating, but have similar if weaker consequences in terms of loss of diversification. Thus, for example, adult education was trained along 'non-partisan' lines in England, the WEA being unified under the Board of Education and subordinated to university direction. Similarly, the burgeoning development of technical schools at intermediate levels was contained: in 1913, junior technical schools were reluctantly recognized providing they operated as terminal institutions, unintegrated with the secondary level. Again, after 1944, they were trained into line

(by adjusting ages of entry, etc.) with the tripartite policy, then condemned to inertia through lack of positive official encouragement. The loss of a strong practical, real or technical definition of instruction was the price paid for the defence of central policies. In general, the centripetal drive stemming from political manipulation does everything it can to restrain practices which reinforce the predominance of differentiation and specialization, for from the start these were already too strong for government to exert effective governance over education.

Clearly, then, the products of internal initiation and external transactions on the one hand, and those of political manipulation on the other, are in a continuous state of tension. Centrifugalism is a perpetual threat to the integration of the system and the achievement of central goals: centripetalism barely contains these diverse developments and separatist tendencies. The changes which actually take place are shaped and reshaped between these pushes and pulls. They are woven by a ceaseless dialectic between the forces for diversification and the pressures towards standardization.

From the moment the decentralized system emerges, change fans out as both external transactions and internal initiation introduce an immediate increase in institutional differentiation and curricular specialization — thus threatening the weak unification and systematization which had been superimposed on the networks at the time of incorporation. The central response arising from political manipulation is to rationalize these disparate developments, pruning, containing and incorporating them — through a re-systematization and an increase in unification. But the central authorities, as we have seen, cannot proceed like a general, deploying and disposing at will in order to achieve a grand planned strategy, because the parts fight back to defend their autonomy. Instead, the centre more often has to work like a sheepdog patrolling the periphery, giving a nip here and a nip there, herding developments on the right trail. Moreover, although unification and systematization are mutually supportive when strong, the two here have frequently to be traded off against one another on the part of the centre. Thus, systematization was often bought at the price of unification, especially when the incorporation of independent elements meant the admission of new partners to control and therefore entailed educational power sharing. Equally, systematization sometimes had to be sacrificed as the only way in which to bring

about some important general change, such as the acceptance of a plethora of local arrangements in order to achieve national comprehensivization.

Consequently, although unification and systematization were periodically reinforced, they were never strong, and though they held diversification back for a time, they themselves were gradually sloughed off by the combined efforts of local initiative, external transactions and internal initiation. As they gradually slipped, more and more changes would accumulate and these would again accentuate systemic differentiation and specialization. Another bout of central intervention would then take place, confining and reordering these changes as unification and systematization were re-established. So the system proceeded in undulating fashion, with changes swelling out and then being squeezed in, only to bulge out again as the phases of diversification and standardization alternated with one another. The phases, however, did allow for progression. They involved no return to the status quo, and though they were sometimes conservative in their effects, this represented no structure-maintaining mechanism. Instead, it was much more common for progressive segmentation and progressive systematization to follow one another like successive waves.¹⁹

The major education Acts signalled the main phases in which unification and systematization were reinforced: differentiation and specialization expanded in the intervals between them, and of course precipitated reintervention on the part of the centre. Thus, in England, the 1902 Settlement was followed not just by the spread of the higher elementary school and Morant grammar school which were officially approved, but by the growth of diverse institutions (science schools, technical day schools, pupil-teacher centres, trade schools, vocational schools, etc.). The 1918 Act, which confirmed the structural and cultural hegemony of the academic grammar school, intended to crowd most of these other developments into the continuation schools, which would be allowed some practical orientation but would remain firmly elementary. Effectively, this Act was weaker than usual as a concrete affirmation of unification and systematization because of the intervention of the Depression and the suspension of many of its provisions. Consequently, despite austerity, a variety of intermediary institutions again proliferated and these central, senior and technical schools represented a real challenge since they enrolled two-thirds as

many pupils as the 'official' grammar schools. Thus, a chaotic array of provisions had accumulated by the outbreak of war, and the application of the 1944 Act again crammed them into the inferior part of the system, this time the secondary modern school. This Act, which had greatly strengthened unification, was also to produce an unprecedented degree of systematization, as the tripartite policy took root and achieved the closest integration between the primary and secondary levels. Almost immediately, however, local initiative began to push forward with multilateral developments which gathered speed with labour encouragement and became even less uniform with the conservative policy of co-existence. Once again, the minister threatened another round of legislative intervention in 1975 and made it clear that this would involve strengthening the powers of the centre. This final phase only serves to illustrate the endurance of a phenomenon which characterized the very inception of the decentralized system, namely that unification and systematization must always be superimposed on component elements which are already highly differentiated and specialized.²⁰

Hence, systematization consistently trailed in the wake of segmentation and the central authorities often presented the picture of running behind and tidying up after the forces producing diversification. Even when the centre tried to take the initiative it could not do so imperatively and categorically but had itself to negotiate the implementation of such policies with the appropriate local authorities and institutions; and negotiation spelled concession, compromise, exception, exemption, reinterpretation, modification, dilution and every other antithesis of standardization. Consequently, although progressive systematization has grown considerably, structural elaboration in the decentralized system remains an untidy jerry-rigged product. And this will always be the case as long as the three processes through which change is negotiated continue to operate alongside one another and to retain their rough parity of importance.

8 CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

The last problem to address is whether the accumulation of changes just discussed will alter the patterns of educational change to be expected in the immediate future. Specifically, this is to ask have the developments which have occurred in centralized and decentralized systems, since their inception, so transformed these systems that they no longer engender two distinctive patterns of change, because the structural differences generating them have been removed? The answer to this question thus hinges on the extent of convergence which has taken place between the two structures of educational systems, from their origins to the present day — as the product of intervening interaction.

Examination of the course of change in the centralized and decentralized systems led to the conclusion that in both a progressive segmentation and a progressive systematization had developed side by side since the initial emergence of these systems. Does this mean, then, that substantial structural convergence has taken place between them? To a certain degree this is undoubtedly the case. From their beginnings, the centralized systems have been subject to pressures to reduce their standardization and to meet a multiplicity of demands with greater precision, by introducing more differentiation and specialization. When such demands were successfully negotiated through political manipulation (and, of course, many were not) they were carefully co-ordinated by the central authorities into polity-directed changes which were transmitted to education from the top down. Sequentially these added up to a multi-purpose system of much greater complexity, whose new subdivided parts permitted this differentiation of services. Sub-division was the key mechanism: through it levels could be broken down into cycles, cycles into differentiated branches, and branches into specialised courses — all without loss of control or co-ordination. Sub-division broke up the stark outlines of the original systems, whose simplicity reflected the

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limited goals of their founders and the equally limited concessions they had been forced to make to get these systems off the ground.

In the decentralized systems, the initial phase of incorporation which brought them into being did not finish there. The processes of external transaction and internal initiation continued to generate new developments, in response to the demands of professional and external interest groups, which were characterized by their specificity. These took place with scant attention to the central authorities beyond the need to evade them and sometimes to propitiate them. Nevertheless, the summativity of these developments did gradually give way to wholeness. The integrative role of the central authorities worked to contain, connect and co-ordinate these anarchic changes. It reduced the internal chaos and contradiction between parts in order to increase responsiveness to central direction and to ensure complementarity between the great variety of services provided. The move towards wholeness increased the coherence of these systems, tidying up their ragged outlines, streamlining their main components, and simplifying the tangle of provisions which mirrored the diverse goals which education had undertaken to service over time.

Thus, to stress convergence is to emphasize the growth of progressive segmentation in the centralized system and of progressive systematization in the decentralized system. Both have indeed taken place but they only represent one part of the story. When discussing the products of change there was also cause to accentuate the way in which the pair of characteristics which dominated these two kinds of systems at their emergence has retained its pre-eminence over time. In other words, it was important to stress that the segmentation progressively introduced into the centralized system involved no diminution of systematization or unification. On the contrary, the very introduction of these sub-divisions was planned, orchestrated and monitored by the central authority, which thus strengthened its position as the leading part. Equally, the systematization progressively introduced into the decentralized system entailed no loss of differentiation and specialization. On the contrary, the coherence produced was an ordering of changes already brought about autonomously by the parts which then retained their capacity to instigate change independently of the centre. In other words, not only did the two kinds of system remain

very different in these structural respects but the mechanisms which generated these differences remained largely intact.

Because of this, it appears that the structural conditions for a continuation of the 'stop-go' pattern of change in France remain largely unaltered and will continue to do so unless and until the polity manifests a thorough-going willingness to relax central controls over education. Otherwise, 'the more complex the system becomes, then if the present principles are retained, the more this form of administration runs the risk of losing itself in details at the expense of essential tasks, of draining itself in the effort to keep every situation, each of which has its own uniqueness, within a rigid framework and, ultimately, of paralysing the overall operation of the whole through its impotence. Decentralization is therefore a matter of urgency. It is at the level of the regional or local authorities, depending on the nature of the case, that the main problems concerning the practical organization and current operation of the public educational service can be resolved. It is at the level of each establishment, not only in higher education but in primary and secondary too, that from a clearly defined outline of aims, the contents and methods of instruction could be adapted to the concrete reality of the ill-served population.'¹ Yet, as the Fifth Republic has now survived three potential crises of presidential succession and the system has continued to stumble onwards despite repeated educational outbursts followed by propitiatory legislation, there is little ground for expecting any drastic move away from the 'stop-go' pattern of change. One of the best substantiated of comparative generalizations is that no governing elite voluntarily renounces a centralized educational system.

If there are few signs that the leading part is abdicating any of its powers in the centralized systems, it is equally the case that decision-making powers remain dispersed in the decentralized systems. In England, the three processes of negotiation have maintained themselves over time and one has not continuously won out at the expense of the others. In particular, there is no consistent tendency for political manipulation to have increased in importance, relative to external transactions and internal initiation, thus spelling a drift towards centralization.

In decentralized systems, the relative importance of the three processes is always subject to temporal variations. The

important point to stress, then, is that the rough parity between them has been preserved during the twentieth century as a whole. Certainly, it is true at the moment that the central authority would like to exert more control, especially over higher education. But there has probably never been a time at which the central authorities in a decentralized system have not wanted greater control over one level or another in order to redirect its activities.

Above all, we must resist the strong temptation to endow the most recent events with a greater significance than their predecessors. It is undoubtedly the case in England at the present time, that the centre seems poised to intervene more roughly at both secondary and higher levels, but this is better interpreted as one of the periodic reorderings conducted by the central authorities than as a dramatic change in the nature of educational control. After all, the 1944 Act seemed at the time to indicate a great lurch towards centralization, but it was in fact followed by the most active period of external transactions and internal innovations which effectively undermined any such convergence. Exactly the same is expected now, not only because a legislative act of that magnitude is not even on the horizon, and the central incursions which have been made depend upon the endurance of economic recession, but also because the rights acquired by professional and external interest groups have taken a number of additional steps forward in the intervening decades since the war.

In other words, both the centralized and the decentralized systems continue to exert different structural influences on educational interaction in their respective countries, despite the fact that some convergence has taken place between them. Does this mean, then, that they will continue to condition different patterns of educational change and to produce different kinds of systemic modifications? In answering this question in the affirmative, let it be absolutely clear that I am talking about structural conditioning and not about structural determinism.

There is no logical necessity about this, for neither in principle nor in practice is there any factor or force which ultimately prevents the appropriate decision-makers in both types of system from deciding to alter the structure of those systems. Thus, logically, there is nothing to stop a governing elite from passing an Act which would transform a centralized system into a decentralized one, hence destroying the conditional influences

which have reproduced the 'stop-go' pattern of change over time and preserved structuration around a 'leading-part'. In reality, however, structures distribute vested interests in their maintenance and it is the fact that groups do defend these which makes patterns of interaction and change durable in the long-run. In our discussion of centralized systems we have examined numerous political elites with the most diverse ideological orientations and have found them unanimous in their support for and defence of the centralized structure. There is not a single counter-example in which centralization itself (rather than the purposes to which it was put) was thrown over by a governing elite, whether reactionary or revolutionary, which was willing to sacrifice the political advantages of educational control. It is because of the endurance of this vested interest that the centralized system is expected to condition its own maintenance in the foreseeable future.

Exactly the same is the case with the decentralized system. Again, logically, the appropriate decision-makers, here the profession and the external interest groups, could decide to terminate their independent initiatives and autonomous innovations. Indeed, in our empirical discussion we did encounter examples of groups which ceased such activities for reasons of financial hardship and others where these transactions were repressed or discouraged. However, this was never a systematic phenomenon, and at the very time that such examples occurred other groups were taking up these processes of negotiation for the first time. In other words, the initial structure again invites its own continuation. There is nothing deterministic about this, it is simply that, over time, the decentralized structure conditions small, localized changes which intensify the autonomy which allowed them to occur in the first place. This, in turn, distributes vested interests in educational control more and more widely through society and outside the central authorities. It is the defence of these interests from within and without the educational system which conditions the endurance of the 'incremental' pattern of change and will prevent the central authority from assuming the position of a 'leading-part' in the foreseeable future.

The lasting structural differences between the two kinds of system, which still allow them to be characterized as centralized or decentralized, mean that the present cycle is not yet over. In other words, structural conditioning continues to shape

interaction in different ways in the two systems; interaction itself still follows two distinctive patterns; and the structural elaboration which results reconfirms the differences between the two systems which caused one to distinguish between centralization and decentralization in the first place.

Thus, the prospects for change are that future educational interaction will continue to be patterned in dissimilar fashions in the two systems, and that the products of change will reproduce the main features of centralization or decentralization. The force of this argument rests on the endurance of differences in the structural conditioning of interaction and change between the centralized system and the decentralized system.

In opposition to this, it might be objected that such an argument neglects cultural factors whose contribution encourages educational convergence. The latter is incontestable. There is no doubt that the post-war period has witnessed a growing internationalization of student culture and of pedagogical approaches: nor is there any doubt that because students, teachers and academics read the same books, repeat the same arguments and respond to the same values the world over, they thus represent a force for convergence — a force which pushes national systems to address similar problems, to adopt similar methods and to accept similar solutions. Nevertheless, cultural forces, however international they may be, still have to contend with the established structures of the different national systems of education and the vested interests associated with their maintenance. In other words, the cultural forces for educational convergence are working against the structural forces which condition the endurance of different systems of education. The differences between the centralized and the decentralized systems of education may ultimately give way, but not yet, and not without tremendous resistance from those who benefit from these two different structures of educational system.

NOTES

In all the following notes, references to the unabridged version of *Social Origins of Educational Systems*, Sage, London and Beverly Hills, 1979, will be referred to as SOES.

1. Introduction: thinking and theorizing about educational systems

1. For a detailed discussion and defence of macro-sociology see SOES, pp. 5-45.
2. The main sociological works influencing the theoretical perspective used throughout this volume are:
P. M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York, 1964;
Walter Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*, New Jersey, 1967;
A. Etzioni, *The Active Society*, London, 1968;
D. Lockwood, 'Social Integration and System Integration', in G. K. Zollschan and H. W. Hirsch (eds), *Explorations in Social Change*, London, 1964;
A. W. Gouldner, 'Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory', in N. J. Demerath and R. A. Peterson (eds), *System, Change and Conflict*, New York, 1967;
S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution', in Demerath and Peterson, op. cit.
3. The main philosophical works informing the theoretical approach adopted here are:
Ernest Gellner, 'Holism versus Individualism', in May Brodbeck (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, New York, 1971
Steven Lukes, 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIX, no. 2, 1968
Leon J. Goldstein, 'The Inadequacy of the Principle of Methodological Individualism', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 53, 1956.
Alisdair MacIntyre, 'On the Relevance of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XX, no. 2, 1969
H. R. Wagner, 'Displacement of Scope: A Problem of the Relationship between Small Scale and Large Scale Sociological Theories', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXIX, no. 6, 1964
J. H. Goldthorpe, 'A Revolution in Sociology?', *Sociology*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1973.
4. P. S. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, London, 1968, p. 205.
5. Macro-sociologists reject the holistic assumptions that social structure dominates individual action in favour of a more moderate notion of emergent power, 'according to which social wholes influence individuals so that individual action is determined by a combination of two factors, social wholes and individual purposes'. J. O. Wisdom, 'Situational Individualism and the Emergent Group-Properties', in R. Borger and F. Cioffi (eds), *Explanations in the Behavioural Sciences*, Cambridge, 1970, p. 294.

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6. For a clear example of the use of this cycle see S. N. Eisenstadt, op. cit.
 7. A more detailed discussion of this theme is found in my 'Morphogenesis versus Structuration', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXIII, no. 4, 1982, especially pages 466-71.
 8. For example, the position epitomized by J. W. N. Watkins: 'The central assumption of the individualistic position — an assumption which is admittedly counter-factual and metaphysical — is that no social tendency exists which could not be altered if the individuals concerned both wanted to alter it and possessed the appropriate information', 'Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies', in Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 271.
 9. Cohen, op. cit., p. 93.
 10. Here the distinction drawn between 'system' and 'social' integration is the same as that outlined by D. Lockwood, op. cit.
 11. 'Differentiation' is used by Eisenstadt as a classificatory concept which refers to the ways in which the main social functions of the major institutions of society become dissociated from one another, attached to a specialized collectivity and roles, and organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks within the confines of the same institutionalized system. Cf. Eisenstadt, op. cit. As far as education was concerned it was not dissociated organizationally, symbolically or in terms of roles and personnel, from various other parts of the historical empires or imperial civilizations. Educational activities intermingled with others which were themselves relatively indistinct — e.g., the position of the literati in China and to a lesser extent the Brahmin in India witness to the intermingling of religious, political, educational and stratificational spheres.
 12. It should be noted that the unabridged study involved a four-country comparison of England, France, Denmark and Russia. Thus, the range of variation was considerably greater than that presented in this textbook edition. The latter two case studies were omitted here for purposes of brevity and clarity. However, they are drawn upon at various times to supplement the cases employed. Their absence here should not be forgotten for the propositions advanced in the following chapters are not simply induced from the educational histories of England and France.
- ### 2. Structure: education as private enterprise
1. As Gouldner argues, reciprocity must not be assumed a priori, see A. W. Gouldner, 'Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory', in N. J. Demerath and R. A. Peterson (eds), *System, Change and Conflict*, New York, 1967, pp. 141-69.
 2. P. M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York, 1964, ch. 5.
 3. Patrick L. Alston, *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia*, Stanford, 1969, p. 5.
 4. Michalina Vaughan and Margaret S. Archer, *Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France, 1789-1848*, Cambridge, 1971, ch. 5.
 5. R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford, 1959; 'Towards a Theory of Social Conflict', in Walter L. Wallace (ed.), *Sociological Theory*, London, 1969.

6. See Robert K. Merton, 'On Sociological Theories of the Middle-Range', in his *On Theoretical Sociology*, New York, 1967, p. 60.

7. For a more detailed discussion of this theme see my 'The Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Social Structure', in Salvador Giner and Margaret S. Archer (eds), *Contemporary Europe: Social Structures and Cultural Patterns*, London, 1978, pp. 1-27.

3. Interaction: competition for educational control

1. The following discussion utilizes the theoretical framework developed in an earlier joint study of educational change in two countries before the advent of state systems. Cf. Michalina Vaughan and Margaret S. Archer, *Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France, 1789-1848*, Cambridge, 1971, ch. 2. This earlier book gives a much more detailed analysis of educational conflict itself, especially at the ideational level, and should be consulted as an example of the expanded application of the theoretical framework. However, this book stops short of the final consolidation of state systems in the two countries.

2. Max Weber, *Basic Concepts in Sociology*, London, 1962, p. 117.

3. This is discussed in greater detail in Vaughan and Archer, op. cit., chs 7-10.

4. Ibid., p. 134. See also F. Vial, *Trois Siècles de l'enseignement secondaire*, Paris, 1936, pp. 48ff.

5. Cf. F. Ponteil, *Histoire de l'Enseignement, 1780-1964*, Paris, 1966, pp. 32ff., on Jesuit attempts to justify and strengthen their educational position.

6. For an estimate of their extensiveness at the beginning of the nineteenth century see H. B. Binns, *A Centenary of Education, being the Centenary History of the British and Foreign School Society (1808-1908)*, London, 1908.

7. Select Committee on the Education of the Lower Orders in the Metropolis appointed in 1816. (Its terms of reference subsequently included the whole country.)

8. W. R. Ward, *Victorian Oxford*, London, 1965.

9. Cf. J. Sparrow, *Mark Pattison and the Idea of a University*, Cambridge, 1967 ch. 3. During the period 1800-50, 25,000 matriculated from Oxford, over 10,000 of whom were later ordained.

10. A. O. J. Cockshut, *Anglican Attitudes*, London, 1959. See also D. Voll, *Catholic Evangelicalism*, London, 1963 and G. Faber, *Oxford Apostles*, London, 1954.

11. Mirabeau's condemnation of the Catholic definition of French education is equally applicable to the English one: 'There is no choice possible between courses in various subject-matters. A single one-way avenue is open to all types of intelligence. The homogeneity which is the result desired, is at the same time, the precondition of this result.' Quoted by F. Vial, op. cit., p. 48. See also G. de Mirabeau, *Travail sur l'Education Publique*, Paris, 1791.

12. 'The ancient tongues are only useful now to some specific sectors of society', D. Diderot, 'Plan d'une Université pour le gouvernement de Russie ou d'une éducation publique dans toutes les sciences' in *Oeuvres complètes* (Assezat-Tourneux ed.) Paris, 1875, p. 441. See also E. Caro, *La Fin du 18^e siècle*, Paris, 1880, pp. 255-56.

13. President B. G. Rolland, *Compte-Rendu aux Chambres Assemblées des Différents Mémoires envoyés par les Universités sises dans le ressort de la Cour*, Paris, 1786, p. 60.

14. Cf. Vaughan and Archer, op. cit., pp. 60-79.

15. An admirable contemporary account of the links between clergy and nobility is found in the polemic by E. J. Sieyès, *Essai sur les Privilèges*, Paris, 1788.

16. A. O. J. Cockshut, op. cit.; T. W. Bamford, *Thomas Arnold*, London, 1960.

17. P. M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York, 1964, pp. 117-41. See also W. Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*, New Jersey, 1967, pp. 200-202.

To Blau a group can avoid imbalances of obligations from occurring, in one of four ways: (a) it can obtain benefits from X by providing services needed by X in return; (b) it can suppress the need for such benefits; (c) it can obtain these benefits from a source other than Group X; (d) it can secure such benefits by force.

In this study we have seen that (a) and (b) are not feasible strategies for assertive groups for they cannot negotiate the scale of educational changes required nor renounce the need for them because of the continuation of obstructions. Hence the present study concentrates on strategies which coincide with Blau's (c) and (d) for gaining the educational benefits needed. Alternative (c) 'leads to the study of competitive processes, of the exchange rates that become established in social structure and of monopolisation' (p. 140). These are in other words precisely the issues examined here for *substitutive* strategies. Alternative (d) calls attention to the differentiation of power in society, to organizations in which it is mobilized and to political processes and institutions. Again these are the crucial elements analyzed here for *restrictive* strategies.

18. Ponteil, op. cit., p. 46.

19. G. C. Hippeau, *La Révolution et l'éducation nationale*, Paris, 1883. M. Gontard, *L'Enseignement primaire en France de la Révolution à la Loi Guizot, 1789-1833*, Lyons, 1959. A. Duruy, *L'Instruction publique et la Révolution*, Paris, 1882. L. Liard, *L'Enseignement supérieur en France 1789-1889* (2 vols), Paris, 1888.

20. An apathy which led Engels to declare, 'So stupidly narrow-minded is the English bourgeoisie in its egotism, that it does not even take the trouble to impress upon the workers the morality of the day, which the Bourgeoisie has patched together in its own interests for its own protection'. F. Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, London, 1892, p. 114.

21. His most important work in this connection is his 'Plan d'une Université pour le gouvernement de Russie' (Diderot, op. cit.). Cf. Tourneux, *Diderot et Catherine II*, Paris, 1899; J. Oestreicher, *La Pensée politique et économique de Diderot*, Paris, 1936.

22. His most important work in this context is M. J. A. de Condorcet, *Sur l'Instruction publique*, Paris, 1792. Cf. F. Vial, *Condorcet et l'éducation démocratique*, Paris, n.d.; J. Bouissounouse, *Condorcet, le philosophe dans la Révolution*, Paris, 1962; F. Alengry, *Condorcet — Guide de la Révolution Française*, Paris, 1904. See also Condorcet, Sieyès, Duhamel, *Journal d'Instruction Sociale*, Paris, 1793.

23. The most important works dealing with education are: Sieyès, op. cit.

and *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1789. Cf. P. Bastid, *Sieyès et sa pensée*, Paris, 1939.

24. Although Utilitarianism represented an attack of secular ethics on religious morals and appealed to an important section of the middle class, this ideological divide did not ultimately split the Dissenter-entrepreneurial alliance. Initially the reason for this was restraint on the part of the utilitarians themselves, who were cautious not to advance overt agnosticism and thus to antagonize the Dissenting sub-group.

25. 'Political economy, though its object be to ascertain the means of increasing the wealth of nations, cannot accomplish its design, without at the same time regarding their happiness, and as its largest ingredient the cultivation of religion and morality.' Thus Kay-Shuttleworth signalled the reincorporation of religion as a form of social control into middle-class thought. J. Kay-Shuttleworth, 'The Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes in Manchester in 1832' in *Four Periods of English Education*, London, 1862, p. 39.

26. B. Simon, *Studies in the History of Education, 1780-1870*, op. cit. See also E. Dolléans, *Le Chartisme (1830-1848)*, Paris, 1912; A. R. Schoyen, *The Chartist Challenge; a Portrait of George Julien Harney*, London, 1958; R. H. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, London, 1964; *The Life and Struggles of W. Lovett* (Tawney ed.) London, 1920.

27. The monitorial system was devised by A. Bell and described by him in *An Experiment in Education Made at the Male (Orphan) Asylum in Madras, Suggesting a System by which a School or Family may Teach Itself under the Superintendence of the Master or Parent*, 2nd ed., London, 1809. This system was used extensively during the early years of the British and Foreign School Society and thus played a part in middle-class substitution. It was used in France, experimentally towards the end of the empire and more extensively during the restoration. There it represented bourgeois anti-clericism and the attempt to replace the teaching Orders by the state as controller and supplier of elementary instruction. In Denmark after the Great Commission in 1814 the King introduced the Lancastrian system in an attempt to break the clerical monopoly of teaching staff and simultaneously to 'diminish the burdens that are necessary otherwise for the organisation of the common-school system' (Willis Dixon, *Education in Denmark*, Copenhagen, 1958, p. 56).

28. Cf. Vaughan and Archer, op. cit., pp. 89-92.

29. The main educational plans to come before the three revolutionary assemblies were those of Mirabeau, Talleyrand, Condorcet, Romme and Lanthenas, Lakanal, Sieyès, Daunou and finally that of Lepelletier. They differ considerably in their underlying principles and in the programmes of educational change advocated. Cf. R. Sevrin, *Histoire de l'enseignement primaire en France sous la Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire*, Paris, 1932; see also H. C. Barnard, *Education and the French Revolution*, Cambridge, 1969.

30. This view was clearly expressed by Thomas Arnold and acted upon by his influential pupils. Cf. T. W. Bamford, op. cit.; J. Fitch, *Thomas and Matthew Arnold and Their Influence upon English Education*, London, 1897; J. J. Findlay, *Arnold of Rugby*, Cambridge, 1898; A. P. Stanley, *Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold*, London, 1846.

4. Structural elaboration: the emergence of state educational systems

1. There is no assumption that the macroscopic changes discussed under Propositions (i) and (ii) are more adaptive, efficient, stable or legitimate than their antecedents. Such concepts can be used to describe or evaluate the consequences of educational change (which may or may not reveal greater adaptation, efficiency, stability or legitimacy), but they cannot be used as a substitute for analyzing the processes which produce change or examining the characteristics which are transformed.

2. Cf. E. Despois, *Le Vandalisme révolutionnaire*, Paris, 1868; R. Sevrin, *Histoire de l'enseignement primaire en France sous la Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire*, Paris, 1932; C. Hippeau, *La Révolution et l'éducation nationale*, Paris, 1883; O. Gréard, *La Législation de l'instruction en France depuis 1789*, vol. 1, 1789-1833, Paris, 1887; and A. Duruy, *L'instruction publique et la Révolution*, Paris, 1882.

3. See C. Jourdain, *Le budget de l'instruction publique et des établissements scientifiques et littéraires depuis la fondation de l'université impériale jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris, 1857.

4. Quoted in L. Liard, *L'enseignement supérieur en France, 1789-1889*, 2 vols, Paris, 1888, p. 69.

5. Cf. M. Vaughan, 'The Grandes Ecoles', in R. Wilkinson (ed), *Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection*, Oxford, 1969.

6. M. d'Ocagne, *Les grandes écoles de France*, Paris, 1873.

7. Napoleon quoted by J. Simon, *Réforme de l'enseignement populaire*, Paris, 1874.

8. A. Delfau, *Napoléon 1^{er} et l'instruction publique*, Paris, 1902.

9. A. Aulard, *Napoléon 1^{er} et le monopole universitaire*, Paris, 1911, p. 242.

10. According to Guizot's aim these schools 'enabled the lower classes of society to increase their output, to improve their living standards and thus to create new sources of wealth for the State'. F. Guizot, *Essais sur l'histoire et sur l'état actuel de l'instruction publique en France*, Paris, 1816, p. 4. At the same time this new form of multiple integration was specifically designed by the political elite to introduce 'the degree of expansion in popular education which the evolution of the occupational structure demanded and a stable society could accommodate'. J. Simon, *Victor Cousin*, Paris, 1910, p. 107.

11. See M. T. Hodgen, *Workers' Education in England and the United States*, London, 1925; M. Tylecote, *The Mechanics' Institutes of Lancashire and Yorkshire, before 1851*, Manchester, 1957.

12. Eric E. Rich, *The Education Act, 1870*, London, 1970, p. 63.

13. The Chairman of the Educational League declared at its founding meeting in 1869 that 'what we are going to do is this; by means of this League and its branches, we are going to rouse the people — in whom now, happily, is placed political power — in order that we may say to Mr. Forster, "Be our leader and give us what we want; we'll support you"'. Quoted by J. W. Adamson, *English Education, 1789-1902*, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 350-51.

14. The Report of the Newcastle Commission (1861) had shown that 76 per cent of children in school attended Church of England schools. *Report of the Royal Commission on the State of Popular Education in England and Wales*. See also M. Cruickshank, *Church and State in English Education, 1870 to the Present Day*, London, 1963.

15. See K. M. Hughes, 'A Political Party and Education: Reflections on the Liberal Party's Educational Policy, 1870-1902', *British Journal of Educational Studies* vol. VIII, no. 2.
16. Typical of this process was the Newcastle Commission's recommendation that the English voluntary system should continue: equally revealing are the reasons Robert Lowe gave for this decision in 1861. 'In making that recommendation, the commissioners, so far as I can understand the case, express, I will not say the opinion of the whole country, or of philosophers, or of persons of great powers of abstract thought, but they express the opinion of those to whom education in this country owes almost its existence — of those who gave both time and money to promote education before the present system was called into being. If we have spent £4,800,000 in educating the people, private liberality has spent double that sum . . . So long as it is the opinion of those who contribute to the maintenance of the schools that the present system is the right and the best one, so long will the present system continue . . . it is not the intention of Government to infringe on the organic principles of the present system.' (My italics.) Quoted by D. Sylvester, *Robert Lowe and Education*, Cambridge, 1974, p. 59.
17. Thus, a radical like John Bright held that 'The fault of the Bill, in my mind, is that it has extended and confirmed the system which it ought in point of fact to have superseded . . . it was a Bill to encourage Denominational education, and where that was impossible, to establish Board Schools. It ought, in my opinion, to have been a Bill to establish Board Schools, and to offer inducements to those who were connected with Denominational schools to bring them under the control of that Privy Council.' John Bright, *Public Addresses*, London, 1879, pp. 201-202.
18. Eric Eaglesham, *From School Board to Local Authority*, London, 1956, p. 52.
19. Brian Simon, *Education and the Labour Movement 1870-1920*, London, 1965, p. 158f. The unpopularity of the School Boards with the Tory Party was exacerbated by the number which, like the London School Board, were captured by a socialist majority.
20. See E. C. Mack, *Public Schools and Political Opinion Since 1860*, New York, 1941.
21. Divide and rule appeared to be the tory strategy throughout the last decade of the century when it furthered the aims of the National Association for the Promotion of Technical Education (largely inspired by industrialists) as a weapon against the school boards. The Technical Instruction Act of 1889 and the whisky money encouraged this network at post-elementary level, that is outside the aegis of the boards. The technical definition of instruction was thus incorporated into the system and came under control of the local authorities in 1902.
22. See R. D. Roberts, *Eighteen Years of University Extension*, Cambridge, 1891.
23. V. A. McClelland, *English Roman Catholics and Higher Education, 1830-1903*, Oxford, 1973.
24. A. D. Hall and R. E. Hagen, 'Definition of a System', in Joseph A. Litterer (ed.), *Organizations, Systems, Control and Adaptation*, New York, 1969, vol. II, p. 36.
25. P. S. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, London, 1968, p. 229.

26. Hall and Hagen, loc. cit.
 27. All to varying degrees lose something of their distinctiveness and autonomy upon incorporation. At the very least they have to concede things like school inspection, financial accountability and teacher certification. But the development of central agencies to undertake such tasks is jealously monitored by the networks and their political sponsors to ensure that their composition is as favourable as possible.
 28. Napoleon quoted by L. Liard, op. cit., vol. II, p. 35.
 29. Cf. M. Vaughan and M. S. Archer, *Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France, 1789-1848*, Cambridge, 1971. See Chapters 8 and 10.
 30. Cited in Antoine Prost, *L'Enseignement en France, 1800-1967*, Paris, 1968, p. 338.
 31. Delfau, op. cit., p. 16.
 32. A. Aulard, op. cit., p. 305f.
 33. Eaglesham, op. cit., pp. 12-16.
 34. The Taunton Commission had witnessed 'innumerable bodies of trustees continued in perpetuity, whose schools were submitted to no public test of an official kind, whose actions were virtually uncontrolled save by the terms of statutes'. Liberal attempts to undermine these predominantly Anglican strongholds, to rationalize their statutes and financing, and to exchange public support for central inspection and examination, met with severe opposition.
 35. *Report from the Select Committee on Education, Science and Art (Administration)*, 1884, p. 399.
 36. *Report of the Royal Commission on Secondary Education*, 1895, vol. I, p. 324.
 37. A. S. Bishop, *The Rise of a Central Authority for English Education*, Cambridge, 1971, p. 262.
 38. Ibid., p. 263, quoted from *The Times*, 16 February 1899.
 39. Adamson, op. cit., p. 469.
 40. Bishop, op. cit., p. 276.
 41. Simon, op. cit., p. 103.
- 5. Structure:**
- state systems and new processes of change**
1. Cf. A. Etzioni, *The Active Society*, London, 1968.
 2. See Margaret S. Archer, 'Theorizing about the Expansion of Educational Systems', in her (ed.), *The Sociology of Educational Expansion: Take-off, Growth and Inflation in Educational Systems*, London and Beverly Hills, 1982. Especially note diagram on p. 16.
 3. Cf. A. Gouldner, 'Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functionalist Theory', in N. J. Demerath and R. A. Peterson (eds), *System, Change and Conflict*, New York, 1967.
 4. For example, concentration on technical subjects in a *realschool* can prevent its pupils from being qualified for higher education, early confessional schooling can lead to clashes in the definition of knowledge if pupils later transfer to secular establishments, and all higher levels of activities can be impeded by the pupils' preparation at lower ones.

5. In particular they treat all three groups — governing elites, external interest groups, and professional interest groups — as *undifferentiated* entities, when in reality each always displays a high level of sub-division (into parties, factions, associations, unions, confederations, institutes, etc.) and a good deal of internal conflict between them, which is also ignored here, although it is taken up in detail in the next two chapters. Secondly, the three types of groups have been presented as *distinct*, whereas in fact there is usually a substantial overlap between their members (e.g., teachers in politics, academics in industry, business representatives in Parliament, politicians with industrial interests, and company directors on governing bodies of universities), which is of considerable importance for educational change. Thirdly, the social environment has literally been reduced to these three kinds of groups and the broader influences of wider society have temporarily been neglected, in the sense that they are presumed to work through these agencies.

6. Interaction: educational negotiations

1. See P. M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York, 1964, especially ch. 4, 'Social Exchange'.

2. *Ibid.*, ch. 5, 'Differentiation of Power'.

3. Margaret S. Archer and Salvador Giner, 'Social Stratification in Europe', in Archer and Giner (eds), *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power*, London, 1971.

4. Power is conceptualized throughout this chapter in line with Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, London 1974. This finds the simple concentration on 'decision-making' (e.g., R. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven, 1961), even when supplemented by the inclusion of 'non-decision-making' (e.g., P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*, New York, 1970) essentially incomplete because they omit the structural bias exerted by the political system itself, which favours certain objective interests and represses others.

5. In fact, underlying any discussion of power is a recognition of the existence of some kind of political framework. Thus Dahl refers to the 'openness' and 'diversity' of pluralistic government (Dahl, op. cit., p. 93f.); Bacharach and Baratz talk variously of a 'decision-making arena', of covert conflict being 'outside the political arena', and of certain grievances being denied 'access to political processes' (Bacharach and Baratz, op. cit., pp. 25-50); Lukes discusses how 'political systems' prevent demands from becoming political issues, or even being made. In other words, despite their completely different theoretical perspectives on power, all acknowledge the existence of an area which is distinctly 'political' (where issues, decisions, processes occur), and which has distinctive characteristics (like being open, or of restricted access or organized so as to repulse demands).

6. For *in practice* (alone) Dahl is right in asserting that where *change* is concerned, 'a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum', Dahl, op. cit., p. 92.

7. On the one hand, the constitutional framework of government can remain constant while elite relations vary — elites either increasing in solidarity or undergoing fragmentation as different issues become salient: on the other, unity between elites can remain unchanged while constitutional arrangements

are transformed. Not only does conceptual confusion arise if the two elements are conflated but also theoretical deficiencies result which weaken explanatory power. First, the individualistic error of reducing all statements about political structures to statements about political groups (A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p. 257, coined the phrase that where politics are concerned 'when the groups are adequately stated everything is stated') leads to a complementary neglect of the structural bias exerted by the political system itself, whose extensiveness, openness or hierarchical nature are essential to account for why 'some issues are organized into politics, while others are organized out', E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, New York, 1960, p. 71. Secondly, elite relations and activities cannot themselves be understood without reference to the framework of government (David Nicholls, *Three Varieties of Pluralism*, London, 1974, p. 24, said, 'group structure and activity in a particular State can be understood only in the context of the whole "political system"'). Factors like the method of attaining elite positions, the scope of elite action, the machinery at their disposal, the checks limiting their freedom of decision-making, all depend on the prior existence of a state framework which cannot itself be explained in terms of interaction among contemporary elites. Conflating the two usually constitutes a denial of the independent influence of the political structure and always precludes analysis of the interplay between structures and elites which is essential to an adequate theory of political manipulation.

8. More detail has been sacrificed in abridging this chapter than in most others. For interaction in twentieth-century England see SOES, pp. 472-612.

9. For a more detailed discussion see SOES, pp. 472-78.

10. See David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: the Evolution of Electoral Choice*, London, 1974; Samuel H. Beer, *Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups*, London, 1965; and George Sayer Bain, Robert Bacon and John Pimlott, 'The Labour Force', in A. H. Halsey (ed.), *Trends in British Society since 1900*, London, 1972; Henry Pelling, *A Short History of the Labour Party*, London, 1968, p. 11f.

11. See Guy Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain: 1906-60*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 106f.; A. L. Bowley, *Wages and Income in the United Kingdom since 1860*, Cambridge, 1937, ch. 4.

12. Asher Tropp, *The School Teachers*, London, 1957, esp. pp. 114-71; P. H. J. H. Gosden, *The Development of Educational Administration in England and Wales*, Oxford, 1966, p. 181f.; Harold Perkin, *Key Profession: The History of the Association of University Teachers*, London, 1969, p. 15f.; Graeme C. Moodie and Rowland Eustace, *Power and Authority in British Universities*, London, 1974; A. H. Halsey and M. A. Trow, *The British Academics*, London, 1971.

13. R. J. W. Selleck, *English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914-1939*, London, 1972.

14. Michael Sanderson, *The Universities and British Industry, 1850-1970*, London, 1972.

15. Brian Simon, *Education and the Labour Movement, 1870-1920*, London, 1965, p. 309f.; W. W. Craik, *The Central Labour College*, London, 1964.

16. Tropp, op. cit., pp. 117-18.

17. H. A. L. Fisher, *The Place of the University in National Life*, Oxford, 1919, p. 6.

18. Thus averting the threat of state 'dirigism' which had formed part of Haldane's approach, see Eric Ashby and Mary Anderson, *Portrait of Haldane at Work on Education*, London, 1974, pp. 78, 100.
19. Lawrence Andrews, *The Education Act, 1918*, London, 1976.
20. R. H. Tawney, *Secondary Education for All*, London, 1922, pp. 83-84.
21. See SOES, pp. 478-83.
22. Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Labour, 1920-24*, Cambridge, 1971; Ralph Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism*, London, 1961, p. 148f.; Robert McKenzie and Alan Silver, *Angels in Marble*, London, 1968, p. 13f.; V. L. Allen, *Trade Unions and the Government*, London, 1960, p. 29f.; Henry Pelling, *A Short History of the Labour Party*, London, 1968, p. 140f.
23. Routh, op. cit., pp. 106-32; Bentley B. Gilbert, *British Social Policy 1914-1939*, London, 1970, chs 3, 5 and 6; Bowley, op. cit., pp. xviii-xix; Beer, op. cit., p. 333f.
24. William Taylor, *Society and the Education of Teachers*, London, 1969, p. 69f.; Tropp, op. cit., pp. 243-46; Norman Morris, 'England' in Albert A. Blum (ed.), *Teacher Unions and Associations, a Comparative Study*, Illinois, 1969.
25. James Murphy, *Church, State and Schools in Britain, 1800-1870*, London, 1971, p. 106.
26. Cf. W. A. C. Stewart, *The Educational Innovators*, London, 1968, vol. 2.
27. Simon, op. cit., pp. 141-42.
28. Sanderson, op. cit., pp. 250-53.
29. John Vaizey and John Sheehan, *Resources for Education*, London, 1968, p. 122.
30. Cf. Maurice Kogan and Tim Packwood, *Advisory Committees in Education*, London, 1974.
31. R. J. W. Selleck, *English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914-1939*, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
32. Brian Simon, *The Politics of Educational Reform*, London, 1974, p. 63f.
33. Ibid., pp. 266-69.
34. David Rubinstein and Brian Simon, *The Evolution of the Comprehensive School, 1926-1966*, London, 1969, pp. 23-24.
35. The key phrase made it the duty of local authorities to offer 'such variety of instruction and training as may be desirable in view of their different ages, abilities and aptitudes, and of the different periods for which they may be expected to remain at school'. See H. C. Dent, *The Education Act 1944*, London, 1969, p. 13.
36. Ibid., p. 47.
37. SOES, pp. 483-87.
38. S. M. Miller, 'Comparative Social Mobility' in C. S. Heller (ed.), *Structured Social Inequality*, New York, 1969, pp. 325-40; Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 177-82; Nigel Harris, *Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives the State and Industry 1945-64*, London, 1972; S. E. Finer, 'The Political Power of Private Capital', pt 2, *Sociological Review*, vol. IV, no. 1, 1956.
39. H. F. Lydall, *British Incomes and Savings*, Oxford, 1955 and his 'The Long Term Trend in the Size of Distribution of Income', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, series A, vol. 122, pt 1, 1959; F. W. Paish 'The Real Incidence of Personal Taxation', *Lloyds Bank Review*, 1957; H. F. Lydall and D. G. Tipping, 'The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Britain', *Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics*, 1961; Routh, op. cit., p. 106; Richard M. Titmuss, *Income Distribution and Social Change*, London, 1963.

40. Tropp, op. cit., pp. 252-61; Sanderson, op. cit., pp. 347-58.
41. Vaizey and Sheehan, op. cit., p. 107, also pp. 116-20. Half the pupils still at school, aged sixteen, were in independent establishments. In general, parental investment was plumped at transition points in the school career where it yielded the highest return.
42. It should be noted that the personal transactions just discussed did not serve individual class interests alone. The Industrial Fund for the Advancement of Scientific Education provided large grants in the mid 1950s for laboratories and equipment in direct grant and independent schools to increase the throughput of those enrolling for science degrees. Some firms also sponsored schoolboys through university to secure them afterwards.
43. B. Tipton, *Conflict and Change in a Technical College*, London, 1973, p. 19f.
44. P. E. P., *Graduates in Industry*, 1957, p. 43.
45. Audrey Collin, Anthony M. Rees and John Utting, *The Arts Graduate in Industry* (Acton Society Trust), London, 1962.
46. 'There has been a strong tendency through most of the present century to leave more and more of the question concerning the content of education to local authorities, schools, training colleges, area training organizations and the like. The amount of devolution of authority from the centre that has taken place here is not fully recognized.' Gosden, op. cit., p. 220.
47. Maurice Kogan, *The Government of Education*, London, 1971, p. 31. However, the establishment of a body equivalent to the General Medical Council was politically vetoed.
48. Maurice Kogan, *Education Policy Making: A Study of Interest Groups and Parliament*, London, 1975, p. 111; R. D. Coates, *Teachers Unions and Interest Group Politics*, Cambridge, 1972; R. A. Manzer, *Teachers and Politics: The Role of the National Union of Teachers in the Making of National Educational Policy in England and Wales since 1944*, Manchester, 1970.
49. Sanderson, op. cit., p. 358.
50. Harold Perkin, op. cit., p. 132.
51. Michael Locke, *Power and Politics in the School System*, London, 1974, p. 86f; Rodney Barker, *Education and Politics 1900-1951: A Study of the Labour Party*, London, 1972.
52. Rubinstein and Simon, op. cit., p. 73.
53. Caroline Benn and Brian Simon, *Half Way There*, Harmondsworth, 1972, p. 70.
54. Cumulatively their effects constitute and reconstitute the environments of one another over time. (E.g., the general rise in expertise, transmitted through instruction, steadily pushed the loci of external transactions up the educational system. This process gradually deserted the primary level, as it became essentially 'preparatory', and clustered around the new, later, terminal points: correspondingly internal initiation at the lower levels became much more untrammelled.) Conjointly their interplay shapes the contemporary context in which each takes place. (E.g., the increased volume of external transactions with the universities enabled much greater internal initiation within them.)
55. SOES, pp. 487-91.
56. Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism*, Oxford, 1965, p. 368f; Harris, op. cit., pp. 270-72; Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 193-207.
57. S. Pollard and D. W. Crossley, *The Wealth of Britain*, London,

- 1968, ch. 9; Routh, op. cit., p. 133f.
58. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 83-92; Halsey and Trow, op. cit., p. 64f.
59. Murphy, op. cit., p. 124.
60. Sanderson, op. cit. Logically there is nothing mutually exclusive about internal initiation and external transactions, indeed 'the 60s also saw an unprecedented creation of administrative arrangements as linking mechanisms binding the Universities and industry more formally and more closely together than ever before' (p. 378).
61. Manzer, op. cit.
62. Perkin, op. cit., p. 223.
63. Benn and Simon, op. cit., p. 56.
64. The following section dealing with France has also undergone substantial abridging. For more detailed discussion of interaction see SOES, pp. 306-91.
65. For an extended discussion see SOES, pp. 312-16.
66. David Thomson, *Democracy in France since 1870*, London, 1964, p. 14.
67. Cf. J. Maurain, *La Politique Ecclésiastique du Second Empire de 1852-1869*, Paris, 1930.
68. Basically, the loi Falloux allowed any Frenchman over twenty-five to open a school providing he had five years teaching experience and possessed the *baccalauréat* or a diploma given by a departmental jury on which the bishop was influential. No qualifications were demanded of teachers and previous prohibitions on teaching orders were lifted.
69. Cf. R. D. Anderson, *Education in France 1848-70*, Oxford, 1975.
70. See SOES, pp. 284-306.
71. Paul Gerbod, *La Condition Universitaire en France au XIX^e Siècle*, Paris, 1965.
72. Cf. Georges Weill, *Histoire du Catholicisme en France 1828-1908*, Paris, 1925.
73. J. B. Piobetta, *Le Baccalauréat*, Paris, 1937.
74. For a more extended discussion see SOES, pp. 333-44.
75. Louis Legrand, *L'influence du positivisme dans l'oeuvre scolaire de Jules Ferry*, Paris, 1961.
76. John E. Talbott, *The Politics of Educational Reform in France 1918-40*, Princeton, 1969, p. 160.
77. See Luc Decaunes and M. L. Cavalier, *Réformes et Projets de Réforme de l'enseignement Français de la Révolution à nos jours (1789-1960)*, Paris, 1962, p. 125f.
78. Eckstein argues that pressure groups take on the same structure as the organizations they seek to influence. Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics*, Stanford, 1960.
79. James M. Clark, *Teachers and Politics in France*, Syracuse, N.Y., 1967.
80. 'Under the IVth Republic the summit of party ambition was to win a share of power rather than to exercise it outright. One way to achieve this was to outbid one's rivals for the support of a clientèle — Gaullists against Conservatives against MRP over the Catholic Schools, Communists against Socialists against Radicals on behalf of secular education — and each against all for the favours of home-distillers, ex-service men, peasants or small shopkeepers.' P. H. Williams and M. Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*, London, 1971, p. 144.
81. Lipset has tried to show how, in parallel, the overlapping of these

- cleavages produced such a complex configuration of political parties. S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation*, London, 1964.
82. Henry W. Ehrman, 'French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. V, 1961, p. 547.
83. See SOES, pp. 360-70.
84. M. Prélôt, *Pour Comprendre la nouvelle Constitution*, Paris, 1958; Maurice Duverger, *La V^e République*, Paris, 1959 and *Institutions Politiques et Droit Constitutionnel*, Paris, 1970; Jean Blondel, *Contemporary France; Politics, Society and Institutions*, London, 1972. On the growth of the Gaullist Party organization see Jean Charlot, *L'UNR. Etude du Pouvoir au sein d'un Parti Politique*, Paris, 1967.
85. Catholic support continued: De Gaulle received four times the number of votes from practising Catholics in the 1965 presidential elections than from those with no religious affiliations, while Mitterrand gained nine times more votes from agnostics and atheists than from Catholics. Pierre Avril, *Politics in France*, 1969, p. 261.
86. 'La réforme de M. Berthoin ... réalise en effet ce qui peut l'être des écoles moyennes, si l'on veut ménager les corporatismes rivaux.' Antoine Prost, *L'Enseignement en France, 1800-1967*, Paris, 1968, p. 422.
87. For an analysis of the participants in the May events see Margaret S. Archer, 'France' in Archer (ed.), *Students, University and Society*, London, 1972.
88. Jacques Fournier, *Politique de l'Education*, Paris, 1971, p. 61.
89. Jean Maynaud, *Les Groupes de Pression en France*, Paris, 1957.
90. Dorothy Pickles, *The Government and Politics of France*, vol. I, London, 1972, p. 262.
91. Gordon Smith, *Politics in Western Europe*, London, 1972, p. 71.

7. Structural elaboration: patterns and products of change

1. Space precludes any detailed discussion of substantive changes here. See SOES, pp. 639-69 for France and pp. 704-75 for England.
2. Bearing in mind the universal deterrents to speedy political redirection of education which have just been discussed, the circumstances leading to protracted stasis can be specified more closely. Given an accessible polity, the quicker the alternation of majority governments, the shorter the period between polity-directed educational changes. Conversely, if the same governing elite remains in office, if parliamentary parties lock in immobilism or produce weak centrist coalitions, stasis will be prolonged (the latter being the story of the Fourth Republic). Given an inaccessible polity the quicker the succession of elite factions dominating decision-making or the more dramatic the changes in domestic or foreign circumstances, the faster polity-directed changes will succeed one another in education. Conversely, a durable elite and a stable political environment will foster educational continuity.
3. The clearest example of this is found in the post-Stalinist period in the USSR where Soviet leadership hunted for a compromise formula to resolve the tension between the use of education to produce socialist society and to service the planned economy. Elite composition meant that polity has leaned first

towards the one, then the other — with the oscillation of compromise being the dominant theme of the last three decades.

4. Often this straightforward dread of losing control is not confessed but is concealed behind an *étatist* ideology which stresses the positive connections between uniformity and social justice, standardization and national integration, or identity and geographical mobility.

5. For a detailed analysis of the May events see Margaret S. Archer, 'France' in Archer (ed.), *Students, University and Society*, London, 1972.

6. This has become rather a common pattern in contemporary France. See Margaret S. Archer, 'Education' in John Flower (ed.), *France Today*, London, 1983, 5th revised ed.

7. Obviously, as in any sort of dealing, there is some room for manoeuvre — for vendors to oversell their products and to try to tell the buyer what he wants, and for purchasers to be blinded by status considerations rather than guided by their practical requirements. Both were true of relations between industry and the English universities at different times in the twentieth century.

8. Incidentally this also works in reverse, when a particular kind of external transaction stops, either through lack of money or political embargo, the system loses one source of diversity. Thus, for example, the worsening finances of the established church and most other denominations has meant a gross diminution of a religious definition of instruction in England, with the exception of Catholic schooling.

9. 'The unco-ordinated development of primary and secondary, further and university education, and of different categories of schools and colleges has always tended to make the pattern of English Education complicated and overlapping.' H. C. Dent, *1870-1970 Century of Growth in English Education*, London, 1970, p. 125.

10. To Jules Ferry, 'quand nous parlons d'une action de l'état dans l'éducation, tendant à maintenir l'unité, nous attribuons à l'état le seul rôle qu'il puisse avoir en matière d'enseignement et d'éducation. Il s'en occupe pour maintenir une certaine morale d'état, certaines doctrines d'état qui importent à sa conservation', cited by M. Reclus, *Jules Ferry, 1832-1893*, Paris, 1946, p. 174. Equally, 'L'unité d'éducation est essentiellement conçue comme un instrument de fusion morale et affective et comme le moyen de vulgariser l'idéal républicain', cited by Louis Legrand, *L'influence de Positivism dans l'oeuvre scolaire de Jules Ferry*, Paris, 1961, p. 188.

11. Special education, 'écartait... l'élément véritablement professionnel, en d'autres termes la préparation à un métier, l'apprentissage d'un état agricole, industriel et commercial', F. Buisson, *L'Enseignement Primaire Supérieur et Professionnel*, Paris, 1887, p. 11.

12. 'The logic of the French Educational System seemed to have no room for an education which was secondary in spirit but too short and practical to fit into the traditional secondary pattern', R. D. Anderson, *Education in France 1848-1870*, Oxford, 1975, p. 218.

13. 'Former le producteur, l'enseignement français y repugne. Son rationalisme tourne à l'intellectualisme', Antoine Prost, *L'Enseignement en France 1800-1967*, Paris, 1968, p. 340.

14. 'Ces mesures restent fragmentaire et ne modifient pas la physionomie générale de l'enseignement public. Aucune d'entre elles n'annonce la refonte d'ensemble que les circonstances et l'évolution technique et sociale réclament

impérieusement depuis des années.' Luc Decaunes and M. L. Cavalier, *Réformes et Projets de Réformes, de l'enseignement Français de la Révolution à nos jours (1789-1960)*, Paris, 1962, p. 154.

15. W. R. Frazer, *Reforms and Restraints in Modern French Education*, London, 1971, p. 131f.

16. See P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron, *Les Héritiers*, Paris, 1964 and *La Reproduction*, Paris, 1970.

17. University reform was 'dans la forme comme au fond, d'essence technocratique: dans la forme car il s'agit d'imposer plus que d'inciter, et la centralization demeure la règle', Jacques Fournier, *Politique de l'Education*, op. cit., p. 184.

18. The 'freedom of the individual school makes it difficult for a national policy of education to be formulated and carried through', Maurice Kogan, *The Government of Education*, London, 1971, p. 32.

19. Although this was the dominant tendency, morphogenesis must not be elevated to the status of an automatic or inevitable process; for in the course of development some elements were killed and remained permanently excluded from twentieth-century education.

20. Where comprehensive reorganization was concerned, 'the total approach was uneven and unsystematic and suffered from the lack of any real "central guidance"', Caroline Benn and Brian Simon, *Half Way There*, Harmondsworth, 1972, p. 72.

8. Conclusion: prospects for change

1. Jacques Fournier, *Politique de l'Education*, Paris, 1971.

APPENDICES


APPENDIX 1

Extended diagrams of interaction in centralized and decentralized systems

The two diagrams which follow represent expanded versions of Figures 4 and 5 (Chapter 5) and form the basis of the patterns of interaction discussed in Chapter 6. The expanded diagrams break up each of the three basic categories (governing elites, professional and external interest groups) into sub-divisions and show the kind of interplay which can take place between them in the course of educational interaction (see Chapter 5, note 5). The sub-units (I-1, I-2, I-3'/P-1'/E-1') which figure in them do not represent specific social institutions, actual political parties, or particular professional associations. Similarly, the relationships depicted do not portray current events in any given society. Each such relationship is illustrated once only, for clarity of presentation, and then only if it is a fairly common occurrence.

Neither of the diagrams approximates to models of empirical reality. The latter would be numerous and varied in their actual patterning of relationships over time: in any society at any given point in time, some relationships may be found in greater profusion than shown here, while others may be lacking altogether. Instead of modelling empirical reality, the two diagrams are intended to be of heuristic and theoretical utility in understanding the patterns of interaction common to all instances of centralized and decentralized systems respectively. Without stylization and abstraction there would be little possibility of generalization and theory formation. However, a few practical examples of the relations depicted follow the first diagram in order to show the kind of flesh which covers its bones.

DIAGRAM 1
Educational interaction in a centralized system


**KEY**

P = Political party or faction
I = External interest group
A = Advisory committee or council
E = Professional interest group
M = General public

Patterns of interaction — illustration

- E1 — P1 A teachers' union affiliated to a political party.
E1 — A1 Educational advisory committees to government with strong professional representation.
E3 — I3 — P3 The alliance between denominational teachers, their church and a sectarian political party.
E4 Internal initiation to advance professional interests.
I1 — P3 A trade union or business federation affiliated to a political party.
I2 — M — E2 — P1 A pressure group of an agricultural organization, farming parents, rural school-teachers, and a political party sponsoring agricultural interests.
I4 External transactions between industry and the private sector of education.
M — P1, P2, P3 The general public voting, mandating or otherwise influencing political parties or factions.

DIAGRAM 2
Educational interaction in a decentralized system

**KEY**

P = Political party or faction
G = Government body or authority
I = External institutional interest group

A = Advisory council or committee
E = Professional educational interest group
M = General public

APPENDIX 2


Variations in political manipulation within centralized educational systems

Neither of the two factors held principally responsible for variability in political manipulation within centralized systems manifested *their* full range of possible variation in French history, which was the sole case study presented in the text. These two factors are (i) the penetrability of the political centre and elite relations inside it, and (ii) the superimposition and organization of supportive or oppositional interest groups in education.

Together these represent the parallelogram of forces which are responsible for specific patterns of interaction and different outcomes of political manipulation in all centralized systems. Hence the following diagram supplements the French case study with further permutations of the above factors, drawn from the Soviet and Japanese experiences, in an attempt to provide a more complete (though very schematic) picture of their interplay and effects.

VARIATIONS IN POLITICAL MANIPULATION

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